Presence’s hospital blamed late breach notices on staff miscommunication; the corrective plan defined roles
HHS’s first HIPAA settlement for untimely breach notice, announced January 9, 2017, recorded notices 101 to 106 days after discovery. The hospital blamed miscommunication among staff, and the corrective plan assigned each step of the notification chain to named roles.
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HHS’s first HIPAA settlement for untimely breach notice, announced January 9, 2017, recorded notices 101 to 106 days after discovery. The hospital blamed miscommunication among staff, and the corrective plan assigned each step of the notification chain to named roles.
- The week The facts in the agreement were short.
- Discovery: when the clock starts and whose knowledge starts it The rule then defines whose knowledge counts.
- Assessment: the presumption of breach and the assessment that can rebut it Not every privacy incident is a reportable breach.
- Notices: three audiences, three formats and two clocks That content is specific.
- Accountability: the training, sanctions and reporting HHS required The corrective action plan began with policies.
- How the case lands on different providers A system the size HHS described has many places where a breach can be found and many people who might find it. [1] The rule counts knowledge by any workforce member or agent. [3] So the intake path has to work at every site, on every shift and for paper as well as electronic records.
- Objections, in order The amount was $475,000, and HHS said it set it to stress timeliness without discouraging reporting. [1] But the agreement said each day of delay was a separate violation, for each of the three audiences. [2] In our reading, a future penalty could turn on that counting, not on the medium of the lost records.
- What privacy officers and operations leaders could check The checks below follow the four stages.
- With hindsight The rule HHS enforced against Presence did not change.
The week
On January 9, 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services announced a HIPAA settlement with Presence Health. [1] The department’s Office for Civil Rights, or OCR, described it as the first HIPAA settlement based on the untimely reporting of a breach of unsecured protected health information. [1] Presence agreed to pay $475,000 and to implement a corrective action plan. [1]
HHS described Presence as one of the largest health care networks serving Illinois. [1] It said the network had about 150 locations, including 11 hospitals and 27 long-term care and senior living facilities. [1] The resolution agreement called Presence a comprehensive, not-for-profit health care system with more than 150 locations in the state. [2]
The facts in the agreement were short. On January 31, 2014, HHS received a breach report from Presence St. Joseph Medical Center, a Presence hospital. [2] The hospital reported that on October 22, 2013, it had discovered that paper operating room schedules were missing from its surgery center. [2] The schedules contained the protected health information of 836 individuals. [2]
HHS listed what the schedules held. The information consisted of names, dates of birth, medical record numbers, dates and types of procedures, surgeon names and types of anesthesia. [1] HHS described the records as paper-based operating room schedules. [1]
In its own report, the hospital said there had been a delay in its breach notifications because of miscommunications between its workforce members. [2] That sentence, recorded in the agreement, is the operational heart of the case. [2]
The agreement set out three items of covered conduct that HHS said its investigation indicated, one for each audience the rule requires a covered entity to notify. Presence did not notify the affected individuals until February 3, 2014, which the agreement called 104 calendar days after discovery. [2] It did not notify prominent media outlets until February 5, 2014, 106 calendar days after discovery by the agreement’s count. [2] It did not notify HHS until January 31, 2014, which the agreement put at 101 calendar days after discovery. [2]
For each, the agreement stated the obligation. Notice to individuals and the media had to come without unreasonable delay and no later than 60 calendar days after discovery. [2] Notice to HHS for a breach of this size had to be contemporaneous with notice to individuals. [2] The agreement said each day of failure was a separate violation of the Breach Notification Rule. [2]
The investigation went further than the 2013 breach. While examining it, HHS reviewed reports of breaches affecting fewer than 500 individuals that Presence entities had submitted in 2015 and 2016. [2] HHS said that for several of them, the Presence entities had failed to provide timely written notifications to the individuals affected. [2]
The agreement contained the usual reservations. It said the agreement was not an admission of liability by Presence and was made without any finding of liability. [2] It also said HHS did not concede that Presence was in compliance. [2] HHS said it had balanced the need to stress timely reporting against the desire not to discourage breach reporting altogether. [1]
The rule at issue was not new in 2017. HHS had adopted the breach notification requirements in an interim final rule in 2009 and retained the 60-day timeliness standard without modification in its January 25, 2013 final rule. [4] That 2013 rule said the 60 days is an outer limit, and that waiting until the 60th day may itself be an unreasonable delay. [4]
Breach notification enforcement is easy to read as a story about deadlines. The Presence agreement shows something narrower and more useful. The deadline was clear, and the hospital still missed it, by its own account because staff did not pass information along. [2] The corrective plan HHS required was mostly about who in the workforce does what, and when. [2]
Our argument is that the Presence case made timely breach notice a workforce design problem. Under the rule, the clock can start with what any staff member knows. [3] The work between that moment and the last required notice passes through several hands. Each hand-off is a place where days are lost.
We take the notification chain in four parts, each a distinct stage where the Presence agreement and the rule assign duties:
- Discovery: when the clock starts, and whose knowledge starts it.
- Assessment: the presumption of breach and the risk assessment that can rebut it.
- Notices: three audiences, three formats and two different clocks.
- Accountability: the training, sanctions and reporting HHS required to make the chain hold.
The stages run in sequence and do not overlap, and together they cover the path from a lost document to the last required notice. After them we look at how the case lands on different kinds of providers, take the objections in order, and end with checks a privacy officer or operations leader could run.
Discovery: when the clock starts and whose knowledge starts it
The rule’s trigger
The Breach Notification Rule treats a breach as discovered on the first day it is known to the covered entity. [3] It also treats a breach as discovered on the first day it would have been known by exercising reasonable diligence. [3]
The rule then defines whose knowledge counts. A covered entity is deemed to know of a breach if it is known, or by reasonable diligence would have been known, to any workforce member or agent other than the person committing the breach. [3] Agency is determined under the federal common law of agency. [3]
That standard ties the legal clock to the least senior person who notices a problem. A scheduler who sees that operating room lists are missing can start the clock. So can a nurse who knows a binder is gone. The privacy office may not hear about it for days, but the 60 days are already running. [3]
Known, not confirmed
HHS addressed the obvious objection in 2013. Commenters had asked that the clock start only after an investigation confirmed a breach. [4] HHS declined. [4] It said the period begins when the incident is first known, not when the investigation is complete, even if it is initially unclear whether the incident is a breach. [4]
HHS also said there was enough time within the standard to investigate promptly and notify. [4] It expected notice as soon as reasonably possible after a reasonable time to investigate. [4] An organization that waits for a full investigation before telling the privacy office has, in our reading, misread when its clock started.
Reasonable diligence
The diligence limb reaches events no one reported. HHS said whether a person acted with reasonable diligence is generally a factual question. [4] Factors include whether the entity took reasonable steps to learn of breaches and whether there were signs a careful person would have investigated. [4]
For an operations leader, that means detection is part of the clock. A practice that does not reconcile paper schedules, check access logs or follow up on returned mail may later be treated as having known what it would have found. [3] [4] The rule does not list specific detective controls. It does make their absence relevant to when a breach is treated as discovered. [3]
What the Presence facts show about discovery
In the Presence case, the discovery date itself was not in dispute in the agreement. HHS counted from October 22, 2013, the date the hospital said it discovered the missing schedules. [2] The problem was what happened after. By the hospital’s own account, miscommunication among workforce members delayed the notices. [2]
That places the failure in the hand-off between the people who knew and the people who notify. The rule gave the entity knowledge on day one. [3] The organization’s internal path did not move that knowledge to the people who send notices fast enough. [2]
Paper as a detection problem
The Presence breach involved paper. [1] Paper records leave no access log. Their loss is noticed only when someone looks for them and finds them gone. That makes the people who handle paper the detection system, and their reports the only alarm.
An electronic breach can be different. A monitoring tool may flag unusual access before any person notices. But the rule’s clock does not care which kind of detection worked. It starts when a workforce member or agent knows, or would have known with reasonable diligence. [3] For paper, the first knower is a person.
A hospital can shorten the paper path by design. It can tell staff that missing schedules, charts or labels are reportable on the day they are missed, without waiting to search further. It can give them one place to report. The Presence plan required policies covering internal reports from workforce members, which is that intake step. [2]
Assessment: the presumption of breach and the assessment that can rebut it
The presumption
Not every privacy incident is a reportable breach. Under the 2013 rule, an impermissible use or disclosure of protected health information is presumed to be a breach. [4] The covered entity can overcome the presumption only by showing a low probability that the information has been compromised. [4]
Three narrow exclusions apply before the presumption. One covers unintentional access or use by a workforce member acting in good faith and within authority, with no further impermissible use. [3] Another covers inadvertent disclosure between people authorized at the same entity or arrangement. [3] The third covers disclosure to someone who, in good faith belief, could not reasonably have retained the information. [3]
Notice duties also attach only to unsecured protected health information. [3] That means information not rendered unusable, unreadable or indecipherable to unauthorized persons by a technology or method the Secretary specifies in guidance. [3] Paper schedules have no such protection, so the exclusion for secured data had no role in the Presence facts. [1] [3]
HHS explained the change in 2013. Some had read the 2009 interim rule’s harm standard as setting a much higher threshold for notice than HHS intended. [4] The final rule replaced the focus on harm to the individual with an assessment of the probability of compromise. [4]
The four factors
The assessment must consider at least four factors. [4] They are the nature and extent of the information, including identifiers and the likelihood of re-identification. [4] They also include who used or received the information, whether it was actually acquired or viewed, and how far the risk has been mitigated. [4]
Applied to the Presence facts, the factors point one way. The schedules carried names, dates of birth, medical record numbers and procedure details. [1] They were missing, so no one could say who had them or whether they had been viewed. [2] The agreement treated the event as a breach and counted from discovery. [2]
The burden of proof
The rule puts the burden on the regulated party. Where a use or disclosure violates the Privacy Rule, the covered entity or business associate bears the burden. [3] It must show either that all notices were made as required or that the event was not a breach. [3]
That burden shapes the paperwork. An assessment that concludes no notice was needed has to be written down well enough to carry the burden later. [3] [4] An assessment that concludes notice is needed has to be finished quickly enough to leave time to prepare the notices. [4] The same document serves both purposes, and it has a deadline built in.
Where the time goes
The 2013 rule expected a reasonable time to investigate and gather the information the notice must contain. [4] It also said that whether a delay inside the 60 days is reasonable depends on facts such as the nature of the breach, the number of people affected and the entity’s resources. [4]
For a lost paper record, the investigation can be short. The question is whether the documents can be found, and who might have them. The notice content is known: what was in the documents and when they went missing. [1] [3] The Presence chronology suggests the assessment was not the slow step. The agreement attributes the delay to communication among staff. [2]
For electronic incidents the assessment can take longer, because the facts are harder to establish. Logs may need review to learn whether records were viewed, which is the third factor. [4] That work still runs inside the same 60 days. [3] An organization that expects such reviews can arrange forensic help before an incident, so the assessment does not consume the time needed for notices.
The assessment also has an owner problem of its own. Privacy staff know the rule, security staff know the systems and clinical managers know what the records contained. The assessment needs all three, and it needs them within days. [3] [4]
Notices: three audiences, three formats and two clocks
Individuals
Notice to individuals must come without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after discovery, unless a law enforcement delay applies. [3] It must use plain language. [3] The rule lists required content to the extent possible. [3]
That content is specific. It includes a brief description of what happened with the dates of the breach and its discovery, if known, and the types of information involved. [3] It also includes steps individuals should take, what the entity is doing, and contact procedures that include a toll-free number, email address, website or postal address. [3]
Each element needs an owner. Someone has to confirm the dates and the data types. Someone has to staff the contact channel. Someone has to arrange printing and mailing. In the Presence case, individual notice went out on February 3, 2014. [2]
The rule also fixes the method. Written notice goes by first-class mail to the last known address, or by email if the individual has agreed to electronic notice. [3] It may go in more than one mailing as information becomes available. [3] Where the individual is known to have died, notice goes to the next of kin or personal representative if the address is known. [3]
Bad addresses trigger substitute notice. If contact information is insufficient for fewer than 10 people, the entity may use another written form, the telephone or other means. [3] For 10 or more, it must post conspicuously on its website home page for 90 days or use major print or broadcast media where those people likely live. [3] It must also run a toll-free number for at least 90 days. [3]
Those steps take time to arrange, and they belong to different offices. Address checks fall to registration or billing staff. A website posting falls to whoever runs the website. A 90-day toll-free line needs a call center script. A notice process that discovers the address problem in week seven has little room left. [3]
In urgent cases the rule allows faster contact. Where the entity judges that misuse may be imminent, it may reach individuals by telephone or other means in addition to written notice. [3]
Content when facts are incomplete
The content rule asks for its elements to the extent possible. [3] The dates of the breach and of discovery are required if known. [3] Notices may go out in more than one mailing as information becomes available. [3] Read together, those words let an entity send a first notice before every fact is settled and follow up later.
That matters for the hand-off between investigators and writers. An investigation that holds back the notice until its report is final is choosing a standard the rule does not require. [3] [4] A notice team that cannot draft until the investigation hands over a finished file has the same problem from the other side. The fix is to draft early, with placeholders, and update as facts arrive.
The media
For a breach involving more than 500 residents of a state or jurisdiction, the covered entity must also notify prominent media outlets serving that state or jurisdiction. [3] The deadline is the same as for individuals, and the content requirements are the same. [3]
The Presence breach involved 836 people. [2] The agreement recorded media notice on February 5, 2014. [2] Media notice may fall to a communications office that has not handled a HIPAA matter before. That office is another link in the chain, and the rule gives it no extra time. [3]
HHS
The notice to HHS follows a different clock. For breaches involving 500 or more individuals, it must be provided contemporaneously with notice to individuals, in the manner specified on the HHS website. [3] For smaller breaches, the entity keeps a log and reports to HHS within 60 days after the end of the calendar year. [3]
Presence notified HHS on January 31, 2014, before it notified individuals. [2] The agreement still counted that notice as 101 days after discovery and late. [2] In our reading, a duty to notify HHS contemporaneously with individuals inherits the 60-day limit that governs individual notice. [2] [3] The difference in clocks matters especially for small breaches. Their HHS report can wait for the annual log, but the individuals affected cannot wait. [3]
The small breaches
That distinction is what HHS said it learned from the 2015 and 2016 reports. For several breaches affecting fewer than 500 people, Presence entities had failed to give timely written notice to the individuals. [2] The annual log to HHS does not extend the 60-day limit for individual notice. [3]
In our reading, small breaches are where an organization can lose track of individual notice. Each event is minor, the HHS report is months away, and no media notice is needed. [3] The only deadline that bites quickly is the one owed to the patients, and it is the easiest to leave to whoever found the problem.
Law enforcement delay
The rule allows one exception to these clocks. A covered entity must delay notice if a law enforcement official states that it would impede a criminal investigation or damage national security. [3] A written statement sets the delay period. An oral statement must be documented and allows a delay of no more than 30 days unless a written statement follows. [3] The 2013 rule described this as the circumstance in which a delay may be requested. [4] No such delay was described in the Presence agreement. [2]
Accountability: the training, sanctions and reporting HHS required
Policies that name roles
The corrective action plan began with policies. Presence had to revise its breach notification policies to more explicitly delineate workforce members’ roles and responsibilities. [2] The plan listed the activities those roles had to cover. [2]
There were seven. They were receiving internal reports of potential breaches, receiving external reports from individuals and business associates, and completing risk assessments. [2] They also included preparing notices to individuals, preparing media notices for breaches over 500 residents, preparing notices to HHS, and ensuring all notices went out on time. [2]
The list is a map of the chain this article describes. Intake, assessment, three kinds of notice and a final check on timing each needed a named owner. [2] HHS did not prescribe who those owners should be. It required that the policies say. [2]
A regulator reading the drafts
The approval cycle put HHS inside Presence’s document process for the term of the plan. HHS reviewed the policies and the training materials before Presence could adopt or deliver them. [2] Any revisions HHS required were, in the agreement’s words, for the purpose of ensuring that Presence complied with the HIPAA Rules. [2]
That arrangement has a practical cost. Drafting, review and revision cycles take staff time from privacy, legal, nursing and operations. They also delay adoption until HHS approves. [2] An organization that has already mapped its roles before an investigation can shorten that cycle, because its first draft is closer to what the regulator will accept.
HHS review of the paperwork
HHS kept a hand in the drafting. Presence had to send the revised policies to HHS within 60 days of the effective date for review and approval. [2] If HHS required changes, Presence had 21 days to revise and resubmit, and the cycle continued until HHS approved. [2] Presence then had 30 days to adopt the approved policies and 30 days after approval to distribute them to the workforce. [2]
Later changes followed the same path. Presence had to review the policies and update them when needed, and send draft updates to HHS for approval. [2] New workforce members had to receive the policies within 30 days of starting. [2]
Sanctions
Presence also had to revise its sanctions policy. The existing policy covered failures to follow Privacy and Security Rule procedures. [2] The plan required it to cover failures to follow breach notification procedures as well. [2]
That change closed a gap the facts exposed. A workforce member who did not pass on a report of missing schedules may not have broken any written privacy or security rule. After the change, failing to follow the notification procedures was itself sanctionable. [2]
Training and certification
Training came next. Presence had to send proposed training materials to HHS within 60 days of HHS’s final approval of the policies. [2] Within 60 days of HHS approving the materials, Presence had to train all workforce members. [2] New staff had to be trained within 30 days of starting, and everyone had to be retrained each year for the term of the plan. [2]
Each workforce member who was trained had to certify it, in writing or electronically, with the date. [2] Training records had to be retained under the plan’s document retention section. [2]
That section required Presence to keep all documents and records relating to compliance with the plan for six years from the effective date. [2] It had to make them available to OCR on request. [2] The agreement also extended the time HHS would have to act if Presence breached the agreement. [2]
Reportable events and attestation
The plan made lapses visible. If Presence learned that a workforce member may have failed to follow the policies, it had to investigate promptly. [2] If its review showed a workforce member may have violated them, it had to report that to HHS within 30 days, with the facts, the people involved and the actions taken, including sanctions. [2]
Presence also had to file reports for each reporting period. The first was the year after the effective date, and the second the following ten months. [2] Each report had to include an attestation by an officer that the policies had been adopted, implemented and distributed. [2] The compliance term was two years from the effective date, unless HHS found a breach of the plan. [2]
The reportable events clause applied to the Presence hospital networks and their covered entity subsidiaries. [2] It also reached any covered entity they later created, acquired or merged with while the agreement was in force. [2] An acquisition during the term would bring the new entity under the reporting duty.
The plan also anticipated divestiture. If a Presence hospital were to be transferred to an unaffiliated party, the parties agreed to confer on how successor liability would be handled. [2]
How the case lands on different providers
The rule applies to covered entities and business associates alike, but the hand-offs differ with size and structure. [3] The agreement’s findings and plan give a reference point for each. [2]
A multi-site health system
A system the size HHS described has many places where a breach can be found and many people who might find it. [1] The rule counts knowledge by any workforce member or agent. [3] So the intake path has to work at every site, on every shift and for paper as well as electronic records.
The Presence plan also shows that a system’s smaller breaches are reviewed together. HHS looked at reports from several Presence entities and found late notices among them. [2] A system that lets each facility run its own small-breach process should expect them to be reviewed as one program.
System scale also affects proof. The burden of showing that notices were timely rests on the entity. [3] A system with one incident register, one discovery-date field and one set of notice dates can meet that burden across sites. A system with separate spreadsheets at each facility may find that the dates it needs were never recorded.
An ambulatory surgery center or small practice
A single-site provider has fewer hand-offs, but each may run through one person. If the office manager is away, the report may wait. The rule does not adjust the 60 days for staffing. [3] The 2013 rule did say the reasonableness of a delay within the 60 days can depend on the entity’s resources. [4] That language does not extend the outer limit. [4]
A business associate
A business associate has its own clock. It must notify the covered entity without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after discovery. [3] Its knowledge is judged by the same agency standard, applied to its employees, officers and agents. [3] It must identify each affected individual to the extent possible and pass on the information the covered entity needs for its notices. [3]
In our reading, that creates two chains in series. A delay inside the vendor arrives at the provider as lost time on the provider’s own clock, unless the vendor was acting as the provider’s agent under the agency standard. [3] Contracts can set shorter vendor deadlines than the rule requires. The rule sets only the maximum. [3]
A health plan
Health plans are covered entities and carry the same notification duties. [3] [5] Their breaches may involve members in many states. The media notice duty is set state by state, for breaches involving more than 500 residents of a state or jurisdiction. [3] A plan with members across state lines has to count by state to know which media notices it owes.
Long-term care and senior living
HHS said Presence included 27 long-term care and senior living facilities. [1] Notice in those settings raises a specific problem. Some affected people may have died, and the rule directs written notice to the next of kin or personal representative where the entity knows of the death and has the address. [3]
Others may rely on a representative for their affairs. The notice must still reach the individual in a form the rule allows, and the contact procedures must work for families as well as residents. [3] A facility that keeps current contacts for representatives can send notice faster than one that must search for them after the breach.
Objections, in order
1. The settlement was small and the breach was paper
The amount was $475,000, and HHS said it set it to stress timeliness without discouraging reporting. [1] But the agreement said each day of delay was a separate violation, for each of the three audiences. [2] In our reading, a future penalty could turn on that counting, not on the medium of the lost records.
2. Late notice is a policy failure, not a workforce one
Presence had policies. The corrective plan required them to be revised to delineate roles more explicitly. [2] The hospital itself attributed the delay to miscommunication among workforce members. [2] In our reading, both the cause and the remedy were about how people pass information, which is why the plan paired policies with training, sanctions and certification. [2]
3. Waiting for a full investigation produces a better notice
HHS rejected that view in 2013. It kept the clock running from when the incident was known and said there is time within the standard to investigate and notify. [4] It also said waiting until the 60th day may itself be an unreasonable delay. [4] A notice can say that facts are still being gathered, since the content rule requires elements only to the extent possible. [3]
4. Enforcement over timing will discourage reporting
HHS acknowledged the concern in its announcement and said the amount balanced it. [1] The agreement also included the usual statement that it was not an admission of liability. [2] The case penalized lateness, not the report itself. A covered entity that reports late faces a timing finding. One that does not report faces the same finding and a longer delay. [2] [3]
5. The small-breach findings were incidental
HHS said it learned of them while investigating the 2013 breach, and recited them in the agreement. [2] The resolution covered the 2013 conduct as defined. [2] Still, the findings show the reviewer’s method. An investigation of one large breach can open the entity’s log of small ones, and the log shows dates. [2] [3]
6. Paper incidents deserve a lighter process
A lost paper list can feel minor next to a hacked server. The rule does not distinguish them. Its definition of breach and its notice duties apply to protected health information in any form that is unsecured. [3] The Presence schedules held identifiers and procedure details for 836 people. [1] [2] A lighter process is defensible only where an exclusion or a documented low-probability assessment applies. [3]
7. A regulator cannot judge how staff talk to each other
HHS did not try to. It judged outcomes: the dates notices went out against the dates the rule required. [2] The plan then required documents a regulator can inspect, such as written roles, training certifications, reportable events and officer attestations. [2] Those records stand in for the conversations HHS cannot observe. [2]
What privacy officers and operations leaders could check
The checks below follow the four stages. They describe good practice suggested by the agreement and the rule, not additional legal requirements.
- Map every intake channel for suspected breaches, including paper, phone and front-desk reports, and name who receives each. [2]
- Record the discovery date as the first day any workforce member knew, and test whether staff understand that rule. [3]
- Keep a dated risk assessment for each incident, whether it ends in notice or not, written to carry the burden of proof. [3] [4]
- Track the 60-day limit for individual notice on every small breach, separately from the annual HHS log. [3]
- Name the person who drafts media notices for breaches over 500 residents of a state, and rehearse the hand-off. [3]
- Extend the sanctions policy to cover failures to follow breach notification procedures. [2]
- Prepare the substitute notice steps in advance: a website posting template and a toll-free line that can run for 90 days. [3]
One further check concerns vendors. Business associate agreements can require notice to the covered entity faster than the rule’s maximum. [3] A shorter contractual deadline leaves the provider time to assess and notify within its own 60 days.
Another check concerns law enforcement requests. The rule requires an oral request for delay to be documented, including the identity of the official, and limits it to 30 days without a written statement. [3] A front-desk or security officer who takes such a call should know where to record it.
A last check concerns measurement. The agreement counted days from discovery to each notice. [2] A privacy office can count the same way for its own incidents each quarter. The interval from discovery to the first internal report is the number that shows whether the workforce part of the chain is working.
The register behind that measure needs a few fields: the date the first workforce member knew, the date the privacy office heard, the assessment result and the date of each notice. [2] [3] With those fields, an organization can show the regulator the same chronology HHS built for Presence, before HHS has to build it.
With hindsight
The rule HHS enforced against Presence did not change. As checked on November 15, 2026, the current text still requires individual notice without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after discovery. [3] The discovery standard based on any workforce member’s knowledge is still in the rule, as are the media and HHS provisions. [3]
Timeliness stayed in OCR’s enforcement work. On May 15, 2025, HHS announced a settlement with Vision Upright MRI, a small California provider of imaging services. [5] The breach involved an unsecured server holding the medical images of 21,778 individuals. [5]
HHS said its investigation found that Vision Upright MRI had never conducted a HIPAA risk analysis. [5] It also found that the provider failed to complete timely breach notification, within 60 days of discovering the breach, to the individuals affected. [5] The provider paid $5,000 and agreed to a corrective action plan monitored for two years. [5]
That plan listed providing the required breach notifications to individuals, HHS and the media as one of its terms. [5] It also required submitting its most recent risk analysis to OCR, a risk management plan, written policies and workforce training. [5] HHS said OCR had opened a compliance review after learning of the breach on the provider’s picture archiving and communication system server. [5] The pattern resembles Presence’s plan. The notification failure was paired with fixes to process and training. [2] [5]
On July 23, 2025, HHS announced a settlement with Syracuse ASC, a single-facility ambulatory surgery center in New York. [6] HHS described it as OCR’s 14th ransomware enforcement action. [6] The breach affected 24,891 individuals. [6]
HHS said OCR began its investigation in October 2021, after Syracuse ASC reported that an unauthorized individual had accessed its network in March 2021. [6] OCR found that the center never conducted an accurate and thorough risk analysis. [6] It also found that the center failed to timely notify affected individuals and the Secretary. [6] The center paid $250,000 and agreed to a corrective action plan that OCR would monitor for two years. [6]
Those cases differ from Presence in one respect. In both, HHS paired the timeliness finding with a security finding, the absence of an adequate risk analysis. [5] [6] Presence was a paper loss, and its agreement concerned breach notification alone. [2] In our reading, those two later cases treated timeliness as one count among several, while Presence showed it could stand alone.
What held up from 2017 is the core point. The 60-day limit is an outer bound counted from discovery, and HHS counts it. [2] [3] Corrective plans continued to require written procedures and workforce training alongside the notices themselves. [5] The Presence plan’s list of seven notification activities remains a usable template for any provider’s notification procedures. [2]
What changed is the setting. The Presence breach was a stack of paper schedules. [1] The 2025 settlements involved an unsecured imaging server and a ransomware attack. [5] [6] Electronic breaches can take longer to scope. The rule, as HHS explained in 2013, still starts the clock when the incident is known, not when the scope is settled. [4]
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