The 2017 Ocwen orders made a servicing platform a finding, and a 2018 settlement tied its exit to data tests

On April 20, 2017, state regulators and the CFPB acted against Ocwen, and Massachusetts named its REALServicing system of record among the deficiencies. Its 2018 consent order let Ocwen grow again only as data mapping, test conversions and audits were completed.

Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.

Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

On April 20, 2017, state regulators and the CFPB acted against Ocwen, and Massachusetts named its REALServicing system of record among the deficiencies. Its 2018 consent order let Ocwen grow again only as data mapping, test conversions and audits were completed.

  1. The week The Bureau’s first listed allegation concerned a computer system.
  2. The finding: a system of record as the subject of the order That description is a familiar failure in a different setting.
  3. The dependency: ownership, vendors and integrations A system of record is also a contract.
  4. The remedy: growth tied to stages of a migration Massachusetts and Ocwen resolved the April 2017 order with a consent order dated March 21, 2018. [2] Ocwen agreed to it without admitting any allegations, and agreed to withdraw its request for a hearing and dismiss its pending Superior Court action over the 2017 order, waiving its rights of appeal. [2] The consent order’s terms are the clearest record we found of how a regulator turned a platform finding into a migration plan.
  5. The proof: audits that the data had moved intact A migration plan answers when.
  6. How the episode applies to different institutions The orders concerned a nonbank servicer licensed by states.
  7. Objections, in order Its circumstances were unusual: rapid acquisitions, related-party arrangements and a financial condition the order called deficient. [1] The technology findings were not unusual in kind.
  8. What technology and operations leaders could check The four parts translate into checks for any institution with a system of record.
  9. With hindsight Ocwen’s annual report for 2019, filed in February 2020, recorded the wider outcome.

The week

On April 20, 2017, state mortgage regulators and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau acted against Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and related companies on the same day. [3] [5] The Bureau filed a lawsuit in federal court. [3] The Florida Attorney General filed a separate lawsuit, and state financial regulators issued cease-and-desist and license revocation orders, the Bureau’s release said. [3]

The Bureau described Ocwen as one of the country’s largest nonbank mortgage servicers. [3] As of December 31, 2016, it serviced almost 1.4 million loans with an aggregate unpaid principal balance of $209 billion, according to the release. [3] The Bureau alleged failures at every stage of the servicing process, including inaccurate monthly statements, misapplied payments, mishandled taxes and insurance, wrongful foreclosures and ignored complaints. [3]

The Bureau’s first listed allegation concerned a computer system. It said Ocwen used a proprietary system called REALServicing to process and apply borrower payments, communicate payment information to borrowers and maintain loan balance information. [3] It alleged that Ocwen loaded inaccurate and incomplete information into the system, and that the system generated errors because of system failures and deficient programming. [3] It alleged that manual workarounds failed to correct inaccuracies and produced more errors. [3] These were allegations in a complaint, not findings.

The state actions came from a coordinated examination. Idaho’s Department of Finance said it joined more than 20 other state mortgage regulators that day in separate enforcement actions. [5] It said its order grew out of a multistate review over several years that revealed Ocwen was unable to accurately reconcile consumers’ mortgage escrow accounts. [5]

The Massachusetts Division of Banks published its order in full. Dated April 20, 2017, with docket number 2017-001, it combined findings of fact and a temporary order to cease and desist. [1] It also included an order to show cause and a notice of the right to a hearing. [1]

The order described the examination behind it. State regulators coordinated by the Multi-State Mortgage Committee had conducted a limited-scope examination covering January 1, 2013 to February 28, 2015. [1] The participating states were Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana and Washington, with Florida as lead. [1] The committee issued its report in December 2015, Ocwen responded in January 2016, and the parties entered a memorandum of understanding on December 7, 2016. [1]

The memorandum, the order said, required Ocwen to retain an independent auditor to audit and reconcile all consumer escrow accounts. [1] According to the order, Ocwen told the regulators on January 13, 2017 that the reconciliation would cost $1.5 billion and was beyond its financial capacity, and proposed a sample of 457 accounts. [1] The order said that was out of 2.5 million active first-lien escrow accounts serviced since January 2013, and called the proposal entirely deficient. [1]

A section of the order was headed System of Record Deficiencies. It said the problems with Ocwen’s system of record, REALServicing, had been extensive. [1] The Division’s order directed Ocwen to begin transferring its entire Massachusetts residential servicing portfolio to licensed servicers approved by the Division, and to stop accepting new mortgage applications in the state. [1] Ocwen was to keep servicing each loan until it was transferred. [1]

The order also set short deadlines. Within 48 hours Ocwen was to submit a list of the Massachusetts loans to be transferred, with borrower and new servicer details. [1] Within five days it was to submit a balance sheet and income statement attested by an officer. [1] The order took effect immediately and was to remain in effect unless the Commissioner set it aside, limited or suspended it, or a court did so on review. [1] Ocwen was ordered to show cause why its licenses should not be revoked, and the order gave notice of its right to a hearing. [1]

Those were the regulators’ findings and directions, issued before any hearing. The sections that follow treat the orders’ statements as findings and allegations, not as established facts.

The Massachusetts order of April 20, 2017 named a system as well as conduct. It devoted a section to the deficiencies of Ocwen’s system of record and, in our reading, traced consumer harm back to how that system was built, fed and integrated. [1] The settlement that followed in 2018 measured Ocwen’s path back to growth in steps of a data migration. [2]

Our argument is that the 2017 orders made a servicing platform a supervisory finding, and that the remedy turned a technology migration into a regulatory schedule. In our reading, that is the part of the episode that matters for banks, credit unions and other lenders today. Their circumstances differ from Ocwen’s. Each of them runs a system of record whose accuracy a regulator can examine.

We take the episode in four parts:

  1. The finding: what the Massachusetts order said was wrong with the system of record.
  2. The dependency: how the system’s ownership, vendors and integrations shaped the problems the order described.
  3. The remedy: how the 2018 consent order tied Ocwen’s growth to stages of a platform migration.
  4. The proof: the audits and reports the consent order required to show that data had moved intact.

The first part is the diagnosis. The second is the cause the order pointed to. The third is the treatment. The fourth is the test of whether the treatment worked. After the four parts we look at how the episode applies to different kinds of institutions, take objections in order, and list what a technology or operations leader could check.

A note on sources and our reading. We describe the 2017 order and the 2018 consent order from the Massachusetts Division of Banks’ published texts, read in archived copies. [1] [2] We describe the Bureau’s lawsuit from its release and its enforcement page, and Ocwen’s migration from its own annual report. [3] [4] [6] The orders’ factual statements were findings and allegations that Ocwen did not admit. [2] Ocwen contested the Massachusetts order, requesting a hearing and filing suit, before settling. [2] What they imply for other institutions is our reading. Institutions should ask counsel how their own regulators treat system deficiencies.

The finding: a system of record as the subject of the order

The order’s overall assessment was that Ocwen’s condition was deficient because it had failed to identify, measure, monitor and control the risk of rapid growth. [1] It said Ocwen acquired servicing rights to over 2.6 million loans between December 2012 and August 2013, and that its management control systems failed to keep pace. [1]

Comment codes

The order quoted a 2014 consent order between Ocwen and the New York State Department of Financial Services. [1] That consent order had said Ocwen’s core servicing functions relied on comment codes, entered manually or automatically, each of which triggered a process such as a delinquency letter or a foreclosure referral. [1] It said the number of codes had grown to more than 8,400, with duplicates after acquisitions, including 50 different codes for assigning a borrower a designated customer care representative. [1]

That description is a familiar failure in a different setting. A rules engine that grows by acquisition and exception becomes impossible to reason about. Each duplicate code is a place where two processes can diverge. Every bank with a core system, a loan origination platform or a case management tool has some version of this risk.

Letters dated before they were sent

The order described letter dating deficiencies. Dates on borrower letters were inserted automatically from events in REALServicing, while third-party vendors printed and mailed them. [1] It said delays between the triggering event and the mailing went back to 2012, so that some letters arrived after deadlines they described had passed. [1]

The order said an external review concluded that the deficiencies were technology related and present in all correspondence platforms, and that Ocwen’s systems and processes did not evolve with its growth and regulatory responsibilities. [1] It recorded a $15 million reserve for remediation. [1]

The mechanism is worth stating plainly. The system recorded when a letter was generated, not when it reached the borrower. The legal deadline ran from the date on the letter. Nobody owned the gap between the two. Any process that hands output to a vendor for delivery has the same gap unless the delivery date is captured and checked.

Custodial accounts that did not reconcile

The order said four of seven consumer custodial accounts reviewed had not been reconciled on time, and that unreconciled aged items numbered 64,139, totaling $83 million, at the end of 2014. [1] It said examiners found that an error in REALServicing’s custodial account software had caused the untimely reconciliation. [1] And it said Ocwen did not realize the software was not working properly until examiners brought the matter to its attention. [1]

That last finding is the one a technology leader should read twice. The failure was a software defect, and it was also a defect that monitoring did not catch. In our reading, the control that failed was the one that should have told management its own reconciliation had stopped.

What examiners saw that management did not

Several findings share a pattern. The order said examiners, not Ocwen, discovered that the custodial reconciliation software was failing. [1] It said Ocwen had no procedures to detect the misleading escrow statements. [1] It said Ocwen’s own internal audits had produced high-priority findings on its failure to reconcile those accounts on time. [1]

The common thread is detection. A system of record can be imperfect and still be well run, if the institution knows where it fails and tracks the fixes. The order described a company that learned of its own system failures from outsiders. A supervisor has reason to resist that condition, because it suggests the next failure will also be found late.

Boarding and transfers

The order described data problems at the edges of the system. It said a vendor received usable data for transfer notices too late, so notices went out with less than the 15 days federal law requires, and that the notices were back-dated. [1] It said two of 29 loans reviewed by Washington regulators were boarded with an escrow requirement they should not have had. [1]

Boarding and transfer are where data enters and leaves a system of record. In our reading, the order’s findings there were the clearest sign that the platform’s problems would not stay inside it. Any successor servicer, and any investor relying on the data, inherited whatever was wrong at the point of transfer.

Escrow

The order said Ocwen failed to make timely escrow disbursements on at least 56 loans, found by five of the six examining states. [1] It said Ocwen sent inaccurate escrow statements to over 7,200 borrowers because accounting entries for a proprietary modification program appeared as actual escrow payments. [1] It said Ocwen had no procedures to detect those statements. [1]

The modification entries are a classic data design problem. A non-cash accounting entry was stored in the same place as real payments, and the statement generator could not tell them apart. In our reading, that is a defect in the data model, not in any single process, and it explains why the regulators wanted every escrow account reconciled. [1]

The dependency: ownership, vendors and integrations

A system of record is also a contract. The order and Ocwen’s later annual report together describe a platform that Ocwen did not own outright, fed by vendors and affiliates it did not fully control. [1] [6]

A licensed platform

Ocwen’s annual report for 2019 said its servicing system had run on an information technology system that it licensed under agreements with Altisource. [6] The Massachusetts order described Altisource as a business unit Ocwen spun off in 2009, by then a publicly traded company whose single largest shareholder was Ocwen’s former chairman. [1]

In our reading, that arrangement shaped every remedy that followed. A company that owns its platform can fix it, replace it or rewrite it on its own schedule. A company that licenses it from a related party must negotiate each of those choices. When the regulators later required a move off the platform, the annual report recorded a binding term sheet in which the licensor confirmed it would cooperate with deboarding the loans. [6]

Vendors at the boundaries

The order’s findings repeatedly involved third parties. Vendors printed and mailed letters; a vendor processed transfer notices; a vendor handled mortgage satisfactions; a vendor carried out property inspections. [1] In our reading, each of those problems arose where Ocwen’s system handed data or work to someone else.

The order said, for example, that a vendor mistakenly raised property inspection fees to the maximum allowable amount, overcharging borrowers $6.2 million in 2014, and that Ocwen agreed to refund them. [1] It said Ocwen’s procedures for issuing mortgage satisfactions, including vendor oversight, were deficient. [1] The boundary with each vendor was part of the system of record, whether or not it appeared on the architecture diagram.

Data inherited through acquisitions

The order tied the platform’s problems to growth. It said Ocwen acquired servicing rights to over 2.6 million loans in a nine-month period from December 2012 through August 2013, and that MSR purchases from 2012 through 2014 more than doubled its servicing portfolio. [1] It quoted the New York finding that duplicate comment codes arose from insufficient integration after acquisitions of other servicers. [1]

Each acquired portfolio arrives with data shaped by another company’s system. Fields mean slightly different things; histories are partial; exceptions are coded differently. Boarding that data onto a single platform requires mapping each field and deciding what to do with what does not fit. In our reading, the duplicate codes were the residue of mappings done under time pressure, and they stayed in the system long after the deals closed.

Offshore affiliates and licensing

The order said an affiliate in the Philippines performed servicing activities for Ocwen without the required state licenses, and billed Ocwen over $10 million in 2014 without a written agreement or statement of work. [1] It said the affiliate had processed consumer loan payments of more than $445 million since 2013, and that about 70 percent of Ocwen’s employees were offshore. [1]

Licensing is a legal question. The data question underneath is who touched the system and under what authority. An institution that cannot list every entity with access to its system of record, and the agreement that governs each one, has the same exposure the order described, whatever its licensing position.

Oversight of change

The order said Ocwen’s board did not review a key strategic decision to switch lender-placed insurance vendors, which it found was a root cause of untimely escrow payments for borrower insurance. [1] It said the internal audit function reported operationally to the chief risk officer, which the examination said could hamper its independence, and that procedures for escalating and tracking deficiencies were inadequate. [1]

These are governance findings. Each touched the platform. A vendor switch changes integrations. An audit function that reports to risk may not test risk’s own systems freely. An escalation process that does not track deficiencies to closure leaves defects open in production. In our reading, the order treated governance and technology as one subject, which is how they behave.

The remedy: growth tied to stages of a migration

Massachusetts and Ocwen resolved the April 2017 order with a consent order dated March 21, 2018. [2] Ocwen agreed to it without admitting any allegations, and agreed to withdraw its request for a hearing and dismiss its pending Superior Court action over the 2017 order, waiving its rights of appeal. [2] The consent order’s terms are the clearest record we found of how a regulator turned a platform finding into a migration plan.

No new loans on the old platform

The consent order barred Ocwen from boarding any new loans onto REALServicing at any time, with narrow exceptions for loans already on it and certain repurchases. [2] New originations could proceed only if they were not boarded, even temporarily, on that platform, and were sub-serviced by an unaffiliated entity instead. [2]

That is a freeze on the system, not on the business. It is a model that other regulators and boards could use. It stops a known-deficient platform from growing while the company continues to operate.

Why the remedy was exit rather than repair

The consent order did not ask Ocwen to fix REALServicing. It asked Ocwen to stop adding loans to it and to move every loan off it. [2] The 2017 order had already pointed to the expense of moving to a new servicing platform as one of the costs Ocwen’s business plan left out. [1]

In our reading, that choice reflected the dependency described above. A licensed platform with deep, duplicated rules is hard to repair from outside, and its owner’s incentives may differ from the licensee’s. Exit put the remedy within Ocwen’s and the regulators’ control, at the price of a full migration. A bank weighing repair against replacement for its own system faces the same trade-off, with fewer regulators watching.

A plan of action and milestones

Ocwen had to develop a detailed plan of action and milestones for moving all residential mortgages off REALServicing onto other platforms that would let it comply with servicing standards. [2] The plan had to include a timeline for each milestone, to complete the transfer within a commercially reasonable time, with quarterly updates to the Division until the transfer was done. [2]

The consent order set out a discipline: named milestones, dates and regular reporting to the party that set the requirement. [2]

Growth unlocked step by step

The consent order then tied Ocwen’s ability to acquire servicing rights to migration events. [2] For loans Ocwen originated in Massachusetts, it could retain servicing rights in tranches tied to milestones. [2] The first tranche came on completion of a mapping project and the next after a mock conversion. [2] A third came once Ocwen and the new system vendor approved starting the transfer, and a fourth once all active Massachusetts loans were on the new platform. [2] Restrictions lifted entirely only after a data integrity audit of the transferred data. [2]

Bulk acquisitions followed a similar ladder, measured against Ocwen’s Massachusetts servicing portfolio of 33,714 loans as of April 24, 2017. [2] Each step allowed a capped share of that portfolio, and the cap came off only after a data integrity audit. [2]

Each milestone defined by evidence

The consent order defined what counted as completing each milestone. [2] The mapping project identified the data points to move and how each would convert from REALServicing to the corresponding field in the new system. Its proof was an initial data definition document with a cover letter from the new system vendor. [2]

A mock conversion was the first test of data moving correctly in a test region rather than a live environment. Its proof was a conversion balancing report showing the results for all fields tested, with the vendor’s cover letter. [2] Approval to start the transfer was proved by email between Ocwen and the vendor. [2] Completion meant all active Massachusetts loans had converted and the new system was live in production, proved by a written certification. [2]

In our reading, these definitions are the part of the episode we would carry to other institutions. A regulator wrote down, in a few sentences each, what evidence would show that a data migration had reached each stage. Any institution planning a core conversion can use the same structure for its own board.

The multistate pattern

Ocwen’s annual report described common terms across its settlements with 29 states and the District of Columbia. [6] They included no new residential servicing rights until April 30, 2018, and a plan of action and milestones for leaving REALServicing. [6] They also barred boarding new loans onto it, with certain exceptions, and set notice requirements for any merger used to move loans. [6] Some states, including Massachusetts, added terms of their own. [2] [6]

The proof: audits that the data had moved intact

A migration plan answers when. It does not answer whether the data arrived correct. The consent order addressed that with two kinds of audit and a rule linking them. [2]

The escrow review

Ocwen had to engage an independent auditor to review escrow transactions on REALServicing for a sample of escrowed loans in the signatory states between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2017. [2] The audit plan was completed on February 8, 2018, and testing had to begin by March 8, 2018. [2]

The sample was specified statistically: a random sample at a 95 percent confidence level, 5 percent expected margin of error and 2 percent precision, allocated across states, plus stratified samples. [2] The strata named groups of loans where escrow errors could hide, among them adjustable-rate loans, loans 60 or more days past due, modified loans, loans in bankruptcy, loans with complaints and loans with lender-placed insurance. [2] Massachusetts added its own sample so that at least 1,219 of its loans would be reviewed. [2]

For each error, the auditor had to record the date it occurred, when Ocwen first knew of it, how it came to Ocwen’s attention, whether it caused financial harm and whether it was remediated. [2] That list is a good template for any institution’s issue records. It asks how the institution learned of a problem as well as what the problem was.

Sampling as a control

The sampling terms answer a dispute recorded in the 2017 order. According to that order, Ocwen had proposed reconciling a sample of 457 escrow accounts, and the regulators called the proposal entirely deficient given 2.5 million active first-lien escrow accounts. [1] The 2018 terms replaced a full reconciliation with a defined statistical design, stratified toward loans with complex escrow histories, and a Massachusetts floor of 1,219 loans. [2]

In our reading, the episode shows how a sample becomes acceptable to a regulator. It needs a stated confidence level and precision, strata chosen for risk rather than convenience, a minimum per jurisdiction, and a rule for what happens when errors are found. The order described Ocwen’s 2017 proposal only by its size, which the regulators found deficient. The 2018 design specified every one of those features. [1] [2]

No loan moves with a known error

The consent order linked the audit to the migration with one sentence. No loan was to be boarded onto a new system under the migration plan with a known, unremediated error. [2]

That rule rules out one shortcut. A migration can be planned as move first, clean later, on the theory that the new system will make cleaning easier. The consent order required clean, then move. It put the cost of data quality before the cutover, where it is visible, rather than after it, where it hides in the new platform.

Data integrity audits

Separately, an independent firm had to conduct three data integrity audits on 1,000 randomly selected Massachusetts loans. [2] The first came before any Massachusetts loans moved, the second after they moved, and the third two years after the last loan moved. [2] Each checked eleven data points: monthly payment, property address, principal balance, interest rate, loan term, escrow balance, suspense balance, delinquency status, loss mitigation status, foreclosure status and mailing address. [2]

The three audits answer three different questions. The first asks whether the old data was right. The second asks whether conversion preserved it. The third asks whether the new platform kept it right in operation. Any core conversion that tests only the second question has left two of the three unanswered.

What eleven fields leave out

The data integrity audits tested eleven fields. [2] They are the fields a borrower would notice first: what is owed, what is due, where the property is and whether the loan is in trouble. They do not include payment histories, correspondence records or the audit trail of past actions. [2]

That is a sensible scope for a regulator protecting borrowers. It is not a complete definition of data integrity for the institution. A bank designing its own conversion tests should start with the fields that drive customer harm, as the consent order did. It should then add the fields that drive its own legal and accounting obligations, such as histories needed to answer disputes.

Complaints and financial condition

The consent order also required a complaint resolution plan, with board-approved policies to document and investigate complaints and escalate errors that might affect other accounts. [2] It required financial condition plans and recurring reports, including monthly liquidity reports and quarterly going concern analyses. [2]

The complaint plan closes the loop with the data audits. Complaints are where borrowers report data errors the institution has not found. A plan that escalates errors affecting other accounts turns each complaint into a test of the system of record. [2]

How the episode applies to different institutions

The orders concerned a nonbank servicer licensed by states. Its findings travel further, though the rules that apply differ by charter and activity.

Banks

A bank’s core and loan servicing systems are examined by its federal or state supervisor. The Massachusetts order is not their rulebook. What it shows is a regulator treating system deficiencies as findings in their own right and writing remedies in terms of migration milestones and data tests. [1] [2] In our reading, a bank planning a core conversion can expect its supervisor to ask the same kind of questions. It can answer them more easily if it designed the conversion around evidence from the start.

Credit unions

A credit union may run on a core provided by a third party under a long contract. The Ocwen episode is a warning about licensed platforms. Exiting one needs the provider’s cooperation, as Ocwen’s annual report recorded. [6] A credit union that negotiates deconversion support, data export formats and test conversions into its contract has priced its exit before it needs it.

Subservicers and servicers of record

Lenders can use subservicers. The consent order required Ocwen’s new originations to be sub-serviced by an unaffiliated entity while the old platform was frozen. [2] The arrangement shifts operational work, not responsibility. The servicer of record still answers for the data the subservicer holds.

Investors and buyers of servicing rights

The Bureau alleged that Ocwen sold servicing rights without fully disclosing the mistakes in borrowers’ records. [3] Whatever the outcome of that allegation, the risk is general. Any buyer of servicing rights should test the data before it boards the loans, which is the rule the consent order imposed on Ocwen’s own migration. [2]

Boards and audit committees

The order’s governance findings were addressed to a board that, it said, did not review key decisions and relied too much on management. [1] The consent order required board-approved complaint policies and regular financial condition reporting. [2]

For any board, the practical point is what it sees about the system of record. A board that receives conversion status as a percentage complete learns little. A board that receives the evidence for each milestone, in the consent order’s terms, can judge whether the institution is ready for the next step. [2]

State-licensed nonbanks

For state-licensed servicers and lenders, the examination itself is a lesson in coordination. The Massachusetts order said the examination was conducted under the participating states’ own authorities and under protocols established by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators. [1] An examination by six states, led by one, was followed by actions from regulators in 29 states and the District of Columbia. [1] [6]

In our reading, that structure raises the stakes of a system of record for any multistate nonbank. A defect found in one examination becomes a finding in every state that relies on it, and each state may add its own conditions, as Massachusetts and New York did. [2] [6]

Fintech lenders

Younger lenders build their own systems and grow fast. The order’s first finding was that controls failed to keep pace with growth. [1] A fintech that adds products and acquisitions on top of a single platform faces the comment-code problem in a modern form: rules, flags and workflows that multiply faster than anyone documents them.

Objections, in order

1. Ocwen was an outlier, so its orders say little about anyone else

Its circumstances were unusual: rapid acquisitions, related-party arrangements and a financial condition the order called deficient. [1] The technology findings were not unusual in kind. Duplicate rules, unchecked vendor handoffs and unmonitored reconciliations exist in institutions of every size.

2. The findings were allegations Ocwen never admitted

That is correct, and this article treats them that way. [2] The remedy is not an allegation. Ocwen agreed to the consent order’s migration terms and later reported that it had moved all loans off the platform. [2] [6]

3. The Bureau’s lawsuit failed, so the system findings fell with it

The Bureau’s case ended with summary judgment for Ocwen in 2023, after litigation over the effect of a prior settlement. [4] The state administrative actions were resolved separately by settlement, and the migration terms came from those. [2] [6]

4. Migration milestones belong to project managers, not regulators

In this case a regulator defined them, along with the evidence for each. [2] It shows what an outside party will accept as proof that a migration stage is complete, which is useful to anyone who has to convince a board.

5. Clean-before-move is too slow

It is slower at the start. The consent order chose it anyway, barring the boarding of any loan with a known unremediated error. [2] The alternative moves the cost into the new platform, where errors are harder to trace back to their source.

6. A licensed platform is safer than building one

It can be. It also makes exit a negotiation. Ocwen needed a binding term sheet with its licensor to deboard loans. [6] The safety of a licensed platform depends on the exit terms written before it is needed.

7. Regulators should not choose an institution’s technology

The Massachusetts consent order did not choose one. It referred to the new system vendor without naming the company, and defined each milestone by the evidence that would prove it. [2] It did name the target system in one respect: its first milestone was the MSP Mapping Project, and Ocwen’s annual report later recorded the move to Black Knight MSP. [2] [6] Neither document says who chose that system. In our reading, the regulator set the tests and left the choice of tool with the company.

What technology and operations leaders could check

The four parts translate into checks for any institution with a system of record.

  1. Do we know how many rules, codes or workflow triggers drive our system of record, and which ones duplicate each other?
  2. For each vendor that receives our system’s output, do we capture and check the date the output actually reached the customer?
  3. Would our monitoring tell us if a reconciliation stopped running or stopped matching, before an examiner did?
  4. Does our platform contract give us data export, deconversion support and test conversions on terms we could use tomorrow?
  5. For our next migration, have we defined the evidence for each milestone and barred moving any record with a known error?

The checks do not need a regulator to ask first. Each can be run by an internal audit team on a sample, in the same spirit as the escrow review the consent order required. [2]

The checks map onto the four parts. The first three test the finding: rules, vendor handoffs and reconciliations. The fourth tests the dependency. The fifth tests whether the institution has planned its remedy and proof before it needs them.

The checks also have owners. The first belongs to whoever governs changes to the system’s rules and codes. The second belongs to vendor management and the business line that sends the output. The third belongs to finance and operations together, since reconciliations sit between them. The fourth belongs to procurement and legal. The fifth belongs to the executive who sponsors the next migration. A check without a named owner is the kind of gap the 2017 order described, repeated one level up. [1]

A short exercise makes the checks concrete. Take one customer-facing letter with a legal deadline. Trace it from the event that triggers it to the date it arrives. Find who owns each step and where the date is recorded. If any step has no owner or no recorded date, the institution has found its own version of the gap the 2017 order described.

With hindsight

The Massachusetts matter closed with the consent order of March 21, 2018. [2] Ocwen paid $1 million to a Massachusetts mortgage education trust, accepted the platform restrictions and migration ladder described above, and agreed to the escrow review, data integrity audits, complaint plan and financial reporting. [2] The consent order said it resolved the April 20, 2017 order in its entirety. [2]

Ocwen’s annual report for 2019, filed in February 2020, recorded the wider outcome. It said regulators from 29 states and the District of Columbia took actions in April 2017 and shortly afterward, and that it had entered agreements with all of them. [6] It said it had resolved all of the administrative actions taken by state regulators in April 2017 and shortly thereafter, though not all of the legal actions. [6]

The report also described the migration. It said that in February 2019 Ocwen and Altisource signed a binding term sheet confirming Altisource’s cooperation with deboarding loans from REALServicing to Black Knight’s MSP servicing system. [6] It said Ocwen had transferred all loans onto the new system and no longer serviced any loans on REALServicing. [6] It attributed lower technology expense in 2019 partly to no longer licensing REALServicing. [6]

New York added its own condition. According to the report, the New York Department of Financial Services approved Ocwen’s acquisition of PHH in September 2018 subject to post-closing conditions tied to moving New York loans onto the new system. [6] The report also said Ocwen was prohibited from boarding additional loans onto REALServicing and required to move all New York loans off it by April 30, 2020. [6] The report said a New York restriction on growth would remain until the Department determined the migration was successful and the infrastructure was satisfactory. [6]

The Bureau’s lawsuit took a different course. Its enforcement page records that the district court partly denied Ocwen’s motion to dismiss in September 2019 and required the Bureau to re-plead. [4] On March 4, 2021, the court granted summary judgment in part on res judicata grounds, and on April 21, 2021 it entered final judgment for the defendants. [4]

On April 6, 2022, the Eleventh Circuit held that the parties had intended to preclude new challenges to conduct covered by their 2013 settlement’s servicing standards and enforcement regime, vacated the judgment and remanded. [4] On May 2, 2023, the district court granted summary judgment to Ocwen. [4] The Bureau’s page lists the case status as expired, terminated or dismissed. [4]

What has held up since April 2017 is the orders’ focus on the platform as the problem to be solved. The state settlements did not ask Ocwen to fix REALServicing. They asked it to leave, on a schedule, with evidence at each step. [2] [6] Ocwen reported that it did leave. [6]

What did not hold up was the federal case, built on overlapping allegations. The Bureau’s page records a litigation history centered on the effect of a 2013 settlement, and it records no ruling on whether the system had worked. [4] In our view, the durable record of the episode is therefore the consent order’s migration terms, not the litigation. They remain a usable template for any institution, and any regulator, that needs to prove a system of record has been replaced without carrying its errors along. [2]

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the article where needed.

  • mortgage servicing
  • system of record
  • data migration
  • state regulators
  • CFPB
  • escrow