Advocate’s 2016 HIPAA settlement put an inventory before the risk analysis and an encryption count after it

On August 4, 2016, HHS announced a $5.55 million settlement with Advocate Health Care over three 2013 breaches. The first item of covered conduct HHS listed was a risk analysis that missed facilities and equipment, and the corrective plan began with an inventory.

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Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article

On August 4, 2016, HHS announced a $5.55 million settlement with Advocate Health Care over three 2013 breaches. The first item of covered conduct HHS listed was a risk analysis that missed facilities and equipment, and the corrective plan began with an inventory.

  1. The week HHS described the payment as the largest settlement to date against a single entity. [1] It gave three reasons for the size.
  2. The scope: a risk analysis that left out a building and its equipment The Security Rule’s risk analysis specification is short.
  3. The vendor: a billing business associate without a contract The vendor incident produced two items of covered conduct.
  4. The device: a laptop in a car and encryption as an addressable choice The third incident was the smallest by count.
  5. The proof: what the corrective plan made Advocate show The plan was built as a chain.
  6. How the case applies to other organizations Advocate was itself the large system case.
  7. Objections, in order The incidents were distinct, as HHS itself said. [1] Combining them raised the count of individuals and the number of findings.
  8. Checks a security or privacy officer could run today Take four lists: leased and owned sites, IT asset records, clinical engineering device records and the vendor register.
  9. With hindsight The rule text that Advocate was measured against has not changed since.

The week

On August 4, 2016, the Department of Health and Human Services announced that Advocate Health Care Network had agreed to settle multiple potential violations of HIPAA involving electronic protected health information. [1] Advocate agreed to pay $5.55 million and to adopt a corrective action plan. [1]

HHS described the payment as the largest settlement to date against a single entity. [1] It gave three reasons for the size. They were the extent and duration of the alleged noncompliance, the involvement of the State Attorney General in a corresponding investigation, and the large number of individuals whose information was affected. [1]

HHS said some of the alleged noncompliance dated back to the inception of the Security Rule. [1] It described Advocate as the largest fully integrated health care system in Illinois, with more than 250 treatment locations. [1]

The investigation began with three breach reports. HHS said Advocate submitted them in 2013, and that each concerned a separate and distinct incident at its subsidiary, Advocate Medical Group. [1] The combined breaches, HHS said, affected the ePHI of approximately 4 million individuals. [1]

The release listed the kinds of data involved. It named demographic information, clinical information, health insurance information, patient names, addresses, credit card numbers and their expiration dates, and dates of birth. [1]

The resolution agreement gave the dates and details. On August 23, 2013, Advocate notified HHS that four desktop computers had been stolen from an Advocate Medical Group administrative office building in Park Ridge, Illinois. [2] The agreement calls that building the Touhy Support Center. [2]

The agreement says the theft happened during the early morning hours of July 15, 2013. [2] The computers held the ePHI of approximately 4,029,530 individuals, a figure the agreement says was later amended to 3,994,175. [2] HHS notified Advocate on August 29, 2013, that it was opening an investigation. [2]

The second report came on September 13, 2013. [2] It involved a business associate that provided billing services to Advocate Medical Group. [2] Advocate reported that, at some point between June 30, 2013 and August 15, 2013, an unauthorized third party had accessed the business associate’s network. [2]

The ePHI of 2,027 Advocate Medical Group patients had been potentially compromised in that intrusion, according to the agreement. [2] HHS opened a second investigation on October 29, 2013. [2]

The third report reached HHS on November 1, 2013. [2] Advocate reported that an unencrypted laptop containing the ePHI of approximately 2,237 individuals had been stolen from a workforce member’s vehicle. [2] HHS notified Advocate on January 8, 2014, that it was investigating that incident too. [2]

The agreement then listed what HHS’s investigations indicated, which it defined as the covered conduct. There were six items. [2]

  1. Advocate failed to conduct an accurate and thorough risk analysis that incorporated all of its facilities, information technology equipment, applications and data systems using ePHI. [2]
  2. Advocate failed to implement policies and procedures to limit physical access to its electronic information systems housed within the Touhy Support Center. [2]
  3. Advocate failed to reasonably safeguard the ePHI of approximately 3,994,175 individuals at that support center. [2]
  4. Advocate failed to obtain satisfactory assurances, in the form of a written business associate contract, that the billing business associate would appropriately safeguard Advocate’s ePHI. [2]
  5. Advocate impermissibly disclosed the ePHI of approximately 2,027 individuals to that business associate by giving it the data without such a contract. [2]
  6. Advocate failed to reasonably safeguard the ePHI of approximately 2,237 individuals when a workforce member left an unencrypted laptop in an unlocked vehicle overnight. [2]

The agreement states that it is not an admission of liability by Advocate. [2] It also states that it is not a concession by HHS that Advocate was not in violation of the HIPAA Rules. [2]

The signature page shows Advocate signed on July 7, 2016, and HHS’s Midwest Region signed on July 8, 2016. [2] The agreement became effective on the date of the last signature. [2] So the terms were fixed in early July and made public on August 4. [1] [2]

The agreement covered Advocate Health Care Network and each of its subsidiaries that met the definition of a covered entity. [2] It also reached any covered entity Advocate might later create, acquire, control or merge with while the agreement and plan were in force. [2]

Advocate waived its procedural rights to notice, hearing and appeal regarding the payment. [2] It also agreed to toll the six-year limitations period for civil money penalties during the agreement, plus one year after any termination for breach. [2]

The release closed with what OCR said its investigations had revealed. It repeated the four failures in shorter form: the risk analysis, the physical access controls at the data support center, the business associate contract and the unencrypted laptop. [1]

The Advocate case arrived as three separate stories: stolen desktops, a vendor intrusion and a laptop taken from a car. HHS’s resolution agreement listed six items of covered conduct, and the first was not about any one of them. [2] It was a risk analysis that did not incorporate all of Advocate’s facilities, equipment, applications and data systems using ePHI. [2]

Our argument is that the settlement treated the scope of the risk analysis as the root finding, and that the corrective plan made that concrete. The plan required a complete inventory before the new risk analysis could begin. [2] It then required a report counting every device that could hold ePHI and how many were encrypted. [2] In our reading, those two documents were the case’s real remedy: one to fix what Advocate looked at, one to prove what it had protected.

We take the case in four parts:

  1. The scope: what the risk analysis missed, and why a support building and its desktops could fall outside it.
  2. The vendor: the billing business associate that held ePHI without a written contract.
  3. The device: the unencrypted laptop, and what encryption’s addressable status allowed.
  4. The proof: what the corrective plan made Advocate produce, in what order, and who checked it.

The parts do not overlap. The first is the organization’s own map of its systems, the second its outside parties, the third its portable equipment, and the fourth the evidence regime HHS imposed. Together they cover each item of covered conduct. After them we look at how the same structure applies to other organizations, take the strongest objections in order, and end with checks a security or privacy officer could run.

The scope: a risk analysis that left out a building and its equipment

What the rule requires

The Security Rule’s risk analysis specification is short. It requires a covered entity or business associate to conduct an accurate and thorough assessment of potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of ePHI it holds. [3] It is marked required, not addressable. [3]

The rule does not list what the assessment must cover. It does not say the word inventory. The standard it sits under, the security management process, asks for policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain and correct security violations. [3] The next specification, risk management, requires security measures sufficient to reduce the risks found to a reasonable and appropriate level. [3]

So the analysis feeds everything after it. A risk that the analysis never sees cannot be managed, because the risk management step only acts on what the analysis found. In our reading, that is why OCR placed the scope finding first.

What “all” meant in the finding

The agreement’s wording is specific. It says Advocate failed to conduct a risk analysis that incorporates all of its facilities, information technology equipment, applications and data systems utilizing ePHI. [2] Four categories appear in that sentence: places, hardware, software and data stores.

The words map onto the incidents. The largest breach involved desktop computers at an administrative building. [2] That is a facility and equipment. The vendor breach involved data held in another company’s network. [2] That is a data system outside Advocate’s walls. The laptop was equipment that moved. [2]

The agreement does not say which of these the earlier analysis left out, or why. The public documents do not describe Advocate’s prior risk analysis at all. What they show is the finding and the remedy. Any account of what Advocate’s analysis looked like before 2013 would be guesswork, and we do not offer one.

Why a support building can fall out of scope

A health system’s security program can be organized around clinical sites. Hospitals and clinics are where patients are, and where auditors from accreditation bodies walk. An administrative building that supports a medical group is a different kind of place.

The Touhy Support Center held desktops that, according to the agreement, contained the ePHI of approximately 3,994,175 individuals. [2] The release called it a large data support center. [1] HHS said Advocate failed to implement policies and procedures to limit physical access to the electronic information systems housed there. [1]

The physical safeguards standard reaches that building. It requires policies and procedures to limit physical access to electronic information systems and the facility or facilities in which they are housed. [3] The standard says nothing about whether the facility treats patients. A building matters to the rule because of the systems inside it.

Physical safeguards are part of the same analysis

The facility access controls standard has four addressable specifications. They cover contingency operations, a facility security plan, access control and validation procedures, and maintenance records for security-related repairs to walls, doors and locks. [3]

The facility security plan specification asks for policies and procedures to safeguard the facility and the equipment in it from unauthorized physical access, tampering and theft. [3] Theft is named. An analysis that does not list a building cannot produce a plan for it.

There is also the Privacy Rule. HHS cited 45 CFR 164.530(c) for the support center finding. [2] That section requires a covered entity to have appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to protect the privacy of PHI. [4] It requires the entity to reasonably safeguard PHI from intentional or unintentional use or disclosure in violation of the rule. [4] The same desktops created a Security Rule finding and a Privacy Rule finding.

The inventory came first

The corrective plan rebuilt the analysis from the bottom. It required Advocate to conduct a comprehensive and thorough risk analysis incorporating all Advocate facilities, whether owned or rented. [2] It had to evaluate risks to ePHI on all electronic equipment, data systems and applications controlled, administered or owned by Advocate or any Advocate entity. [2]

The next sentence set the order. Before conducting the risk analysis, Advocate had to develop a complete inventory of all facilities, electronic equipment, data systems and applications that contain or store ePHI. [2] The inventory would then be incorporated into the risk analysis. [2]

The words “whether owned or rented” matter. Leased office space, shared buildings and storage sites are easy to miss if the inventory starts from the real estate register of owned property. The plan closed that gap in its own text. [2]

The plan allowed Advocate to submit a risk analysis already underway for HHS to consider. [2] It gave Advocate 180 days from the effective date to provide the analysis. [2] HHS then had 60 days to approve or disapprove it, with a written explanation if it disapproved. [2] The cycle repeated until HHS approved, and HHS could not unreasonably withhold approval. [2]

Change and acquisition

The plan added a third item tied to scope. Advocate had to write a process to regularly evaluate environmental or operational changes that affect the security of ePHI. [2] The plan named one change specifically: Advocate’s acquisition of new entities. [2]

That clause reflects how health systems grow. A system that acquires a physician group or a hospital inherits buildings, devices and vendors. If the inventory is updated only during an annual cycle, the newly acquired assets can sit outside it for months. The plan asked for a standing process instead. [2]

The agreement also reached forward. It defined the Advocate entities to include any covered entity Advocate might create, acquire or merge with while the agreement was in force. [2] So acquired entities came under the plan’s obligations as well as its scope.

How an assessor would test coverage

A coverage test asks a simple thing: does the analysis name each place and system that holds ePHI? An assessor can approach it from both directions.

From the top down, the assessor starts with the organization chart, the lease list, the vendor list and the application portfolio. Each item either appears in the analysis or has a reason it does not. From the bottom up, the assessor samples real devices, such as a desktop in an office or a laptop assigned to a field worker. Each one should trace back to an inventory line and a risk entry.

Neither direction needs special tools. Both need records that agree with each other. The Advocate plan asked for the inventory first because, in our reading, the other records could not be checked without it. [2]

The vendor: a billing business associate without a contract

What the business associate standard asks

The Security Rule lets a covered entity permit a business associate to create, receive, maintain or transmit ePHI on its behalf only if the covered entity obtains satisfactory assurances. [3] Those assurances must be documented through a written contract or other arrangement that meets the requirements of section 164.314(a). [3] The written contract specification is marked required. [3]

HHS’s investigations indicated, as the agreement put it, that Advocate did not obtain those assurances from the billing business associate in the form of a written contract. [2] It cited 45 CFR 164.308(b)(1) for that failure. [2]

Two findings from one gap

The vendor incident produced two items of covered conduct. The first was the missing contract. [2] The second was a disclosure finding: Advocate impermissibly disclosed the ePHI of approximately 2,027 individuals to the business associate when it lacked the contract. [2]

In our reading, the second finding is the more important one for a compliance officer. It means a data transfer that was operationally normal, sending billing data to a billing vendor, became an impermissible disclosure because the paperwork was missing. The intrusion at the vendor then exposed data that, in HHS’s framing, should not have been there on those terms.

The contract is not the control

A business associate agreement does not stop an intruder. The vendor’s network was accessed by an unauthorized third party regardless of what any contract said. [2] So what does the contract do?

It assigns duties. It commits the vendor to safeguards, to reporting security incidents and to flowing the same terms down to its own subcontractors. [3] It also creates the record that the covered entity knew who held its data. Without the contract, the covered entity may also lack the inventory entry: the vendor’s network does not appear as a place where ePHI lives.

That links the vendor finding to the scope finding. A data system outside the covered entity’s walls is still a data system using its ePHI. [2] If the contracting process never flags the relationship, the risk analysis may never see it.

What the plan required

The plan set out five things Advocate’s business associate policies had to do. [2]

  1. Designate one or more individuals responsible for ensuring Advocate enters into a business associate agreement with each business associate before disclosing PHI. [2]
  2. Create a process for assessing current and future business relationships to determine whether each one involves a business associate. [2]
  3. Create a process for negotiating and entering into agreements before any disclosure. [2]
  4. Limit disclosures to business associates to the minimum amount reasonably necessary for them to perform their duties. [2]
  5. Maintain documentation of each agreement for at least six years after the relationship ends. [2]

The first item names an owner. The second makes the decision about whether a vendor is a business associate a process rather than a judgment left to whoever signs a purchase order. The fourth adds data minimization, which limits the harm if the vendor is breached anyway.

Where vendor relationships begin

Billing, collections, transcription, analytics and IT support are all functions a health system may buy from outside. Some purchases go through central procurement. Others start in a department with its own budget and a short-term need.

A process like the one in the Advocate plan has to catch both. That means the trigger is not the contract value but the data flow. If a department arranges to send patient data to a vendor, the business associate review should start, whatever the purchase route. The plan’s wording, that the agreement must be in place before disclosing PHI, makes the data flow the trigger. [2]

The device: a laptop in a car and encryption as an addressable choice

What the finding said

The third incident was the smallest by count. A laptop containing the ePHI of approximately 2,237 individuals was stolen from a workforce member’s vehicle. [2] The agreement lists as covered conduct that Advocate failed to reasonably safeguard that ePHI when the laptop was left unencrypted in an unlocked vehicle overnight. [2]

HHS cited the Privacy Rule’s safeguards section for that finding, not a Security Rule encryption specification. [2] The section requires reasonable safeguards against intentional or unintentional uses or disclosures that violate the rule. [4] So the finding rested on the circumstances, a laptop left unencrypted in an unlocked car overnight, as a failure of reasonable safeguards. [2]

What “addressable” meant then and means now

The Security Rule’s technical safeguards include encryption and decryption as an implementation specification under access control. [3] It is marked addressable. [3] That label remains in the current text as checked on November 16, 2026. [3]

Addressable did not mean optional. Section 164.306(d) requires an entity to assess whether each addressable specification is a reasonable and appropriate safeguard in its environment. [3] It must implement the specification if reasonable and appropriate, or follow the section’s alternative path if not. [3] HHS later said, in its 2025 proposal, that it saw an apparent misunderstanding by regulated entities of the word addressable. [5]

Encryption also changes what a theft means for notification. The Advocate breaches were reported to HHS as breaches of unsecured ePHI. [2] The status of the data on the device, not the theft itself, decided that label. Whether an encrypted device would have avoided the report depends on the breach notification rules and the encryption used, a question for counsel in each case.

The desktops raise the same question

The laptop is the obvious device case. The desktops at the support center raise the same question in a less obvious form. They were stationary office machines, and they held the ePHI of approximately 3,994,175 individuals, according to the agreement. [2]

A desktop’s risk profile changes when it is carried out of a building. The rule’s device and media controls standard asks for policies and procedures governing the receipt and removal of hardware and electronic media containing ePHI into and out of a facility. [3] Theft is unauthorized removal. The facility controls and the device controls meet at the door.

What the plan required for devices

The plan required Advocate to review and revise its policies for hardware and electronic media. [2] The list it gave was broad: desktop computers, laptop computers, servers, tablets, mobile phones, USB drives, external hard drives, DVDs and CDs. [2]

The policies had to identify criteria for using such hardware and media. [2] They had to set procedures for authorizing use of personal devices and media that use Advocate ePHI systems. [2] They had to address security responsibilities, including disposal and reuse of personal devices and media, and regular compliance monitoring. [2]

The personal device clause matters. A personal phone or tablet that connects to clinical systems is equipment the organization does not own but must still govern. The plan required Advocate to decide, in writing, how such use would be authorized. [2]

The encryption report

The plan’s encryption requirement did not order Advocate to encrypt every device. It ordered a report. Within 90 days of HHS’s final approval of the risk management plan, Advocate had to give HHS a written report on its encryption status. [2]

The report had three parts. [2]

  1. The total number of Advocate devices and equipment that may be used to access, store, download or transmit Advocate ePHI, including desktops, laptops, tablets, mobile phones, USB drives and medical equipment. [2]
  2. The total number of those devices that were encrypted as of the report date, with evidence of the encryption. [2]
  3. An explanation for the devices that were not encrypted. [2]

Medical equipment is on the list. [2] A device count that includes imaging systems, monitors and other clinical equipment is a different exercise from an IT asset count. It needs input from clinical engineering as well as IT.

In our reading, the report design is sharper than a mandate. A mandate to encrypt everything could be met on paper. A count with evidence and an explanation for each gap creates a number HHS could compare with the risk analysis and the inventory.

The proof: what the corrective plan made Advocate show

A sequence of approvals

The plan was built as a chain. The risk analysis came first, due 180 days after the effective date. [2] The risk management plan was due 90 days after HHS’s final approval of the risk analysis. [2] The written change-evaluation process and the revised policies for devices, facilities and business associates were due on the same 90-day clock from that approval. [2]

The encryption report and the training materials were due 90 days after HHS’s final approval of the risk management plan. [2] Each submission went through an approve-or-disapprove loop with written reasons. [2] Revisions were due within 30 or 60 days, depending on the item. [2]

The chain meant that a delay in the first step delayed everything. The inventory and the analysis gated the rest. In our reading, the order had a practical effect: policies written before the scope was known could repeat the original gap.

The compliance term

The plan’s compliance term began on the effective date. [2] It ended two years from the date of HHS’s final approval of all the corrective action obligations in the plan’s section V. [2] So the length of the term depended on how long the approval chain took. A plan that took longer to approve ran longer.

If HHS notified Advocate of a breach of the plan, the term would not end until HHS said the breach was cured. [2]

An independent assessor

The plan required Advocate to engage a qualified, objective, independent third-party assessor within 90 days of the effective date. [2] The assessor could not be employed by or affiliated with Advocate, and could not have been for at least five years before the effective date. [2]

The assessor’s scope was Advocate Medical Group and its covered entity subsidiaries. [2] The assessor would perform unannounced site visits to facilities and departments to check whether workforce members followed the new policies. [2] It would hold quarterly progress meetings with Advocate’s Security Officer and interview workforce members and business associates as needed. [2]

Assessor reports were due after the first, second and third anniversaries of HHS’s approval of the assessor. [2] Advocate had to respond in writing to each report. [2] The assessor had to report any significant violation of the plan immediately to Advocate and HHS. [2]

Advocate could not terminate the assessor except for cause and with HHS’s consent. [2] HHS could require a replacement if it found the assessor lacked expertise, independence or objectivity. [2] HHS could also conduct its own validation review if it believed an assessor report was inaccurate or incomplete. [2]

Why unannounced site visits matter here

The support center theft was a physical event. A policy review cannot show whether doors are locked and visitors are logged. An unannounced visit can. [2]

The same is true of devices. An assessor walking through a department can see whether laptops are logged in an inventory, whether a USB drive is in use and whether staff know the rules on personal phones. The plan’s monitoring design matched the kinds of failures the case involved.

Reportable events and attestations

During the compliance term, Advocate had to investigate any information that a workforce member or business associate may have failed to follow its HIPAA policies. [2] If it found a failure under the device, facility or business associate policies, it had to notify HHS and the assessor in writing within 60 days. [2] The report had to describe the event, the actions taken and any sanctions applied. [2]

The implementation report required attestations signed by Advocate’s Chief Compliance Officer. [2] One attested that the required policies had been implemented and distributed. [2] Another attested that the workforce had completed training and signed training certifications. [2] The plan required each person trained to certify the training in writing or electronically, and Advocate to keep those certifications for at least six years. [2]

Training as part of the proof

The plan required Advocate to augment its existing mandatory privacy and security awareness training for workforce members with access to PHI. [2] The training had to cover the new and revised policies. [2] New workforce members, and members returning after the initial training period, had to be trained within 30 days. [2]

Advocate had to review the training program at least every two years and update it for material changes in policies, law, HHS guidance or compliance issues found in audits. [2] Training on HIPAA policies had to be provided annually to all active workforce members as necessary for their functions. [2]

How the case applies to other organizations

A large integrated health system

Advocate was itself the large system case. HHS described it as having more than 250 treatment locations. [1] The agreement described twelve acute-care hospitals, while the release said ten acute-care hospitals and two integrated children’s hospitals. [2] [1] At that scale, the inventory is a program of its own, with owners in real estate, IT, clinical engineering and procurement.

The lesson for a system of that size is coordination. Each of those functions keeps its own list. The inventory the Advocate plan required is the union of those lists, reconciled. [2]

A physician group or ambulatory network

All three incidents involved Advocate Medical Group, the physician group subsidiary. [2] A medical group can have several small offices, shared administrative centers and staff who travel between sites with laptops.

For such a group, the support center and the laptop are the two ends of the problem. One is a concentration of data in a back-office location. The other is data dispersed across portable devices. Both need to be in the inventory and both need physical and technical safeguards.

A business associate

The vendor finding was against Advocate, the covered entity. [2] The Security Rule applies to business associates directly as well. [3] The rule’s safeguards apply to a covered entity or business associate. [3]

A billing company, a cloud host or a managed service provider holding ePHI needs its own risk analysis, its own inventory and its own contracts with any subcontractors that touch the data. A business associate that cannot show its clients those records may struggle to meet the written verification step HHS has since proposed. [5]

A state or county health department

Public agencies that provide health care can fall under HIPAA too. Where a county clinic, a public hospital or a state program is a covered entity, the same Security Rule standards apply to it. [3]

Public bodies also have records schedules, procurement rules and audit offices of their own. The Advocate plan’s structure, an inventory, a risk analysis, a device count and an assessor, maps onto public sector controls. The assessor’s independence requirement has a public equivalent in an inspector general or state auditor review.

A health plan

Health plans that are covered entities face the same rule. They hold claims data in large central systems and send data to vendors for processing, pharmacy benefits and analytics. The vendor half of the Advocate case may matter more to a plan than the device half. The plan’s requirement to limit disclosures to vendors to the minimum necessary applies the minimum necessary idea to vendor data flows. [2]

Objections, in order

1. Three unrelated incidents were combined to justify a large payment

The incidents were distinct, as HHS itself said. [1] Combining them raised the count of individuals and the number of findings.

The answer is in the first finding. HHS did not treat the incidents as three unrelated lapses. It named one failure, the risk analysis scope, that ran under all of them. [2] In our reading, the combination was the point of the case: the same gap appeared in a building, a vendor and a car.

2. Physical theft is a crime problem, not a security program failure

A determined thief can break into a building. Locks and badges reduce the risk but do not remove it.

The rule asks for reasonable physical safeguards and a facility security plan against unauthorized access and theft. [3] It does not ask for perfect prevention. HHS’s investigations indicated that Advocate lacked policies and procedures limiting physical access to the systems in the support center. [2] The finding was about the absence of a program, not about the success of a burglar.

3. Encryption was addressable, so leaving a laptop unencrypted was a permitted choice

Encryption was, and is, an addressable specification. [3] Addressable has never meant a free choice without analysis.

The finding was also framed under the Privacy Rule’s safeguards standard. [2] Leaving an unencrypted laptop in an unlocked vehicle overnight was listed in the covered conduct as a failure of reasonable safeguards. [2] The agreement did not say that encryption was mandatory. It treated the circumstances as a failure to safeguard.

4. A resolution agreement is not a ruling

The agreement agrees on this point. It says it is not an admission of liability and not a concession by HHS. [2] No court or administrative law judge decided the facts.

But the agreement was published, and it tells regulated entities what OCR looks for and what remedies it asks for. The corrective plan is a template others can read. [2] Its value to other organizations is not as precedent but as a specification of evidence.

5. The vendor breach would have happened with or without a contract

Probably so, in our reading. The intrusion at the vendor did not depend on Advocate’s paperwork. [2]

The contract finding was about assurance, not causation. HHS said the disclosure to the vendor was impermissible because the contract was missing. [2] A covered entity that cannot show its contracts cannot show it knew where its data was or what the recipient promised.

6. An inventory of every device is impractical for a system with hundreds of sites

The plan did ask for a lot. It required a complete inventory of facilities, equipment, data systems and applications containing ePHI, and a device count including medical equipment. [2]

The alternative is worse. Without the inventory, the risk analysis cannot be accurate and thorough, because it cannot say what it covered. [3] The plan let Advocate submit work already underway and gave HHS a duty not to withhold approval unreasonably. [2] That is a path to a complete inventory, not a demand for one overnight.

Checks a security or privacy officer could run today

An inventory reconciliation

Take four lists: leased and owned sites, IT asset records, clinical engineering device records and the vendor register. For each site, device class and vendor, ask whether the risk analysis names it. Record the gaps and assign an owner for each.

Include administrative buildings, billing offices, call centers and storage sites. Advocate’s largest breach began at an administrative building. [2]

An encryption count

Count devices that can access, store, download or transmit ePHI. Count those that are encrypted, with evidence. Write down why each remaining device is not encrypted and what compensating control applies. That mirrors the report Advocate owed HHS. [2]

A vendor data flow review

List each outbound data flow that carries PHI. Match each one to a signed business associate agreement on file before the first transfer. Check that the data sent is limited to what the vendor needs. The Advocate plan made each of these a policy requirement. [2]

A change trigger

Write down what events trigger an update to the inventory and the risk analysis. Include acquisitions, new buildings, new vendors and new device classes. The Advocate plan required a written process to evaluate such changes, naming acquisitions. [2]

A physical walk-through

Visit one back-office site without notice. Check door controls, visitor logs, workstation locks and how devices leave the building. The Advocate assessor was required to make unannounced site visits. [2]

These checks are good practice drawn from the Advocate plan, not rule text. The Security Rule does not prescribe these exact steps. [3] How they apply to a given organization’s obligations is a question for its counsel.

With hindsight

The rule text that Advocate was measured against has not changed since. As checked on November 16, 2026, the eCFR still requires an accurate and thorough risk analysis as a required implementation specification. [3] Facility access controls still require policies to limit physical access to electronic information systems and the facilities that house them. [3]

Encryption and decryption remain an addressable specification in the current text. [3] The amendment notes on sections 164.308 and 164.310 end with the January 25, 2013 rule. [3] The Privacy Rule’s safeguards requirement at 164.530(c), cited for the support center and the laptop, also reads as it did. [4]

The public record we checked does not say how Advocate’s corrective plan concluded, what its encryption report showed or what the assessor found. The plan sent the encryption report to HHS and the assessor’s reports to HHS and Advocate; it did not provide for publishing them. [2] We do not speculate about them.

Congress changed how settlements are weighed. On January 5, 2021, Public Law 116-321 amended the HITECH Act. [7] It requires the Secretary to consider whether a covered entity or business associate adequately demonstrated it had recognized security practices in place for not less than the previous 12 months. [7]

That consideration applies to fines, to the length and extent of audits, and to remedies otherwise agreed to in resolving potential Security Rule violations. [7] So the terms of a corrective plan like Advocate’s can now reflect an entity’s documented security practices. [7]

The law defines recognized security practices to include standards and guidelines developed under the NIST Act and approaches promulgated under section 405(d) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. [7] It says the practices are determined by the regulated entity, consistent with the Security Rule. [7] It also says nothing in the section lets the Secretary increase fines for not following such practices. [7]

The bigger change was proposed, not adopted. On January 6, 2025, HHS published a proposed rule to modify the Security Rule. [5] It would require a regulated entity to conduct and maintain an accurate and thorough written technology asset inventory and a network map of its electronic information systems and assets that may affect ePHI. [5]

HHS wrote that the inventory forms the foundation for a fulsome and accurate risk analysis. [5] That is the order Advocate’s corrective plan imposed in 2016: inventory first, analysis second. [2]

The proposal would also remove the distinction between addressable and required specifications. [5] HHS said it wanted to address an apparent misunderstanding of addressable by regulated entities. [5] Under the proposal, regulated entities would have to encrypt all ePHI at rest and in transit, with limited exceptions. [5]

HHS explained part of its reasoning on encryption by pointing to a court. It described the Fifth Circuit’s holding in University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center v. HHS. [5] As HHS described it, the court held that the Security Rule does not say how effective an encryption mechanism must be. [5] HHS said it disagreed with the court’s view that requiring employees to sign an agreement to encrypt portable devices was enough, and that additional clarity was warranted. [5]

The proposal addressed portable equipment too. HHS proposed changes so that physical safeguards would cover all workstations, including mobile ones, as well as those in an entity’s facilities. [5] In our reading, a laptop in a car would be within that text.

On vendors, the proposal would require written verification from a business associate that it has deployed required technical safeguards, at least once every 12 months. [5] It also proposed that business associates notify covered entities within 24 hours of activating a contingency plan. [5] Advocate’s plan had asked for a named owner and a process before disclosure. [2] The proposal would add verification after the contract is signed. [5]

Comments on the proposal were due March 7, 2025. [5] As checked on November 16, 2026, the 2026 Unified Agenda lists the rule as a long-term action. [6] The agenda shows the January 6, 2025 proposal and a final action date of July 2027, which is HHS’s projection. [6] It designates the rule economically significant. [6]

So the specific things the Advocate plan asked of one health system, an inventory before the analysis, an encryption count and vendor assurances with an owner, are now proposed as rules for all regulated entities. As checked on November 16, 2026, none of them has been finalized. [6]

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the article where needed.

  • HIPAA
  • risk analysis
  • asset inventory
  • encryption
  • business associates
  • OCR enforcement