M-17-09 asked agencies to weigh adversary interest in ranking systems and to protect the ranked list itself
OMB’s December 9, 2016 memo on high value assets told agencies that impact ratings were one input among several. It paired them with an adversary’s view, a classified reporting channel, contract terms for testers and a remediation plan validated beyond the CIO.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
OMB’s December 9, 2016 memo on high value assets told agencies that impact ratings were one input among several. It paired them with an adversary’s view, a classified reporting channel, contract terms for testers and a remediation plan validated beyond the CIO.
- The week The initiative did not start with this memo.
- Choosing the list: three views of what an attacker wants That shift sounds technical.
- Guarding the list: the ranked inventory as a target This is a candid statement for a governance memo.
- Contracting for the test: authority before access A footnote explained that the Rules of Engagement authorized DHS, through its National Cybersecurity Assessment and Technical Services team, to conduct Risk and Vulnerability Assessments on the agency’s networks. [1] Without those documents, the assessment team could not start.
- Paying for the fix: remediation that reaches the budget The appendix set the clock.
- How the memo reached different agencies The memo’s mandatory requirements applied to CFO Act agencies, which a footnote listed: 24 departments and agencies, from Agriculture to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. [1] For a large department, the hard part was enterprise view.
- Objections, in order FIPS 199 categorizes information and systems by the potential impact on an organization if they are compromised. [1] [2] The memo’s point was that this is one factor.
- What agency technology leaders could check The four decisions give a short set of checks.
- With hindsight DHS changed the program in 2018.
The week
On December 9, 2016, the Office of Management and Budget issued memorandum M-17-09, Management of Federal High Value Assets, to the heads of executive departments and agencies. [1] The memo set out guidance for planning, identifying, categorizing, prioritizing, reporting, assessing and remediating federal high value assets, which it abbreviated as HVAs. [1]
The memo described the HVA initiative as an ongoing government-wide activity intended to evolve over time. [1] It applied to executive branch departments and agencies and excluded national security systems, whose owners were pointed to Defense Department and Intelligence Community guidance. [1]
The initiative did not start with this memo. On June 12, 2015, the Federal Chief Information Officer started a Cybersecurity Sprint, with a team leading a 30-day review of federal cybersecurity practice. OMB’s Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan, M-16-04, followed on October 30, 2015. [2] That plan told agencies to identify their HVAs and gave a working definition: assets, systems, facilities, data and datasets of particular interest to potential adversaries. [2]
M-16-04 also said the effort built on FIPS 199, the federal standard for rating the impact of a compromise, while giving special consideration to the capability, intent and targeting of adversaries. [2] It asked each agency’s Senior Agency Official for Privacy to review systems holding personally identifiable information and recommend which belonged on the HVA list. [2]
M-17-09 replaced that working definition. [1] Under the new text, HVAs were assets, federal information systems, information and data whose compromise could cause a significant impact. [1] The impact could fall on national security interests, foreign relations, the economy, public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety. [1] The definition kept the earlier reference to criminal, politically motivated and state-sponsored actors. [1] [2]
The memo then laid out a continuous process in seven steps: plan, identify, categorize, prioritize, report, assess and remediate. [1] Planning included naming a senior accountable official and a lead office, and engaging contracting officers and general counsel so that agreements for penetration testing, audits and security architecture reviews were in place. [1]
For identification, the memo asked agencies to start with FIPS 199 and NIST SP 800-60, then to consider systems and data from a potential adversary’s perspective, then to take a federal enterprise-wide view. [1] A footnote stated that there was no minimum FIPS categorization for a system to be considered an HVA. [1]
Agencies were to build a risk-based matrix of threats, vulnerabilities, impacts and likelihood of compromise. [1] That matrix would support an annual Top 10 prioritized list of HVAs delivered to OMB and DHS. [1] The memo listed additional criteria, including adversary interest, controlled unclassified information, industrial control systems and whether a system was a single point of failure. [1]
Reporting had an unusual channel. All CFO Act agencies were to report all of their HVAs, with the Top 10 list, to DHS on an annual basis, and the Fiscal Year 2017 reporting date was January 15, 2017. [1] Submissions went to an INTELINK platform on either JWICS or SIPR, both classified networks, and agency points of contact had to keep active accounts. [1]
Before assessment, the memo required ten security activities for all HVAs, citing Binding Operational Directive 16-01. [1] They included secure configuration management, multifactor authentication, network segmentation, verified data recovery, tested incident response and 100 percent automated asset visibility and control. [1]
Assessments would come from DHS through a Risk and Vulnerability Assessment and, as resources allowed, a Security Architecture Review. [1] Agencies could also buy similar services through the Highly Adaptive Cybersecurity Services Special Item Numbers on GSA’s IT Schedule 70. [1]
An appendix set deadlines. Senior accountable officials and lead offices were due January 15, 2017, as was the Top 10 list. [1] Remediation POA&Ms were due within 30 days of receipt of an assessment findings report, with status reports every 30 days until high-priority vulnerabilities were mitigated. [1]
M-17-09 is easy to file as one more inventory memo. We read it as a change in who decides what matters. Under the general federal framework, a system’s FIPS 199 impact rating set the baseline of controls it received. [1] M-16-04 had already asked agencies to give special consideration to adversaries when identifying HVAs. [2] M-17-09 made the order of reasoning explicit: the rating was one input, and a footnote said there was no minimum rating for an HVA. [1]
Our argument is that the memo split one familiar task, protecting important systems, into four decisions that sat with different people. Each decision had its own owner, its own paperwork and its own way of failing. We take them in turn:
- Choosing the list: which systems count as high value, judged from three views, including an adversary’s.
- Guarding the list: how the ranked list is reported, stored and shown, given that it is a map for attackers.
- Contracting for the test: the agreements that must exist before anyone, DHS or a vendor, assesses a system.
- Paying for the fix: who signs the remediation plan and how it reaches the budget.
The four do not overlap. The first is about judgment, the second about information handling, the third about legal authority and the fourth about money. An agency could do any one of them well and the others badly. After the four parts, we look at how the memo reached different kinds of agencies, take the strongest objections in order, and end with what agency technology leaders could check.
Choosing the list: three views of what an attacker wants
What changed in the definition
M-16-04 had defined HVAs by adversary interest: assets of particular interest to potential adversaries. [2] M-17-09 defined them by consequence: assets whose compromise could cause a significant impact to the nation’s security, economy, public confidence, civil liberties or public health and safety. [1] It then asked agencies to weigh adversary interest as part of identifying and prioritizing them. [1]
That shift sounds technical. It meant that two different questions now fed one list. One was what would hurt if this system failed or leaked. The other was what an attacker would want to take. A system could score high on one and low on the other.
Three views, in a set order
The memo gave a sequence. Agencies were to start with an agency-specific assessment using FIPS 199 and NIST SP 800-60. [1] Next, they were to consider the value of their systems and data from a potential adversary’s perspective, using government and commercial threat intelligence. [1] Throughout, they were to take a federal enterprise-wide view of their mission responsibilities. [1]
The order matters for how a list gets built. An agency that stops after the first view has a list of high-impact systems. That list may be right, but it reflects the agency’s own sense of harm. The second view can add systems that look ordinary from inside, such as a mid-sized database holding unique personal records.
The third view adds systems whose importance comes from connections. The memo asked agencies to consider whether an HVA was connected with HVAs in other agencies so that a compromise could affect mission essential functions elsewhere. [1] That question cannot be answered by one agency alone.
Why the footnote mattered
The memo’s footnote said there was no minimum FIPS categorization for a system to be considered an HVA, because FIPS ratings are only one factor. [1] In our reading, this freed agencies to list a moderate-impact system if adversary interest or interdependence justified it.
It also removed a defense. Before, a program office could argue that its system was rated moderate and therefore outside the special regime. After December 9, 2016, the rating alone did not settle the question. [1] Someone had to explain why a system was or was not on the list.
The criteria list
The memo listed criteria to use alongside an agency’s own approach, and said the list was not exhaustive. [1] They covered adversary and criminal interest, the sensitivity of information, controlled unclassified information, industrial control and SCADA systems, quantity of information, uniqueness, mission dependence, scale of impact and nature of impact. [1]
The memo then grouped the inputs into three categories of risk: threat, vulnerability and consequence. [1] It said all three should be considered when ranking HVAs. [1] That is a familiar risk formula. The difference was that the memo asked agencies to apply it across systems, to produce a ranked list, rather than within each system’s authorization.
Where judgment entered
A ranked list needs a ranker. The memo called for a risk-based matrix of threats, vulnerabilities, impacts and likelihood of compromise, and said the matrix should be the basis for prioritizing assessments. [1] It required a Top 10 list and left agencies discretion to rank the rest using a 1-to-n or tiered approach. [1]
This design put a lot of weight on the people filling in the matrix. Threat intelligence about adversary interest sat with security teams. Mission dependence sat with program owners. Interdependence sat with enterprise architects. The memo asked all of them to be engaged, naming the CFO, the Chief Acquisition Officer, the privacy official, mission and policy owners, the CIO and the CISO. [1]
The owners’ notice
One small step deserves attention. After the agency-level list was assembled, CIOs were to ensure that the owners and operators of the HVAs were notified of their designation. [1] A system owner who did not know the system was an HVA could not plan for the extra controls and assessments that came with the label.
In operational terms, designation should change a system’s life. It brings the ten pre-assessment activities, assessment scheduling, remediation deadlines and closer budget scrutiny. [1] A notice to the owner is where those obligations start to have a name attached.
What could go wrong at this step
The first failure mode is a list built from the impact ratings alone, with the adversary view added as a comment. The second is a list that grows to include every system anyone considers important, which defeats prioritization. The third is a list that excludes shared services because no single office owns them.
The memo anticipated the third failure in part. It asked agencies to identify system interdependencies and the physical location of HVAs, and to identify key stakeholders, including third parties, involved in their administration. [1] Those steps can surface shared components that no program office lists as its own.
A hypothetical bureau
A hypothetical bureau shows how the views interact. Say it runs three systems. One controls a payment process and is rated high impact. One holds a unique research dataset rated moderate. One is a shared identity service, also moderate, that other bureaus use to sign in.
On FIPS 199 alone, only the payment system stands out. The adversary view, as M-17-09 framed it, could lift the research dataset because of its uniqueness and the interest it may draw. [1] The enterprise view could lift the identity service, because a compromise there reaches every system that trusts it. [1]
The bureau now has three candidates for its list, each justified by a different view. The memo’s criteria let it rank them. [1] Without the adversary and enterprise views, two of the three would have stayed in the general population of moderate systems, assessed on the ordinary cycle.
Recording the reasons
A ranked list without reasons is hard to defend and hard to update. The memo required the list to be updated at least annually. [1] Each update is easier when the agency recorded why each system was included, which criteria applied and which threat information was used. Those notes also help a new CIO or CISO who inherits the list.
Guarding the list: the ranked inventory as a target
The memo’s own warning
The memo said the identification and prioritization of HVAs was critical to running assessments efficiently, but that the results of these efforts were also an attractive target to anyone with malicious intent. [1] It directed agencies and independent assessors to follow handling guidance kept on OMB’s MAX site. [1]
This is a candid statement for a governance memo. A list of the ten systems an agency ranks highest, with their functions, assessment dates and open findings, is a targeting guide. The memo treated it as sensitive information in its own right.
The classified reporting channel
The reporting design followed from that view. CFO Act agencies were to submit their HVA data to DHS on an INTELINK platform on JWICS or SIPR. [1] Agency HVA points of contact had to maintain active INTELINK accounts on one of those networks, and the appendix made that an annual task before the Top 10 submission. [1]
The required data fields show why. They included the HVA name, a short description of its function and a description of the impact of its compromise. [1] They also asked whether it had a valid Authorization to Operate and whether it was an industrial control system. [1] Further fields covered the date of its last assessment and how many critical, high, moderate and low actions remained open. [1] Together, those fields describe where an agency is weakest.
Practical effects of a classified channel
A classified reporting channel has costs. Points of contact need clearances and access to a classified terminal. Working files have to move between unclassified planning systems and classified submission systems under the agency’s own rules. Staff turnover can leave an agency without a cleared contact at the moment a list is due.
None of those costs is a reason to send the list by email. They are reasons to plan for them. An agency that named a single cleared point of contact had a single point of failure in its HVA reporting. The memo’s requirement for an active account in advance of each submission addressed part of that risk. [1]
Handling inside the agency
The memo’s handling instructions also applied inside the agency. [1] The working matrix, draft rankings and internal remediation notes carry the same information as the submission. A program office spreadsheet with the same fields is the same target.
In our reading, this extended the protection question to the agency’s own collaboration tools. Shared drives, ticketing systems and project trackers that held HVA findings became places where the list lived. The memo did not prescribe controls for those systems, but it set the principle that the information about HVAs needed protecting. [1]
Third-party assessors and the data they hold
The memo addressed assessors directly. Agencies had to include confidentiality and data handling requirements in agreements with independent third-party assessors. [1] Those agreements had to specify that the agency was the sole owner of all agency information the assessor collected. [1] That information and any derivative work, including notes and working documents, had to be returned to the agency. [1]
That clause matters because assessors collect exactly what an attacker wants: network maps, credentials found, exploitable paths and screenshots. An assessor’s working files are a second copy of the agency’s weaknesses. The memo treated them as agency property to be recovered.
Retention and disposal
Information about HVAs accumulates. Each annual list, assessment report and monthly status update adds to the record. Old findings may describe weaknesses that were not fixed, or systems that were retired but still share components with live ones.
The memo did not set retention periods for this material. Records schedules and agency policy govern that, and counsel or records officers would need to confirm what applies. What the memo did establish is that the information is sensitive while it describes live weaknesses. [1] Agencies can align their retention decisions with that point, keeping what records law requires and protecting it for as long as it is kept.
Why this belongs in a security architecture
We file this part under architecture deliberately. The list, the matrix, the assessment reports and the remediation trackers form an information system of their own. They have users, data flows and storage locations. They can be designed well or badly.
An agency that treats them as a document set will protect them like documents. An agency that treats them as a system will ask who can query them, where copies exist, how long they are kept and how access is logged. The memo’s handling section points toward the second approach without spelling it out. [1]
Contracting for the test: authority before access
Agreements with DHS
The memo said all CFO Act agencies were required to participate in the HVA initiative and to have required legal agreements signed and in place with DHS before assessment work began. [1] That included a valid, signed, standing Federal Network Authorization and Rules of Engagement consistent with M-16-03. [1]
A footnote explained that the Rules of Engagement authorized DHS, through its National Cybersecurity Assessment and Technical Services team, to conduct Risk and Vulnerability Assessments on the agency’s networks. [1] Without those documents, the assessment team could not start.
What the assessment covered
The Risk and Vulnerability Assessment could include network mapping, vulnerability scanning, phishing tests, wireless assessments, web application assessments and database assessments. [1] The Security Architecture Review, offered as appropriate and as resources were available, looked at the design and interconnections of the system and proposed a target state architecture. [1]
Additional services could include tailored assessments for industrial control systems, hunting for malicious activity and an evaluation of incident response readiness. [1] The memo said a hunt should be deployed, at a minimum, when the assessment or review found evidence of a potential incident. [1]
The commercial route
Agencies could work with DHS or procure similar services from commercial providers. [1] The condition was that the services met the DHS baseline requirements of the Highly Adaptive Cybersecurity Services Special Item Numbers on GSA’s IT Schedule 70. [1] The memo listed four: penetration testing, incident response, cyber hunt, and risk and vulnerability assessment. [1]
This gave agencies a choice and a duty. If they used a commercial assessor, they had to ensure that the findings and recommendations reached DHS in a timely manner. [1] DHS would still see the results, whoever did the work.
Contracts with the agency’s own vendors
The planning step asked agencies to engage third parties to ensure that appropriate contract clauses or legal agreements were in place to assess and remediate system vulnerabilities. [1] In our reading, this reached the vendors that ran or hosted HVAs as well as the assessors.
A system run by a contractor raises a basic question: can the agency test it? If the contract does not give the agency or DHS the right to scan, probe and review the architecture, the assessment either waits for an amendment or covers less than the whole system. The memo put this question into planning, before any assessment was scheduled. [1]
Cloud-hosted and shared HVAs
An HVA hosted by a cloud provider or run as a shared service raises the same contract question with more parties. The agency may own the data and the application while another party runs the infrastructure. Rules of Engagement with DHS cover the agency’s networks. [1] Whether they reach a provider’s environment depends on the provider’s agreement.
The memo asked agencies to determine the physical location of their HVAs and to identify the third parties involved in their administration. [1] For a cloud-hosted system, that step identifies which contracts must permit testing. It also tells the agency which parts of the system a DHS assessment can reach and which parts rely on the provider’s own testing and reporting.
Access and onboarding
The appendix assigned DHS or the other assessor the task of establishing and communicating access rights and entrance-on-duty requirements to the agency before assessments. [1] Assessors need badges, accounts and approvals. Each takes time in an agency’s personnel and security processes.
An agency that had its agreements ready but not its onboarding would still face a delay before testing could begin. The memo’s appendix listed both as prerequisites, which is a fair reading of how assessments stall. [1]
What could go wrong at this step
Three failure modes stand out. An agency could have Rules of Engagement that covered its own networks but not a cloud-hosted HVA. A contractor-run system could lack a clause permitting assessment. A commercial assessor’s contract could omit the data ownership and return clause the memo required. [1]
Each of these is a contract problem, not a technical one. That is why the memo placed contracting officers and general counsel in the planning step. [1] In our view, this was a practical instruction, because it turned part of an assessment program into a procurement task with a known owner.
Paying for the fix: remediation that reaches the budget
The remediation plan
After an assessment, DHS or the independent assessor would provide a report with detailed recommendations. [1] The agency then had to create a remediation plan with a POA&M detailing specific actions, milestones and timelines. [1] The memo said the agency must complete it expeditiously and treat it as a priority. [1]
The appendix set the clock. A remediation POA&M was due within 30 days of receipt of the assessment findings report. [1] High-priority vulnerabilities were to be mitigated and their status reported to DHS within 30 days of receipt of the report, and every 30 days after until all were mitigated, with reference to BOD 16-01. [1]
Who signs
The memo said the remediation plan should be validated by the CISO, CIO, CFO, the Senior Agency Official for Privacy if the HVA contained personal information, and the Chief Acquisition Officer. [1] That is up to five signatures, the privacy official’s only where the HVA held personal information, for a document that a security office could otherwise have owned alone.
The list of signers tells us what the memo expected the plan to need. The CFO is there because fixes cost money. The acquisition officer is there because fixes involve contracts. The privacy official is there because systems with personal data carry separate obligations. A plan signed only by the CISO would describe what security wanted, not what the agency had agreed to do.
The budget connection
The memo told agencies to work with their budget offices and governance structures so that remediation strategies aligned with the cybersecurity risk-based budgeting plan in the Capital Planning and Investment Control process. [1] Planning also asked for budget, procurement and contract management plans to address potential assessor findings. [1]
This is where a fix becomes real. Some findings close with a configuration change. Others require replacing an end-of-life component, re-architecting a network segment or buying a new service. Those take budget cycles. The memo’s instruction was to plan for findings before they arrived, so that the budget request could follow the assessment.
Legacy systems
The planning list included IT lifecycle management, with plans to upgrade legacy components, migrate systems and dispose of them. [1] For an HVA built on an old platform, the honest remediation plan may be replacement. The 30-day POA&M can record that decision. It cannot deliver it.
This is a tension the memo did not resolve. A 30-day reporting cycle suits configuration fixes. A multi-year replacement needs a different kind of tracking: milestones, interim mitigations and a funded program. An agency that reported a replacement project on a 30-day cycle risked a status report that did not change from month to month.
Interim mitigations while a fix waits
Between the finding and the fix, an HVA still runs. The memo’s pre-assessment list offers tools for that period: network segmentation, boundary protections, stricter access controls with multifactor authentication and closer monitoring of audit logs. [1] An agency waiting for budget can tighten those controls around the affected system.
Interim measures belong in the POA&M too. A plan that records only the final fix gives oversight bodies nothing to check until the fix lands. A plan that records interim controls, with dates, shows that the agency reduced the risk while it waited.
Measuring progress
OMB took on a role in monitoring. The appendix said OMB would monitor progress against remediation plans through the CyberStat process and governance bodies such as the President’s Management Council. [1] OMB would also work with agencies on budget formulation and execution for HVA remediation. [1] DHS would coordinate with OMB on tracking progress in DHS assessments. [1]
That oversight reached the agency through its leadership as well as its security office. In our reading, the memo designed remediation to be visible to the people who control budgets, which is the condition for fixes that cost money to happen.
How the memo reached different agencies
Large CFO Act departments
The memo’s mandatory requirements applied to CFO Act agencies, which a footnote listed: 24 departments and agencies, from Agriculture to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. [1] For a large department, the hard part was enterprise view. Components run their own systems, and a department-level Top 10 list requires components to accept a ranking set above them.
A large department may also have more third-party relationships to sort out than a small agency. Each contractor-run HVA needed assessment rights. Each component needed its own points of contact and handling practices. The memo’s governance step, a senior accountable official and a lead office, was the mechanism for holding that together. [1]
Smaller CFO Act agencies
Smaller CFO Act agencies faced the same requirements with fewer staff. [1] One office might fill several roles: CIO, CISO and privacy. That simplifies coordination but concentrates workload. The requirement for a cleared point of contact with an active classified account could be a real constraint for a small agency. [1]
Non-CFO Act agencies
Non-CFO Act agencies were encouraged, but not required, to follow the same review and reporting process. [1] The appendix repeated that all agencies were encouraged for each task. [1] An encouraged agency that skipped the process still had its FISMA duties and the existing NIST framework, which the memo listed as continuing to apply. [1]
For these agencies, the memo was a model rather than a mandate. An agency outside the CFO Act list may still hold data an adversary would value. The memo’s adversary view gave such an agency a reason to ask the question even without a deadline.
National security systems
The memo did not apply to national security systems. [1] A footnote encouraged agencies operating them to apply its enterprise risk principles anyway, noting that existing technical controls might not address policy and strategic impacts. [1] Agencies with both kinds of systems had two regimes to reconcile.
State and local governments
M-17-09 was directed to federal executive branch agencies. [1] It did not bind states, counties or cities. State and local agencies that exchange data with federal HVAs, such as benefits or law enforcement systems, could find their connections examined in a federal agency’s interdependency mapping. Any obligations on them came from their agreements with the federal agency, which counsel would need to check.
Inspectors general and auditors
The memo said HVA processes should use the artifacts agencies already produce under FISMA, to avoid duplication. [1] Those artifacts are what an auditor would ask to see. An HVA designation gives an auditor a list of systems to examine with special care. The records suggested in this article, reasons for inclusion, contract coverage and signed plans, are the evidence an auditor can test.
Objections, in order
1. FIPS 199 already identifies important systems
FIPS 199 categorizes information and systems by the potential impact on an organization if they are compromised. [1] [2] The memo’s point was that this is one factor. Adversary interest and interdependence across agencies can make a moderate system an HVA, which is why the memo said there was no minimum FIPS level. [1]
2. A Top 10 list ignores the rest
The memo required a Top 10 list for prioritizing assessments, not for deciding what deserved protection. [1] It required agencies to report all their HVAs and allowed them to rank the rest. [1] The Top 10 was a queue for scarce assessment capacity.
3. Classified reporting is excessive for unclassified systems
The memo itself said HVAs could be classified or unclassified, and that agencies needed to report only non-national security HVAs to DHS. [1] The classification question concerns the compiled list, not each system. A list of weaknesses across an agency’s critical systems is more sensitive than any one system’s findings.
4. DHS assessments could not reach every HVA
The memo said so. A select number of HVAs would receive a standardized assessment based on DHS and OMB reviews, and SARs would happen as resources allowed. [1] That is why it opened a commercial route through GSA and required the ten pre-assessment activities for all HVAs. [1] Agencies could act before DHS arrived.
5. Extra signatures slow remediation down
They may. The alternative is a plan signed by one office that the budget office has not seen. The memo named finance, acquisition and privacy officials among the validators. [1] In our reading, it did so because remediation needing money or contracts would stall without them. Configuration fixes can proceed while the plan is signed. Funded projects need the signatures.
6. The memo was rescinded, so it no longer matters
M-19-03 rescinded M-17-09 on December 10, 2018. [4] It kept the core elements: governance, designation, prioritization, assessment, remediation and privacy review. [4] The four decisions in this article carried over. The hindsight section sets out what changed.
7. Adversary interest is guesswork
Some of it is. The memo asked agencies to use government threat intelligence and commercial sources, and to watch actor intent, capabilities, targeting and trends. [1] Threat information will be incomplete. The memo did not ask agencies to predict attacks, only to let known adversary interest influence the ranking. Recording the sources used keeps that judgment open to review.
What agency technology leaders could check
The four decisions give a short set of checks. Each produces a record an auditor or inspector general can review:
- Write down, for each system on the HVA list, which of the three views put it there: impact, adversary interest or interdependence.
- Write down, for each high-impact system left off the list, why.
- Name the people who may see the full ranked list and the working matrix, and record where every copy lives.
- Confirm that Rules of Engagement and any other required agreements cover every HVA, including cloud-hosted and contractor-run systems.
- Check that each assessor contract states that the agency owns all information collected and that notes and working files return to the agency.
- Confirm that each HVA’s owner and operator have been told of the designation and what it requires.
- For each open finding, record whether it needs configuration, money or a contract, and track each kind differently.
- Get remediation plans signed by finance, acquisition and privacy leaders as well as the CIO and CISO.
Where to start
Start with interdependencies. The memo asked agencies to identify connections between HVAs and other systems, including non-HVAs. [1] A map of those connections tells an agency which low-profile systems carry risk into its high value ones. It also tells the agency which other agencies must be part of its own assessment.
Then check the contracts. An assessment that cannot start because a vendor will not permit testing is a delay that a contract review can prevent. The memo placed that work in planning. [1]
Third, look at the people. The memo’s process depends on named roles: a senior accountable official, a lead office, cleared points of contact, system owners told of their designation and up to five signers for each plan. [1] A roster that lists each role, its current holder and a backup shows quickly where the process has gaps. Turnover is where these programs lose their memory.
Fourth, check the pre-assessment controls. The memo required ten security activities for all HVAs before any assessment, citing BOD 16-01. [1] An agency can confirm each one for each HVA without waiting for DHS. A gap found by the agency itself is cheaper to close than one found by an assessor.
What the checks will not do
These checks do not make an HVA secure. They make it known, ranked, testable and funded. Security comes from the fixes that follow. The memo’s design rested on the idea that fixes follow more reliably when the first four steps are done well. [1]
A closing note on the memo’s design
The memo described itself as the start of a process that would evolve as lessons were learned. [1] The four decisions it set out, about choosing, guarding, testing and funding, are the parts of that process an agency can control. They do not depend on which memo is in force.
With hindsight
DHS changed the program in 2018. On May 7, 2018, DHS issued Binding Operational Directive 18-02, Securing High Value Assets, which superseded and revoked BOD 16-01. [3] As published on CISA’s site, the directive said DHS was expanding system scope, refining assessment methods and using less-constrained penetration testing. [3]
BOD 18-02 changed the reporting channel. All agencies were to submit a prioritized HVA list through the Homeland Security Information Network within 30 days of the directive, then review it quarterly. [3] A footnote said points of contact should have access to JWICS or SIPR/HSDN, which kept a classified path for exchanging information. [3]
The directive also made the remediation clock stricter. Agencies were to remediate major or critical weaknesses within 30 days of receiving the assessment report, or submit a remediation plan signed by the Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management. [3] Such a plan had a timeline not to exceed one year, and status reports were due every 30 days until full remediation. [3]
On scope, BOD 18-02 told agencies selected for DHS-led assessments to impose no restrictions on timing, frequency, services or the systems related to an HVA. [3] It defined related systems to include the network infrastructure that enables the agency’s enterprise network, with DHS deciding what counted. [3] This followed the memo’s focus on interdependencies, with a firmer hand. [1] [3]
OMB then replaced the memo. On December 10, 2018, M-19-03 consolidated and updated the requirements of M-16-04 and M-17-09 and rescinded both. [4] It replaced M-17-09’s single definition with three categories under which an agency may designate an HVA: informational value, mission essential and Federal Civilian Enterprise Essential. [4]
M-19-03 also said OMB and DHS may designate HVAs at agencies based on potential impact to national security. [4] That added a top-down route to the list. It extended the program to all agencies, including non-CFO Act agencies, for identification, assessment, remediation and incident response. [4]
Governance moved up. M-19-03 required an integrated agency-level office or team for HVA activities and told Chief Operating Officers to coordinate regularly with these structures and mission owners. [4] It asked agencies to adopt a prioritization method provided by DHS. [4] In our reading, that took the place of the agency-built matrix M-17-09 had described. [1] [4]
The contracting decision became more explicit. M-19-03 told agencies to incorporate requirements into all existing and future contracts and service-level agreements that enable HVA assessments, including cloud-managed services and contractor-owned, contractor-operated systems. [4] Third-party assessments in lieu of DHS assessments needed a legally binding agreement that incorporated DHS’s baseline requirements. [4]
Funding also got a firmer link. M-19-03 asked agencies to develop plans to update the technology or architecture of HVAs where findings traced to obsolete technology or critical architectural deficiencies. [4] The plans were due within a year of sending findings to DHS and went to OMB Resource Management Offices. [4]
What held up from December 2016 is the structure. Choosing, testing and paying each appear in M-19-03 and BOD 18-02, though with different owners. [3] [4] Guarding the list survives in a narrower form: BOD 18-02 kept submissions on DHS-provisioned HSIN accounts and asked points of contact to have access to JWICS or SIPR/HSDN. [3] What did not hold up, in our reading, was the agency-built matrix and the INTELINK submission, which gave way to a DHS methodology and submission through HSIN. [3] [4]
As checked on November 15, 2026, CISA’s page for BOD 18-02 notes that M-17-09 has been rescinded and replaced by M-19-03. [3] Agencies working on HVAs today should start from the current directives and OMB guidance rather than the 2016 memo, and confirm with their counsel and CISA which documents are in force.
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