OCR’s 2017 CardioNet settlement began with a stolen laptop and turned on a risk analysis and device policies
On April 24, 2017, HHS announced a $2.5 million HIPAA settlement with CardioNet after a laptop theft. Its findings centered on an insufficient risk analysis and policies left in draft; in our reading, encryption was the last link of a chain OCR examined whole.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
On April 24, 2017, HHS announced a $2.5 million HIPAA settlement with CardioNet after a laptop theft. Its findings centered on an insufficient risk analysis and policies left in draft; in our reading, encryption was the last link of a chain OCR examined whole.
- The week The release described the incident behind it.
- The analysis: knowing where the data and the devices were The first item of covered conduct was the security management process.
- The policies: decisions in force, not in draft The second item of covered conduct concerned device and media controls.
- The device: encryption as an addressable choice that has to be documented Addressable is not optional.
- The people: training, reporting and the workforce member with the laptop The third item of covered conduct was about people.
- Where the chain breaks in different organizations The CardioNet chain applies to every covered entity and business associate.
- Objections, in order Encryption to the Secretary’s guidance would have taken the lost data outside the definition of unsecured information. [4] It would not have supplied the missing risk analysis or the policies in draft, which the agreement listed as separate conduct. [2] An organization with encryption and no analysis has protected one device class by luck.
- What security and privacy officers could check The four parts translate into checks for any covered entity or business associate.
- With hindsight The CardioNet corrective plan ran for two years from its effective date. [2] We cite no public document reporting how it ended.
The week
On April 24, 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights announced a HIPAA settlement with CardioNet. [1] CardioNet agreed to pay $2.5 million and implement a corrective action plan to settle potential noncompliance with the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. [1] HHS described it as the first settlement involving a wireless health services provider, since CardioNet provides remote mobile monitoring of patients at risk for cardiac arrhythmias. [1]
The release described the incident behind it. In January 2012, CardioNet reported to OCR that a workforce member’s laptop had been stolen from a parked vehicle outside the employee’s home. [1] The laptop contained the electronic protected health information of 1,391 individuals. [1]
The release then described what OCR found. CardioNet had an insufficient risk analysis and risk management processes in place at the time of the theft. [1] Its policies and procedures implementing the Security Rule standards were in draft form and had not been implemented. [1] It was unable to produce any final policies or procedures on safeguards for electronic health information, including those for mobile devices. [1]
The resolution agreement, which the release pointed to on OCR’s website, gave more detail. [1] [2] It identified CardioNet as a covered entity providing ambulatory cardiac monitoring, headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania, and a wholly owned subsidiary of BioTelemetry. [2] It said OCR received notifications from CardioNet on January 10, 2012 and February 27, 2012 of breaches affecting 1,391 and 2,219 individuals, and notified CardioNet of its investigations in May 2012. [2]
The agreement listed three items of covered conduct. [2]
- CardioNet failed to implement a security management process, by failing to conduct an accurate and thorough risk analysis and to plan and implement measures sufficient to reduce the risks.
- Until March 2015, CardioNet failed to implement policies and procedures governing the receipt and removal of hardware and electronic media containing electronic health information, their encryption, and their movement within its facilities.
- CardioNet failed to safeguard against impermissible disclosure by its employees, permitting access by an unauthorized person, and failed to take sufficient steps to correct the disclosure immediately.
The list paraphrases the agreement, which cited the Security Rule’s security management and device and media control provisions for the first two items. [2] The agreement stated that it was not an admission of liability by CardioNet, and not a concession by HHS that CardioNet was not in violation. [2] It was signed for both parties on April 3, 2017. [2]
The corrective action plan ran for two years from its effective date. [2] It required a risk analysis within 90 days for HHS approval, followed by a risk management plan, revised policies with attention to device and media controls, and a revised training program. [2] With the revised policies, CardioNet had to certify that all laptops, flash drives, SD cards and other portable media devices were encrypted, and describe the encryption methods used. [2]
The plan also set the terms of oversight. During the two-year term, CardioNet had to investigate any information that a workforce member might have broken its policies and report confirmed failures to HHS within 30 days. [2] It had to file annual reports with an officer’s attestation and keep records relating to the plan for six years. [2] A material breach of the plan could lead HHS to pursue a civil money penalty for the covered conduct. [2]
The rules behind the settlement were not new in 2017. The Security Rule’s device and media controls standard and its encryption specification for access control had read the same since the 2013 amendments. [3] Encryption was, and remains, an addressable implementation specification. [3] The Breach Notification Rule defines unsecured protected health information as information not rendered unusable, unreadable or indecipherable to unauthorized persons through a technology or methodology the Secretary specifies in guidance. [4]
A stolen laptop is the kind of incident a security program is meant to make dull. In our reading, if the device is encrypted to the Secretary’s guidance, the data on it is not unsecured, and the breach notification duties for unsecured information do not apply. [4] If it is not, the organization faces notification and possibly an investigation. CardioNet’s laptop fell into the second case. [1]
What makes the settlement worth revisiting is where OCR looked once it started. Its release and the agreement said little about the laptop itself. They described a risk analysis that was insufficient, risk management that was missing, policies left in draft and device controls absent until 2015. [1] [2] The corrective plan then rebuilt the program in that order, with encryption certified together with the revised policies, after the analysis and the risk management plan. [2]
Our argument is that the CardioNet settlement treated encryption of a lost device as the last link in a chain, and examined the whole chain. In our reading, that is the useful way for a health organization to read it. The question after a device loss starts with whether the device was encrypted. It goes on to whether the organization knew the device existed, had decided how it should be protected and had told the person carrying it.
We take that chain in four parts:
- The analysis: whether the organization had assessed the risks to the data, including on portable devices.
- The policies: whether it had decided, in force rather than in draft, how devices and media were to be handled.
- The device: whether the protection on the device itself met the rules and could be shown to.
- The people: whether the workforce knew the rules and whether failures were reported and acted on.
The first part is about knowledge. The second is about decisions. The third is about technical controls. The fourth is about behavior and follow-up. A failure at any link can expose data, and the corrective plan addressed all four. After the four parts we look at how the chain breaks in different kinds of organizations, take objections in order, and list what a security or privacy officer could check.
A note on sources and our reading. We describe the settlement from HHS’s release and the resolution agreement, read in archived copies, and the rules from the current Code of Federal Regulations. [1] [2] [3] [4] We describe later events from a Fifth Circuit decision, a 2021 statute and HHS’s 2025 proposed rule. [5] [6] [7] [8] What these imply for a particular organization’s program is our reading. Covered entities and business associates should check their own obligations with counsel.
The analysis: knowing where the data and the devices were
The first item of covered conduct was the security management process. OCR’s investigation indicated that CardioNet failed to conduct an accurate and thorough risk analysis of the risks and vulnerabilities to its electronic health information, and failed to plan and implement measures to reduce them. [2] The release put it more briefly: an insufficient risk analysis and risk management processes at the time of the theft. [1]
What a risk analysis has to cover
The Security Rule makes risk analysis and risk management required implementation specifications under the security management process standard. [3] They are not addressable. Every covered entity and business associate must do them. [3]
The corrective plan showed what HHS expected the analysis to include. It had to incorporate CardioNet’s current facilities and the electronic equipment, data systems and applications it controlled, administered or owned that contain, store, transmit or receive electronic health information. [2] That is a scope defined by where the data goes, not by which systems the IT department manages. [2]
In our reading, the laptop was in scope by that definition, and the release’s finding implies the 2012 analysis did not deal with it adequately. [1] [2] A risk analysis that covers servers and the electronic health record but treats laptops as an afterthought misses the place where data leaves the building.
A company built on mobility
CardioNet’s business was remote monitoring. [1] HHS described it as providing remote mobile monitoring of, and rapid response to, patients at risk for cardiac arrhythmias. [1] For such a company, data on the move is the normal condition, not an exception.
That raises the bar for the analysis. A hospital whose data stays largely inside its walls can treat portable devices as a defined edge case. A monitoring service whose staff and devices work in the field cannot. Its risk analysis has to start from the assumption that data is outside the facility and work back to the controls.
From analysis to management
The plan made the sequence explicit. CardioNet would submit its risk analysis within 90 days, HHS would approve or disapprove it within 60 days of receipt, and revisions would continue until HHS approved. [2] Only then would CardioNet submit an organization-wide risk management plan, within 90 days of approval, with a process and timeline for implementing, evaluating and revising its remediation. [2]
The plan also required the analysis to be reviewed at least annually and updated in response to environmental or operational changes, with the risk management plan, policies and training revised as needed. [2] That clause is the one organizations forget. An analysis done once becomes stale the first time a new device type or workflow arrives.
The record across the years
The agreement’s dates show how long the record stayed open. The breach notifications came on January 10 and February 27, 2012, and OCR opened its investigations in May 2012. [2] The agreement said device and media policies were missing until March 2015. [2] The parties signed on April 3, 2017, and HHS announced the settlement on April 24. [1] [2]
In our reading, the dates carry a point for any organization under investigation. OCR assessed conduct that continued after the incident, as well as the state of things on the day of the theft. Policies adopted during an investigation count from the day they take effect, and the gap before that day stays part of the record. [2]
Who owns the analysis
The Security Rule places the duty on the covered entity or business associate, not on a department. [3] Inside an organization, the analysis needs an owner who can reach every part of the business that handles data, including field operations, research and vendors.
In our reading, the CardioNet findings point to a common ownership problem. A security office can analyze the systems it runs. It cannot analyze the devices it does not know about. The analysis belongs with someone who can require every department to declare where its data goes, and who answers to leadership for the result. The corrective plan made HHS the reviewer of that analysis for two years, which is one way of forcing that ownership. [2]
The inventory question
An analysis can only assess the assets it knows about. The corrective plan’s scope, every system and piece of equipment that touches the data, assumes an inventory. [2] HHS later said so directly. Its 2025 proposed rule stated that an accurate and thorough risk analysis already requires an inventory of technology assets and an understanding of how data moves, though the current regulatory text does not specify it. [7]
For a CISO, the practical consequence is that asset management and risk analysis are one job seen from two sides. An inventory that misses laptops, removable media or field devices produces an analysis with the same gap. The CardioNet findings are what that gap looks like when a device is lost.
The policies: decisions in force, not in draft
The second item of covered conduct concerned device and media controls. The agreement said that, until March 2015, CardioNet failed to implement policies and procedures governing the receipt and removal of hardware and electronic media containing health information, their encryption, and their movement within its facilities. [2]
What the standard requires
The device and media controls standard requires policies and procedures for hardware and electronic media containing electronic health information. [3] They must govern receipt and removal of those items into and out of a facility, and their movement within it. [3] Its disposal and media re-use specifications are required; its accountability and backup specifications are addressable. [3]
The standard is written about facilities. A laptop that leaves the building each evening is hardware removed from a facility. In our reading, an organization whose staff take laptops home has a device and media control question every evening, whether or not it has written a policy for it.
Draft policies
The release said CardioNet’s policies implementing the Security Rule standards were in draft form and had not been implemented. [1] It said CardioNet could not produce final policies on safeguards for electronic health information, including for mobile devices. [1]
A draft policy is evidence that someone identified the need. It is not evidence that anyone was told to follow it. In our reading, OCR treated the gap between the two as a finding in its own right. An organization cannot point to a draft as proof of a safeguard, because nobody was bound by it.
Why encryption was tied to policy
The corrective plan tied device encryption to the policies. CardioNet had to revise its policies with particular attention to device and media controls, based on the approved risk analysis and risk management plan. [2] The encryption certification was due at the same time as the revised policies. [2]
In our reading, that pairing was deliberate. Encryption without a policy is a setting someone chose. Encryption with a policy is a decision the organization made, applied to defined devices, with an owner and a method. The policy says which devices must be encrypted, how, who checks, and what happens to a device that is not. Without that, the organization cannot show that encryption covers everything it should.
Exceptions and how they are recorded
No device policy survives contact with operations without exceptions. A clinician needs a device that cannot run the standard encryption agent. A vendor’s diagnostic laptop must connect to a monitor. A study needs data on a portable drive for an offsite analysis. Each is a reasonable request. Each also creates a device that the standard policy does not cover.
In our reading, the policy link holds only if exceptions are recorded, approved by someone accountable, time-limited and reviewed. An unrecorded exception is indistinguishable from a policy that does not exist. When a device under an exception is lost, the record of who approved it and why is the organization’s evidence that the policy was in force.
Policies that reach the field
For a monitoring service, the policy has to reach people who do not work in an office. Field staff, technicians and clinicians carry devices between patients, vehicles and homes. The theft in this case was from a parked vehicle outside an employee’s home. [1]
A policy that addresses movement within a facility does not address a car outside a house. An organization with field workers needs policies that follow the device: where it may be left, how it is carried, how it is locked and what to do when it is lost. The standard’s language about facilities is the floor, not the boundary. [3]
The device: encryption as an addressable choice that has to be documented
The Security Rule’s access control standard lists encryption and decryption as an addressable implementation specification: implement a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt electronic health information. [3] Its transmission security standard lists encryption of data in transit as addressable as well. [3]
What addressable means
Addressable is not optional. HHS’s 2025 proposed rule summarized the existing obligation. A regulated entity must assess whether encryption is reasonable and appropriate in its environment and implement it if so. [7] If it is not, the entity must document why and implement an equivalent alternative measure if reasonable and appropriate. [7]
In our reading, the CardioNet findings show the weakness of that structure in practice. An organization that never completed its risk analysis never reached the point of deciding whether encryption was reasonable for its laptops. The addressable decision depends on the analysis. When the analysis is missing, the decision is missing too.
The documentation is the evidence. Take an organization that decided in writing to encrypt laptops but not a class of bedside devices that cannot support it. If it recorded the compensating controls for those devices, it has made the addressable decision the rule describes. [3] [7] An organization that encrypted some laptops because the vendor shipped them that way has made no decision at all. After a loss, the first can show its reasoning. The second can only show its luck, good or bad.
The breach safe harbor
Encryption also matters for breach notification. The Breach Notification Rule applies to unsecured protected health information, defined as information not rendered unusable, unreadable or indecipherable to unauthorized persons through a technology or methodology specified in the Secretary’s guidance. [4]
In our reading, a lost device encrypted to that guidance does not carry unsecured information, so the notification duties for unsecured information do not apply to it. [4] A lost device that is not encrypted to the guidance does. That is a strong financial argument for encryption: it can change a reportable breach into an incident that does not require notification, if the encryption and the key management meet the guidance.
Lost, stolen or misplaced
Not every missing device is a breach. The Breach Notification Rule presumes that an impermissible use or disclosure is a breach unless the entity demonstrates a low probability that the information has been compromised. [4] The demonstration rests on a risk assessment of at least four factors. [4] They are the nature and extent of the information, the unauthorized person involved, whether the information was actually acquired or viewed, and the extent of mitigation. [4]
In our reading, those factors explain why the chain matters even when a device is recovered. An organization that knows what was on the device, can show it was encrypted, and can show when it was locked or wiped has material for the assessment. One that cannot answer those questions has little to set against the presumption. [4]
Certification and description
The corrective plan required CardioNet to certify that all laptops, flash drives, SD cards and other portable media devices were encrypted, together with a description of the encryption methods used. [2] HHS could respond that the certification was not adequate, and CardioNet would have to make changes until HHS approved. [2]
The list is broader than laptops. Flash drives and SD cards are small, cheap and easy to lose. Some devices that collect data in the field store it on removable cards. The certification asked CardioNet to prove encryption for the whole class of portable storage, which requires knowing where all of it is.
Keys and evidence
A certification is only as good as the evidence behind it. For each device class, an organization needs to show the encryption method, how keys are managed, how compliance is checked, and what happens to a device that falls out of compliance. The corrective plan’s requirement to describe the encryption methods points to that evidence. [2]
Device management tools make this evidence easier to produce, but they do not decide what it should show. The policy decides which devices must be encrypted. The tool reports whether they are. The gap between the two lists, devices the policy covers that the tool cannot see, is where the next CardioNet finding would come from.
The case against encryption everywhere
There is a serious argument against treating encryption as universal. Some clinical devices run software that cannot support it, or cannot be changed without the manufacturer. Encryption adds key management, recovery procedures and support calls. The addressable structure exists so that an organization can document a reasoned alternative where encryption is not reasonable and appropriate. [3] [7]
The argument holds only where the documentation exists. HHS’s 2025 proposal would make encryption required with limited exceptions. [7] It said that implementing a mechanism to encrypt generally would be reasonable and appropriate for regulated entities. [7] In our reading, an organization that wants to keep that flexibility should be able to show, device class by device class, why encryption was not reasonable and what it did instead.
Data in transit from the field
Remote monitoring moves data as well as storing it. The Security Rule’s transmission security standard requires measures to guard against unauthorized access to electronic health information sent over a network, with integrity controls and encryption as addressable specifications. [3]
A monitoring service’s chain has a second device link: the gateway or phone that sends readings from the patient to the service. The CardioNet findings concerned a stolen laptop, but the same questions apply to the transmitting device. Does the analysis name it, does a policy govern it, is its traffic encrypted, and do the staff who set it up know what to do when it goes missing? [1] [3]
The people: training, reporting and the workforce member with the laptop
The third item of covered conduct was about people. CardioNet failed to safeguard against impermissible disclosure by its employees, permitting access by an unauthorized person, and failed to take sufficient steps to correct the disclosure immediately. [2]
Correcting a disclosure quickly
The third item of covered conduct had a second half: CardioNet failed to take sufficient steps to correct the disclosure immediately. [2] The agreement did not describe what steps were missing. [2]
Immediate correction after a device loss means a short list of actions taken in hours rather than weeks. Report the loss, lock or wipe the device if possible, revoke its credentials and certificates, reset the passwords of accounts used on it, and start the breach risk assessment. Each action depends on earlier links: an inventory that identifies the device, a management tool that can reach it and a policy that tells the employee to report at once.
Training aimed at mobility
The corrective plan required CardioNet to review and revise its Security Rule training program. [2] The program had to include a focus on security, encryption, handling of mobile devices and out-of-office transmissions. [2] After HHS approved it, CardioNet had to deliver it to all workforce members with access to electronic health information. [2]
The phrase out-of-office transmissions is the telling one. It recognizes that the workforce moves data outside the facility as part of the job, and that training must cover what happens there. Generic annual security training that does not mention cars, homes, public networks or lost devices would not meet the focus the plan required.
Reportable events
During the compliance term, CardioNet had to investigate promptly any information that a workforce member might have failed to follow its policies. [2] If it determined that a failure occurred, it had to notify HHS in writing within 30 days. [2] The report had to describe the event, the people and policies involved, the actions taken and the sanctions applied. [2]
This clause turns policy violations into records. It is also a test of whether the policies were specific enough to be violated. A policy that says devices should be protected cannot be breached in a reportable way. A policy that says laptops must be encrypted and never left in unattended vehicles can.
Sanctions
The Security Rule already required a sanction policy: covered entities and business associates must apply appropriate sanctions against workforce members who fail to comply with their security policies. [3] The corrective plan’s reportable event clause asked CardioNet to report the sanctions it applied. [2] In our reading, a sanction policy is meaningless without policies in force to sanction against, which ties the people link back to the policy link.
Annual reports and attestation
CardioNet had to submit annual reports describing changes to its risk analysis and risk management plan, revisions to policies and training, reportable events and corrective measures. [2] Each report needed an attestation by an owner or officer that the information was accurate after reasonable inquiry. [2] It had to keep records relating to compliance with the plan for six years. [2]
The attestation puts a named executive behind the program. That is the plan’s way of making sure that the chain from analysis to people is visible at the top of the organization, as well as in the security office.
The second breach
The release discussed one breach. The agreement recorded two: notifications on January 10 and February 27, 2012, affecting 1,391 and 2,219 individuals. [1] [2] Neither document we cite describes the second incident in detail. [1] [2]
The documents do not say what the second breach involved. The agreement’s third item of covered conduct refers to impermissible disclosure by CardioNet’s employees, in the plural, and the corrective plan gave workforce behavior and reportable events their own sections. [2] We infer nothing further about the second incident.
Where the chain breaks in different organizations
The CardioNet chain applies to every covered entity and business associate. Where it breaks differs by organization.
Health systems
A health system has a large inventory and staff in several roles who carry devices: clinicians on call, researchers, administrators and staff working from home. The risk analysis may be done centrally while devices are bought and issued by departments. Here the break is between the central analysis and the departmental inventory. A system that cannot reconcile the two has the CardioNet gap at scale.
Ambulatory networks and physician practices
Smaller practices may have no dedicated security staff. Their analysis may be a template, and their policies may be adopted from a vendor without being adapted. Here the break is between draft and in force: policies that exist but have never been issued, trained on or checked. [1]
Remote monitoring and home health
For organizations like CardioNet, the data lives outside the facility by design. [1] Field devices, patient-worn monitors, technicians’ laptops and cellular gateways all carry or relay health information. Here the break is between policies written for facilities and work done in homes and vehicles. [3]
Business associates
The Security Rule applies to business associates directly. [3] A billing company, transcription service or analytics firm whose staff take data home faces the same chain. The break can be contractual: the covered entity assumes the business associate encrypts, and the business associate assumes its own staff follow a policy nobody has checked.
Academic medical centers and research
Research teams copy data to laptops and portable drives for analysis, and visiting researchers come and go. The Fifth Circuit’s later decision in a case involving a cancer center described a stolen faculty laptop and two lost USB drives, one by a trainee and one by a visiting researcher. [5] Here the break is in the population: people who handle data but are not fully inside the workforce training and device management program.
Device makers and digital health companies
CardioNet was a covered entity because it provided a monitoring service, as the agreement stated. [2] A company that only makes devices may not be a covered entity or business associate, depending on its relationships. In our reading, that boundary matters to the companies that sit on it. A digital health firm that moves from selling a device to running a monitoring service crosses into the Security Rule, and its risk analysis has to follow the move. [2] [3]
Public health and government health programs
State and local health departments that are covered entities face the same rules. [3] Their field staff, investigators and outreach workers carry devices in the community. Their break can be procurement: devices bought on short notice for a program or an emergency, outside the standard build that enforces encryption.
Objections, in order
1. The settlement was about one laptop
The incident was one laptop in the release and two breaches in the agreement. [1] [2] The covered conduct was about the program: risk analysis, risk management, device and media policies, and safeguards against workforce disclosure. [2] The corrective plan rebuilt the program, not the laptop. [2]
2. Encryption alone would have avoided all of this
Encryption to the Secretary’s guidance would have taken the lost data outside the definition of unsecured information. [4] It would not have supplied the missing risk analysis or the policies in draft, which the agreement listed as separate conduct. [2] An organization with encryption and no analysis has protected one device class by luck.
3. Addressable means encryption is optional
HHS’s description of the existing rule is that the entity must assess encryption, implement it if reasonable and appropriate, and otherwise document why and implement an equivalent measure if reasonable and appropriate. [7] That is a documented decision, not a free choice. Without a risk analysis, the decision has nothing to rest on.
4. The Fifth Circuit later limited what OCR can demand
It did. The court held in 2021 that the encryption specification requires a mechanism, not a guarantee, and vacated a penalty. [5] That decision concerned a civil money penalty. CardioNet’s was a negotiated settlement with a corrective plan. [2] [5] And the decision did not touch the required risk analysis specification, which is where CardioNet’s first item of covered conduct sat. [2] [3]
5. Device management tools solve this
They make evidence easier to produce. They do not decide which devices are in scope, train the person who leaves a laptop in a car, or write the policy that says what must happen next. The corrective plan required all three. [2]
6. A small organization cannot afford this
The Security Rule allows the measures to reflect an organization’s size, complexity, capabilities and costs. [3] It does not exempt anyone from risk analysis or risk management. [3] The cheapest version of the chain is still a complete one: a short analysis, a short policy in force, encrypted devices and a page of training on what to do with them.
7. Settlements set no precedent
A resolution agreement binds only its parties, and CardioNet admitted no liability. [2] HHS placed no restriction on publishing the agreement and published it with a release. [1] [2] In our reading, its value is as a record of what the regulator asked for once it found gaps: an approved analysis, an approved plan, revised policies, an encryption certification and targeted training. [2]
What security and privacy officers could check
The four parts translate into checks for any covered entity or business associate. Each can be tested on a small sample of devices and staff before it is run across the whole organization.
- Does our risk analysis name every class of portable device and removable media that holds health information, including those used in the field?
- Are our device and media policies in force, issued to staff and dated, rather than in draft?
- For each device class, can we show the encryption method, the key management and how compliance is checked?
- Does our training cover cars, homes, public networks and lost devices, and is completion recorded?
- When a workforce member breaks a device policy, is it investigated, recorded and acted on within a set time?
The checks follow the chain. The first is the analysis. The second is the policies. The third is the device. The fourth and fifth are the people. Each depends on the one before it. An organization that cannot answer the first will struggle to answer the third, because it does not know which devices to check.
The checks also have different owners. The first belongs to whoever owns the risk analysis, ideally with authority across departments. The second belongs to the privacy and security officers who issue policy. The third belongs to the teams that run device management and key escrow. The fourth belongs to training and human resources. The fifth belongs to the security officer and the managers who apply sanctions. An organization that names those owners has already done part of what the CardioNet plan required. [2]
A short exercise makes the chain visible. Pick one laptop at random from the inventory. Find it in the risk analysis, find the policy that governs it, show its encryption status and key escrow, and find the training record of the person who carries it. Each link that cannot be found is a link CardioNet’s corrective plan would have required the organization to build.
With hindsight
The CardioNet corrective plan ran for two years from its effective date. [2] We cite no public document reporting how it ended. The more significant developments after 2017 concerned the rules themselves and how far they could be enforced.
On January 14, 2021, the Fifth Circuit decided University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center v. HHS. [5] HHS had imposed a civil money penalty of $4,348,000 after a stolen unencrypted laptop and two lost unencrypted USB drives. [5] After the petition was filed, HHS conceded it could not defend a penalty over $450,000. [5] The court held the penalty arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law, vacated it and remanded. [5]
The court read the encryption specification narrowly. It held that the regulation requires a mechanism for encryption and does not require a covered entity to warrant that its mechanism provides bulletproof protection. [5] It said the regulation does not prohibit creating a mechanism by having employees sign an agreement that requires encryption of portable devices. [5] It also read the disclosure prohibition to require an affirmative act of disclosure, not a passive loss of information. [5]
Separately, on January 5, 2021, Public Law 116-321 amended the HITECH Act. [6] It requires HHS, when determining fines, audit outcomes and remedies in settlement agreements, to consider whether an entity had recognized security practices in place for not less than the previous 12 months. [6] It defines those practices to include NIST standards and the approaches promulgated under section 405(d) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, and it does not let HHS increase fines for not adopting them. [6]
On January 6, 2025, HHS published a proposed rule to revise the Security Rule. [7] It said the Department disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s view that having employees sign an agreement to encrypt portable devices was sufficient, and that additional clarity was warranted. [7] It proposed to require encryption of electronic health information expressly, with limited exceptions, removing the reasonable-and-appropriate analysis. [7] It proposed requirements for a technology asset inventory and a network map of how the data moves. [7]
Comments closed on March 7, 2025. [7] As checked on November 15, 2026, the Federal Register lists only the proposed rule under its regulation identifier, RIN 0945-AA22. [8] The current Security Rule text still lists encryption as addressable. [3]
What has held up since April 2017 is the reading that a lost device opens an examination of the whole program. The proposed rule’s inventory and network map requirements describe the same chain the CardioNet plan rebuilt: know the assets, know where the data goes, then protect it. [2] [7] HHS itself said a thorough risk analysis already requires that inventory. [7]
What did not hold up was any assumption that the agency’s own reading of the encryption rule would prevail in court. In M.D. Anderson, the Fifth Circuit held that the current text requires a mechanism, not a guarantee that the mechanism works. [5] In our view, that makes the risk analysis and policy links more important, not less. They are required outright, and they are where an organization shows that its mechanism was a decision rather than a gesture. [3]
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