OMB’s 2018 rescission list removed reminders, not the controls behind them
M-18-23 retired decades of OMB guidance, including the 2008 order to secure federal DNS, which it said agencies should already have done. Rescission ended an instruction, not a risk: CISA’s January 2019 DNS directive asked for much of the same inventory.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
M-18-23 retired decades of OMB guidance, including the 2008 order to secure federal DNS, which it said agencies should already have done. Rescission ended an instruction, not a risk: CISA’s January 2019 DNS directive asked for much of the same inventory.
- The week On Monday, August 27, 2018, the Office of Management and Budget issued memorandum M-18-23, Shifting From Low-Value to High-Value Work, to the heads of executive departments and agencies.
- Met: the DNS memo and the duty to keep proving it M-08-23, dated August 22, 2008, set a policy of deploying Domain Name System Security, known as DNSSEC, to all federal information systems by December 2009.
- Superseded: following the requirement to its new home The memo rescinded M-00-07, on incorporating and funding security in information systems investments, and M-04-26, on personal use policies and file sharing technology, so that agencies would implement current guidance.
- Passed: guidance whose occasion had ended Several groups on the list concerned events that were over.
- Promised: a gap until new guidance arrived M-08-22, dated August 11, 2008, had told agencies about version 1.0 of the Federal Desktop Core Configuration, a set of security settings for Windows XP and Windows Vista developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology with the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security, checkable with automated content.
- What the memo asked for in return M-18-23 removed reporting and also added some.
- Partial rescission: the privacy policy section One item on the list did not fit neatly into a single group, and the memo explained why.
- The central agencies’ own cuts The memo’s second section is easy to skip, but it shows how burden reduction worked when the central agencies applied it to themselves, and where it moved risk.
- A register of rescissions The practical tool our argument points to is a register: a short record, kept by the agency’s policy or compliance office, of every central guidance document that is rescinded, withdrawn or superseded and that touched the agency’s controls.
- How to tell which group a rescission falls into The four groups are useful only if an agency can sort each rescinded item quickly.
- Objections: burden, duplication and trust One objection is that agencies do not need a memo to tell them to keep their DNS records current, and that treating rescission as risky assumes agencies will stop doing sensible things the moment they are no longer told to.
- Reading a rescission list as a risk review A rescission list is read first for what it removes.
- How the argument travels beyond federal agencies State and local agencies were not bound by M-18-23.
- What we would ask a federal CIO today In our view, an agency that can answer those questions from its records has taken the benefit of a rescission list without paying for it in lost controls.
- With hindsight The DNS item on the list came back in January 2019.
The week
On Monday, August 27, 2018, the Office of Management and Budget issued memorandum M-18-23, Shifting From Low-Value to High-Value Work, to the heads of executive departments and agencies. It opened by saying that federal employees devote tens of thousands of hours each year to low-value compliance activities from rules and requirements built up over decades, and that the President’s Management Agenda prioritized reducing that burden and redirecting resources to mission outcomes.
The memo placed itself in a sequence. It recalled that an earlier memorandum, M-17-26, had lifted 59 redundant, obsolete or unnecessary requirements from all federal agencies, and that OMB had worked with agencies to propose eliminating or modifying 407 plans and reports required by Congress, a list released with the President’s budget for fiscal year 2019. It said that further action could be tracked through a Cross-Agency Priority Goal with the same name as the memo.
M-18-23 did three things, in its own numbering. It gave agencies guidance to review their own management guidance regularly, find ways to streamline operations and reduce burden on their components, and report progress publicly. It summarized actions that central management agencies had taken to free agencies from unnecessary burden. And it rescinded obsolete guidance documents.
The second part described changes the central management agencies had made or planned. The Office of Personnel Management would test new ways to assess candidates for the Senior Executive Service and review the workforce data it collects from agencies. OMB and the General Services Administration had paused data collection for most agency metrics in the benchmarking initiative, with GSA collecting only a subset of the data in 2018. OMB described category management for common purchases, automation of repetitive procurement tasks and cuts to the data agencies report about IT investments. It also listed recent financial management guidance that had replaced longer documents.
The first part applied with force to the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act. Each had to designate a senior official to coordinate burden reduction, a role the memo said would, for most agencies, be the Performance Improvement Officer, and notify OMB within 30 days of the memo. Each had to develop and carry out strategies to shift resources to high-value work, which the memo said could include cutting reporting requirements, consolidating processes, using shared services and adopting technologies such as robotic process automation. Each had to report progress twice a year, at the close of the second and fourth quarters of the fiscal year, where feasible in terms of full-time-equivalent hours shifted to high-value work, and otherwise in cost savings or, failing both, in pages of reporting eliminated.
The third part was a list. Under acquisition, financial management and information technology headings, OMB rescinded memoranda and policy letters issued between 1992 and 2013, each group with a stated reason. The information technology list included M-08-22, the 2008 guidance on the Federal Desktop Core Configuration for Windows XP and Vista; two security memoranda from 2000 and 2004; a 2009 planning guide toward adoption of Internet Protocol version 6; a section of the 2003 privacy guidance on machine-readable privacy policies; and M-08-23, the 2008 memo on securing the federal government’s Domain Name System infrastructure. For the last of those, OMB wrote that the requirements were outdated and that agencies already should have implemented these security protections.
A memo that rescinds other memos reads like housekeeping. M-18-23 was partly that: it cleared away guidance about Recovery Act reporting, alternative dispute resolution awards and Windows XP settings that no longer described anything agencies did. It also rescinded guidance whose subject was still live, including the 2008 memo that told agencies to secure the Domain Name System, the internet’s directory service that turns names such as an agency’s web address into network addresses.
Our argument is that rescission removes an instruction and a reporting line, not the risk the instruction addressed, and that M-18-23’s own stated reasons sort the rescinded guidance into four groups that leave agencies with four different jobs. Guidance rescinded because its requirements had been met left agencies to keep proving they still met them. Guidance rescinded because something else had superseded it left agencies to follow the requirement to its new home. Guidance rescinded because its occasion had passed left agencies only records to keep. Guidance rescinded with a promise of something better left a gap to manage until the promise arrived. In our reading, nearly every item on the list fits one of those four reasons, because those are the reasons the memo gave; the one partial rescission, which we take separately, is the exception.
We take each group in turn, using the memo’s own words, then look at the reporting the memo asked for in return, test the argument and set out what it means for agency leaders. The memo applied to federal executive agencies. State and local agencies, and the banks and health systems that follow federal practice in their own controls, can read it as a case study. Nothing here is legal advice about what any agency must do.
Met: the DNS memo and the duty to keep proving it
What the 2008 memo had asked for
M-08-23, dated August 22, 2008, set a policy of deploying Domain Name System Security, known as DNSSEC, to all federal information systems by December 2009. DNSSEC adds cryptographic protection to the answers the Domain Name System gives, so that a computer asking where an agency’s website lives can check that the answer was not forged. The memo said the government would sign the top-level .gov domain by January 2009, and that each agency had to develop a plan of action and milestones for deploying DNSSEC to all applicable systems, with all agency .gov domains signed by December 2009.
The plan outline in the memo is the part that has lasted. Section 1 asked each agency to enumerate the second-level domains beneath .gov that it operated or that others operated on its behalf. Section 2 asked it to identify the sources of its DNS services for each domain: in house, outsourced to a commercial provider or delivered by another agency. Section 3 asked it to describe its DNS server infrastructure, including the number of servers from each source. Section 4 asked it to document technical, contractual or operational barriers. The memo said draft plans were due to OMB by September 5, 2008, and that progress would then be tracked through annual reporting under the Federal Information Security Management Act.
What rescission said, and what it did not
M-18-23 described M-08-23 as a memo that provides additional guidance on DNS, specifically focusing on new security protections for the federal DNS. It rescinded it because the requirements were outdated and agencies already should have implemented the protections. That reason is a statement about the past. It says the deadline had come and gone and the work should be done. It does not say the protections had stopped mattering, and it does not say anything about how an agency would show, in 2018 or later, that they were still in place.
For an agency, that distinction is practical. The 2008 memo had created a reason to keep a list of domains, the parties that ran DNS for each one and the servers involved. Rescission removed the instruction that created the list. Unless the agency’s own policy kept the list current, nothing in the central guidance any longer asked for it. The protections the memo required depend on exactly that list: a domain that nobody remembers owning is a domain whose records nobody checks.
Green purchasing: a second example of met
The memo applied the same kind of reason to two green purchasing memoranda from 2008 and 2011, which it said were obsolete because the agency requirements had been met, alongside two others that the Federal Acquisition Regulation had superseded. Met, in that usage, means a reporting exercise had run its course. It does not mean the purchasing behavior it encouraged had become automatic. For any guidance rescinded as met, the question an agency has to answer is whether it still does the thing, and how it would know.
Why met is the hardest group to manage
Of the four groups, met carries the greatest risk, in our assessment, because nothing outside the agency prompts it to keep going. Superseded guidance points to a new source that will be updated and audited. Passed guidance leaves nothing to do. Promised guidance leaves a visible gap that someone will eventually fill. Met guidance leaves a control in place with no current instruction behind it, no reporting line and no deadline. It survives only if the people who run it decide it should.
Controls of that kind drift in predictable ways. Domains are registered for a project and forgotten when the project ends. DNS hosting moves to a new provider in a contract change, and the inventory of who can change records is not updated. Accounts with access to change records accumulate. None of those changes breaks anything that anyone notices, until an attacker uses one of them. The 2008 memo’s plan outline, with its list of domains and DNS sources, was a defense against exactly that drift, and it was the part of the memo with the least reason to retire.
For an agency, the remedy is to restate each met requirement as its own. That can be a line in the agency’s security policy, an entry in its control catalog or a recurring task with an owner. The form matters less than the fact that the requirement now has an author inside the agency who will notice if it lapses.
Superseded: following the requirement to its new home
Security memos older than FISMA 2014
The memo rescinded M-00-07, on incorporating and funding security in information systems investments, and M-04-26, on personal use policies and file sharing technology, so that agencies would implement current guidance. It said both were issued before the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and that “many of their requirements have been superseded by policy and OMB-guidance updates.” It made an exception in a footnote: two sections of M-00-07, titled Principles and Policy, would remain publicly available as informal supplementary information accompanying Circular A-130, imposing no requirements.
A rescission for supersession is the cleanest kind, provided the agency can trace each requirement to where it now lives. The memo’s wording, that many of the requirements had been superseded, leaves open that some had not. An agency that maps an old memo’s requirements to current guidance can see which ones moved and which ones simply ended. An agency that does not map them cannot tell the difference.
IPv6, A-130 and the FAR
The memo rescinded the 2009 Planning Guide and Roadmap toward IPv6 adoption, saying it had been superseded by subsequent OMB guidance, including Circular A-130. It rescinded small business contracting memoranda because the guidance had been incorporated into statute, regulation or other executive branch direction, and it added that agencies remained subject to requirements to give small businesses maximum practicable opportunity to participate. It rescinded two green purchasing documents because the Federal Acquisition Regulation had superseded them.
In each case the memo named, at least in general terms, where the requirement had gone, which makes supersession manageable. The agency’s job is to confirm that its own policies point to the new source rather than the old memo, so that a policy citing a rescinded memo does not become, unnoticed, a policy with no authority behind it.
Passed: guidance whose occasion had ended
Several groups on the list concerned events that were over. The memo rescinded twelve memoranda on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act because they were outdated, and an interim guidance document on contractor Recovery Act reports because the funds were no longer available. It rescinded a 2013 controller alert on internal controls for Hurricane Sandy disaster relief because funds had been disbursed or guidance superseded. It rescinded memos about alternative dispute resolution awards because the awards were no longer applicable, and memoranda on strategic sourcing issued between 2005 and 2012 because they focused narrowly on strategic sourcing and were therefore outdated.
For these, rescission is genuinely housekeeping. The only remaining duty is to the records the guidance produced: the reports, plans and evidence agencies made while it applied. Those records remain subject to records schedules and may matter in audits or disputes about the period they covered. An agency should keep them as the schedules require, and it should stop citing the rescinded memos as current authority.
The financial management section shows a variation. OMB said that its June 2018 revision of Appendix A to Circular A-123 eliminated over 100 pages of guidance and superseded a list of earlier documents, and that all associated memoranda and guidance related to the previous Appendix A were retained as best practices to be adopted at the discretion of management. That sentence turns former requirements into options. It leaves each agency to decide which of them it keeps, and the decision is worth recording, because an auditor reading the old guidance will want to know which parts the agency chose to drop.
Promised: a gap until new guidance arrived
The desktop configuration memo
M-08-22, dated August 11, 2008, had told agencies about version 1.0 of the Federal Desktop Core Configuration, a set of security settings for Windows XP and Windows Vista developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology with the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security, checkable with automated content. M-18-23 rescinded it, saying it specified standards for operating systems used by federal agencies and had been issued when the predominant operating systems were Windows XP and Windows Vista. It said OMB was committed to providing standards that could be carried forward through multiple generations of operating system, and that OMB would issue a new policy designed to accommodate future generations of operating system.
This kind of rescission works differently. The memo acknowledged that the subject still needed guidance and promised it, without giving a date. Between the rescission and the new policy, the requirement to use secure baseline configurations did not disappear from the broader security framework, but the specific central instruction did. An agency in that gap had to decide for itself which baseline it applied to current operating systems and how it would show that its computers matched it.
IT cost savings
The memo did the same for M-06-22, a 2006 memo on cost savings achieved through e-government and line of business initiatives. OMB said the memo no longer reflected current methods for budgeting and cost accounting and that it was committed to replacing it with guidance broadly applicable and compatible with current data-submission practices. Again the subject stayed and the instruction went, with a replacement promised.
For guidance in this group, we think the right response is to treat the rescinded memo as the agency’s own interim standard, adapted to current technology, until the promised guidance appears. That keeps the control in place and gives the agency something definite to show an inspector general.
What the memo asked for in return
M-18-23 removed reporting and also added some. Its first section added a reporting line of its own: semi-annual updates on burden-reduction initiatives, with instructions on a MAX Community page dedicated to the effort, which also offered examples. The memo said these updates were not intended to be burdensome reporting requirements and that agencies had discretion over the activities, measurement methods and reporting that best fit their strategies. Where feasible, agencies were to report progress in hours of full-time-equivalent work shifted to high-value work.
The measure matters for how an agency treats the controls behind rescinded guidance. Hours shifted away from compliance work count as progress under that measure. Hours spent keeping a DNS inventory current, after the memo that asked for it was rescinded, do not obviously count as anything. A measure built on hours saved can, without anyone intending it, reward dropping work that still protected the agency. We do not suggest that was the memo’s aim. Its own text named mission outcomes as the goal. But an agency setting its own targets should make sure that work which keeps a control alive is not scored as low-value simply because the memo that once required it is gone.
The memo’s second section showed the central agencies doing the same exercise on themselves. It reported that OMB had eliminated 83 data fields from IT investment reporting in fiscal year 2016, and in fiscal year 2017 had dropped the requirement for business cases for IT infrastructure, IT security and IT management costs, which it said made up approximately 40 percent of the total IT portfolio, in favor of more strategic data collection suited to commodity IT. It said fiscal year 2022 was the target for full implementation of Technology Business Management across the government. Those changes moved IT security spending out of one kind of reporting and into another. An agency’s own oversight of that spending did not have to move with it.
Partial rescission: the privacy policy section
One item on the list did not fit neatly into a single group, and the memo explained why. OMB partially rescinded M-03-22, its 2003 guidance for implementing the privacy provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002. It said the memo provided valuable implementation guidance on specific privacy requirements that were relevant and should continue to be actively enforced, while certain other requirements were outdated and no longer in use. It removed only Section IV of the memo’s attachment, on privacy policies in machine-readable formats, and kept its other requirements.
A partial rescission is a precise tool, and it shows what the other items could have looked like. It names exactly what goes, gives the reason and says in plain words that the rest stays and should be enforced. An agency reading it has no doubt about what to do: stop maintaining the machine-readable privacy policy format the section described, and keep doing everything else the 2003 guidance required.
The DNS memo could have been handled the same way. OMB could have retired the 2009 deadlines and the 2008 plan submissions while saying that the inventory of domains and DNS providers, and the protections themselves, remained expected. It chose a full rescission with a reason about the past. The contrast is useful to any agency writing its own policy cleanup: a rescission that says what survives is worth the extra sentence.
The central agencies’ own cuts
The memo’s second section is easy to skip, but it shows how burden reduction worked when the central agencies applied it to themselves, and where it moved risk.
Human capital and workforce data
OPM said the process for certifying candidates for the Senior Executive Service through Qualification Review Boards delayed the entry of qualified executives, at times for months, and that it would develop a proof of concept for alternative assessment methods, test it in the first quarter of fiscal year 2019 and, if successful, run pilots in the second quarter. It also said it would assess, by the end of fiscal year 2019, the need for the workforce data reports it collects from agencies and their frequency, and would work with Congress where statutory changes were needed.
Workforce data is a good example of reporting that also serves as a control. Agencies use the same data to know who holds which roles, which matters for access management and separation of duties. Reducing what OPM collects does not reduce what an agency needs to know about its own workforce. The agency should keep the internal data even where the central report goes away.
Procurement and post-award reporting
On procurement, the memo said that almost two-thirds of federal contracting dollars, over $300 billion each year, supported common goods and services that every agency needs, and that agencies were using category management to reduce duplicative contracts. It said OMB intended to modernize operations through automation technologies like robotic process automation and artificial intelligence to execute repetitive administrative tasks, using data and process standards to be completed in 2018. It also described a central capability, built with GSA, for contractors to report post-award data required under the Federal Acquisition Regulation to one location rather than thousands.
Each of those changes moves work from people to systems or from thousands of places to one. The change is efficient, and it also concentrates risk. A software robot that executes contracting tasks needs credentials and permissions, and its actions need logs and review like any user’s. A central reporting point holds data from thousands of contractors. In our reading, burden reduction through automation should come with the access controls, monitoring and data protection that the automated work now needs, and those controls belong in the plan from the start.
Payment integrity and the Do Not Pay privacy memo
In financial management, the memo noted that OMB had released a revised Appendix C to Circular A-123 on payment integrity in June 2018, as M-18-20, consolidating 78 pages of earlier guidance into one document. The guidance it replaced included M-13-20, Protecting Privacy while Reducing Improper Payments with the Do Not Pay Initiative. It was a supersession in which a memo with privacy in its title was folded into a broader payment integrity document.
Supersession of that kind is where mapping earns its keep. An agency whose privacy program cited M-13-20 for its Do Not Pay controls needs to find where those protections now sit in the consolidated guidance and confirm they are still there in the form it relied on. If the consolidated text is shorter, the agency should check whether anything it treated as a requirement became a matter of discretion.
A register of rescissions
The practical tool our argument points to is a register: a short record, kept by the agency’s policy or compliance office, of every central guidance document that is rescinded, withdrawn or superseded and that touched the agency’s controls. We suggest five fields. The register is our recommendation; no rule we know of requires it.
- The rescinded document, the rescinding document and the date.
- The reason the rescinding document gave, sorted into met, superseded, passed or promised.
- The controls or internal policies that cited the rescinded document.
- The agency’s decision for each control: keep as an internal requirement, map to a named new source, retire with records kept, or adopt an interim standard pending new guidance.
- The owner of each decision and the date it will be reviewed.
A register like this is small. For M-18-23, an agency would have needed entries only for the items that touched controls it ran, which for an IT organization means the security, configuration, DNS, IPv6 and privacy items. The value is in what it prevents: a control that ends by default because the memo behind it ended, with nobody having decided that it should.
The register also gives the agency a ready answer when an inspector general or auditor asks why a control exists, or why it no longer does. Instead of citing a memo that is gone, the agency can cite its own decision, with the reason and the date.
How to tell which group a rescission falls into
The four groups are useful only if an agency can sort each rescinded item quickly. We suggest four questions, asked in order, about any rescinded memo.
- Does the rescission say the requirements were met or should already have been implemented? Then it is in the first group, and the agency needs a way to keep showing that they still are.
- Does it say the requirements were superseded or incorporated elsewhere? Then it is in the second group, and the agency needs to map each requirement to its new source and update its policies to cite that source.
- Does it say the occasion has ended: funds disbursed, awards no longer given, a program finished? Then it is in the third group, and the agency needs only to keep the records the schedules require.
- Does it promise new guidance? Then it is in the fourth group, and the agency needs an interim standard of its own until the new guidance arrives.
The same questions work for any future rescission list, from OMB or from any regulator. The point of asking them is to keep a decision about paperwork from becoming, by default, a decision about controls.
Objections: burden, duplication and trust
Agencies should be trusted to keep what matters
One objection is that agencies do not need a memo to tell them to keep their DNS records current, and that treating rescission as risky assumes agencies will stop doing sensible things the moment they are no longer told to. We agree that capable agencies kept the work going. The concern is about the rest, and about turnover: a new team inheriting a DNS service has no way to know that a rescinded memo once required an inventory unless the agency’s own policy says so.
Old memos really were clutter
A second objection is that the list was largely obsolete material, and clearing it helped agencies find the guidance that applied. That is right for the third group, and the memo said as much: it rescinded some memoranda so that agencies could more easily identify relevant guidance. Our argument does not quarrel with clearing clutter. It asks only that items in the first and fourth groups be recognized as different from clutter.
Security requirements live elsewhere anyway
A third objection is that security controls such as DNS protections are set by standards and statute, not by OMB memos, so rescinding a memo changes nothing. M-08-23 itself pointed to NIST guidance and the security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53. But the memo added a deadline, a scope covering all agency .gov domains and an inventory outline that the standards did not specify in the same way. Rescission removed those additions. Whether the general standard was enough without them is the question an agency had to answer for itself.
The hours measure was voluntary
A fourth objection is that the memo gave agencies wide discretion in how to report, so our concern about the hours measure overstates its pull. The discretion was real. Still, measures shape behavior even when they are flexible, and the memo’s preferred unit was hours shifted. An agency can keep the discretion working in its favor by saying in its reports which control work it chose to keep and why.
Emergency directives are the backstop
A fifth objection is that the government has a backstop for exactly this case. If a retired control turns out to matter, DHS can issue an emergency directive, as CISA did for DNS in January 2019. The directive did work as a backstop. But a backstop sets deadlines measured in business days, under conditions an agency does not choose. The DNS directive gave agencies 10 business days to audit records for every domain they managed. An agency that had kept its 2008 inventory current could meet that from its records. An agency that had let it lapse had to rebuild it under an emergency deadline, while attackers were already using the weakness.
The cost of keeping a control alive between memos is small and spread out. The cost of rebuilding it under a directive is large and arrives all at once. In our reading, that asymmetry is the strongest practical reason to treat a rescission as a decision point rather than an ending.
Reading a rescission list as a risk review
A rescission list is read first for what it removes. We suggest reading it a second time for what it reveals. Every item on M-18-23’s list was guidance that someone once thought necessary, and the reason given for removing it says something about the state of the risk it addressed.
Read that way, the IT section of the list was a short tour of federal infrastructure risk in 2018. The desktop configuration memo pointed to the question of how agencies set secure baselines for current operating systems. The IPv6 roadmap pointed to an unfinished network transition. The pre-2014 security memos pointed to how far policy had moved since the modernization act. The DNS memo pointed to an internet-facing service whose integrity every agency website and email system depends on. An agency CIO who reviewed the list for those questions in August 2018 would have had a useful agenda for the year, whatever the agency decided about each item.
The same reading works for the financial and acquisition items. The payment integrity consolidation pointed to the privacy controls around the Do Not Pay initiative. The procurement automation plans pointed to new credentials and access for software robots. In each case, the rescission or consolidation was a moment to check that the agency’s controls matched its current risk as well as its current paperwork.
How the argument travels beyond federal agencies
State and local agencies
State and local agencies were not bound by M-18-23. Where a state program has adopted federal guidance as its own standard and a federal memo it cites is rescinded, the state policy keeps citing it unless someone updates it. The four questions apply directly: a state agency should decide for each borrowed requirement whether to keep it as its own, map it to a new source or retire it.
Banks and health systems
Banks and health systems face the same pattern when regulators withdraw or replace guidance. A withdrawn guidance document may have been the reason a control existed, and an audit program may still test against it. The safe course is the same: sort each withdrawn item by the reason given, and keep or replace the controls that still address a live risk, documenting the decision so that a later examiner can see it was deliberate.
The DNS example carries over directly. A bank or health system depends on its domains for online services, patient portals and email in the same way an agency does, and, in our reading, the tampering technique CISA described in 2019 could work against any organization whose DNS accounts could be taken over. Whether or not any rule told such an organization to keep a list of its domains and of who can change their records, the list is what it would need on the day a similar campaign reached it.
What we would ask a federal CIO today
- For each OMB memo rescinded in recent years that touched a control we run, do we know which of the four groups it fell into, and is that recorded?
- Do our own policies still cite any rescinded memo as authority, and if so, have we adopted its requirement as our own or mapped it to a current source?
- For the DNS service in particular, can we produce today the list M-08-23 asked for in 2008: every domain we operate, who runs DNS for it and on what infrastructure?
- Do our burden-reduction targets distinguish between work that only produced reports and work that kept a control alive?
In our view, an agency that can answer those questions from its records has taken the benefit of a rescission list without paying for it in lost controls.
With hindsight
The DNS item on the list came back in January 2019. On January 22, 2019, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued Emergency Directive 19-01, Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering. CISA said it was tracking a series of incidents involving DNS infrastructure tampering and was aware of multiple executive branch agency domains affected by the campaign. It described the technique: the attacker compromises or obtains the credentials of an account that can change DNS records, alters records such as address, mail exchanger or name server records to point to infrastructure the attacker controls, and can then obtain valid encryption certificates for the agency’s domain names, so that redirected traffic can be decrypted without users seeing any warning.
The directive’s required actions read like the inventory M-08-23 had asked for, applied under emergency deadlines. Within 10 business days, agencies had to audit public DNS records for all .gov or other agency-managed domains on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, change the passwords for all accounts on systems that could change their DNS records and add multi-factor authentication to those accounts. In the same period CISA was to begin delivering newly logged certificates for agency domains, and agencies were to begin monitoring that certificate transparency data, on receipt, for certificates they had not requested. Agencies had to submit a status report by January 25, 2019 and a completion report by February 5, 2019. Every one of those actions required the agency to know its domains and the parties and systems that could change their records. The 2008 plan outline had asked agencies to enumerate much of that: their domains, who provided DNS for each and the servers involved.
The government’s later handling of IPv6, a subject that also appeared on the list, shows a different way to rescind. On November 19, 2020, OMB issued M-21-07, Completing the Transition to Internet Protocol Version 6. It rescinded a 2005 memo and a 2010 memo on IPv6, but it said that two actions from the 2010 memo were still relevant and that agencies were required to address them in future transition plans: upgrading public-facing servers and services, including DNS, to native IPv6 by the end of fiscal year 2012, and upgrading internal client applications by the end of fiscal year 2014. It said OMB expected agencies that had not completed those actions to do so as soon as possible. It also set new targets: at least 20 percent of IP-enabled assets on federal networks operating in IPv6-only environments by the end of fiscal year 2023, 50 percent by the end of fiscal year 2024 and 80 percent by the end of fiscal year 2025.
That is the model our argument points to: a rescission that names which requirements survive. M-18-23 had treated the DNS memo as finished. M-21-07 rescinded two earlier IPv6 memos and carried the 2010 memo’s unfinished obligations forward in plain words.
DNS also came back into central guidance in its own right. On January 26, 2022, OMB’s zero trust memo, M-22-09, said that agencies must resolve DNS queries using encrypted DNS wherever technically supported, and must enforce HTTPS for all web and API traffic, as part of a strategy with objectives to be met by the end of fiscal year 2024.
What held up from M-18-23 is the case for clearing guidance whose occasion had passed; nobody needed the Recovery Act reporting memos back. What did not hold up is the idea that a requirement already met could be retired without a way to keep showing it was met. The domains that agencies were no longer told to enumerate in August 2018 were the subject of Action One in CISA’s January 2019 directive, which told them to audit the public records of every one.
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