Janus made consent a payroll record, and California handed that record to the unions the same day
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court said no payment to a public-sector union could be deducted without an employee’s affirmative consent. California’s budget law, signed that day, told public employers to rely on the union’s word that consent existed. Payroll sat between them.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court said no payment to a public-sector union could be deducted without an employee’s affirmative consent. California’s budget law, signed that day, told public employers to rely on the union’s word that consent existed. Payroll sat between them.
- The week On Wednesday, June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31.
- The deduction: a payroll change with a constitutional deadline The Court described the Illinois procedure in a single sentence and then rejected it: “This procedure violates the First Amendment and cannot continue.”
- The evidence: who holds the proof of consent The Court set a demanding evidentiary standard for nonmembers: consent “freely given and shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence,” which “cannot be presumed.”
- The revocation: where employees go to stop a deduction Stopping an agency fee for a nonmember was the Court’s requirement.
- The communication: what an employer may say We think the fourth part is the easiest for a public employer to overlook.
- The contracts: clauses to stop administering Behind every agency fee deduction stood a contract.
- The fee machinery that stopped running The opinion described the annual cycle that produced an agency fee in Illinois.
- The data the employer gives the union SB 866 also touched a flow that runs the other way: personal data from the employer to the union.
- How the four parts fall across public employers SB 866 extended its payroll provisions beyond state agencies and the California State University to, in the digest’s words, “the Regents of the University of California, the Judicial Council, counties, cities, and public authorities, including transit districts, among others.”
- One deduction, three organizations: the employee’s route The four parts are easiest to see from the employee’s side.
- What an oversight body can ask to see Boards of supervisors, city councils, university regents and agency inspectors general oversee public payrolls.
- Objections: settled law, a union matter, and a one-time fix One objection is that Janus was a question for unions and legislatures, not for public employers’ operations.
- What a public HR or payroll leader can check The four parts translate into checks that any public employer with represented staff can run, in 2018 or now.
- With hindsight The questions Janus left about members’ dues and authorization cards reached the federal courts quickly, and the Ninth Circuit’s answers rested in part on arrangements like the one SB 866 set up in California: the employer acting on the union’s word that an authorization exists.
The week
On Wednesday, June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31. By five votes to four, the Court held that “the State’s extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment,” and overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, its 1977 decision allowing such fees. Justice Alito wrote for the Court. Justice Kagan wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor; Justice Sotomayor also wrote separately.
The case came from Illinois. Under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, the opinion explained, a union chosen by a majority of a bargaining unit represents all its employees, and nonmembers could be required to pay an agency fee, a percentage of full dues. The union categorized its expenses, the amount was audited and certified to the employer, and “the employer automatically deducts that amount from the nonmembers’ wages.” Nonmembers “need not be asked, and they are not required to consent before the fees are deducted.” In the case before the Court, the chargeable amount was 78.06 percent of full dues.
The Court ended that arrangement in terms addressed directly to payroll. “Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay.” Such consent waives First Amendment rights, the Court said, and “such a waiver cannot be presumed”; it must be “freely given and shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence.” The Court added: “Unless employees clearly and affirmatively consent before any money is taken from them, this standard cannot be met.” The majority also said that States “can keep their labor-relations systems exactly as they are—only they cannot force nonmembers to subsidize public-sector unions.”
The dissent counted what would have to change. Justice Kagan wrote that 22 States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, plus two more States for police and firefighter unions only, had enacted statutes authorizing such fee provisions, and that every one would need new ways to structure relations between government employers and their workers.
The same day, California’s governor approved Senate Bill 866, a budget trailer bill on public employment that took effect immediately as chapter 53 of the statutes of 2018. Among much else, it added section 1157.12 to the Government Code. Public employers other than the state that administer union payroll deductions must “rely on a certification” from the union that it has and will maintain a signed authorization from each employee; the union need not provide a copy “unless a dispute arises about the existence or terms of the authorization”; requests to cancel or change deductions go to the union, not the employer; the employer relies on the union’s information about cancellations; the union indemnifies the employer for claims arising from that reliance; and deductions “may be revoked only pursuant to the terms of the employee’s written authorization.” The bill also restricted employer communications about union membership and extended these rules beyond state agencies to counties, cities, transit districts, the University of California and the Judicial Council, among others.
Janus was a constitutional case about speech and unions. For the people who run public payrolls, it was also an instruction about records. The Court did not stop at saying who could be charged. It said what had to be true before money left a paycheck, and what kind of evidence would show it. California answered the same day with a law that put that evidence somewhere other than the payroll office. Read together, the two documents describe the operational problem that public employers with represented staff, and agency fees on their payrolls, had to solve in the summer of 2018.
We break that problem into four parts, each owned by a different function:
- The deduction: stopping fee deductions for nonmembers, which is a payroll configuration and data problem.
- The evidence: deciding who holds proof of an employee’s consent, and what the employer may rely on.
- The revocation: deciding where an employee goes to stop a deduction, and when it stops.
- The communication: deciding what managers and HR may say to employees about all this, and through which channels.
The parts are separate. A payroll office could stop every agency fee correctly on the first payroll after the decision and still have no answer to the second question. An employer could hold perfect authorization records and still mishandle revocations, or speak to its workforce in a way state law restricted. After the four parts we look at how they fall across different kinds of public employers, take the objections, and set out what an HR or payroll leader can check. Throughout, we describe the documents; whether a given practice is lawful in a given state is a question for each employer’s counsel.
The deduction: a payroll change with a constitutional deadline
The Court described the Illinois procedure in a single sentence and then rejected it: “This procedure violates the First Amendment and cannot continue.” For a payroll office, the operational meaning was immediate. Any deduction code that took an agency or fair-share fee from a nonmember without that employee’s affirmative consent had to stop.
That sounds simple. It depends on three things a payroll system may not hold cleanly. The first is the distinction between a member paying dues and a nonmember paying a fee. Where both were deducted under similar codes, or where the union sent a single list of amounts to deduct, the payroll office needed a way to tell them apart. The second is the source of the instruction. Under the Illinois scheme, the union certified the fee amount to the employer. The employer had acted on the union’s certification, not on anything the employee signed. The third is the timing. The Court’s standard required consent “before any money is taken.” A deduction already scheduled in a payroll run that closed before the decision, or one processed in the days after, was a question of timing that each employer had to answer with its counsel.
The opinion addressed “any other payment to the union” as well as the agency fee itself, and “any other attempt” to collect such a payment. In our reading, that wording reached beyond a single deduction code. It covered every route by which a nonmember’s money might reach the union through the employer, including any arrangement in which the employer billed, collected or forwarded payments on the union’s behalf.
The majority also said what the decision did not require. States “can keep their labor-relations systems exactly as they are,” it wrote, except that they cannot force nonmembers to pay. The opinion left exclusive representation in place; its holding concerned payments taken from nonmembers. For a payroll office, that meant the change was narrow in scope but exact in execution: one category of deduction had to stop for one category of employee, and everything else continued.
The data problem behind this is ordinary and easy to underestimate. A payroll record holds what the payroll system was told. If the system was told to deduct a percentage of dues from a list of names, it may not record why each person was on the list or what each person signed. Stopping the fee is a configuration change. Knowing that every remaining deduction rests on consent is a records question, and it leads directly to the second part.
The evidence: who holds the proof of consent
The Court set a demanding evidentiary standard for nonmembers: consent “freely given and shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence,” which “cannot be presumed.” It did not say who had to hold that evidence, or what an employer had to see before deducting.
California answered that question for its public employers, and the answer was not the payroll office. Under the new section 1157.12, public employers other than the state that administer union deductions “shall” rely on the union’s certification that it has and will maintain a signed authorization from each employee. The union “shall not be required to provide a copy of an individual authorization to the public employer unless a dispute arises about the existence or terms of the authorization.” The union “shall indemnify the public employer for any claims made by the employee for deductions made in reliance on that certification.” SB 866 amended section 1153, which governs the State Controller, along parallel lines: the Controller obtains the certification, and the union need not provide a copy of an individual authorization unless a dispute arises.
This design separates two things that a payroll office might assume go together: the authority to deduct and the evidence that justifies it. The employer acts. The union holds the record. The employer is protected by an indemnity rather than by its own copy of the signed form.
There are good administrative reasons for that design. It avoids duplicate records, keeps signed forms with the organization that collected them and spares employers from judging the validity of each one. But it also means that when an employee says “I never signed that,” the employer’s own files may not answer the question. The statute anticipated this. It provides for a copy when a dispute arises about the existence or terms of the authorization. The operational question for an employer is what happens between the dispute and the copy: who receives the complaint, how quickly the union must respond, whether deductions continue in the meantime, and who records the outcome.
The two documents also start from different places. The Court’s standard was written for nonmembers and asks whether consent was clearly shown before money was taken. California’s statute was written for all deductions to employee organizations and asks the employer to accept the union’s statement that the signed authorization exists. The opinion did not decide whether the same standard applies to members’ dues, and the statute did not try to apply it. For an employer, the practical result is that the strictest evidence question attached to one group of employees, while the routine process for everyone else ran on certification. An employer that treated the two the same, in either direction, could end up holding too little evidence for one group or building a heavier process than its state law asked for the other.
The Court’s standard did not dictate one arrangement. Depending on its state’s law, an employer might hold signed forms itself, rely on a union certification, use an electronic authorization system or some combination. Each choice puts the evidence in a different place and the burden of a dispute on a different office. In our view, the most important decision a public employer made in response to Janus was not whether to stop agency fees, which the Court decided, but where proof of every remaining deduction would live and who would produce it when challenged.
That decision has a records management side as well. A signed authorization is a record with a life: it is created, stored, perhaps amended, revoked and eventually destroyed. Where the union holds it, the employer’s retention schedule does not govern it. An employer relying on a certification should know, at least, what the certification says, how often it is renewed and how a disputed authorization reaches the employer’s file.
The revocation: where employees go to stop a deduction
Stopping an agency fee for a nonmember was the Court’s requirement. Stopping dues for a member who decided to leave was a different question, and the opinion did not answer it. The Court’s holding addressed nonconsenting employees. Members who had signed authorizations raised the question whether, and when, they could stop paying.
California’s answer had two parts. Requests to cancel or change deductions are directed to the union, “rather than to the public employer.” And deductions “may be revoked only pursuant to the terms of the employee’s written authorization.” The employer “shall rely on information provided by the employee organization regarding whether deductions for an employee organization were properly canceled or changed,” again with an indemnity.
Operationally, that creates a route that runs outside the employer’s HR system. An employee who walks into a county HR office to stop dues is to be directed to the union. The union decides, under the terms of the card the employee signed, when the deduction ends, and tells the employer. The employer acts on what it is told.
For HR and payroll staff, that raises practical questions the statute leaves to local procedure. Front-line staff need a script for the employee who asks the employer to stop a deduction. Payroll needs a reliable feed from each union of cancellations and changes, with dates. And someone needs to reconcile what the union reports against what payroll deducts, because an error in that feed takes money from a paycheck.
The terms of the authorization matter here more than anything the employer writes. If an authorization limits revocation to a window or makes it irrevocable for a period, the employer, in California, relies on the union’s application of those terms. The employer’s exposure is managed by the indemnity, but the employee’s experience is shaped by a card the employer did not draft and may never see. Later litigation, discussed below, turned on exactly that kind of card.
The communication: what an employer may say
We think the fourth part is the easiest for a public employer to overlook. SB 866 amended section 3550 of the Government Code so that a public employer “shall not deter or discourage public employees or applicants to be public employees from becoming or remaining members of an employee organization, or from authorizing representation by an employee organization, or from authorizing dues or fee deductions to an employee organization.” The bill described that provision as declaratory of existing law, but the wording now reached applicants and authorizations as well.
It also added section 3553. Where a union is the exclusive representative, a public employer that chooses to send “mass communications” to employees or applicants about their rights to join or support a union, or to refrain from doing so, must first meet and confer with the union about the content. If they do not agree and the employer still sends its message, it must distribute, at the same time, a communication of reasonable length provided by the union. A “mass communication” is defined as a written document, or a script for an oral or recorded presentation or message, intended for delivery to multiple public employees. The section does not apply to a communication on employee rights adopted for this purpose by the Public Employment Relations Board or the Department of Human Resources.
The legislative counsel’s digest adds that the bill made the date, time and place of new employee orientations confidential, shared only with employees, the exclusive representative or a vendor contracted for the orientation. Existing law already required affected employers to give the exclusive representative new hires’ names, job details and contact information within set periods, and the bill extended those duties to more employers.
For a public employer’s HR and communications staff, these provisions change the response to a court decision that every employee could read about in the news. In our reading, an all-staff email explaining what Janus meant for employees’ rights to join or refrain could fit the statute’s definition of a mass communication. In California, the Public Employment Relations Board has jurisdiction over violations of this chapter, subject to the exceptions the bill set out, so an employer sending such a message without first meeting and conferring would be taking a risk its counsel should weigh. A manager who answers a question about leaving the union in a way that could be read as discouraging membership is in similar territory. In our reading, the safest operational step was to route every such communication through labor relations and counsel, and to give managers a short, approved answer.
Outside California, each state’s own labor law governs. The point for any public employer is that the response to Janus included a communications decision as well as a payroll change, made under state labor law that may limit what the employer can say and require it to share the channel.
The contracts: clauses to stop administering
Behind every agency fee deduction stood a contract. The Illinois agreement in the case contained an agency-fee provision, and the decision invalidated the practice it authorized. The majority and the dissent disagreed about how much that mattered, and their disagreement is useful to anyone who manages labor agreements.
The majority treated reliance on Abood as weak, citing among other things “the short-term nature of collective-bargaining agreements” and the ability of unions to protect themselves if an agency-fee provision was essential to the bargain. It pointed out that the Illinois agreement provided expressly that the invalidation of any part “shall not invalidate the remaining portions,” which “shall remain in full force and effect.”
Justice Kagan’s dissent saw the same contracts differently. In her account, thousands of existing contracts covering millions of workers provided for agency fees, and the decision forced the parties to reopen settled terms at once and strike new tradeoffs. She gave one example from an amicus brief: New York City had agreed to agency fees in 144 contracts with 97 public-sector unions. A footnote added that canceling some agency-fee provisions could bring down whole contracts that had no severability clause.
For a public employer, the debate translates into an inventory. Each collective bargaining agreement needed to be read for its agency-fee or fair-share clause, its severability clause, any related clauses about payroll deduction, notice or indemnity, and any reopener the decision might trigger. Labor relations staff, not payroll staff, own that reading, but payroll acts on its result. Where an employer had many agreements, as the dissent’s New York City example shows some did, the inventory itself was a project with a deadline set by the next payroll run.
The inventory had a second purpose. Contracts that remained in force still described the deduction process: what the union would send, when, and in what form. Those clauses became the operating procedure for the evidence and revocation questions discussed above. An employer that wanted to change how it received authorizations or cancellations had to do so through the contract or through the statute, not by changing a payroll setting.
The fee machinery that stopped running
The opinion described the annual cycle that produced an agency fee in Illinois. The union categorized its expenses as chargeable or nonchargeable and determined a nonmember’s “proportionate share.” That determination was audited, the amount was certified to the employer, and the employer deducted it. Each year the union sent nonmembers a notice, known as a Hudson notice after an earlier decision, meant to explain the basis for the fee, and nonmembers could challenge the union’s classification.
The employer’s part in that cycle was narrow: it received a certified amount and applied it. But it was a recurring part, with dates, data feeds and reconciliations. When the fee ended, so did that cycle, and an employer needed to make sure that every element of it stopped together. A deduction code switched off while a scheduled feed from the union continued to arrive, or a year-end reconciliation that still expected fee amounts, would produce errors that looked like payroll mistakes and were in fact process remnants.
There is also a records question. The certifications, notices and fee amounts from past years remained in the employer’s files. We think an employer should know where those records are and how long it keeps them under its retention schedule, because questions about past deductions did not end with the decision. The hindsight below shows that questions about deductions did reach the courts, though the cases we discuss concerned dues deductions rather than past fees.
The data the employer gives the union
SB 866 also touched a flow that runs the other way: personal data from the employer to the union. The digest restated existing law requiring affected public employers to give the exclusive representative each new hire’s name, job title, department, work location, work, home and personal cellular telephone numbers, personal email addresses on file and home address, within 30 days of hire or by the first pay period of the following month, and the same information for all unit employees at least every 120 days. The bill extended those duties to the Judicial Council and to certain transit district employees, and made the date, time and place of new employee orientations confidential.
Those provisions predate Janus and do not depend on it. But after a decision that made membership a matter of each employee’s affirmative choice, the data an employer hands over about every new hire becomes the starting point for the union’s request for that choice. For an employer’s HR information system, that means a scheduled extract of personal data to an outside organization, with a legal basis, a deadline and a recipient.
From a records and security point of view, that extract deserves the same controls as any other disclosure of employee personal data: a defined field list, a secure transfer method, a log of what was sent and when, and a named owner. The statute sets what must be sent and when. It does not set how securely. In our reading, that is the employer’s decision, and the one most within its control.
The orientation provision points the same way. Making the date, time and place of orientations confidential implies that someone in the employer must know who has that information and who does not. Calendar invitations, facilities bookings and vendor contracts for orientations all carry it. A public employer that treats orientation scheduling as routine administration may not have thought of it as confidential information until the statute said so.
How the four parts fall across public employers
SB 866 extended its payroll provisions beyond state agencies and the California State University to, in the digest’s words, “the Regents of the University of California, the Judicial Council, counties, cities, and public authorities, including transit districts, among others.” It distinguished school districts and community college districts as their own category of public school employers. That list is a reminder that the employers affected by Janus went well past state governments. They included public universities, courts, local governments, transit agencies and, through counties and public authorities, public hospitals and health systems.
The four parts fall differently on each. A state payroll run centrally by a controller may have one deduction system and one set of union feeds. A county with its own hospital, sheriff’s department and social services agency may have several bargaining units, several unions and a payroll configured over many years. A transit district may run payroll through a vendor. A public university may have academic and staff employees in different units. In each case the questions are the same: which deductions are fees and which are dues, where the authorization lives, where revocations go and who approves communications. The answers, and the people who give them, differ.
Public health systems belong on this list. A county hospital is part of a public employer, and the four parts apply to it as to any county department. Where its HR team works apart from the county’s labor relations function, the two need a shared answer on each part.
The federal government sits apart. The majority noted that under federal law a union chosen by majority vote represents all employees in a unit, but “federal law does not permit agency fees,” and that nearly a million federal employees, about 27 percent of the federal workforce, were union members. Janus required no change to federal payroll deductions for nonmembers, because there were none. Federal agencies’ dues deduction processes may raise similar evidence and revocation questions under their own rules, which we do not examine here.
One deduction, three organizations: the employee’s route
The four parts are easiest to see from the employee’s side. Take two employees of a California county in July 2018, described here only to trace the documents.
The first had never joined the union and paid an agency fee. After June 27, the Court’s holding meant no fee could be taken without that employee’s affirmative consent. The employee’s experience depended on whether the county’s payroll stopped the fee on the next run, and on whether anyone told the employee it had stopped. The fee’s end was the Court’s decision; the timing and the explanation were the county’s.
The second was a member who decided, after reading about the decision, to leave the union and stop paying dues. Under SB 866, that employee’s request was to be directed to the union rather than to the county. The union would apply the terms of the authorization the employee had signed, including any limit on when it could be revoked, and tell the county whether and when to stop. The county would rely on what the union told it. If the employee disputed the outcome, the statute’s exception for disputes would apply and, in our reading, the county could ask the union for a copy of the authorization; until then it had none.
For that second employee, three organizations were involved in one deduction: the union holding the card, the county running the payroll and, if the employee pressed the point, a court or the Public Employment Relations Board. The employee saw only the paycheck and whichever office answered the phone. That office’s script, its escalation route and its record of the call were the parts of the process the county controlled, and they were the parts the employee would judge it by.
Tracing the route this way also shows where errors can enter. A cancellation the union records but does not transmit, a transmission payroll does not process, or a processed change that misses a payroll cut-off each produce a deduction the employee did not expect. None depends on the law. Each depends on the handoffs between organizations, which is why the reconciliation step in the checks below matters.
What an oversight body can ask to see
Boards of supervisors, city councils, university regents and agency inspectors general oversee public payrolls. After Janus, the four parts give them a structure for asking whether the employer’s process works, without asking them to judge any legal question.
On the deduction, they can ask for confirmation that agency fee codes were closed and when, and for the result of any check that no fee was taken from a nonmember afterward. On the evidence, they can ask where authorizations are held, how many disputes were raised in a period and how many were resolved with a copy of the authorization. On revocation, they can ask how many cancellation requests the union reported, how many payroll processed and how many differed. On communication, they can ask which all-staff messages on the subject were sent, and whether each went through the process state law requires.
None of those numbers is in the statute or the opinion, and no source we cite sets a standard for them. They are management information, and their value lies in being collected consistently. An employer that cannot produce them has a process it cannot show is working, which is a weaker position in front of an oversight body, an auditor or an employee with a grievance.
Objections: settled law, a union matter, and a one-time fix
One objection is that Janus was a question for unions and legislatures, not for public employers’ operations. The Court addressed States and unions, but the act it prohibited, taking money from a paycheck without consent, is performed by the employer. The employer runs the payroll. The Illinois procedure the Court described ended with the employer automatically deducting the fee. Whatever the allocation of legal responsibility, the operational step belonged to the payroll office.
A second objection is that California’s law resolved the employer’s exposure through indemnity, so the employer need not worry about the evidence. An indemnity moves the cost of a claim. It does not prevent the claim, answer the employee or correct the paycheck. An employer that relies on a certification still receives the complaint, still processes the deduction and still has to explain to the employee what it did and why.
A third objection is that stopping agency fees was a one-time fix, finished in a payroll cycle. The deduction change was. The evidence, revocation and communication questions recur every time an employee joins, leaves, disputes a deduction or asks a manager a question. They are processes, not projects.
A fourth objection is that the employer cannot do much in states where the law tells it to rely on the union. That is partly right, and it is the reason the process design matters. Where the employer cannot hold or judge the evidence, it can still decide how disputes are received, logged, escalated and closed, how union feeds are reconciled, and what staff say. Those are the parts it controls.
A fifth objection is that the safest course for an employer was to say and do as little as possible. Saying little was, in California, partly what the statute asked: communications about membership were constrained. Doing little was not an option for the payroll office, which had to stop fees and process changes. The risk in minimalism is that it leaves employees to find out what happened from their paychecks. A short, approved explanation of what changed in payroll, routed through the process the statute sets for mass communications where it applies, is consistent with both the decision and the law.
What a public HR or payroll leader can check
The four parts translate into checks that any public employer with represented staff can run, in 2018 or now. Each produces evidence that can be shown to an auditor, an oversight body or a court.
- List every union-related deduction code, what it is for, who instructs it and on what basis, and confirm that no fee is taken from a nonmember without affirmative consent.
- Write down where proof of each deduction’s authorization lives, who holds it, and how and how quickly a copy reaches the employer when an employee disputes it.
- Map the revocation route: where employees are sent, how cancellations reach payroll, and who reconciles union reports against actual deductions each cycle.
- Give managers and HR staff an approved, short answer for questions about membership and deductions, and route any all-staff message on the subject through labor relations and counsel.
- Record which of these steps are required by your state’s law and which are your own practice, so that a change in either can be traced.
Where payroll is run by a vendor or a shared service center, each check also has a contract side. The vendor configures the deduction codes, receives the union feeds and produces the reconciliation. The employer’s agreement with the vendor should say who makes a change when the union reports a cancellation, how fast, and what record the vendor keeps of it. Without that, the employer may be relying on the union’s certification and the vendor’s processing at once, with its own staff holding neither record.
None of the checks requires deciding a legal question. Each requires knowing where a record is and who acts on it.
With hindsight
The questions Janus left about members’ dues and authorization cards reached the federal courts quickly, and the Ninth Circuit’s answers rested in part on arrangements like the one SB 866 set up in California: the employer acting on the union’s word that an authorization exists.
On September 16, 2020, the Ninth Circuit decided a case brought by Washington state employees who had signed a revised union membership card that the union circulated in 2017. According to the opinion, the signatory “voluntarily authorize[ed]” and “direct[ed]” the state to deduct dues and agreed that the authorization would be “irrevocable for a period of one year.” After Janus, the employees resigned their membership; the union ended it, but the state kept deducting dues until the one-year term expired. The court held that the union was not a state actor, and it described the state’s role as “ministerial processing of payroll deductions pursuant to Employees’ authorizations.” It quoted earlier circuit law that the state’s “mandatory indifference to the underlying merits” of the authorization “refutes any characterization” of the union as a joint actor. On the First Amendment claim, it said Janus “in no way created a new First Amendment waiver requirement for union members before dues are deducted pursuant to a voluntary agreement.” The Supreme Court denied review on June 21, 2021.
On September 19, 2022, the Ninth Circuit applied that reasoning to Oregon. An Oregon Health Authority employee who never joined the union alleged that the union forged her signature on a membership agreement and that the state deducted dues on the strength of it. The court said Oregon, like Washington, relies on the union to provide a list of employees who have authorized deductions, and that Oregon law “mandates that the State accept SEIU’s dues deductions certifications.” It held that the employee lacked standing for prospective relief because, having retired before she sued, any future injury was too speculative, and that her federal damages claims against the union failed for lack of state action; the district court had declined jurisdiction over her state law fraud and wage claims. The Supreme Court denied review on January 23, 2023.
Both cases came from states whose statutes, like California’s, had the employer act on the union’s list or certification. The Washington opinion noted that the state had since amended its law, effective July 28, 2019, to remove the authority for collecting representation fees while leaving the language about collecting membership dues. Neither court decided whether a different arrangement, such as one in which the employer held each signed form, would have produced a different answer, and we draw no conclusion about that.
In our reading, these cases confirm what the 2018 documents implied. Where state law tells the employer to act on the union’s certification, the employer’s required indifference to the card was part of the court’s reasoning for finding no state action, and the employee’s dispute about the card moves elsewhere. That allocation may be lawful, as these courts held. It still leaves a public employer processing deductions whose evidence it does not hold, and receiving complaints it must route somewhere. Employers in other circuits and states face their own law; each should check its position with counsel. The operational lesson holds across them: the payroll office is where the money moves, so it is where a disputed authorization is first felt.
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