Point-of-sale drug discounts made a rebate fight into a claims-data problem
HHS’s January 2019 proposal would have protected Part D and Medicaid managed care drug discounts only if fixed in writing, applied in the price at dispensing and settled to the pharmacy. The pricing fight became a contract and claims-data job.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
HHS’s January 2019 proposal would have protected Part D and Medicaid managed care drug discounts only if fixed in writing, applied in the price at dispensing and settled to the pharmacy. The pricing fight became a contract and claims-data job.
- The week On Thursday, January 31, 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services announced that Secretary Alex Azar and Inspector General Daniel Levinson had proposed a rule aimed at prescription drug rebates.
- A discount that had to appear at the counter The proposal described the market it wanted to change in plain economic terms.
- The price agreement: fixed in writing before the drug is bought The point-of-sale safe harbor began with the requirement that the reduction in price be set in advance with the Part D plan sponsor, the Medicaid managed care organization or a PBM acting for either.
- The claim: the discount had to be in the price at dispensing The third condition of the proposed safe harbor said the reduction in price must be completely reflected in the price the pharmacy charged to the beneficiary at the point of sale.
- The settlement: the chargeback and the pharmacy’s cash The chargeback condition reached pharmacies directly, and the text said little about how it would work.
- The fee ledger: what manufacturers paid PBMs, fixed and disclosed The proposal paired its point-of-sale safe harbor with a second new safe harbor, for fees that manufacturers paid PBMs for services the PBMs rendered to the manufacturers in connection with their pharmacy benefit management for health plans.
- What the proposal’s own estimates priced, and what they left out The regulatory impact analysis is where the proposal said, in dollars, where it thought the work would be.
- Reading the conditions as a specification The proposal was not finalized in the form proposed, and the hindsight section explains what happened.
- With hindsight HHS published the final rule on November 30, 2020, at 85 FR 76666, in a narrower form.
The week
On Thursday, January 31, 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services announced that Secretary Alex Azar and Inspector General Daniel Levinson had proposed a rule aimed at prescription drug rebates. The department’s press release said the proposal would expressly exclude from safe harbor protection under the Anti-Kickback Statute the rebates on prescription drugs that manufacturers paid to pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), Part D plans and Medicaid managed care organizations. It would create a new safe harbor for prescription drug discounts offered directly to patients, and another for fixed fee service arrangements between drug manufacturers and PBMs.
The release made an economic case. It said prescription drug rebates then amounted, on average, to 26 to 30 percent of a drug’s list price, and that under the proposal those discounts could be passed on directly to patients and reflected in what they paid at the pharmacy counter. Because discounts would show up in coinsurance, the release said, the greatest benefits were projected for seniors with high drug costs. It described the pressure to provide ever larger rebates as the incentive manufacturers cited for raising list prices each year, and it presented the rule as part of the administration’s “American Patients First” blueprint, alongside list prices in television advertising, a ban on pharmacy gag clauses and real-time prescription benefit tools.
The legal text went on file the same day. At 4:45 p.m. on January 31, the proposed rule was filed for public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register, with a scheduled publication date of February 6, 2019. The filed document, from the HHS Office of Inspector General under regulation identifier 0936-AA08, ran to 123 pages and bore two signatures: the Inspector General’s, dated January 18, 2019, and the Secretary’s, dated January 25, 2019.
The filed text proposed three changes to the safe harbor regulations at 42 CFR 1001.952. The discount safe harbor would no longer protect price reductions from manufacturers to Part D plan sponsors or Medicaid managed care organizations, whether paid directly or through PBMs under contract with them, unless the reduction was required by law. The proposal asked that this change, if finalized, take effect on January 1, 2020, and it said it would not alter the statutory Medicaid drug rebate obligations under section 1927 of the Social Security Act. A new safe harbor would protect a manufacturer’s reduction in price to those plans if it met three conditions: it was set in advance in writing, it involved no rebate unless the full value reached the dispensing pharmacy through a chargeback or the rebate was required by law, and it was completely reflected in the price the pharmacy charged the beneficiary at the point of sale. A second new safe harbor would protect fees that manufacturers paid PBMs for services, if those fees were fixed, consistent with fair market value, not based on a percentage of sales and not tied to the volume or value of business, and if the PBM disclosed the services to its health plan clients at least annually and to the Secretary on request.
The document also counted who would be touched. It cited 67,753 community pharmacies, estimated about 60 PBMs, named 56 Medicaid agencies, and cited 44,491,003 Medicare prescription drug enrollees in December 2018. It expected PBMs, pharmacies and health insurance providers to update their IT systems for processing claims and payments, and it considered, as an alternative, a January 1, 2021 compliance date that would give affected entities more time for contract changes and claim software updates.
The rebate proposal of January 31, 2019 was argued in public as a drug pricing fight: who would gain and who would lose if manufacturers stopped paying rebates to the intermediaries between them and patients. That argument was real, and the proposal’s own regulatory impact analysis showed how uncertain the answer was. But the readers of this series meet the proposal from a different side. A health system that owns a pharmacy or runs a Medicare Advantage plan with drug coverage, and a state Medicaid agency that contracts with managed care organizations, would each have had to make the new arrangement work in its own contracts and systems.
Our argument is that the proposal converted a question about money into a question about records. Under the existing approach, a manufacturer could pay a rebate retrospectively, in a flow the proposal said pharmacies were not part of, and the price paid at the counter did not reflect it. The proposed safe harbor for point-of-sale price reductions protected a discount only if it had a precise shape: fixed in writing before the initial purchase, completely reflected in the price charged when the drug was dispensed, and, where money still moved behind the scenes, paid in full to the dispensing pharmacy. The companion safe harbor for PBM service fees protected manufacturer payments to PBMs only if they were fixed, written down and disclosed. Each condition is a statement about data: what has to be known, by whom, at what moment, and with what proof.
The analysis takes those conditions in the order a prescription meets them, and ends with what the proposal’s own estimates said about where the work would fall. The parts are:
- The money flow that the proposal set out to move: what changed when a discount had to appear at the counter instead of in a retrospective payment.
- The price agreement: the condition that a discount be fixed in writing before the drug is bought.
- The claim: the condition that the discount be in the price at the moment of dispensing.
- The settlement: the chargeback that had to make the pharmacy whole, and the cash that sat with someone in the meantime.
- The fee ledger: the conditions on what manufacturers paid PBMs, and the disclosures that came with them.
- The estimates: how the proposal priced the work, and what that pricing left out.
The opening part explains the shift; the next four follow the records it required, each owned by a different party; the last looks at the cost of building them.
A discount that had to appear at the counter
The proposal described the market it wanted to change in plain economic terms. Manufacturers set a list price, the wholesale acquisition cost, prospectively. They also paid PBMs or other entities in the supply chain retrospectively, under rebate arrangements that met volume-based or market-share criteria. The industry called the list price net of the rebate the “net price.” The proposal pointed to the growth of both list prices and rebate payments, and to what it called the “gross to net bubble,” the phenomenon of list prices rising faster than net prices.
It also said where the patient stood. Under Part D, plan sponsors paid network pharmacies a negotiated price meant to cover the pharmacy’s acquisition cost, plus a dispensing fee. The proposal noted that pharmacies were not part of the financial flow related to rebates paid outside the point of sale, and that beneficiaries received no out-of-pocket benefit from those rebates. A beneficiary who owed coinsurance paid a percentage of the price paid to the pharmacy, a price that did not include the rebates the plan received through its PBM.
The economics of the proposal followed from that. If the discount had to be in the price at the counter, a beneficiary paying coinsurance would pay a percentage of a lower number. The proposal’s analysis expected premiums to rise as a result. That analysis, drawing on work by the CMS Office of the Actuary and two commissioned actuarial firms, said that without behavioral changes beneficiaries might see premiums rise in 2020 by $3.15 to $3.73 per beneficiary per month, 14 to 19 percent, while average cost sharing fell by $5.75 to $8.01 per beneficiary per month, 11 to 14 percent. It also said that more beneficiaries would pay more in premiums than they saved in cost sharing, and that the greatest benefit of these transfers went to sicker beneficiaries.
Those figures are about who pays. The conditions of the new safe harbor are about how the payment is made, and that is where the proposal reached beyond the pricing debate. A retrospective rebate is a payment between two parties, settled on their schedule, on their data. A point-of-sale reduction, as the proposal defined it, is a number that has to exist before the claim, travel through the claim and be honored in the pharmacy’s settlement. Three or more organizations have to hold the same number at the same time.
The proposal was explicit that the old arrangement would not qualify. It said the current rebate frameworks, in which a manufacturer paid the Part D plan sponsor or Medicaid managed care organization directly or through a PBM, would not meet the chargeback condition unless the chargebacks gave the dispensing pharmacy the full value of the price reduction. In effect, the protected path ran through the pharmacy.
The proposal also left some things alone, and those limits matter to the public-sector reader. It said it would not alter obligations under the statutory Medicaid drug rebate provisions of section 1927 of the Social Security Act, including best price and the inflation-based additional rebates, or the supplemental rebates that states negotiated with manufacturers. It treated rebates paid by manufacturers to Medicaid managed care organizations as different from supplemental rebates paid to states, because of what it called the differing risk under the anti-kickback statute. And it said the department might issue separate guidance, if the proposal was finalized, on how pharmacy chargebacks would be treated in the calculation of average manufacturer price and best price. For a state Medicaid agency, that meant the proposal touched its managed care contracts and left its own rebate program in place, with an open question about how chargebacks would feed into the numbers that program depended on.
The price agreement: fixed in writing before the drug is bought
The point-of-sale safe harbor began with the requirement that the reduction in price be set in advance with the Part D plan sponsor, the Medicaid managed care organization or a PBM acting for either. The proposal defined “set in advance” to mean that the terms were fixed and disclosed in writing to the plan sponsor or Medicaid managed care organization by the time of the initial purchase, which it read as the earliest purchase of the product at the reduced price by the plan on behalf of an enrollee.
That is a contract requirement, and it is also a data requirement. A discount that is fixed and disclosed in writing before the purchase is a record that exists at a known time, with known terms, held by a known party. A retrospective rebate, in the proposal’s description, was paid under arrangements that met volume-based or market-share criteria, which can be measured only once the purchases have happened. A point-of-sale reduction has to be expressible before the purchase in terms that a claim can use.
For a plan sponsor, including a Medicare Advantage organization offering a prescription drug plan, which the proposal read into the term “plan sponsor under Medicare Part D,” the consequence was that negotiated reductions would have to reach the prices used to process its pharmacy claims. For a health system that operated such a plan, the question for its procurement and contracting staff was whether its PBM contract gave it access to those terms, the right to verify that they had been applied and the right to audit them.
The proposal anticipated pressure on the edges of this condition. It said the safe harbor’s requirements were meant to exclude conduct that mimicked rebates but was referenced in other ways in the contracts between manufacturers and PBMs, plan sponsors or Medicaid managed care organizations. Its example was fees based on a percentage of a product’s list price, which it said could be a disguised kickback. It also said the discount safe harbor would continue to protect discounts offered to other entities, such as wholesalers, hospitals, physicians and pharmacies, and asked whether those other price reductions could be used to funnel remuneration that would otherwise have been a rebate. That question matters to any organization with a pharmacy: the line between a protected discount to a pharmacy and an unprotected rebate to a plan depends on how the contract describes the payment and what the payment is tied to.
From a procurement point of view, the condition changed what a pharmacy benefit contract needs to say. Under a rebate model, a plan sponsor’s contract with its PBM could describe rebate pass-through, guarantees and audit rights over a reconciliation that happened periodically. Under the proposed model, the contract would also need to cover where the negotiated point-of-sale prices lived, who could see them, how changes were dated and how a disputed price would be traced to the written agreement in force when the drug was dispensed. None of those clauses is required by the proposal in those words. They are what an organization would need in order to show, if asked, that a discount met the condition.
The proposal also asked a pointed question about the edge of the market. It recognized that some PBMs might argue that processing the reduction at the point of sale would give pharmacies enough data to reverse engineer the manufacturer’s or the PBM’s discount structure, and it sought comment on whether that was likely and what effect it might have on competition. The question shows that the department saw one consequence of its design: a discount applied at the counter is a discount that the counter can see. Data that had been held between two parties would now pass through a third.
For public agencies that buy pharmacy benefits for their own employees, the proposal did not apply directly: it addressed Part D and Medicaid managed care. But the proposal sought comment on whether the amendment should reach other HHS programs. An agency reviewing its own pharmacy benefit contract in 2019 could read the proposal as a description of what a contract with point-of-sale pricing would need, whether or not the rule applied to it.
The claim: the discount had to be in the price at dispensing
The third condition of the proposed safe harbor said the reduction in price must be completely reflected in the price the pharmacy charged to the beneficiary at the point of sale. The proposal gave a short example: if the discounted rate was set in advance, at the time of dispensing the pharmacy would have the information it needed to charge a beneficiary who owed coinsurance correctly, even if the manufacturer made up the difference to the pharmacy through a chargeback.
That example is the hinge of the design. It assumes that the discounted price is known to the pharmacy when the drug is dispensed, and that the beneficiary’s cost share is calculated from it. The proposal had already said that a beneficiary paying coinsurance was charged a percentage of the price paid to the pharmacy, or the full price before meeting the deductible. The condition meant the negotiated reduction had to be one of the inputs to that charge, on every claim where it applied.
The proposal said it meant the safe harbor to protect reductions in price without regard to the phase of the benefit the beneficiary was in, and it sought comment on how the safe harbor should apply during periods of 100 percent beneficiary cost sharing, such as a deductible. That is a claims-system question as much as a legal one. A beneficiary still in the deductible pays the full price; if that price had to reflect the reduction, the reduction had to be applied there too.
The department did not specify a claims format. Its responses to comments in the final rule, covered in the hindsight section, show that commenters raised the claim standard directly, with one saying the change would require new NCPDP electronic health care transaction codes for pharmacy claims. In 2019, the proposal itself placed the obligation on the outcome: the price charged must completely reflect the reduction. How the systems carried it was left to the parties.
For a health system that owns pharmacies, this condition would have reached its pharmacy management system and its relationship with every PBM whose claims it processed. The pharmacy would have been on the receiving end of the adjudication response: it would charge the patient what the claim said and rely on the plan, the PBM or the manufacturer’s agent to make up the difference. Its interest was in knowing, from the claim response, how much of its reimbursement would come from the plan, how much from the patient and how much would arrive by chargeback.
For a plan sponsor, the condition meant that the price tables loaded into its claims processor would have to change when a manufacturer agreement changed, and that the change would have to be dated and traceable. An error in a retrospective rebate sits between a plan and a manufacturer. An error in a point-of-sale price shows up as a wrong charge to a patient at the counter, and correcting it involves the pharmacy and the patient.
The proposal itself put this in terms of transition. It asked whether its January 1, 2020 date gave affected entities enough time to restructure arrangements, and it said that plan sponsor and manufacturer negotiations for the 2020 benefit year could be influenced by the proposal’s release, with bids possibly submitted without knowledge of whether it would be finalized. As an alternative, it considered delaying the compliance date by one year, to January 1, 2021, which it said would lower transition costs by giving affected entities time to make the necessary changes to contracts and claim software updates and to fit those changes into their scheduled updates.
That sentence is the closest the proposal came to naming its central operational dependency. A pricing rule whose transition cost depends on claim software is a pricing rule whose timetable depends on release cycles at PBMs, claims processors, pharmacy system vendors and plans.
The Medicaid side of the claim looked different. The proposal said Medicaid managed care enrollees were less likely to be significantly affected, given Medicaid’s low beneficiary cost-sharing requirements. For those claims the patient-facing effect of a point-of-sale price would be small, but the condition would still apply to the price and the chargeback. A state agency’s interest would lie less in what the enrollee paid at the counter and more in whether its managed care organizations and their PBMs could show, from their own records, how the price on each claim related to the agreement behind it.
The settlement: the chargeback and the pharmacy’s cash
The chargeback condition reached pharmacies directly, and the text said little about how it would work. The reduction in price could not involve a rebate unless the full value of the reduction was provided to the dispensing pharmacy through a chargeback or series of chargebacks, or the rebate was required by law. The proposal defined a chargeback as a payment made directly or indirectly by a manufacturer to a dispensing pharmacy so that the total payment to the pharmacy for the product was at least equal to the price agreed in writing between the plan or its PBM and the manufacturer.
The proposal’s own example made the arithmetic clear. When a pharmacy dispensed a drug to a beneficiary covered by a Part D plan or Medicaid managed care organization, the pharmacy’s total payment, made up of the beneficiary’s cost sharing, the plan’s payment and any chargeback, would be at least equal to the price agreed between the manufacturer and the plan or PBM. The pharmacy would charge less at the counter and recover the difference from the manufacturer.
That design moved a receivable onto the pharmacy’s books. Under a rebate model, the plan or PBM waited for rebate money; the pharmacy was paid the negotiated price and was outside that flow. Under the chargeback model, the pharmacy would give the reduction at the counter and wait for the manufacturer’s payment, directly or through an intermediary. Between dispensing and chargeback, someone carried the cash.
The proposal recognized that it had not studied this. It said the actuarial analyses it had commissioned were not designed to evaluate the effects on the pharmacy supply chain of moving from a system in which reimbursement was divorced from actual negotiated prices net of rebates. It invited comments on how such an analysis might be structured. It also sought comment on the ability of wholesalers to facilitate chargebacks to pharmacies in a timely fashion, on replacing PBM rebates with manufacturer discounts routed through wholesalers and on other concerns related to disrupting the relationship between pharmacies and PBMs.
For a health system with its own pharmacies, the chargeback condition would have created three new data needs. The pharmacy would need to know, claim by claim, how much of its reimbursement was due by chargeback. It would need to match chargeback payments to those claims. And it would need to chase or write off the ones that did not arrive. Those are reconciliation tasks, and the proposal did not say who would own them or on what timetable.
The proposal also noted the role of ownership. It recognized that some pharmacies and PBMs were related through ownership, and it sought comment on any issues such ownership might create under the safe harbor. For a pharmacy owned by a PBM or a plan, the chargeback might move within one corporate family. For an independent pharmacy, or a health system’s outpatient pharmacy, it would move between unrelated parties, and the contract would set the terms.
In economic terms, the chargeback condition did not change who bore the discount. The manufacturer paid it in either model. What changed was the timing and the route: from a periodic payment to a plan to a claim-level payment to a pharmacy. For a buyer, that is a procurement question about payment terms, and for a pharmacy it is a working-capital question. Neither question was answered in the proposal. An organization that would have been on either side of a chargeback needed its own answer: what payment term it would accept, what data it would require with each payment and what happened to a claim that was never paid.
The fee ledger: what manufacturers paid PBMs, fixed and disclosed
The proposal paired its point-of-sale safe harbor with a second new safe harbor, for fees that manufacturers paid PBMs for services the PBMs rendered to the manufacturers in connection with their pharmacy benefit management for health plans. The proposal’s example of such a service was a PBM helping a manufacturer prevent duplicate discounts on 340B claims, a service that would rely on data the PBM held from its health plan clients. It noted that nothing in the proposed safe harbor would override contract terms limiting a PBM’s use of a health plan’s data.
The conditions were written in the same register as the point-of-sale conditions. The PBM and the manufacturer would need a written agreement that covered all of the services the PBM provided to the manufacturer in connection with its health plan arrangements for the term of the agreement, and that specified each service and its compensation. The compensation would have to be consistent with fair market value in an arm’s-length transaction, be a fixed payment not based on a percentage of sales, and not be determined in a manner that took into account the volume or value of referrals or business generated between the parties, or between the manufacturer and the PBM’s health plans, payable by federal health care programs.
The proposal explained why it drew the line at percentages. If a manufacturer paid a PBM a fee based on a percentage of its product’s price, the proposal said, the PBM could be influenced to place higher-priced alternatives in favorable formulary tiers, increasing its own profits while being less beneficial for the health plans it was supposed to serve as agent. It added that the existing rebate framework, in which it understood PBMs to seek payments from manufacturers in exchange for favorable formulary placement, was instructive about the relative risk of payments based on sales versus fixed fees.
The disclosure condition matters to health plans and public buyers. The PBM would have to disclose in writing to each health plan it contracted with, at least annually, and to the Secretary upon request, the services it rendered to each manufacturer related to its arrangements with that health plan and the associated costs. The proposal said the department believed PBMs were agents of the health plans they contracted with and that this transparency was important to make sure a PBM’s arrangements with manufacturers were not in tension with its services to those plans. It sought comment on whether PBMs should also have to disclose fee arrangements to health plans, and on competitive concerns.
For a plan sponsor, that disclosure would have been a new input to procurement. A health plan buying PBM services would receive, at least once a year, a description of what its PBM was doing for manufacturers in connection with its business. The value of that disclosure would depend on whether the plan could tie it to its own contract, its formulary and its claims. A disclosure that a plan could not compare to anything is a document; a disclosure that a plan could test against its own data is a control.
The proposal’s cost estimate for this condition shows how lightly it weighed the record-keeping. It said it believed the written agreements already existed as standard business practice, so the documentation requirement imposed no marginal cost. It estimated that each PBM would provide the new disclosures an additional 50 times a year, at an average of 4 hours each, split among managers, attorneys and IT staff, for a cost of $1.28 million in each year following publication of the final rule. The department was estimating the cost of producing the disclosure. It did not estimate the cost to a plan of reading and testing it.
What the proposal’s own estimates priced, and what they left out
The regulatory impact analysis is where the proposal said, in dollars, where it thought the work would be. Read as a procurement document, it tells a reader which tasks the department expected to be large and which small.
The department estimated that affected businesses and Medicaid agencies would need an average of 2 hours each to review the rule, at a cost of $5.3 million in the first year following publication of a final rule. It estimated that businesses would then spend an average of 20 hours reviewing their policies and deciding how to respond, with 10 hours a year of implementation work in subsequent years, for $53.5 million in the first year and $24.8 million in years two through five. It said that for some businesses this might mean substantially changing their pricing models and engaging in lengthy negotiations, and for others much more modest changes. It estimated $5.45 million for 218 Part D parent organizations to update their bids.
Against those figures, the IT estimate was small. The proposal expected PBMs, pharmacies and health insurance providers to update their IT systems for processing claims and payments, and estimated an average of five hours per year over the first five years following publication of the final rule, at $10.8 million in each of those years. It estimated $209 million in each of the first five years for Medicare prescription drug enrollees to spend time reviewing their plan choices in response to changes.
Two points stand out from those numbers. The department’s estimate put more cost into enrollees’ time choosing a plan than into the systems that would have to calculate what those enrollees paid. And the estimate for systems work was a per-entity average across tens of thousands of pharmacies, dozens of PBMs and hundreds of plan organizations, which says little about the cost to any one of them. A health system with several pharmacies and a Medicare Advantage plan would have faced claims, pharmacy, contract and settlement changes at the same time; an average of five hours a year was not a planning figure for it.
The estimates also carried a structural signal about the economics. The department said the rule might affect incentives for vertical integration: PBMs, plan sponsors and pharmacies might want to integrate as a result, while the potential loss of retained rebate revenue might lead existing integrated businesses to consider new structures. For a buyer, that is a reminder that the pricing rule could change the shape of its suppliers as well as their prices.
The proposal also showed how wide the uncertainty was on the money side. It presented ranges across the Office of the Actuary and the two commissioned firms, and scenarios in which manufacturer and plan behavior pushed net prices down or up. Where the commissioned analyses differed, it presented the range rather than a single answer. That candor about the money did not carry over to the systems. The analyses, it said, were not designed to evaluate effects on the pharmacy supply chain.
The proposal also listed alternatives to its own design, and one of them shows that the department saw a different route to the counter. Unrelated to the safe harbor rulemaking, it described an option, raised in a request for information in the proposed Part C and D policy and technical rule for 2019, that would require Part D sponsors to pass a specified minimum percentage of the average rebates expected for a drug’s therapeutic class into the point-of-sale price. That option would have worked through the Part D program’s own rules instead of the anti-kickback statute, but it would have needed the same thing: a price known at the counter that reflected money settled elsewhere.
In our view, the gap between those two treatments is what a technology or procurement leader can put to use from the proposal. The department modeled the transfer of dollars among beneficiaries, plans, manufacturers and the government with care. It did not model the transfer of data and working capital among plans, PBMs, pharmacies and wholesalers, which its own conditions required. An organization reading any pricing rule can ask the same question: if the rule changes who pays, what does it change about who must know the price, when, and with what proof.
Reading the conditions as a specification
The proposal was not finalized in the form proposed, and the hindsight section explains what happened. But its conditions are a compact specification for any arrangement that moves a discount from a retrospective payment to the transaction itself, and the specification has four parts that correspond to the sections above.
Start with the agreement record. A discount that must be fixed in writing before the initial purchase requires a store of terms with effective dates, owners and version history. A buyer that cannot find the agreement in force on the date of a claim cannot show that the discount met the condition.
Next is the transaction record. A discount that must be completely reflected in the price at dispensing requires that the claims system hold the price and that the claim response carry it. A buyer that cannot see the price on the claim cannot show that its members received the discount.
Then comes the settlement record. A discount that reaches the pharmacy through a chargeback requires matching each payment to the claim it settles. A pharmacy that cannot match payments to claims cannot tell what it is owed, and a plan that cannot see the chargeback cannot tell whether its pharmacies were made whole.
Last is the fee record. A safe harbor that protects only fixed, fair-market-value fees with written agreements and disclosures requires that both sides keep the agreement, the valuation and the disclosures, and that the buyer can match a disclosure to its own business.
For health systems, each of those records belongs to a different function: contracting, pharmacy operations, revenue cycle and finance, and compliance. The proposal’s design put them into one chain. A health system preparing for it would have needed someone to own the chain end to end: a person who could say, for a given claim, which agreement set the price, what the patient was charged, what the plan paid and whether the chargeback arrived.
For state Medicaid agencies, the proposal would have reached managed care contracts and the interaction between chargebacks and the Medicaid drug rebate calculations. The department said it might issue separate guidance on that interaction. An agency would have needed its contracts with managed care organizations to require the data to test all four records, because the department had flagged that chargebacks could affect the average manufacturer price and best price calculations its rebate program used.
For any organization, the legal analysis belongs with counsel. Whether an arrangement meets a safe harbor, or needs to, is a fact-specific question under the anti-kickback statute, and organizations should check with their own counsel before restructuring any pricing or fee arrangement. What a technology or procurement leader can own is the evidence: that the records exist, that they agree with one another and that they can be produced.
With hindsight
HHS published the final rule on November 30, 2020, at 85 FR 76666, in a narrower form. It did not finalize the change to the discount safe harbor for Medicaid managed care organizations; the exclusion applied to price reductions from manufacturers to Part D plan sponsors, paid directly or through PBMs under contract with them. It kept both new safe harbors. The point-of-sale safe harbor, at 42 CFR 1001.952(cc), still covered reductions in price to Part D plan sponsors and Medicaid managed care organizations, and its wording moved closer to the transaction: the reduction had to be completely reflected in the price of the drug at the time the pharmacy dispensed it, and a “point-of-sale chargeback” was defined as a payment by the manufacturer, directly or through a PBM or other entity, to the dispensing pharmacy equal to the agreed reduction. The rule took effect on January 29, 2021, except for the discount safe harbor amendments, which were set for January 1, 2022.
The comments the department answered read like a systems review. Commenters said plans might need to adjust bids, renegotiate contracts and make systems changes; that vendors would have to develop, test and sell products; and that the change would require new NCPDP electronic health care transaction codes for pharmacy claims. Others raised the delay between dispensing and a chargeback, the financial risk in that period and whether prompt payment rules applied. The department recognized that some system changes might be required to administer point-of-sale chargebacks, but said nothing in the safe harbor required parties to use that process: if the pharmacy received the full reduction at the time of sale, no chargeback was needed. It declined to set the timing of chargeback payments or say which party held the financial risk, saying these were questions to be resolved through arrangements negotiated by the relevant parties.
The cost estimate for systems work changed sharply. The proposal had estimated five hours a year per entity for IT changes to claims and payment processing. The final rule estimated 40 to 120 hours, with a primary estimate of 80 hours, in the first year following publication, and 10 to 30 hours a year in years two through five, for a first-year cost of $66.7 million to $200.1 million, with a primary estimate of $133.4 million. It said the estimates were in line with a comment suggesting that thousands of hours were required to make IT changes in response to the rule.
Litigation and then legislation held the rule back. According to a December 2023 OIG notice, a lawsuit challenging it was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on January 12, 2021, Pharmaceutical Care Management Association v. HHS. Because of orders in that case and a government memorandum on postponing rules not yet in effect, the effective dates were pushed back several times between January and March of 2021, and the effective date of the rule’s regulatory revisions became January 1, 2023.
By the OIG notice’s count, Congress then extended the date three times. Section 90006 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act prohibited implementation, administration or enforcement of the rule before January 1, 2026, the OIG notice says. Section 13101 of the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, approved June 25, 2022, amended that section by striking “January 1, 2026” and inserting “January 1, 2027.” Section 11301 of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, approved August 16, 2022, provides that the Secretary “shall not, prior to January 1, 2032, implement, administer, or enforce” the November 2020 final rule. On December 29, 2023, OIG stayed the amendments, including the point-of-sale and PBM service fee safe harbors, until January 1, 2032. As checked on November 15, 2026, the Code of Federal Regulations still carries both safe harbors with a note that they are stayed until January 1, 2032.
What held up was the shape of the problem. The proposal treated a discount as a number to be moved, and the final rule’s own record showed the work was in the records that carry it: contract terms, claim codes, chargeback payments and their timing. What did not hold up was the timetable. A rule proposed to take effect on January 1, 2020 may not, under the Inflation Reduction Act, be implemented, administered or enforced before January 1, 2032. A map of how a point-of-sale price would travel through an organization’s contracts, claims and settlements would still describe the work if this rule, or another built on the same conditions, were applied.
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