UMass’s 2016 HIPAA settlement showed a hybrid entity’s safeguards reached only the components it designated
OCR said UMass Amherst left its speech, language and hearing clinic out of its HIPAA designation, so no HIPAA policies were implemented there; it also cited a missing firewall and no accurate risk analysis until 2015. The $650,000 settlement made designation the first control.
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OCR said UMass Amherst left its speech, language and hearing clinic out of its HIPAA designation, so no HIPAA policies were implemented there; it also cited a missing firewall and no accurate risk analysis until 2015. The $650,000 settlement made designation the first control.
- The week The case began with a single workstation.
- The designation: what hybrid status allows and where UMass drew the line HIPAA’s rules apply to covered entities.
- The cascade: policies, training and the risk analysis followed the designation Inside a health care component, the full rules apply.
- The edge: the network control and the technical areas the plan named OCR’s second finding was technical.
- The settlement terms: payment, approval loops and the long tail UMass agreed to pay HHS $650,000 as the resolution amount, on the agreement’s effective date. [2] HHS said the amount reflected the university’s financial loss in 2015. [1] The release did not say what the amount would have been otherwise.
- How the structure lands on other organizations A university that owns a hospital or faculty practice faces the UMass question at larger scale.
- Objections, in order The rule requires an accurate and thorough analysis of the ePHI a covered entity holds, which for a hybrid means its health care components. [3] [5] OCR said the Center should have been one of them. [1] An analysis that starts from the old line would repeat the error.
- Checks a privacy or security officer could run These checks follow from the UMass documents.
- With hindsight The rule at the center of the case has not changed since.
The week
On November 22, 2016, the Department of Health and Human Services announced that the University of Massachusetts Amherst had agreed to settle potential violations of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. [1] The settlement included a corrective action plan and a payment of $650,000. [1] HHS said the amount reflected the fact that the university operated at a financial loss in 2015. [1]
The case began with a single workstation. HHS said UMass reported that a workstation in its Center for Language, Speech, and Hearing was infected with malware. [1] The press release dated that report June 18, 2013. [1] The resolution agreement said HHS received the notification on June 4, 2013. [2]
HHS said the infection led to the impermissible disclosure of electronic protected health information of 1,670 individuals. [1] The information included names, addresses, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, health insurance information, diagnoses and procedure codes. [1] The resolution agreement described the event as a malware infection that may have resulted in a breach affecting approximately 1,670 individuals. [2]
According to HHS, the university determined that the malware was a generic remote access Trojan. [1] By the same account, it infiltrated the system and gave impermissible access to the data because UMass did not have a firewall in place. [1] HHS notified UMass of its investigation on August 27, 2013. [2]
The Office for Civil Rights listed what its investigation indicated. First, UMass had failed to designate all of its health care components when it became a hybrid entity. [1] It had treated University Health Services as a covered component, but not other components, including the Center where the breach happened. [1]
Because the Center was not designated, OCR said, UMass had not implemented policies and procedures there to ensure compliance with the Privacy and Security Rules. [1] Second, UMass had failed to put technical security measures in place at the Center, such as firewalls, to guard ePHI sent over a network. [1] Third, UMass had not conducted an accurate and thorough risk analysis until September 2015. [1]
The release explained the concept at the center of the case. The Privacy Rule lets a single legal entity with both covered and non-covered functions elect to be a hybrid entity. [1] To do so, HHS said, the entity must designate in writing the health care components that perform covered functions and assure their compliance. [1]
The resolution agreement recorded the university’s designation as it stood when the agreement was made. It listed the Center for Language, Speech and Hearing, the Center for Counseling and Psychological Health, the Psychological Services Center, the Student Health Benefit Plan and University Health Services. [2] It also listed four departments only to the extent they performed business associate functions within UMass: Information Technology, Administration and Finance, Facilities and Plant Management, and the Office of the General Counsel. [2]
The agreement stated the conduct as what HHS’s investigation indicated, not as admissions. It said the agreement was not an admission of liability by UMass. [2] It also said it was not a concession by HHS that UMass had not violated the rules. [2]
The corrective action plan required an enterprise-wide risk analysis, a risk management plan, revised policies and procedures, and training. [1] The release pointed readers to the resolution agreement and corrective action plan on OCR’s website. [1]
HHS’s release led with the settlement and the breach. OCR’s first listed finding, though, concerned a decision UMass had made, in writing, about which parts of the university HIPAA covered. [1]
Our argument is that the UMass settlement showed designation working as the first security control in a hybrid entity. HHS tied the missing policies at the clinic directly to the line UMass drew, and in our reading the missing firewall followed from the same gap. [1] OCR said the clinic outside that line had no HIPAA policies and no firewall. [1] The corrective plan then forced the line to be redrawn and the program extended to match it. [2]
We take the case in four parts:
- The designation: what hybrid status allows, what the rule requires it to include, and where UMass drew the line.
- The cascade: how policies, training and the risk analysis followed the designation.
- The edge: the network control OCR said was missing, and the technical areas the corrective plan named.
- The settlement terms: the payment, the approval loops, the reporting and the long tail of obligations.
The first part is a legal choice, the second its program consequences, the third its technical consequences, and the fourth the enforcement response. Together they cover what the case asked of UMass. After them we look at how the same structure lands on other kinds of organizations, take the strongest objections in order, and end with checks a privacy or security officer could run.
The designation: what hybrid status allows and where UMass drew the line
What a hybrid entity is
HIPAA’s rules apply to covered entities. The definition covers health plans, health care clearinghouses and health care providers who transmit health information electronically in connection with covered transactions. [8] A large organization may do only some covered work. A university runs clinics, but also teaches, researches and houses students.
The rules give such organizations a choice. A hybrid entity is a single legal entity that is a covered entity, whose business includes both covered and non-covered functions, and that designates health care components. [4] A health care component is a component or combination of components the hybrid entity designates under the rule. [4]
Once an entity is a hybrid, the requirements of Part 164, apart from a few organizational sections, apply only to its health care components. [3] References in the rules to a covered entity become references to the health care component, and protected health information means information created or received by or for that component. [3]
What the designation must include
The choice has a floor. The covered entity is responsible for designating its health care components and documenting the designation. [3] If it designates any, it must include every component that would meet the definition of a covered entity or a business associate if it were a separate legal entity. [3]
That requirement does not let an organization pick only its most visible clinic. Any part that would be a covered provider on its own must be in. So must any part that does business associate work for the covered parts, such as IT or legal support. [3] The rule also lets a component be included only to the extent it performs covered functions. [3]
The designation must be kept in writing or electronically. [3] It must be retained for six years from its creation or from when it was last in effect, whichever is later. [3]
When a clinic becomes a covered provider
The definition of covered entity explains why a teaching clinic can fall inside HIPAA. A health care provider is covered if it transmits health information electronically in connection with a covered transaction. [8] Billing a health plan electronically is the familiar example.
In our reading, the question for each clinic is concrete: whether it provides care, and whether health information about that care is sent electronically in a covered transaction such as a claim. We would not assume a clinic falls outside the test because a central billing office, rather than its own staff, sends the claims; that is a point for counsel. The privacy office needs the billing office’s list of clinics as well as the clinical directory.
The paper trail
The designation is itself a record. The rule requires it to be documented in writing or electronically and kept for six years from creation or from when it was last in effect. [3] An organization that updates its designation should keep each version, with its effective dates.
Those versions answer a question an investigator will ask about which components were designated on the date of the incident. In the UMass case, the answer at the time of the breach differed from the designation recorded in the agreement. [1] [2] A version history makes that comparison possible and shows when the gap was closed.
Where UMass drew the line
HHS said UMass had incorrectly determined that University Health Services was a covered health care component while other components, including the Center, were not. [1] The resolution agreement described the conduct in the rule’s language: UMass failed to include each component that would meet the definition of a covered entity or business associate if it were a separate legal entity. [2]
By the time of the agreement, UMass’s designation listed five clinical or plan components and four support departments to the extent of their business associate functions. [2] The difference between the two lists is the gap OCR’s first finding described. [1] [2]
Why the line is easy to draw wrong
A university’s covered activity is spread out. A speech and hearing center may be a teaching clinic run by an academic department. A counseling center may sit under student affairs. A student health insurance plan may sit under finance. Each looks like a different business from the medical clinic everyone thinks of as health care.
The rule’s test ignores the organization chart. It asks whether a component would be a covered entity or business associate on its own. [3] So the people who draw the line need a list of every unit that provides care and bills for it electronically, and every unit that supports those units with access to their data.
How an auditor would test it
An internal auditor can test a designation without clinical expertise. The test compares three lists: the designation, the units that send covered transactions, and the units with access to those units’ data. Any unit on the second or third list and absent from the first needs a recorded reason. [3] [8]
The auditor can also test currency. The designation’s last review date can be set against what changed in the institution since then: new clinics, new billing arrangements, new shared services and reorganized departments. A new clinic opened after the last review is a red flag even before anyone looks at its billing. So is a support office that took on clinic systems after a reorganization.
The decision has an owner
The rule puts the responsibility on the covered entity as a whole. [3] It does not say which office signs. For a university, we would make the privacy officer the owner, working with general counsel. The trigger for review should be any new clinic, new billing arrangement or new shared service.
In our reading, a designation is a living document. It is right on the day it is signed and drifts as the institution changes. A clinic that starts billing a payer electronically can enter HIPAA’s scope without anyone redrawing the line.
The cascade: policies, training and the risk analysis followed the designation
What applies inside the line
Inside a health care component, the full rules apply. The hybrid entity must ensure that the component complies with the applicable requirements. [3] That includes the Security Rule’s security management process, which requires an accurate and thorough risk analysis of the risks to ePHI the entity holds. [5]
The hybrid entity also has duties at the boundary. Its health care component may not disclose protected health information to another component where the Privacy Rule would bar the disclosure between separate entities. [3] It must protect ePHI from other components of the same organization as if they were separate legal entities. [3] Staff who work for both a health care component and another component may not carry protected information across in ways the rules prohibit. [3]
Some duties stay with the whole organization. The covered entity, not the component, is responsible for compliance and enforcement purposes. [3] It is responsible for the policies and procedures that ensure compliance, including the boundary safeguards. [3] And it is responsible for business associate arrangements and the other organizational requirements. [3] A hybrid designation narrows where the rules apply. It does not move accountability away from the institution’s leadership.
What happens outside the line
Outside the line, the HIPAA program does not reach. HHS made the consequence explicit for UMass. Because the Center was not designated, UMass did not implement policies and procedures at the Center to ensure compliance with the Privacy and Security Rules. [1]
That is the cascade. No designation meant no policies. The public record does not describe HIPAA training at the Center before the breach, but the corrective plan required it for every Center workforce member with access to ePHI. [2] And, as HHS’s investigation indicated, the university had not conducted an accurate and thorough analysis of the risks to all its ePHI. [2]
The risk analysis finding
OCR said UMass did not conduct an accurate and thorough risk analysis until September 2015. [1] The resolution agreement framed the finding as a failure to assess the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of all of its ePHI. [2]
The word all matters. A risk analysis bounded by an incomplete designation will miss the data in the excluded components. It can be thorough within its scope and still fail the rule, because the scope is wrong.
What the corrective plan required
The corrective action plan reversed the order of work. Before the risk analysis, UMass had to develop a complete inventory of all its facilities, electronic equipment, data systems and applications that contained or stored ePHI. [2] The inventory would then feed the analysis. [2]
The analysis had to incorporate all UMass facilities, whether owned or rented. [2] It had to cover ePHI on all electronic equipment, data systems and applications controlled, administered or owned by UMass or any UMass entity. [2] The plan allowed UMass to submit an analysis already under way for HHS to consider. [2]
Policy work came next. UMass had to review and revise the Center’s policies and procedures to comply with the Privacy and Breach Notification Rules. [2] It had to distribute them to all Center workforce members who used or disclosed ePHI. [2]
Training followed policies. All Center workforce members with access to ePHI had to be trained on the approved policies, and then at least annually. [2] Each had to certify, in writing or electronically, that they received the training, with the date. [2] New workforce members had to be trained within 30 days of joining. [2]
Workforce in mixed roles
Universities have people who work in more than one component. A faculty member may supervise students in a clinic and run a research lab. A graduate student may see clients in the clinic and teach a course. The hybrid rule addresses this directly. [3]
A person who works for a health care component and another component in the same capacity may not use or disclose protected information from the health care work in ways the Privacy Rule prohibits. [3] For a clinic like the Center, that means its training has to reach students and faculty whose main job is elsewhere. The corrective plan’s training duty covered all Center workforce members with access to ePHI. [2]
Workstations follow people. A clinic workstation used by trainees and faculty from an academic department is easy to treat as departmental equipment. If the designation is right, that workstation is inside the HIPAA program. If it is wrong, the workstation is managed like any other departmental machine.
The enterprise scope
The corrective plan’s language was broader than the Center. The risk analysis covered all facilities and systems of UMass and any UMass entity holding ePHI. [2] The risk management plan had to be enterprise-wide. [2] The press release described the analysis as enterprise-wide too. [1]
In our reading, this was the cascade run in reverse. The original failure was a narrow line that left a clinic outside. The remedy required the university to look everywhere for ePHI before deciding where its controls had to be.
The edge: the network control and the technical areas the plan named
Transmission security
OCR’s second finding was technical. UMass did not implement technical security measures at the Center to guard against unauthorized access to ePHI transmitted over an electronic communications network, by ensuring firewalls were in place. [2] The agreement cited the Security Rule’s transmission security standard. [2]
That standard requires technical measures to guard against unauthorized access to ePHI being transmitted over an electronic communications network. [5] It does not name firewalls. OCR’s finding tied the general standard to a specific missing control at a specific site. [2]
Why the edge followed the designation
In a university, network design can follow academic structure. A department may run its own subnet, its own workstations and its own administrator. If the department is outside the HIPAA program, no one applies HIPAA’s technical requirements to that network.
The malware OCR described was a generic remote access Trojan. [1] According to HHS, the university determined that it gave impermissible access because there was no firewall. [1] We do not know from the public documents how the infection arrived or how long it ran. The finding is about the missing barrier, not the entry point.
The technical areas the plan named
The corrective plan was specific about technical evidence. With the risk analysis, UMass had to provide documentation of a review of current security measures and risk to ePHI in five areas. [2] They were network segmentation, network infrastructure, vulnerability scanning, logging and alerts, and patch management. [2]
Those five areas describe a basic security program for a network that holds sensitive data. Segmentation limits what a compromised workstation can reach. Scanning and patching reduce the openings. Logging and alerts give a chance to notice an intruder. Infrastructure review confirms the barriers exist where the diagram says they do.
What a clinic network needs
For a clinic inside a larger institution, the design question is where its boundary sits. A clinic on a shared campus network depends on campus controls it does not run. A clinic on its own segment needs its own rules for what crosses the boundary.
Either can work. Neither works if the clinic is invisible to the people who run the controls. That brings the edge back to the designation. A security team cannot segment a network for data it does not know is there.
What the public record does not say
The public documents leave questions open. They do not say how the Trojan arrived, how long it was present or what data left the workstation. [1] [2] They do not say whether the Center’s network was segmented from the rest of the campus. We do not fill those gaps.
What the record does say is enough for the argument. HHS tied the missing firewall to the Center, and the missing policies to the missing designation. [1] The corrective plan then asked for evidence on segmentation, infrastructure, scanning, logging and patching across the enterprise. [2] The remedy describes what OCR expected a designated clinic’s network to have.
The business associate departments
The designation listed IT, finance, facilities and general counsel to the extent of their business associate functions. [2] That inclusion matters for the edge. Central IT runs the networks and the firewalls. If central IT is inside the designation for those functions, its work on clinic systems falls under HIPAA’s requirements. [3]
The rule says a component may be included only to the extent it performs covered functions. [3] UMass applied the same idea to its support offices, listing them only to the extent they performed business associate functions. [2] For a central IT office, that approach puts its work for the clinic in scope and leaves its work for the history department outside. Drawing that line inside a single department takes care. It is also the only way to apply HIPAA where the clinic’s data actually flows.
The settlement terms: payment, approval loops and the long tail
The payment
UMass agreed to pay HHS $650,000 as the resolution amount, on the agreement’s effective date. [2] HHS said the amount reflected the university’s financial loss in 2015. [1] The release did not say what the amount would have been otherwise.
UMass agreed not to contest the payment or its other obligations and waived procedural rights to notice, hearing and appeal regarding the resolution amount. [2] In exchange, HHS released UMass from actions under the HIPAA Rules arising from the covered conduct, conditioned on performance. [2] The release did not extend to criminal actions under the statute’s wrongful disclosure provision. [2]
The approval loops
The corrective plan used repeated HHS review. UMass had to send its risk analysis to HHS within 180 days of the effective date. [2] HHS would approve or disapprove within 60 days, with technical assistance if it disapproved. [2] UMass would have 60 days to revise, and the cycle would continue until HHS approved. [2]
The risk management plan followed the same pattern, due to HHS within 90 days of its final approval of the risk analysis. [2] UMass had to begin implementing the approved plan within 30 days of approval and distribute it to the workforce members involved. [2] Policies and procedures followed approval of the risk analysis, with their own review and revision cycle. [2]
Each loop is a dependency. The policy work could not finish until the risk analysis was approved. Training could not start until policies were adopted. For the compliance office, the timeline was set by HHS’s responses as much as its own pace.
Reporting and attestation
During the compliance term, UMass had to investigate any information that a workforce member may have failed to follow the approved policies. [2] If it found a failure, it had to report it to HHS in writing within 30 days as a reportable event, with a description and the corrective steps. [2]
Within 180 days after HHS approved the policies, UMass had to submit an implementation report. [2] It needed an officer’s attestations that the policies were implemented and that Center workforce members had been trained and certified. [2] An officer also had to attest that the report was accurate after reasonable inquiry. [2]
The long tail
The compliance term was two years from the effective date, unless HHS found a breach of the plan. [2] Document retention ran longer: UMass had to keep all records relating to compliance with the plan for six years from the effective date. [2]
The agreement also tolled the statute of limitations. Civil money penalties must be imposed within six years of a violation. [2] UMass agreed that the period from the effective date until any termination for breach, plus one year, would not count toward that limit. [2] If UMass breached the plan and failed to cure, HHS could move to impose penalties for the covered conduct and any other violations. [2]
What the terms reveal
In our reading, the terms show where OCR placed the weight. The money was modest by the release’s own account of ability to pay. [1] The obligations were long, reviewed and attested. For an institution, the corrective plan was the larger commitment.
What the plan did not require
The corrective plan relied on HHS’s own review. We found no independent monitor or outside assessor in it. [2] HHS approved the risk analysis, the risk management plan and the policies itself, with technical assistance where it disapproved. [2]
That design puts the quality of the remedy in the exchange between the institution and OCR. For a compliance office, it means the submissions are the record. A risk analysis written to win approval quickly, rather than to find risk, would pass through the same loop. The officer attestations at the end are the institution’s promise that the work was real. [2]
Extensions and the calendar
The plan allowed UMass to ask for more time. A timely written request had to reach HHS at least five days before the act was due. [2] If HHS found a breach of the plan, it could send a notice of breach and intent to impose a penalty. [2] UMass would then have 30 days to show compliance, a cure, or a reasonable timetable for a cure already under way. [2]
For the compliance office, the calendar was the control. The first deadline ran from the effective date, and most later ones ran from an HHS action or a prior approval. Missing one without a timely request risked turning a settlement into a penalty case. [2]
How the structure lands on other organizations
A university with an academic medical center
A university that owns a hospital or faculty practice faces the UMass question at larger scale. Its designation must capture the hospital, the practices, the student health service, any health plan it runs, and the support offices that touch their data. [3]
The support offices are the harder part. A university general counsel’s office may advise the hospital one day and the athletics department the next. UMass’s designation listed its general counsel’s office only to the extent of its business associate functions. [2] The rule’s text speaks of including a component only to the extent it performs covered functions, so how that applies to a support office is a question for counsel. [3] The privacy office needs a way to tell the two apart in the office’s own records.
A student health plan
Universities can also run health plans. UMass’s designation, as recorded in the agreement, listed its Student Health Benefit Plan as a health care component. [2] A health plan is a covered entity in its own right under the definition. [8]
A plan component has different data from a clinic: enrollment, premiums and claims. It may share staff with a student affairs or finance office. The same floor applies. A plan that would be a covered entity on its own must be in the designation, and the offices that do business associate work for it must be in to that extent. [3]
A state or county government
Governments are also single legal entities with mixed functions. A county may run a public health clinic that bills electronically alongside departments that have nothing to do with health care. The hybrid rule applies to any covered entity that meets the definition. [4]
For a county CIO, the UMass case is a direct analogy. The clinic may sit on the county network. The county IT department may support it. If the designation leaves out IT’s business associate functions, the clinic’s data runs through infrastructure that no HIPAA policy governs. [3]
A health system inside a larger nonprofit
Some health systems are part of a larger organization with schools, research institutes or social services. The same choice applies. If the organization is one legal entity, hybrid status is available. If it is several legal entities under common control, the separate affiliated covered entity rules may apply instead. [3]
Which path fits depends on legal structure, and organizations should check with counsel. The UMass case shows the risk on the hybrid path: a component left out by mistake loses the protections everyone assumes it has.
A research unit holding clinical data
A research lab that receives data from a university clinic is not always a health care component. Whether it is depends on what it does. The hybrid rule’s firewall-style duties apply at the boundary. The component may not disclose protected information to another component where the rules would bar disclosure between separate entities. [3]
So the boundary is a data flow question as well as a designation question. The privacy office needs to know which data crosses from clinic to lab, on what authority, and with what safeguards.
Objections, in order
1. An enterprise-wide analysis is disproportionate to one clinic
The objection is that a single infected workstation in one center led to a requirement to inventory and assess every UMass facility and system holding ePHI. [2]
The rule requires an accurate and thorough analysis of the ePHI a covered entity holds, which for a hybrid means its health care components. [3] [5] OCR said the Center should have been one of them. [1] An analysis that starts from the old line would repeat the error. We think starting from a full inventory is the surest way to find anything else that was missed.
2. Hybrid status exists to narrow HIPAA’s scope
The objection is that the rule lets organizations keep non-covered parts out of HIPAA, so a narrow designation is a legitimate choice.
It is, up to the rule’s floor. A hybrid entity may exclude components that do not perform covered or business associate functions. [3] It may not exclude a component that would be a covered entity or business associate on its own. [3] UMass’s problem, as OCR described it, was below the floor. [2]
3. This was a firewall failure, not a governance failure
The objection is that the real cause was a missing network control, and the designation finding is paperwork.
The two findings are linked. HHS said the lack of designation was why UMass did not implement HIPAA policies and procedures at the Center. [1] Policies are where technical requirements such as transmission security get assigned and checked. [5] In our reading, a missing firewall in an unmanaged clinic is what an absent program tends to produce.
4. A resolution agreement is not a ruling
The objection is that UMass admitted nothing, so the case sets no rule.
As a legal matter, the objection is correct. The agreement said it was not an admission of liability and made no finding of liability. [2] In our reading, its value is as a statement of what OCR investigated and what remedy it accepted. Organizations should read it as enforcement guidance, not as precedent, and ask counsel how the rules apply to their own structure.
5. The payment shows OCR treats public universities leniently
The objection is that a reduced payment for financial loss signals that the consequences are small.
HHS said the amount reflected the 2015 financial loss. [1] The rest of the agreement was not reduced. It carried an approval-driven corrective plan, attestations, reporting, six-year retention and a tolled limitations period. [2] The cost of compliance work and leadership time is not in the $650,000.
6. Designating more components raises compliance cost
The objection is that each added component brings policies, training, risk analysis and audit, so organizations have reason to keep the list short.
That reason is real, and the rule allows excluding components that do no covered or business associate work. [3] But the rule’s floor is not optional. [3] The UMass agreement shows the cost of a short list that falls below it: a resolution payment, an enterprise-wide analysis and years of reporting and retention. [2] The cheaper path is an accurate list from the start.
Checks a privacy or security officer could run
These checks follow from the UMass documents. They are our suggestions, not requirements stated in the agreement or the rules.
- Pull the current hybrid entity designation and confirm its date, its signer and that it is kept as the rule requires.
- List every unit that provides care and bills electronically, and compare the list with the designated components.
- List every support office with access to designated components’ data, and confirm the designation covers those functions.
- Confirm the risk analysis scope starts from an asset inventory, not from the designation alone.
- Map the network boundary of each designated clinic and record who runs the controls at that boundary.
- Check that HIPAA training records cover every workforce member in each designated component.
- Set a trigger to review the designation whenever a new clinic, billing arrangement or shared service starts.
The first three checks test the line. The next three test whether the program followed it. The last keeps it from drifting.
A designation review, step by step
A designation review depends on the right inputs. We would sequence it in four steps. First, take the billing office’s list of every unit that submits claims or other covered transactions, and the clinical directory. [8]
Second, list every support office with access to those units’ data: IT, finance, facilities, legal, audit and any outsourced service. Third, compare both lists with the current designation and note each gap. [3] Fourth, for each gap, either add the component or record why it does no covered or business associate work.
The output is a signed, dated designation and a short memo explaining each exclusion. The memo is what an investigator, an auditor or a successor privacy officer will want to read.
With hindsight
The rule at the center of the case has not changed since. As checked on November 16, 2026, the eCFR text of 45 CFR 164.105 still required a hybrid entity that designates components to include any component that would be a covered entity or business associate if separate. [3] The section’s amendment history ended with the January 25, 2013 rule. [3]
The definition of hybrid entity also stood as before: a single legal entity that is a covered entity, has covered and non-covered functions and designates health care components. [4] The documentation and six-year retention requirement for the designation remained in the section. [3]
The Security Rule’s risk analysis specification also remained in place. The current text still requires an accurate and thorough assessment of risks to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of ePHI held by a covered entity or business associate. [5] The transmission security standard still requires technical measures against unauthorized access to ePHI in transit over a network. [5]
The proposed changes went further. On January 6, 2025, HHS published a proposed rule to modify the Security Rule. [6] HHS said it would revise standards to address changes in health care delivery, increases in breaches and cyberattacks, and common deficiencies OCR had seen in its investigations. [6]
The proposal would require a written technology asset inventory and a network map of electronic information systems and assets that may affect ePHI. [6] HHS called the inventory the foundation for an accurate risk analysis. [6] That is the same order of work UMass’s corrective plan imposed: inventory first, analysis second. [2]
The proposal would also add network segmentation. One proposed specification would require written policies to segment relevant systems to limit access to ePHI to authorized workstations. [6] Another would require technical controls to segment relevant systems in a reasonable and appropriate manner. [6] Segmentation was one of the five areas the UMass plan named. [2]
Comments on the proposal were due March 7, 2025. [6] In the 2026 Unified Agenda, HHS listed the rule as a long-term action. [7] The agenda projected final action for July 2027. [7]
As checked on November 16, 2026, we found no final rule from that proposal in the Federal Register. The proposal’s requirements were not in force. The current Security Rule, as quoted above, still governed. [5]
What held up from 2016 is the designation logic. A hybrid entity’s HIPAA program reaches the components it designates, and the rule still sets a floor for what must be included. [3] What changed is the expectation around evidence. The 2025 proposal would write inventory, mapping and segmentation into the rule text for every regulated entity. [6]
For hybrid entities, that proposal points in one direction. An inventory and network map, if required, would have to cover the systems that affect ePHI. [6] A component left out of the designation would show up on the map if its systems touched ePHI. In our view, the inventory would make a UMass-style gap harder to miss, whether or not the rule is finalized.
In our reading, the settlement stands as an example of OCR treating a designation error as a root finding. Its terms, approval loops, attestations and six-year retention, remain a guide to what OCR asked of an institution in that position. [2]
The proposal also set a cadence the UMass plan had only partly imposed. Its information access management specifications, including segmentation, came with a duty to review and test the written policies and procedures at least once every 12 months. [6] The UMass plan had required annual training and a review of training at least annually. [2]
We did not find, in the documents we opened, when OCR closed the UMass corrective plan. The agreement’s two-year compliance term ran from its effective date unless HHS found a breach. [2] We make no claim about how the term ended.
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