Fedwire’s 2018 ISO 20022 plan split the format, the content and the duty to receive
The Federal Reserve’s July 2018 proposal moved Fedwire to ISO 20022 in three phases: structure first, then syntax, then content. Sending richer data stayed optional; receiving it did not. The phases were later dropped; the duty to receive set what every bank had to decide.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The Federal Reserve’s July 2018 proposal moved Fedwire to ISO 20022 in three phases: structure first, then syntax, then content. Sending richer data stayed optional; receiving it did not. The phases were later dropped; the duty to receive set what every bank had to decide.
- The week On Thursday, July 5, 2018, the Federal Reserve Board invited public comment on a proposal to adopt the ISO 20022 message format for the Fedwire Funds Service.
- The connection decided the size of the job Section VI of the notice made a point that a bank’s project plan could easily skip: the impact “would vary depending on how each participant accesses the Fedwire Funds Service.”
- Phase 1: structure before syntax The first phase, targeted for November 23, 2020, involved no ISO 20022 messages at all.
- Phase 2: syntax without content Phase 2 was the most unusual part of the proposal.
- Phase 3: optional to send, required to receive We read the most consequential sentence in the notice as a short one in the phase 3 description: “Although it would be optional for participants to send the enhanced data, all participants would need to be capable of receiving enhanced data.”
- Dates that no single bank controlled The fifth part of the proposal was the set of outside dependencies.
- Testing and documentation as the working schedule The target dates in the notice were the dates the industry would remember.
- What a receiving bank faced in each phase The notice set out the phases from the sender’s side: what a participant would send, in which format, from which date.
- Who owned each part inside a bank The five parts map onto different owners, which is the main reason we think the phasing was the right way to read the notice.
- The notice’s questions as a planning tool The Board asked nine numbered questions in three groups, and the third group was addressed to each institution directly.
- Objections: cost, timing and the value of the data One objection is that a format change is plumbing and should be left to vendors and the Reserve Banks.
- What a payments leader could check The notice’s structure translates into a short set of checks.
- With hindsight The Board received 17 comments on the 2018 notice, it said in October 2021, and the commenters all supported adopting ISO 20022.
The week
On Thursday, July 5, 2018, the Federal Reserve Board invited public comment on a proposal to adopt the ISO 20022 message format for the Fedwire Funds Service. The Board said the action, if approved, would replace the service’s current, proprietary message format. The proposal appeared in the Federal Register the same day as a notice of proposed service enhancement under docket OP-1613, with comments due September 4, 2018. The notice was issued by order of the Board on June 28, 2018.
The Board described the Fedwire Funds Service as a real-time gross settlement system owned and operated by the Federal Reserve Banks, which participants use to make final payments with their balances at Reserve Banks or with intraday credit. The notice said Fedwire and CHIPS, run by The Clearing House Payments Company, are the main large-value payment systems in the United States, and gave their 2017 volumes: Fedwire processed 152,649,633 payments with a total value of approximately $740 trillion, and CHIPS processed 112,597,088 payments worth approximately $393 trillion.
The press release listed the potential benefits as more efficient domestic and cross-border payments between Fedwire and other payment or messaging systems, and “a richer set of payment data that could help banks and other entities meet evolving requirements to screen payments for sanctions and anti-money laundering purposes.” It said many foreign wire transfer systems, including those used by key US trading partners, had already adopted ISO 20022, and recalled that the Federal Reserve’s 2015 paper on improving the payment system had recommended that the US payments industry develop a strategy for adopting the format.
The notice set out a migration in three phases. Phase 1, targeted for November 23, 2020, would change the existing proprietary format to close interoperability gaps with the SWIFT MT format and would eliminate the free-text option for the originator and beneficiary fields in customer transfers, requiring a structured format. Phase 2, targeted from March 2022 to August 2023, would move participants in waves to “like-for-like” ISO 20022 messages, with XML syntax but content limited to what the old format could carry, followed by a stability period of at least three months in which the old format stayed available as a fallback. Phase 3, targeted for November 2023, would let participants send messages with enhanced data. Sending enhanced data would be optional; all participants would need to be able to receive it.
The notice listed nine enhancements, among them new elements for an initiating party, ultimate debtor and ultimate creditor, a purpose code, names of up to 140 characters, structured postal addresses with a country code, regulatory reporting elements such as an OFAC license, and a tax component. It said the phase 3 date could be delayed if SWIFT had not yet implemented a solution for its network to carry enhanced ISO 20022 messages. The Board asked nine numbered questions in three groups: benefits and drawbacks, the timeline, and the impact on participants and service providers, including what each institution’s costs would be, in dollars if possible.
A message format change sounds like a single technical project. The July 2018 notice described something else. It spread the change over three phases with separate dates: a change to the structure of the old format first, then a change of syntax with the content held back, then the content itself. It attached one obligation to the last phase and had banks test it in the second: every participant would have to be able to receive the richer data, whether or not it ever sent any. And it said plainly that the burden would depend on how each bank connected to the service. Reading it again with the later history in hand, we think the most useful thing about the proposal is that phasing, and the asymmetry between sending and receiving inside it.
We take the proposal in five parts, in the order a bank met them:
- The connection: how a bank reached Fedwire decided whether each phase was a software project, a training project or almost nothing.
- Phase 1, structure before syntax: the old format would lose its free-text option for the parties to a customer transfer, targeted for November 2020, while XML messages would not begin until phase 2 in March 2022.
- Phase 2, syntax without content: the like-for-like waves changed the envelope while keeping the old limits on what could go inside it.
- Phase 3, the duty to receive: sending enhanced data stayed optional, receiving it did not, and the notice left banks to decide what their legal obligations required them to do with it.
- The dependencies: SWIFT, CHIPS and the Reserve Banks’ own schedule set dates that no single bank controlled.
The parts are separate. A bank could be ready on the connection and still fail on phase 3, because a working connection says nothing about what a compliance system does with a 140-character name or a structured address it has never seen. After the five parts we look at testing, at what a receiving bank faced in each phase, at who owned each part and at the objections, and then turn to what a payments or technology leader can check, then and now.
The connection decided the size of the job
Section VI of the notice made a point that a bank’s project plan could easily skip: the impact “would vary depending on how each participant accesses the Fedwire Funds Service.” The Board described three groups.
The first group built or bought software to talk to Fedwire. It included participants and service providers on the FedLine Direct solution, which the notice called “an unattended, IP-based computer interface,” and participants that used the import and export feature of FedPayments Manager-Funds over FedLine Advantage to move payment files between Fedwire and their own payment and deposit systems. For this group the Board said participants and service providers “would need to make significant changes to their payment applications or processes” for the revised proprietary format in phase 1 and for ISO 20022 in phases 2 and 3.
The second group typed payments into FedPayments Manager-Funds through a web interface. For them the Reserve Banks would change the application and provide training. The participants’ job was to learn the terminology and the information the new format required, and to get used to a changed screen.
The third group used an offline, telephone-based service in which a Reserve Bank employee entered the payment order. The Board did not believe their processes would materially change, though they too would need to learn the new terms so they could give the Reserve Bank the information the format required.
What follows from this, in our reading, is that the first question for any bank was not “are we ready for ISO 20022?” but “which of our wire flows touch which connection, and what sits behind each one?” A bank that sent its own wires through FedLine Direct and also received files through import and export for a correspondent business had at least two integration points. Each had upstream systems that created payment instructions and downstream systems that posted, screened, reconciled and reported them. The format change reached all of them, because the format of the message is the format of every field those systems read.
The notice also recorded who wrote the software. One of its questions asked each institution whether it developed its own software or relied on a vendor. That question matters to a technology leader for a practical reason. Where a vendor writes the interface, the bank’s readiness depends on the vendor’s release schedule, the vendor’s testing and the contract terms that govern both. The notice gave the industry dates; it could not give a bank a date for its vendor.
Banks that typed or phoned their wires had less to build, but they did not have nothing to do. The format’s terms and required information still had to be learned by the people who took payment instructions from customers, and the customer-facing forms and procedures that gathered that information had to ask for it. For those banks, the change was a workforce and front-office change more than a systems change, and it was easy to leave off a technology plan for exactly that reason.
Phase 1: structure before syntax
The first phase, targeted for November 23, 2020, involved no ISO 20022 messages at all. The Reserve Banks would change the existing proprietary format to close interoperability gaps with SWIFT’s MT format, and they said they would need to make most of the phase 1 changes even if they were not planning to adopt ISO 20022. The change with the widest reach was the end of free text for the parties: they would “eliminate the free-text format option for the originator and beneficiary fields in customer transfer messages” and require a structured format, a change SWIFT was making to its MT format in November 2020.
That change did not wait for XML. It reached the data a bank collected from its customers about who was sending money and who was receiving it, which is the data its sanctions and anti-money-laundering controls read. A bank whose customer forms and core systems held a name and address as free text would have to change how it captured them as well as how it transmitted them.
Phase 1 also had the firmest documents and the earliest date. The final message format documents for phase 1 had been published in March 2018, which the notice said gave the industry “over two years” to prepare, and the Reserve Banks planned nine months of testing before the November 2020 date. For the first access group the Board expected significant changes to payment applications or processes already in phase 1, for the revised proprietary format. In our reading, that made phase 1 the part of the plan a bank could least afford to treat as a later problem: its specifications were final, its date came first, and its work began at the customer’s form rather than at the bank’s gateway. A bank that thought of ISO 20022 as a 2022 project would have missed that its first deadline was a change to the old format.
Phase 2: syntax without content
Phase 2 was the most unusual part of the proposal. From March 2022 to August 2023, participants would move in waves to ISO 20022 messages whose syntax was XML but whose content was “limited to data elements and character lengths comparable to those that are supported in the current Fedwire Funds Service message format.” The notice gave two examples. A like-for-like message could carry only one intermediary financial institution, though ISO 20022 messages can generally carry up to three. And although ISO 20022 supports structured address elements, like-for-like messages would be limited, as before, to three lines of 35 characters each for free-text address information.
Because participants would migrate in waves, the Fedwire Funds Service itself would translate between the old format and ISO 20022 when a sender and receiver were on different formats. At the end of phase 2 there would be a stability period of at least three months, from August 2023 to November 2023, in which everyone used like-for-like messages and the Reserve Banks kept the old format available as a fallback in case participants had to revert.
This design had a clear logic. It let a bank change its plumbing without changing what flowed through it, and it gave the Reserve Banks a way back if something broke. But it also meant that a bank’s first ISO 20022 project would deliver none of the data the Board had listed as the benefit. The richer names, structured addresses and purpose codes would arrive only in phase 3. A bank would pay for two projects: one to adopt the syntax and one to use the content.
Phase 2 also carried phase 3 inside it. The Reserve Banks said they would use phase 2 to prepare for full implementation, and would require participants to test their ability to receive full ISO 20022 messages during it. A bank’s like-for-like project therefore had two acceptance tests: sending and receiving the limited messages in its wave, and proving it could take in the full messages it would not yet be sent. The second test belonged to the duty to receive, not to the wave.
Phase 3: optional to send, required to receive
We read the most consequential sentence in the notice as a short one in the phase 3 description: “Although it would be optional for participants to send the enhanced data, all participants would need to be capable of receiving enhanced data.” The Reserve Banks would require participants to test their ability to receive full ISO 20022 messages during phase 2.
That asymmetry put a floor under every participant. A bank that never planned to send a purpose code or a structured address still had to accept them, store them and pass them to whatever system needed them. A message that a receiving bank’s software truncated or rejected would not be a sending bank’s problem.
The notice then added a sentence that moved the question out of the technology department. Participants “would also need to determine, consistent with any legal obligations, how to handle enhanced data that they receive,” for example whether and how to provide it to the next receiving bank in the transfer or to the beneficiary if the participant was the beneficiary’s bank. The notice did not say which legal obligations it had in mind. One set is plain from the rule text. The Bank Secrecy Act recordkeeping rule at 31 CFR 1010.410, in subsection (f), requires a transmittor’s financial institution and an intermediary institution to include specified information in a transmittal order for a transmittal of funds of $3,000 or more, and an intermediary must pass on certain information “if received from the sender.”
The rule text itself was written around Fedwire’s format. As it read in the eCFR on November 1, 2026, it still excused the transmittor’s address “for a transmittal order through Fedwire until such time as the bank that sends the order to the Federal Reserve Bank completes its conversion to the expanded Fedwire format,” and a footnote required only one of the listed items of recipient information for Fedwire transfers on the same condition. We do not draw a legal conclusion about how that wording applies to any bank after the migration; that is a question for counsel. The point for a technology leader is narrower. A regulation that refers to a message format makes the format a compliance fact, and a change in the format can change what a bank’s systems must carry forward.
The 2018 notice also flagged the language problem. In a footnote, it said ISO 20022 “employs terminology that differs in key respects from that used in U.S. funds-transfer law,” including subpart B of Regulation J, and noted that the Board had proposed in March 2018 to amend Regulation J to clarify that terms used in messaging standards “do not confer or connote legal status or responsibilities.” An “ultimate debtor” in a message is a data field. Whether that party has any status under funds-transfer law is a separate question, and the notice took care not to answer it through the format.
Put together, the duty to receive created three tasks that a bank could not delegate to its payment vendor: deciding which received fields its screening and monitoring would read, deciding which fields it would pass on and to whom, and deciding how long it would keep them. Each of those is a policy decision with a system consequence. None is a format question.
Dates that no single bank controlled
The fifth part of the proposal was the set of outside dependencies. The notice tied the plan to three other parties.
The first was SWIFT. The notice said SWIFT had begun a study of migrating cross-border MT traffic to ISO 20022, quoting SWIFT that the consultation would run “until early June,” with a final report before the end of 2018. Phase 3 “could be delayed if SWIFT has not yet implemented a solution for its network to support ISO 20022 messages that contain enhanced data,” and the Board asked whether it should delay phase 3 in that case.
The second was CHIPS. The Reserve Banks and The Clearing House had “decided independently” to pursue ISO 20022, the notice said, but intended to align implementation “to the extent possible.” The competitive impact analysis said that if both systems adopted ISO 20022, their formats would remain interoperable.
The third was the Reserve Banks’ own publication and testing schedule. They had published final phase 1 documents in March 2018 and draft documents for phases 2 and 3 at the same time, and said they would publish final documents for those phases by the end of June 2018. The notice said this would give the industry “over two years” to prepare for phase 1 and “nearly four years” for phase 2. The Reserve Banks planned nine months of testing for phase 1 and at least one year for phases 2 and 3 in their Depository Institution Testing environment, with a final testing plan by the end of 2018.
For a bank, each dependency meant a date it could plan around but not set. A bank’s own roadmap could only be as firm as the least firm of these dates. The notice was candid about that, and its question about delaying phase 3 for SWIFT was an invitation to say so.
There was a fourth dependency the notice did not list, because it ran inside each bank: the other payment changes competing for the same people. Banks that sent cross-border payments faced SWIFT’s own November 2020 MT changes, which the notice cited. Those with correspondent or treasury businesses faced customer demands. The proposal could set Fedwire’s timetable; it could not set a bank’s capacity.
Testing and documentation as the working schedule
The target dates in the notice were the dates the industry would remember. The dates that would govern a bank’s work were the ones in section V, on documentation and testing.
The Reserve Banks were using a restricted page on SWIFT’s MyStandards web application to share documentation with authorized participants and software vendors. Final message format documents for phase 1 had been published in March 2018. Draft documents for phases 2 and 3 had been published at the same time, with final versions promised by the end of June 2018. Testing would run in the Reserve Banks’ Depository Institution Testing environment: nine months for phase 1 before the November 2020 date, and at least one year for phases 2 and 3. A final testing plan was promised by the end of 2018.
For a bank, these were the dates to work back from. A test window that opened nine months before a go-live date meant the bank’s own build, and its vendor’s, had to be finished before the window opened, or the bank would be testing incomplete software against a fixed deadline. A final testing plan due at the end of 2018 meant that a bank could not know until then what it would be required to prove, which affected how it planned its own test cases and evidence.
Documentation access was a smaller point with a practical edge. The documents sat behind a restricted page for authorized participants and vendors. A bank whose specialists, or whose vendor’s specialists, had not been set up for access would be reading summaries instead of specifications. In our view, confirming who in the bank and at each vendor could read the final documents was one of the cheapest steps a program could take in July 2018, and one of the easiest to forget.
Testing also produces a kind of evidence that a project status report does not. A record that the bank sent and received each message type in the test environment, including messages carrying the enhanced data it would have to receive in phase 3, is something an internal auditor can check. A statement that the bank is on track is not. The notice’s requirement that participants test their ability to receive full ISO 20022 messages during phase 2 effectively told banks what that evidence would need to show.
What a receiving bank faced in each phase
The notice set out the phases from the sender’s side: what a participant would send, in which format, from which date. Read from the receiving side, the same plan looks different, because a bank controlled when it sent new data but not when it received it.
In phase 1, every participant’s customer transfers would carry structured originator and beneficiary fields from the November 2020 date, because the free-text option was to be eliminated for all of them. In our reading, a receiving bank whose posting, screening or customer notification parsed those fields as free text would meet the new structure on the same day as every sender, whatever its own readiness to send.
In phase 2, what a bank received depended on the waves. The Fedwire Funds Service would translate between the old format and ISO 20022 when a sender and receiver were on different formats, so a bank would receive messages in its own format either way. The content would still be like-for-like. A receiving bank in this phase was protected by design: nothing it received could carry more than the old format allowed.
In phase 3, the protection ended. Any sender could choose to populate any of the nine enhancements, and every receiver had to be capable of accepting them. A bank that had decided not to send enhanced data had made a decision about its own messages. It had not made one about its inbound messages, which would arrive with whatever the most ambitious sender in the system chose to include.
The list of what might arrive was long. Beyond the new parties, the longer names and the structured addresses, the notice’s table of enhancements included a purpose code, a data element telling participants how to handle or process a message, information about a bilateral processing agreement, contact details for persons or entities in the transfer, regulatory reporting elements such as an OFAC license, and a tax component for remittance information about tax payments. Each was optional to send. None was optional to receive.
For that reason we read the duty to receive as the part of the plan that set the floor for every bank. The sending timetable was each bank’s own within the plan’s dates. The receiving timetable was set by the plan and by other banks’ choices, and the compliance decisions that followed from receiving, about what to read, pass on and keep, could not be deferred until the bank felt ready to send.
Who owned each part inside a bank
The five parts map onto different owners, which is the main reason we think the phasing was the right way to read the notice. The order of the phases also decided the order in which teams were needed: data capture first, payment integration second, and the teams that consume payment data last.
- The connection belongs to payment operations and the technology team that runs the Fedwire interface, together with vendor management where a third party writes the software.
- Phase 1 belongs to whoever owns customer and counterparty data capture, because structured originator and beneficiary fields start at the point of instruction.
- Phase 2 belongs to the payment integration team and, where a vendor writes the interface, to vendor management, because the waves and the translation are an integration problem.
- Phase 3 and the duty to receive belong jointly to the BSA/AML officer, the sanctions function and the data owners for screening, monitoring and archiving, because they decide which received fields are read, passed on and kept.
- The dependencies belong to the program manager who tracks external dates and to the executive who decides what gives when two of those dates collide.
A bank that assigned the whole change to the payments technology team put two of the five parts with a team that could not decide them. That team could build a parser. It could not decide what the sanctions function should read or what the bank was obliged to forward.
The same split applies to credit unions that send wires through a corporate credit union or a bankers’ bank, and to banks that use a service provider’s connection. Their connection work may be done for them. The duty to receive and the decision about what to pass on remain theirs, because those decisions follow the institution’s own obligations rather than the provider’s.
The split also gives a board a better report than a single status color. A board can be told, separately, whether the connection work is on schedule with the vendor, whether structured customer data is being captured at the point of instruction, whether the compliance function has decided what it will read and forward, and which external dates the program is waiting on. Each of those statements can be checked against evidence. A single line saying the ISO 20022 project is on track cannot, and it hides the parts of the change that no project manager can finish alone.
The notice’s questions as a planning tool
The Board asked nine numbered questions in three groups, and the third group was addressed to each institution directly. It asked how the institution accessed the Fedwire Funds Service, whether it developed its own software or relied on a vendor, what costs it would incur, with dollar estimates or ranges if possible, and whether the benefits would outweigh those costs for that institution.
Whether or not a bank sent a comment letter, those questions were a usable planning template. Answering them required the connection map described above, a conversation with the software vendor about its roadmap and cost, and a view from the compliance and treasury functions about what the richer data was worth. A bank that could answer the three questions in the third group by the September 4, 2018 comment deadline had, in effect, sized its own program.
The second group of questions was just as useful internally. The Board asked whether the timeline, including the dates for final documents and testing, was reasonable and, if not, how much time participants and vendors would need for each phase. A bank that tried to answer that question for itself would discover which phase was its constraint. For a bank with a vendor-built interface, the constraint could be the vendor’s schedule. For a bank whose customer data was held as free text, it could be phase 1. For a bank with a complex screening estate, it could be phase 3. Each answer pointed to a different first step.
Comment letters to the Board are public, and the notice said so: comments would be posted on the Board’s website as submitted. For a bank that wanted to influence the timeline, that was a reason to be specific. For one that did not comment, the questions were still a free outline of what a regulator thought every participant should know about itself.
Objections: cost, timing and the value of the data
One objection is that a format change is plumbing and should be left to vendors and the Reserve Banks. For the second and third groups of participants in section VI, much of it was. But even those participants had to learn the format’s terms and supply the information it required. For the first group, the Board said the changes would be significant. And for every group, the duty to receive and the question of what to pass on could not be handed off.
A second objection is that a phased plan was safer than any alternative, because it allowed waves, translation and a fallback. The notice made that case, and asked whether phasing would mitigate implementation risk. The later history, set out below, shows that the industry’s own advisers came to the opposite view, partly because of the truncation that a like-for-like phase implied. Both views can be held at once: a fallback reduces one risk while translation and truncation create another. A bank planning for either approach needed to know which risk it was buying.
A third objection is that the richer data had no proven value. The notice itself conceded that extended remittance information was already supported in the existing Fedwire and CHIPS formats, but that its use “by depository institutions and their customers has been limited.” The Board hoped a common global format would encourage investment. That is an argument about adoption, not a promise of value, and a bank that wanted to justify the cost had to find its own use for the data.
A fourth objection is that 2018 was too early to act on a plan with targets running into late 2023. Phase 1, though, targeted November 2020 and changed customer data capture. The final phase 1 message documents were already published. A bank that waited for certainty about phase 3 before starting phase 1 would have compressed its own schedule, whatever later happened to the plan.
A fifth objection is that the duty to receive was cheap, because a bank could accept the new fields and store them without using them. Storing them is the easy part. The notice made participants responsible for deciding, consistent with their legal obligations, what to do with received data, including whether to pass it to the next bank or the beneficiary. A bank that stored a field it was obliged to forward, or received a field naming a party it was expected to screen and did not, would have turned a cheap technical choice into a compliance finding. The cost of receiving was the cost of deciding.
What a payments leader could check
The notice’s structure translates into a short set of checks. They were useful in 2018, and they remain useful for any later change to a payment message format.
- Map every wire flow to its connection type and to the systems before and after it, and name who writes the software at each point.
- Find where originator and beneficiary names and addresses are captured as free text, from the customer form to the core system, and decide who owns changing them.
- List every system that reads an incoming payment message, and for each one record which fields it reads, which it ignores and which it would truncate.
- Write down, with counsel, what the bank must pass to the next institution or the beneficiary, and confirm the system does it.
- Keep a single list of external dates the program depends on, with the person who tracks each and the decision rule if one moves.
No check on this list requires waiting for a final date. Each produces evidence a board or an examiner can read: a map, a list, a decision and an owner.
With hindsight
The Board received 17 comments on the 2018 notice, it said in October 2021, and the commenters all supported adopting ISO 20022. The three-phase plan did not survive. In September 2019 the Reserve Banks paused it in response to a formal request from the Payments Market Practice Group, an independent advisory group reporting to a committee of SWIFT’s board, to consider a single-day implementation. The Board’s 2021 notice said the group had raised concerns about “the need to truncate ISO 20022 message details” in a phased approach and argued that dropping the like-for-like phase would simplify implementation. The 2021 notice announced that the Reserve Banks would adopt ISO 20022 and proposed doing so on a single day, targeted for and no earlier than November 2023. It also replaced the 2018 fallback idea: if a significant issue arose on or after the implementation date, the Reserve Banks “would not be able to return to the legacy format” and would follow a “fix-in-place” strategy instead.
In its October 2022 notice, the Board said it had received 60 comment letters on the 2021 proposal and that the vast majority of those expressing a preference favored the single-day approach. Three commenters, including a major trade association representing community banks, opposed it as costly, a strain on testing capacity and a source of implementation risk. Another commenter said that implementing the FedNow Service and the new format at the same time would strain the resources of community banks. The Board set the implementation date as March 10, 2025, with mandatory testing for users with their own FedLine Direct connection and for those importing 100 or more transactions a day through FedPayments Manager. Under the backout plan, first described in 2021, users would also need to attest to their ability to back out their changes when they ran production testing.
The March date moved. In a Fed360 notice dated March 4, 2025, preserved in an Internet Archive copy captured June 17, 2025, Federal Reserve Financial Services said that “after careful consideration of industry requests and assessment of customer readiness” it had rescheduled implementation from March 10 to July 14, 2025, to give customers and vendors who were not ready more time. Its August 2025 newsletter, in an Internet Archive copy captured August 21, 2025, said that on July 14 it had adopted ISO 20022 for the Fedwire Funds Service “in a single-day implementation,” and advised users whose payments were not processing straight through to work with their counterparties, service providers and software vendors.
The 2021 notice also showed how the industry dealt with the gap between SWIFT and Fedwire, one of the 2018 dependencies. To reduce the risk of data truncation in the interim, the Reserve Banks said they would make minor changes in November 2022 to an existing 9,000-character field in the old format so that it could carry the full text of data-rich ISO 20022 messages. The same notice said the Reserve Banks would support up to 9,000 characters for structured remittance information and would reassess the business case for more “if actual usage by Fedwire Funds Service participants increases over time,” and that its guidelines would cover only messages between the Reserve Banks and direct participants, leaving each participant to decide how to exchange messages with its own customers.
What held up from 2018 was the duty to receive, not the phases. The 2021 notice repeated, as the Board had noted in 2018, that participants would need to determine, consistent with any legal obligations, how to handle enhanced data they receive, including whether and how to provide it to the next receiving bank or the beneficiary. On capability it went further than 2018: under the single-day approach, as of the implementation date all participants would be required to be able to send and receive fully enhanced ISO 20022 messages. The like-for-like phase and the fallback were dropped, and the date that slipped last was set by readiness across the industry, which no single bank controlled.
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