M-19-16 put a business case between agencies and their next back-office buy
OMB’s April 2019 shared services memo moved no payroll and no ledger. What it changed first was procurement: once a QSMO was named for a function, an agency needed four approvals and a better-value case to buy on its own.
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Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
OMB’s April 2019 shared services memo moved no payroll and no ledger. What it changed first was procurement: once a QSMO was named for a function, an agency needed four approvals and a better-value case to buy on its own.
- The week On April 26, 2019, the Office of Management and Budget issued memorandum M-19-16, “Centralized Mission Support Capabilities for the Federal Government,” to the heads of executive departments and agencies.
- The agency as a buyer: a solicitation gate with four keys The restriction was specific.
- The agency as a provider: legacy centers needed a partner’s consent The memo described the government’s existing model as a network of legacy providers, some designated and some self-selected, that delivered specific shared services to other agencies.
- The agency as a standards contributor: the SAPOC and the business standards The memo asked every agency to designate a SAPOC within 30 days.
- The agency as an employer: people affected on a 24-to-36-month horizon The memo tied the strategy to two other management agenda goals, on the workforce and on shifting from low-value to high-value work.
- Four questions the memo left to the QSMOs The memo set up a process and a governance model.
- Where the argument is weakest The solicitation restriction applied only once a QSMO had been pre-designated for a function.
- How it played out by kind of agency Departments that ran legacy shared service centers faced the memo from both sides.
- With hindsight OMB did name QSMOs.
The week
On April 26, 2019, the Office of Management and Budget issued memorandum M-19-16, “Centralized Mission Support Capabilities for the Federal Government,” to the heads of executive departments and agencies. It set out a new strategy for shared services: the back-office work, such as hiring transactions, financial management, travel and payroll, that every agency performs and that OMB wanted fewer agencies to perform for everyone else.
The memo placed the strategy under the President’s Management Agenda and its Sharing Quality Services cross-agency priority goal. It gave the scale of the problem in its own terms. Common mission-support services, it said, cost taxpayers more than $25 billion a year, were delivered largely by agencies themselves, and produced duplicated contracts, staff and technology across hundreds of locations. It reported that 38 percent of federal leaders reported low satisfaction with mission-support services, citing the annual customer satisfaction survey. Pointing to private-sector experience, it said the government could potentially realize financial benefits of 5 to 30 percent, after some initial costs.
The memo did five things. It described the process and intended outcomes for shared services. It set up a process for designating agencies as Quality Service Management Offices, or QSMOs. It established the governance model, including a Shared Services Governance Board and a Business Standards Council. It asked agencies to designate a Senior Accountable Point of Contact, or SAPOC, within 30 days. And it rescinded four earlier OMB documents: M-13-08 on financial systems shared services (March 25, 2013), M-16-11 on administrative functions (May 4, 2016), and two unnumbered memos from 2006 and 2009 on the Information Systems Security Line of Business.
A QSMO, in the memo’s design, is a lead agency that OMB designates for a function once OMB and the General Services Administration judge the function mature enough to centralize. The QSMO offers and manages a marketplace of technology, services or fully managed services; governs those offerings over the long term; helps agencies build a business case where no marketplace solution yet exists; runs a customer feedback model; and drives common standards. Each designated agency had to submit a five-year implementation plan, and final designation depended on OMB approving it.
Two provisions reached past the QSMOs themselves. Existing providers, which the memo called legacy providers, would need a joint business case with the QSMO, approved by OMB, before taking new customers, expanding services or investing in technology for a function that had a designated or pre-designated QSMO. And once a QSMO was pre-designated for a function, agencies were not to issue new solicitations for new or modernized technology or services in that function unless they had a business case, approved by the agency’s SAPOC, its CIO, the QSMO and OMB, showing that a separate procurement gave better value, considering price, timeline and other factors. A footnote to the legacy provider rule said priority would go to critical operational, security and maintenance patches; a footnote to the solicitation rule left the review threshold to the QSMO for its area.
The memo also addressed people. Parent agencies of affected providers were to plan human capital changes for implementation over the next 24 to 36 months, with a framework and standards from the Office of Personnel Management, and to identify employees whose roles might change.
Shared services memos have a long history in federal management, and M-19-16 said as much when it rescinded two of its predecessors. Read as a statement of intent, it promised what earlier memos had promised: fewer systems, common standards, better service and lower cost. Read as an instruction, it did something narrower and more immediate. It put a gate in front of an agency’s next purchase.
The gate was the business case. Once OMB pre-designated a QSMO for a function, an agency that wanted to buy new or modernized technology or services for that function on its own needed a written case that a separate procurement gave better value. That case needed four approvals: the agency’s own senior accountable point of contact, its CIO, the QSMO and OMB. No payroll moved and no ledger migrated on April 26, 2019. But from the day a QSMO was named for a function, an agency’s modernization plan in that function became something it had to justify against a marketplace it did not control.
Our argument is that the memo’s first real effect on an agency was on its procurement and investment planning, not on its operations, and that an agency CIO or chief financial officer should have read it that way. The memo asked an agency to play four roles, which do not overlap and together cover its exposure. First, the agency as a buyer, facing the solicitation gate. Second, the agency as a provider, if it ran a legacy shared service center. Third, the agency as a contributor to standards, through its SAPOC and the Business Standards Council. Fourth, the agency as an employer, planning for staff whose work would change. We take each in turn, then test the argument against its strongest objections and look at how it applied to different kinds of agency.
The memo applied to executive departments and agencies, and its readiness assessments were required of CFO Act agencies and optional for small agencies. It did not bind state or local governments, though state CIOs running their own shared service programs faced many of the same choices. Agencies should confirm with their general counsel and OMB desk officers how any designation applies to them, especially where appropriations language directs a particular agency to serve others, for which the memo said OMB would provide exceptions.
The agency as a buyer: a solicitation gate with four keys
What the gate covered
The restriction was specific. It applied to new solicitations for new or modernized technology or services in a function for which a QSMO had been pre-designated. It did not, on its face, stop an agency from operating or maintaining what it already had. The memo’s one word on patches came in a footnote to the legacy provider rule, which gave priority to critical operational, security and maintenance patches to sustain critical operations; we read the solicitation gate the same way, though the memo did not say so there. It did stop an agency from launching a fresh modernization of, say, its core financial system without first showing why the QSMO’s marketplace would not serve.
The memo also left the review threshold to the QSMO for its functional area. That meant an agency could not know, from the memo alone, how small a purchase had to be to fall below the gate. A CIO planning a budget cycle would have had to ask, function by function, what the QSMO considered reviewable. Until a QSMO published its threshold, the cautious reading was that any meaningful new acquisition in the function was in scope.
Better value, judged by others
The test the memo set was better value, considering price, timeline and other appropriate factors. That is a familiar procurement standard, but here it had an unusual audience. An agency would make the case to the QSMO, which offered the competing solution, and to OMB, which wanted the strategy to work. The agency’s own CIO and SAPOC also had to approve, so the case had to survive internal and external review.
We think agencies should have prepared these cases before they needed them. A business case for a separate procurement is strongest when it rests on a documented requirement the marketplace cannot meet: a statutory function unique to the agency, an integration with a mission system, a security or data residency requirement, or a timeline the QSMO cannot match. It is weakest when it rests on preference for an incumbent vendor or on the cost of migration alone. The memo’s logic treated migration cost as an investment the government had already decided to make.
Timing and the budget cycle
Federal budgets are planned well ahead of execution. An agency that had built a modernization request into its budget submission before a QSMO was pre-designated could find, by the time the money arrived, that it needed a business case to spend it. The practical step was to map each mission-support function to its likely QSMO status and to flag every planned acquisition in a function where designation was possible. That map belonged with the CFO and the senior procurement executive as well as the CIO, because the gate sat on contracts and money as much as on technology.
What a good business case contained
The memo pointed agencies to GSA’s shared services site for business case processes rather than prescribing a template. Whatever the template, a defensible case would compare total cost over a realistic period, including migration and exit costs; set out the timeline for each option; name the requirements the marketplace options did and did not meet, with evidence; and assess risk, including the risk of depending on another agency’s provider. It would also say what the agency would do if the QSMO’s offering improved, so that a separate procurement did not become a permanent exception by default.
The contract terms that followed
An agency that won approval for a separate procurement still had reason to write the contract with the strategy in mind. Data portability, standard interfaces aligned to the government-wide business standards, and an exit path at reasonable cost would all make a later move to a shared solution cheaper. A contract that locked an agency into a proprietary data model for a decade would make the next business case harder, and OMB would know it.
Keeping a record of the decision
Whatever the outcome, an approved or rejected business case is a record an inspector general, the Government Accountability Office or a later administration may ask to see. It shows why public money was spent one way rather than another. We would keep each case, its supporting analysis, the approvals and any conditions attached in the agency’s official records, with the acquisition file, so that the reasoning survives staff turnover. An agency that cannot later show why it bought separately, or why it moved to a shared provider that then underperformed, has a weaker answer to oversight than one that can produce the analysis it relied on at the time.
Contracts already in flight
The gate applied to new solicitations. An agency part way through a multi-year contract with option periods for, say, a human resources system faced a slower version of the same question. Exercising an option is not a new solicitation, but the agency would eventually need to recompete or replace the system, and the memo meant that decision would happen under the new rules. We would review every mission-support contract with options or an end date inside the planning horizon, note which functions might see a QSMO, and decide early whether to prepare a business case or a migration plan. Waiting until the final option year would leave too little time for either.
Inside the agency, the gate needed an owner
Because the business case needed approval from the SAPOC and the CIO as well as from the QSMO and OMB, the agency itself had to decide who prepared it and how it moved. Without a defined internal route, cases would stall between the program office that wanted the purchase, the CIO who controlled the technology budget and the SAPOC who coordinated the strategy. A short internal procedure, naming who drafts, who reviews and what evidence is required, would have prevented the gate from becoming a queue.
The agency as a provider: legacy centers needed a partner’s consent
Growth tied to the QSMO
The memo described the government’s existing model as a network of legacy providers, some designated and some self-selected, that delivered specific shared services to other agencies. It did not shut them down. It said that, as QSMOs became operational, some legacy providers might keep offering technology or services for a finite period. But for any function with a designated or pre-designated QSMO, a legacy provider needed a joint business case with the QSMO, approved by OMB, before it accepted new customers, expanded services to existing ones or invested in technology or services for that function.
For the departments that ran these centers, the effect was to tie their growth plans to another agency’s agreement. A provider that had been marketing its payroll or accounting service to small agencies could no longer sign a new customer on its own authority. A provider that needed to replace an aging platform could not make that investment without a joint case. A footnote gave priority to critical operational, security and maintenance patches to sustain critical operations, which kept the lights on, but the rule moved strategic decisions about the provider’s future outside the parent department.
Customers of legacy providers
Agencies that bought services from a legacy provider had their own exposure. If the provider could not invest without a joint business case, the customer agency’s service roadmap now depended on that case being approved. A customer expecting a platform upgrade, a new module or better reporting had reason to ask its provider directly whether the planned work needed QSMO and OMB approval and when that would be settled. That question belonged in the service agreement review, not in a hallway.
A path, not a deadline
The memo asked legacy providers to work with QSMOs, OMB and GSA on a longer-term path to modernization and organizational efficiency, in a measured and coordinated fashion. It set no date by which legacy providers had to stop. That left room for a provider to become part of a QSMO’s marketplace rather than a competitor to it. A department running a legacy center would have been wise to decide early which of the two it wanted to be, because the joint business case process would favor a provider whose plans fit the QSMO’s.
Evidence a provider would need
A legacy provider making a joint business case needed the same evidence an outside vendor would: unit costs, service levels achieved, customer satisfaction, security posture and a modernization plan. Providers that had run on informal cost allocations and handshake service levels would find the exercise harder. We think the memo rewarded providers that already measured themselves the way a customer would.
Pricing a provider’s own costs honestly
A legacy provider’s rates to customer agencies may not have covered the full cost of running and modernizing the service, especially where a parent department absorbed overhead or deferred investment. A joint business case would expose that. A provider whose true unit cost was higher than its rate card would struggle to justify new investment; one whose cost was lower would have an argument for growth. The parent department’s CFO needed to know which situation it was in before the provider sat down with the QSMO, because the answer would shape whether the department argued to grow the center, fold it into a marketplace or wind it down.
The agency as a standards contributor: the SAPOC and the business standards
A named point of contact
The memo asked every agency to designate a SAPOC within 30 days. The role was to coordinate across mission-support functions and with program offices, drive the agency’s participation in developing standards, receive and distribute communications about shared services, and coordinate the agency’s strategy for adopting centralized services. The SAPOC was also one of the four approvers of any business case for a separate procurement.
The choice of SAPOC mattered more than the memo’s short description suggested. A SAPOC who sat in the CFO’s office would see financial management clearly and human resources less so. One placed in the CIO’s office might treat the strategy as a technology program. The memo’s design called for someone who could speak across the chief officer councils, which in our view argued for a senior official reporting to the deputy secretary or chief operating officer, with clear authority to convene the CFO, CIO, chief human capital officer and senior procurement executive.
Standards that would bind later
The Business Standards Council, made up of OMB-designated functional leads, was to design an integrated, end-to-end future state for mission-support activities, following the Federal Integrated Business Framework to identify common capabilities. The memo said data standards for business management would remain under the governance of their existing policy offices and communities. It also noted that the governance board would draw on work done by the DATA Act executive steering committee.
An agency that stayed out of standards work would inherit standards written by others. Those standards would shape what the QSMO marketplaces offered, which in turn would shape what the agency could buy without a business case. For a CIO or CFO, sending capable people to the standards process was a way to influence the gate before reaching it. An agency with unusual requirements, such as a fee-funded organization or one with complex reimbursable agreements, stood to lose the largest share of their requirements from standards that ignored them.
Readiness assessments
The memo said the government would assess the maturity of agencies’ processes against government-wide standards, with input from all CFO Act agencies, and that OMB and GSA would analyze the results to decide whether centralizing a function would offer efficiencies. Those assessments were the factual basis for designations. An agency that answered them carelessly, or overstated its maturity, would affect decisions it would later live under. We would treat the assessment as an inventory exercise with an owner and a review, the same way an agency treats a data call from an inspector general.
The data under the standards
Standards for business processes are only as useful as the data that moves between systems. An agency planning to buy from a QSMO marketplace would need to map its own data, such as its chart of accounts, position data or grant records, to the government-wide standards. That mapping work could start before any designation and would pay off whichever way the agency went. It would also make a separate-procurement business case more credible, because the agency could show exactly where its requirements departed from the standard.
Learning from other agencies’ choices
The governance model gave GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy the job of making information and best practices available to support adoption of shared solutions. For an agency facing a decision, the experience of agencies that had already moved a function, or had tried and stepped back, was some of the best evidence available. We think a SAPOC should have gathered that experience deliberately: which migrations worked, what they cost against plan, what service levels customers actually received. That evidence would strengthen whichever business case the agency eventually made.
The agency as an employer: people affected on a 24-to-36-month horizon
What the memo asked
The memo tied the strategy to two other management agenda goals, on the workforce and on shifting from low-value to high-value work. It required agencies to begin planning a new approach to delivering mission-support services by shifting resources to higher-value work and reducing duplication. Parent agencies of affected providers were to conduct human capital planning for implementation over the next 24 to 36 months, using a framework and standards OPM would establish.
Parent agencies of legacy providers were to work with QSMO agencies to identify employees whose roles might change. The memo listed options that could range from moving with the work to a QSMO marketplace, to consideration for other roles in the region, to training programs for new roles in the parent agency. It made parent agencies responsible for connecting affected employees to those options and supporting their decisions.
Why this was the slowest part
Technology migrations can be planned to a schedule. Workforce changes in the federal government are governed by personnel rules, labor agreements where they apply, and the practical limits of retraining. A finance office that would eventually buy accounting services from a QSMO marketplace still needed people to manage that relationship, reconcile accounts and answer auditors. The work changed shape rather than disappearing. An agency that planned only the system move and not the new roles would find itself with a migrated system and an organization built for the old one.
Skills to build first
The roles that grow in a shared services model are the ones that manage a provider: service-level management, contract and interagency agreement oversight, data quality and reconciliation, and business analysis that translates program needs into requests a QSMO can act on. We think agencies should have begun training for those roles as soon as the memo appeared, because they would be needed whether the agency moved to a shared provider or made a business case to buy separately.
Labor relations and timing
Where employees in an affected office are represented by a union, changes in work assignments can carry obligations to notify and bargain under federal labor relations law and the agency’s agreements. The memo did not address this, and the details depend on each agreement. Agencies should have involved their labor relations staff and counsel early, so that the 24-to-36-month planning window included the time those processes need.
Communication
The memo gave OPM a mailbox for workforce planning questions and asked agencies to support employee decision making. For staff in a legacy provider, uncertainty about the future would arrive before any decision did. Clear, early communication about what was and was not decided would have reduced the risk of losing the experienced people every option depended on.
Small steps that kept options open
Some preparation cost little and helped under any outcome. Cleaning up master data, such as vendor records, employee records and the chart of accounts, made both migration and a separate modernization cheaper. Documenting current business processes against the government-wide framework showed where the agency was standard and where it was not. Retiring local customizations that no longer served a requirement reduced the gap a marketplace would have to close. These steps committed an agency to no path, and each one made the eventual business case faster to write and easier to defend.
Four questions the memo left to the QSMOs
The memo set up a process and a governance model. It left several practical questions for each QSMO to answer, and an agency deciding whether to buy from a marketplace or make a business case needed answers to all of them. They are separate questions, and together they cover what a customer agency takes on when it moves a function to someone else.
Who pays, and how the price is set
The memo said QSMOs should offer competitive solutions and that the strategy should reduce costs to agency customers. It did not set a pricing model. Shared services in government are paid for through interagency agreements and fee-for-service arrangements, and the customer agency’s budget office has to plan for those charges. An agency needed to know how a QSMO marketplace offering would be priced, how prices could change and what notice it would receive. Without that, a business case comparing the marketplace to a separate procurement would compare a known contract price to an estimate.
What service the customer could hold the provider to
The memo asked QSMOs to institute a customer engagement and feedback model for continuous improvement and performance management. That is a commitment to listen. It is different from a service-level agreement with remedies. A customer agency moving its core financial processing to a shared provider still answers for its own financial statements and its own audit. It needed service levels for availability, processing times, reporting and support, and a route to escalate when they were missed. The memo named the Shared Services Governance Board as the escalation point for standards disputes; operational disputes would need their own path, written into the agreement.
Who owned the data and the security authorization
When an agency’s financial or personnel records sit in another agency’s system, two questions follow. The first is ownership and access: the customer agency needs its data for its own reporting, audits, records management and any later move, in a usable format and on its own schedule. The second is security. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act makes the head of each agency responsible for protecting information collected or maintained on the agency’s behalf and information systems operated on its behalf by a contractor or other organization. A customer agency relying on a shared provider would need to review the provider’s security authorization and decide whether to accept it, and it would need incident notification terms that let it meet its own reporting duties. We would put both points in the interagency agreement before migration, not after.
How a customer could leave
The memo described a path toward fewer providers and more standardization. It said less about what happens when a provider underperforms or when a better option appears. An agency moving a function should know, before it moves, how it would get its data and processes back out, at what cost and with what notice. Exit terms protect the customer and also discipline the provider, which is part of what the memo meant by competitive solutions. A marketplace that offered several solutions within a function, as the memo envisioned, made exit within the marketplace possible; a marketplace with one offering made it harder.
Why these questions belong in the business case
Each of these questions also bears on the separate-procurement business case. An agency arguing for its own acquisition could point to gaps in pricing transparency, service commitments, data terms or exit rights as risks the marketplace option carried. An agency choosing the marketplace could point to answers on each as evidence of a sound decision. Either way, the four questions turned a policy debate into terms that could be written down, compared and approved by the four parties the memo required.
Where the argument is weakest
The gate depended on designations that might not come
The solicitation restriction applied only once a QSMO had been pre-designated for a function. In April 2019 the memo named none. An agency could reasonably argue that until OMB acted, nothing changed. That is correct as far as it goes. Our reply is that budgets and acquisitions are planned years ahead, so an agency buying in a likely function needed to plan for the gate before it existed. The memo pointed to GSA’s site for designations in their various phases, a signal that designations were expected.
Better value is a standard agencies already apply
A second objection is that every federal acquisition already has to show value, so the memo added little. The difference was who judged it. A separate procurement now needed the approval of the QSMO and OMB as well as the agency, and the comparison point was a specific government marketplace rather than the commercial field in general. That changed the evidence an agency needed and the time it took to assemble it.
Earlier memos did not stick
A third objection is history. The memo itself rescinded two shared services memos from 2013 and 2016. A skeptical CIO could expect this one to fade too. We think that skepticism was reasonable about the outcomes and unwise about the process. Even if the strategy delivered less than promised, the business case requirement would bind any agency that wanted to buy in a designated function for as long as the memo stood.
Security work could be caught
A fourth concern is that a gate on modernization could slow security improvements. The gate covered new solicitations for new or modernized technology or services, which on its face leaves routine fixes under existing contracts alone; the footnote giving priority to critical operational, security and maintenance patches sat under the legacy provider rule. A larger security modernization in a designated function, such as a new identity integration for a financial system, would still need a case. Agencies should have documented security requirements explicitly in any business case so that reviewers could weigh them.
The marketplaces might not be ready in time
A fifth objection is practical. A QSMO had to submit and win approval for a five-year plan before final designation, and a marketplace takes time to stock with offerings. An agency whose system was failing could not wait. The memo anticipated this: it said agencies with legacy system concerns or resource challenges might need to act before QSMOs were fully functional, and the business case route was the way to do so. The objection argues for preparing the case early, not for ignoring the gate.
How it played out by kind of agency
Large departments with their own centers
Departments that ran legacy shared service centers faced the memo from both sides. As buyers, their component agencies were subject to the gate. As providers, their centers needed joint business cases to grow. The department-level SAPOC in these organizations had a delicate job: representing the department’s interest as a provider while supporting the strategy as a customer. A clear internal decision on the provider’s future would have made that job easier.
Mid-sized agencies on aging systems
Mid-sized agencies with aging financial or human resources systems that were due for replacement felt the effect first. Their next modernization was the kind of purchase the gate was built for. For them, the strategy offered a possible shortcut, buying from a marketplace instead of running a full acquisition, and a possible delay if the marketplace was not ready when their old system needed replacing. Their business case work had the highest stakes.
Small and micro agencies
Small agencies had the least capacity to run complex acquisitions and much to gain from a working marketplace. The memo made readiness assessments optional for them. Those that already bought services from legacy providers were exposed mainly as customers, because those providers’ ability to invest now depended on joint business cases.
Agencies with unusual requirements
Agencies with statutory structures that set them apart, such as those funded by fees or with distinct financial reporting obligations, had the strongest grounds for a separate procurement and the greatest interest in shaping standards early. For them, participation in the Business Standards Council was the cheapest way to avoid a long string of business cases later.
Field offices and regional operations
Agencies with large field structures faced a version of the problem that headquarters planning could miss. Travel, timekeeping and some procurement functions are carried out by people spread across the country, and a change in the system or provider for those functions reaches every office. An agency planning for a QSMO offering in such a function would need a rollout plan for the field, with training and support in each region, and its business case would need to price that rollout honestly, whichever option it chose.
What a CIO would have done that spring
Pulling the parts together, we think a CIO reading M-19-16 in April 2019 should have done five things. Mapped every mission-support function to its likely QSMO status. Flagged planned acquisitions in those functions and started business cases early. Asked any legacy provider the agency relied on how the memo affected its roadmap. Helped choose a SAPOC with authority across the chief officers. And begun building the provider-management skills every option required. Each of those steps was useful before OMB named a single QSMO, and each would remain useful whichever functions it named. The memo’s design favored agencies that prepared for the gate early and worked against those that met it for the first time with a failing system and a budget already spent on a plan nobody had approved.
With hindsight
OMB did name QSMOs. GSA’s shared services site, checked on November 14, 2026, says OMB designated QSMOs in cybersecurity, financial management, grants management and human resources. It lists the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency for cybersecurity services, the Treasury Department for core financial management, the Department of Health and Human Services for grants management and OPM for human resources, each shown as formally designated; CISA is also listed as pre-designated for a further set of cybersecurity services. It also shows GSA as pre-designated for acquisition. The press releases it lists include a June 29, 2020 announcement of two new QSMOs, Treasury and GSA, a June 30, 2020 release on Treasury’s designation for financial management, and a January 11, 2021 release on HHS leading grants management.
The legacy provider rule also survived in that guidance. The same page restates M-19-16’s requirement that legacy designated providers propose a joint business case with the QSMO before accepting new customers, expanding services or investing. It lists legacy providers for civilian HR transaction services and core financial management, including centers at the Departments of Defense, the Interior, the Treasury, Agriculture and Transportation. The memo is still described there as the basis for QSMO offerings.
At least one marketplace took the shape the memo described. CISA’s Cyber QSMO marketplace page, checked the same day, describes an online platform for acquiring cybersecurity services. It lists the Department of Justice, which it says OMB designated as a shared service provider for security operations center services, along with HHS and the Department of Transportation as providers. It features CISA’s Protective DNS Resolver service.
Federal management then reached for a different tool. Executive Order 14240, signed March 20, 2025, directed agencies to submit proposals within 60 days to have GSA conduct domestic procurement of common goods and services, directed GSA to submit a comprehensive plan within 90 days, and directed OMB to designate GSA as executive agent for all governmentwide acquisition contracts for information technology. The order said the government spends about $490 billion a year on contracts for common goods and services. It addresses procurement of common goods and services, a wider field than the mission-support functions M-19-16 dealt with, and it does not mention the memo. GSA’s shared services page still presents M-19-16 as the basis for QSMO offerings.
What held up is the instrument we described: the business case. The memo’s joint business case rule is still restated on GSA’s site as of our check, and the 2025 order put a different, wider consolidation into GSA’s hands. Agencies that built the habit of evidence-based cases for separate procurements, and the provider-management skills to run shared services, had something useful under either approach. For an agency CIO in 2026, the practical position is that two kinds of central buying now coexist: function-level marketplaces run by designated agencies, and the wider consolidation of common purchases in GSA that the 2025 order directed. In our reading, both put a burden of proof on an agency that wants to go its own way. What we cannot say from the sources is how much the QSMOs saved or how widely agencies adopted them; GSA’s pages describe offerings, not results, and we would not repeat the memo’s projected 5 to 30 percent as an outcome. The lesson we draw is narrower: the memo’s lasting effect was on how agencies justify buying on their own.
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