New York’s first Part 500 certificate was due before the risk assessment it rested on
February 15, 2018, was the deadline for the first Part 500 compliance certificates, covering 2017. The risk assessment the regulation put beneath the program was not due until March 1, so the record behind each signature carried the weight.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
February 15, 2018, was the deadline for the first Part 500 compliance certificates, covering 2017. The risk assessment the regulation put beneath the program was not due until March 1, so the record behind each signature carried the weight.
- The week Thursday, February 15, 2018, was the first filing date for the annual compliance certificate under New York’s cybersecurity regulation for financial services companies, 23 NYCRR Part 500.
- The signer: a named person, a review and a knowledge standard The certificate’s force came from its signature.
- The scope: what “complies” meant for 2017 The certificate covered the prior calendar year.
- The foundation: a program based on an assessment not yet due The third part is the one that made the first certificate unusual.
- The evidence: five years of records and examiners who would ask The fourth part is what made the signature consequential.
- How this applied across regulated firms Part 500’s definition of covered entity was broad, so the certificate landed on very different organizations on the same day.
- Objections, in order We address five objections to our argument, numbered in the order we take them.
- What a leader could check These checks follow from the four parts.
- With hindsight The department did test certificates against records.
The week
Thursday, February 15, 2018, was the first filing date for the annual compliance certificate under New York’s cybersecurity regulation for financial services companies, 23 NYCRR Part 500. The New York State Department of Financial Services had adopted the regulation with an effective date of March 1, 2017. Section 500.21 said covered entities would be required to prepare and submit the certificate annually, commencing February 15, 2018.
The regulation reached a wide population. A covered entity was any person operating under, or required to operate under, a license, registration, charter, certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization under New York’s Banking Law, Insurance Law or Financial Services Law. That took in state-chartered banks, insurers, mortgage bankers and servicers, money transmitters and licensed individuals such as insurance agents and brokers. Smaller entities could claim limited exemptions, but those exemptions did not remove the certification requirement.
The certification requirement was in section 500.17(b). Each covered entity had to submit to the superintendent, by February 15 each year, a written statement covering the prior calendar year. The statement was to follow the form in Appendix A and certify that the entity was in compliance with the requirements of Part 500. The entity had to keep all records, schedules and data supporting the certificate for five years, for examination by the department.
The same subsection added a second duty. To the extent an entity had identified areas, systems or processes needing material improvement, updating or redesign, it had to document that identification and the remedial efforts planned and underway. That documentation had to be available for inspection by the superintendent.
Appendix A set out the form. The board of directors or a senior officer certified two things. First, that the board or the named senior officer had reviewed documents, reports, certifications and opinions of officers, employees, representatives, outside vendors and others as necessary. Second, that to the best of their knowledge the entity’s cybersecurity program, as of a stated date, complied with Part 500 for the year. The chairperson of the board or the senior officer signed it.
On January 22, 2018, the department issued a reminder. Its release said the first certification of compliance, covering the prior calendar year, must be filed online through the DFS Portal on or before February 15, 2018. The release also announced that the department would include cybersecurity in all its examinations. It would add cybersecurity questions to the first day letters that open examinations of banks and insurers, for safety and soundness and for market conduct.
The release described what had been required since the first implementation deadline of August 28, 2017. By then, regulated entities had to have a cybersecurity program designed to protect consumers’ private data, and a written policy or policies approved by the board or a senior officer. They also had to have a chief information security officer, and controls and plans for the safety and soundness of New York’s financial services industry. They had to report cybersecurity events to the department through the portal.
Other requirements were not yet due. Section 500.22 gave entities one year from the effective date, to March 1, 2018, for five items. They were the CISO’s annual report to the board, penetration testing and vulnerability assessments, the risk assessment, multi-factor authentication and the training requirement. It gave eighteen months for audit trails, application security, data retention limits, monitoring and encryption. It gave two years for the third party service provider policy.
The department’s published answers to frequently asked questions, as they stood on February 15, 2018, addressed the certificate. The certificate was a stand-alone document, and entities were not required to submit supporting materials with it. The department expected each entity to keep the documents and records that supported it. An affiliate could not meet the requirement for an entity: each covered entity had to certify its own compliance. The same page said the first penetration test and vulnerability assessment need not have been concluded before March 1, 2018.
A compliance certificate is a short document. Part 500’s first one was a few lines in Appendix A, signed by a board chair or a senior officer. We read it as a consequential governance device, because it put a named person’s signature on a statement the department could later test against records.
The first certificate had an unusual feature. It covered calendar year 2017, when only part of the regulation was in force. It was due on February 15, 2018. The risk assessment, which the regulation said the program and the policy must be based on, was not due until March 1, 2018. Penetration testing, multi-factor authentication and the CISO’s board report had the same March date. So the first certificate was signed before the evidence the regulation treated as foundational was required to exist.
We take the certificate in four parts. Each is a separate question a signer had to answer, and together they cover what the signature committed the entity to:
- The signer: who signed, on what review, and to what standard of knowledge.
- The scope: which requirements the certificate covered for 2017, and which it did not.
- The foundation: how a program could be based on a risk assessment that was not yet due.
- The evidence: what the entity had to keep, and how the department planned to examine it.
Our argument is that the first certificate was a statement about a program in transition, and its value depended on what entities recorded about that transition. A certificate that said only “complies” for 2017 was literally limited to the provisions then in force. It would be tested later against records built for a fuller program. The entities that used the first filing to document their transition, and their foundation, gave themselves a record that would serve in later years. After the four parts, we look at how this applied across regulated firms, at objections, and at what a leader could check.
A note on reading the regulation. We describe Part 500 as adopted in 2017 and as amended in 2023, from the department’s own copies. Our reading of how provisions interact is ours. Whether a particular entity was in compliance in a particular year is a question for its counsel and for the department.
The signer: a named person, a review and a knowledge standard
The certificate’s force came from its signature. Appendix A asked the board of directors or a senior officer to certify. The board, or the senior officer by name, attested to a review of the documents, reports, certifications and opinions of others as necessary. The compliance statement itself was made to the best of the signer’s knowledge.
Board or senior officer
The regulation let an entity choose. A board could certify by resolution, signed by its chair. A senior officer, or several, could make a compliance finding and sign. For a bank or an insurer with an active board, the choice raised a governance question: should the board own the certificate, or delegate it to management?
Each choice had costs. A board certificate brought the directors into the cybersecurity program in a way an annual briefing might not. It also required directors to rely on management’s reports, which is what the review attestation described. A senior officer certificate put the statement with someone closer to the facts. It also concentrated the exposure in one or a few people. The regulation did not prefer either. We think the choice should follow who could actually answer the department’s questions about the review.
The review attestation
The first sentence of the form was easy to overlook. It said the signer had reviewed the documents and opinions of others “as necessary.” That attestation is itself checkable. A signer who could not show which reports, assessments and certifications were reviewed, and when, would have difficulty supporting it.
The certification process therefore needed its own record. Our suggestion is a certification file containing the list of materials reviewed, the sub-certifications from the people responsible for each area, and the minutes or notes of the review meeting. Entities with internal audit functions could add the audit function’s view. The file does not go to the department with the certificate. It is what the entity would show if asked.
Sub-certifications
A signer could not personally verify every control. The practical answer, borrowed from financial reporting, was a cascade. Owners of each area, such as access management, incident response, vendor management and the CISO’s program, would certify their part to the signer. The signer’s certificate rested on theirs.
A cascade works only if each sub-certificate is specific. A line manager asked to confirm “compliance with Part 500” cannot answer meaningfully. A line manager asked to confirm that each system holding nonpublic information had the access controls listed in the entity’s policy, with exceptions listed, can. The quality of the first certificate depended on how the questions in the cascade were written.
When a sub-certificate comes back qualified
A cascade that works will produce exceptions. An owner will report that a system lacked a control, that a review was late or that a vendor contract had no security terms. The signer then has to decide whether the exception touches a requirement that was in force for the year, and whether it is material.
That decision should be made on the record, with counsel, before the signature. If the exception concerns a requirement still in transition, it belongs in the improvement documentation. If it concerns a requirement in force, the signer faces the choice the 2017 form left open, which we discuss under the scope. Either way, the file should show that the exception was raised, who considered it and what was decided.
The knowledge standard
“To the best of” the signer’s knowledge limits the statement to what the signer knew. It does not excuse not looking. Our reading is that a signer who skipped the review the form describes would struggle to rely on the knowledge qualifier. The two sentences of the form work together: review, then state what the review showed.
When the signer changes
Signers move on. A senior officer who signs in February may leave by the summer, and the five-year retention period outlasts tenures. A successor inherits a certificate they did not sign, describing a year they did not oversee. The certification file is what lets the successor answer the department’s questions about it.
The same applies to a board. Directors rotate, committees are reorganized and chairs change. A board resolution adopting the certificate should record what the board reviewed, so a later board can see what its predecessor relied on. That is a minor cost at the time and a large help in an examination years afterward.
The scope: what “complies” meant for 2017
The certificate covered the prior calendar year. For the first certificate, that was 2017. Part 500 took effect on March 1, 2017, with a general transition of 180 days and longer periods for named sections. So what did compliance for 2017 cover?
Three tiers in force on different dates
Read with section 500.22, the regulation sorted requirements into tiers. The general requirements applied after 180 days. The 180-day tier was due by the August 28, 2017 date the department described. By our reading of the sections not given longer periods, it included the program, the approved written policy and the designation of a CISO. It also included access privileges, incident response planning, cybersecurity personnel and notices to the superintendent. The one-year tier, due March 1, 2018, included the CISO’s board report, penetration testing and vulnerability assessments, the risk assessment, multi-factor authentication and training. Later tiers followed at eighteen months and two years.
A certificate for 2017 was therefore, in our reading, a certificate about the 180-day tier, for the part of 2017 after it applied. It could not sensibly certify compliance with requirements that were not yet due. The form did not say this. Appendix A’s text asked the signer to certify that the program complied with Part 500. The regulation’s own transition periods supplied the limits.
A partial year inside a partial year
The timing narrowed the scope further. The regulation took effect on March 1, 2017, and the general transition ran to August 28, 2017. For the months before that date, the 180-day requirements were in transition too. A certificate for calendar 2017 therefore described, at the outside, compliance with the 180-day tier from August 28 to December 31, 2017, and good-faith progress before then.
The certificate form had a field for the date of the board resolution or compliance finding and the year it covered. It had no field for the period within the year when each requirement applied. The certification file could supply that period, section by section.
Saying what was covered
Because the form was silent, the entity’s own records had to carry the scope. A certification file that listed which sections were in force for the period, and which were in transition, would show the department exactly what the signer had attested to. Without that list, a reader could later assume the certificate claimed more than it did.
The same applied in reverse. An entity that had already implemented one-year requirements early, such as multi-factor authentication, could say so in its file. That would not change the certificate. It would show the department where the entity stood when the one-year deadline arrived.
The improvement documentation
Section 500.17(b) had a second sentence that fit the transition well. Where an entity had identified areas, systems or processes requiring material improvement, updating or redesign, it had to document them and the remedial efforts planned and underway. For a program in its first year, there would be such areas. The one-year requirements were, by definition, still being built at the time of the first certificate.
Our reading is that this documentation was the honest companion to the first certificate. The certificate stated compliance with what was due. The improvement record stated what was not yet done, and the plan. An entity that kept both had a complete account. An entity that filed the certificate and kept no improvement record had a statement that would look stronger than its program.
No room for qualification on the form
The 2017 form had no place to qualify the statement. It was a certificate of compliance, not a report. An entity that knew it was not compliant with a requirement that was in force faced a hard choice: certify anyway, or not file. The regulation, as adopted, did not offer a third option, in our reading. As our hindsight section describes, the department added one in 2023, with an acknowledgment of noncompliance.
In the meantime, the department’s 2018 answers said only that the certificate was stand-alone and that supporting records should be kept. Entities that could not certify had to decide with counsel how to proceed. We do not know how entities resolved that choice in 2018, and the department’s public materials we reviewed did not say.
The foundation: a program based on an assessment not yet due
The third part is the one that made the first certificate unusual. Part 500 put the risk assessment at the base of the regulation. The risk assessment requirement itself was in the one-year tier.
What the text said
Section 500.02(b) said the cybersecurity program “shall be based on the Covered Entity’s Risk Assessment.” Section 500.07, on access privileges, also began from the risk assessment. Section 500.03 said the cybersecurity policy “shall be based on the Covered Entity’s Risk Assessment.” Section 500.05 tied penetration testing and vulnerability assessments to the risk assessment. Section 500.12 began “Based on its Risk Assessment” before requiring effective access controls. Section 500.09, which required the periodic risk assessment, sat in the one-year tier, due March 1, 2018.
So the program and the policy, required by August 2017, were to be based on an assessment that the regulation did not require until March 2018. Our reading is that the drafters meant entities to rely on whatever risk analysis they had, and to formalize it under section 500.09 within the year. The text does not say that. An entity certifying for 2017 had to decide what its program was “based on” in the meantime.
Three ways an entity could stand
Entities would have stood in one of three places. Some already had a documented information security risk assessment, for example under federal banking guidance or an insurer’s enterprise risk management. Their program could be based on it from the start, and section 500.09 required them to bring its documentation into line. Some had informal risk analysis, spread across audit findings, vendor reviews and IT plans. Their program had a basis, but not one they could easily show. Some had little. Their program was based on a template.
For the first group, the certificate was straightforward on this point. For the second, the certification file should have pointed to where the informal analysis lived. For the third, the honest course was to treat the risk assessment as the first item in the improvement documentation, with a plan to complete it by March 1, 2018.
What a first risk assessment had to contain
Section 500.09 set out what the assessment needed when it did come due. It had to be periodic and sufficient to inform the design of the program. It had to be updated as reasonably necessary for changes in systems, nonpublic information or business operations. It had to consider the entity’s particular risks, its nonpublic information, its systems, and the availability and effectiveness of controls.
It also had to follow written policies and procedures. Those had to include criteria for evaluating and categorizing risks, and criteria for assessing confidentiality, integrity, security and availability, including the adequacy of existing controls. They also had to include requirements describing how identified risks would be mitigated or accepted, and how the program would address them. An entity building its first formal assessment in early 2018 had to write those procedures as well as perform the assessment.
The last of those elements connects back to the certificate. A documented decision to accept a risk, made under written criteria, is a defensible basis for a control that falls short of an ideal. Without the assessment, the same shortfall looks like noncompliance. The assessment turns gaps into decisions, and the certificate depends on those decisions being on record.
Why the foundation mattered to later certificates
The certificate for 2018, due in February 2019, would cover a year in which the risk assessment was due from March 1. Every control the regulation tied to the risk assessment would then be tested against it. An entity whose risk assessment was weak would find its 2018 certificate exposed on several sections at once, because each rested on the same base.
The department said as much later. Its current answers to frequently asked questions give, as an example of material noncompliance, the failure to conduct a risk assessment, because the cybersecurity program must be based on one. That answer is from the amended regulation, not the 2018 version. It shows how the department came to read the foundation: if it is missing, the program is not compliant.
Vendors and the base
The risk assessment also fed the third party service provider policy, due at two years. The department’s 2018 answers addressed a shortcut. An entity could not treat a vendor’s own Part 500 certificate as adequate due diligence on that vendor. Each entity had to assess the risks each provider posed and address them, and the department expected that work to be complete by March 1, 2019.
That answer also says something about certificates generally. The department did not treat a certificate as evidence of controls. It treated it as a statement to be tested. An entity relying on its own certificate as proof of its program would be making the same mistake the department warned against for vendors.
The evidence: five years of records and examiners who would ask
The fourth part is what made the signature consequential. The certificate was short, but it pointed at a record the entity had to keep for five years. The department announced, in the same January release that reminded entities of the deadline, that it would examine cybersecurity in all its examinations.
What had to be kept
Section 500.17(b) required each entity to maintain all records, schedules and data supporting the certificate for five years. The department’s answers added that the entity should keep the documents and records necessary to support the certification, should the department ask. The improvement documentation had to be available for inspection.
Five years is a long time in a technology function. Systems are replaced, staff move, vendors change and file shares are reorganized. A record that exists in February 2018 may be hard to reconstruct in 2022. The retention duty needed an owner, a location and a format that would survive those changes. Our reading is that the certification file should be held by the compliance or legal function, outside the IT systems it describes, with its own retention schedule.
First day letters
The January 2018 release described first day letters as the notices the department issues to start examinations. It said cybersecurity questions would now be added to them, for examinations of banks and insurers, including for safety and soundness and market conduct. That made the certificate part of every examination cycle. An examiner could ask for the certification file, the improvement documentation and the records behind each section.
An entity preparing for that request would want its evidence arranged by section of the regulation. For each section, the file would show the requirement, when it took effect, how the entity met it, who owned it and where the supporting records were. That arrangement also makes the next year’s certificate easier, because the cascade questions follow the same structure.
Examiners will also look at sequence. A risk assessment dated after the controls it supposedly shaped, or a policy approved after the certificate that relied on it, tells a story the entity may not intend. Dates on each document, and a version history showing what changed and when, let the entity show that the program developed in the order the regulation describes. Where it did not, the improvement documentation should say so before an examiner finds it.
The examination also tests consistency across documents. The CISO’s board report, once it was due, would describe material cybersecurity risks and the program’s effectiveness. A certificate that claimed compliance while the CISO’s report described serious gaps would invite questions. The signer should read the CISO’s report before signing and reconcile the two.
Incident notices and the certificate
The certificate and the incident notices described the same program from two directions. Section 500.17(a) required notice to the superintendent within 72 hours of determining that certain cybersecurity events had occurred. Those notices went through the same portal as the certificate. An examiner could set them side by side.
An entity that certified compliance while holding an unreported event that should have been notified would have a certificate the department could test against its own records. The reconciliation is simple to describe. Before signing, compare the year’s internal incident log with the notices filed. For each event not notified, confirm that the file records why it did not meet the notice test. The certification file should hold that reconciliation.
The cost of the record
The record has a cost. A certification file, a cascade of sub-certifications, a reconciliation of incidents and an improvement register take staff time each year. For a large bank or insurer, that work could build on existing control testing for financial reporting or internal audit. For a small licensee, it could fall on one or two people who also run the systems. The regulation did not scale the certificate to size. Our view is that the record can scale: a short file for a small entity, organized the same way, still answers the department’s questions.
The confidentiality of what was filed
Section 500.18 addressed the confidentiality of information provided to the department under Part 500. We do not analyze its scope here. Entities considering what to put in the certification file and the improvement record should take advice on how those records would be treated, and on privilege for any assessments prepared at counsel’s direction.
Enforcement of the signature
Section 500.20 said the regulation would be enforced under the superintendent’s existing authority. It did not set out penalties for a false certificate as such. The consequence of an inaccurate certificate would come from the department’s general powers under the banking, insurance and financial services laws. As our hindsight section shows, the department later cited a false certificate as a violation in its own right.
How this applied across regulated firms
Part 500’s definition of covered entity was broad, so the certificate landed on very different organizations on the same day. The four parts weighed differently on each.
State-chartered banks and branches of out-of-state banks
A New York state-chartered bank was already examined by federal and state regulators for information security. It had a board and an audit committee, and it may already have had a risk assessment process under federal guidance. For such a bank, the signer question was the main one: board or officer, and how to tie the certificate to existing governance. The foundation was likely in place. The evidence would be examined in the ordinary course.
The department’s 2018 answers addressed a related case. New York branches of out-of-state state-chartered banks were primarily supervised by their home state under an interstate agreement. The department said it would defer to the home state for supervision and examination, while strongly encouraging those branches to adopt protections consistent with Part 500.
Insurers
Insurers licensed in New York were covered entities, with examinations for safety and soundness and market conduct. Large insurers would have enterprise risk management frameworks that could anchor the risk assessment. Their challenge was more likely in the evidence part: insurers can hold nonpublic information across distribution networks of agents and brokers, and tracing controls across those networks takes work.
Mortgage bankers, servicers and money transmitters
Licensed mortgage bankers, servicers and money transmitters were covered entities too. Some are small, with limited security staff, and rely on vendors for core systems. For them, the foundation and scope parts were likely hardest. A small licensee might not have had a documented risk assessment before Part 500, and might rely on a vendor’s controls for much of its program. As we note in hindsight, the department’s 2021 cybersecurity settlements included one with a mortgage banker and one with a company it described as a licensed insurance company.
Entities with limited exemptions
Section 500.19(a) gave a limited exemption on any of three tests. The first was fewer than 10 employees, counting independent contractors, of the entity and its affiliates located in New York or responsible for the entity’s business. The others were under $5 million in New York gross annual revenue in each of the last three fiscal years, or under $10 million in year-end total assets. The exemption covered the CISO, penetration testing, audit trails, application security, personnel, multi-factor authentication, training and monitoring, encryption and incident response plan sections.
It did not cover the program, the policy, access privileges, the risk assessment, vendor policy, data retention or notices, including the certificate. So a small exempt licensee still had to base its program on a risk assessment and still had to certify. For such an entity, the foundation problem was the whole problem: a program with few prescribed controls rested almost entirely on its own assessment of risk.
Licensed individuals
Individual insurance agents and brokers held licenses under the Insurance Law and so fell within the definition. Some qualified for exemptions. The department’s 2018 answers addressed agents covered by a principal’s program: an employee, agent, representative or designee fully covered by another covered entity’s program could qualify for an exemption under section 500.19(b), and had to file a notice of exemption. A notice of exemption was a separate filing from the certificate.
Entities relying on affiliates
Section 500.02(c) allowed an entity to meet requirements by adopting relevant provisions of an affiliate’s program. The department’s answers said an entity could adopt part or all of an affiliate’s program, but remained responsible for full compliance, and the affiliate’s program had to be available for examination. The certificate could not be filed by the affiliate. In a group with several licensed entities, each one signed its own certificate, even if the program behind it was shared.
For a group, that created a coordination job. The cascade of sub-certifications had to run through shared functions, with each entity’s signer able to rely on the shared program’s owners. The certification file for each entity had to show which parts of the program were its own and which were adopted.
Objections, in order
We address five objections to our argument, numbered in the order we take them.
1. The first certificate was a formality
The first objection is that a certificate for a partial year, covering only some requirements, was a formality the department would not test. The January 2018 release cuts against that. In announcing the deadline, the department also announced cybersecurity questions in every examination. The certificate was the statement those questions would be measured against.
2. The transition periods made the scope obvious
The second objection is that everyone knew which requirements applied in 2017, so there was no need to record the scope. The regulation’s text supplies the tiers. The certificate form does not refer to them. A reader years later, such as an examiner new to the entity or a successor officer, would see a certificate that said “complies” and need the file to know what that meant.
3. The risk assessment issue was drafting, not substance
The third objection is that the tension between sections 500.02 and 500.09 was a drafting quirk, and the department would not hold it against anyone. That may be right for 2017. Our argument does not depend on the department enforcing it. It depends on the fact that later certificates would rest on the risk assessment, and that the department came to treat a missing one as material noncompliance.
4. A board cannot certify technical controls
The fourth objection is that directors are not equipped to certify cybersecurity compliance. The form anticipated that by attesting to a review of others’ reports and opinions, and by allowing a senior officer to certify instead. The objection is a reason to build the sub-certification cascade, not a reason the certificate could not be signed.
5. Federal examiners already covered this for banks
The fifth objection is that state banks were already examined against federal information security standards, so the certificate added little. Federal examinations did not require a signed annual compliance statement to the state regulator. The certificate added a named signer, a filing date and a record retention duty. It also reached insurers and licensees that federal bank examinations do not.
What a leader could check
These checks follow from the four parts. They reflect our reading of good practice, not a list of requirements.
- Does the certification file list every section of Part 500 the certificate covers, with the date each took effect for the entity?
- Is there a sub-certification for each section, from a named owner, with exceptions listed?
- Does the file show what the signer reviewed, when, and with whom?
- Is the risk assessment dated, and does each control the regulation ties to it point back to it?
- Is the improvement documentation current, and does each item have an owner and a date?
Each check needs an owner. The certification file and the scope list belong with compliance or legal. The sub-certifications belong with the control owners, coordinated by the CISO. The risk assessment belongs with the CISO and the risk function, with the board or a committee informed of its results. The improvement register belongs with whoever runs the program’s project portfolio, reported to the signer each quarter.
Each answer should be a document, not a description. The department’s question, when it comes, will be to see the record behind the signature. The time to assemble that record is before the signature, not after the first day letter arrives.
With hindsight
The department did test certificates against records. On April 14, 2021, it announced that National Securities Corporation, which it described as a licensed insurance company, would pay a $3 million penalty for violations of the cybersecurity regulation. The department said the company had been the subject of four cyber breaches between 2018 and 2020, two of which it had not reported. It said the breaches involved unauthorized access to the email accounts of employees and independent contractors.
The department’s release made the certificate a violation in its own right. It said the company had failed to implement multi-factor authentication, without reasonably equivalent or more secure access controls approved in writing by its CISO. It said the company “falsely certified compliance” with the regulation for calendar year 2018, because multi-factor authentication was not fully implemented. Multi-factor authentication was in the one-year tier, due March 1, 2018. The certificate the department called false was the second annual one, the first to cover a year in which that requirement applied.
The same release added context about the transition. It said additional implementation time had been granted for multiple provisions and that the regulation was not fully in effect until March 2019. That confirms, from the department, the point of our scope section: the early certificates covered a regulation still coming into force.
The foundation also came up. On March 3, 2021, the department announced a $1.5 million penalty against Residential Mortgage Services, Inc., a licensed mortgage banker. It said a July 2020 examination found an unreported 2019 breach of an employee’s email account. The department also found that the company had failed to have a comprehensive cybersecurity risk assessment. The examination route the January 2018 release described was the route by which the department found the violations.
The regulation itself changed. On November 1, 2023, the governor announced amendments the department had adopted. The amendments enhanced governance requirements, added controls against unauthorized access, required more regular risk and vulnerability assessments, and required reporting of ransomware payments, among other changes. The amended section 500.17(b), in the department’s current copy, replaced the single certificate with a choice. By April 15 each year, an entity submits either a certification that it materially complied during the prior calendar year, or an acknowledgment that it did not.
The amended form addresses each of our four parts. On the signer, the certificate or acknowledgment is signed by the entity’s highest-ranking executive and its CISO, or the senior officer responsible for the program if there is no CISO. On scope, the acknowledgment must identify every section not materially complied with and describe the noncompliance. It must also give a remediation timeline or confirm remediation is complete. On evidence, the certification must be based on data and documentation sufficient to determine and demonstrate material compliance, kept for five years with the remediation records. Amended section 500.20 lists among penalty factors whether the entity provided false or misleading information.
The department’s current answers close the loop on the foundation. They say an entity may not submit a certification of material compliance unless it was in material compliance with all applicable requirements for the prior year. As an example of material noncompliance requiring an acknowledgment, they give the failure to conduct a risk assessment, since the program must be based on one.
What held up from our argument is that the certificate became a testable statement, and that the risk assessment became its base. What changed is the remedy for the scope problem. An entity that cannot certify now has a defined way to say so. The single-option form of 2018, with no room for qualification, did not survive the 2023 amendments.
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