Medicare’s e-prescribing mandate ran through the credentialing office
The October 2018 opioid law required electronic prescriptions for Part D controlled substances. DEA’s rules turned that into an identity program: proofing the prescriber, a two-factor credential, two-person control of signing rights and a daily audit.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The October 2018 opioid law required electronic prescriptions for Part D controlled substances. DEA’s rules turned that into an identity program: proofing the prescriber, a two-factor credential, two-person control of signing rights and a daily audit.
- The week On Wednesday, October 24, 2018, the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act, known as the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, became Public Law 115-271.
- Proofing: the credentialing office as an identity provider DEA’s rules offer two routes to proofing.
- The credential: two factors that survive a clinical workflow Under 21 CFR 1311.115, the application must require two of three factors to sign: something the practitioner knows, such as a password; something the practitioner is, such as a fingerprint or iris scan; and something the practitioner has, a hard token separate from the computer being accessed.
- Access control: two people to grant the right to sign Proofing and a credential do not by themselves let anyone sign.
- Audit: proving the chain held The fourth link turns the first three into evidence.
- Objections: the vendor’s job, a soft penalty, a percentage threshold The first objection is that DEA’s requirements are the application vendor’s problem.
- With hindsight Medicare’s requirement arrived later and softer than the statute’s date suggested.
The week
On Wednesday, October 24, 2018, the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act, known as the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, became Public Law 115-271. The bill, H.R. 6, ran to several titles touching Medicaid, Medicare, the Food and Drug Administration, public health programs and law enforcement, all aimed at the opioid crisis.
One short section carried a deadline for every prescriber in the Medicare drug benefit. Section 2003, titled “Every prescription conveyed securely,” amended the Social Security Act so that a prescription for a covered Part D drug for a Schedule II, III, IV or V controlled substance, under a prescription drug plan or a Medicare Advantage drug plan, must be transmitted electronically by the practitioner through an electronic prescription drug program meeting the statute’s standards. The requirement applied to drugs prescribed on or after January 1, 2021.
The law left the details to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Secretary was to specify by rulemaking when the requirement could be waived, including where prescriber and pharmacy are the same entity, where the prescription could not be sent under the current NCPDP SCRIPT standard, and where a practitioner had a waiver of up to one year for economic hardship, technological limits outside the practitioner’s control or other exceptional circumstances. Other listed cases covered prescriptions that would be impractical to obtain electronically in time and where delay would harm the patient, research protocols, drugs whose FDA safety requirements could not be met electronically, hospice patients whose drugs fell outside the hospice benefit, and nursing facility residents dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. Plans and pharmacists were not required to check whether a prescriber had a waiver, and pharmacists could still dispense from otherwise valid written, oral or fax prescriptions. The Secretary was given authority to set penalties for non-compliance by rulemaking.
Section 2003 also told the Attorney General to update, within one year of enactment, the requirements for the biometric component of multifactor authentication for electronic prescriptions of controlled substances. That instruction pointed at the Drug Enforcement Administration’s rules, which governed how any controlled substance prescription could be sent electronically.
Those rules dated from an interim final rule published on March 31, 2010 and effective June 1, 2010. It gave practitioners the option of writing controlled substance prescriptions electronically and let pharmacies receive and archive them, in addition to the existing paper and oral rules. To use the option, a prescriber needed an identity-proofed, two-factor credential; the application needed logical access controls, audit trails and a third-party audit or certification. Before the 2018 law, a practitioner could choose not to use the electronic option. After it, the statute expected prescribers of Part D controlled substances who did not fall under an exception to prescribe electronically, and so to meet DEA’s requirements, for drugs prescribed from January 1, 2021.
Other sections of the act reached health records too. Section 2001 expanded Medicare telehealth for substance use disorder treatment, including in the home, for services furnished on or after July 1, 2019. Section 5042 required states, beginning October 1, 2021, to have Medicaid providers check a qualified prescription drug monitoring program before prescribing certain controlled substances, and to document a good faith effort when they could not.
Section 2003 read like a pharmacy and payment rule. It told Medicare drug plans what kind of prescription they would cover. Its effect inside a hospital or practice was different. The statute required electronic transmission. DEA’s rules decided what electronic transmission of a controlled substance prescription required, and those rules were about identity: who the prescriber is, what proves it at the moment of signing, who may grant the permission to sign, and what record shows that nobody else did. For a health system, the 2018 mandate therefore landed less on the pharmacy informatics team than on the medical staff office, the identity team and the security operations function.
This article argues that the mandate is best understood as an identity architecture problem, and that health systems which treated it as an application upgrade built fragile programs. It follows the four links in DEA’s chain, each with a different owner. The first is proofing: establishing that the person who will sign is who they claim to be and is authorized to prescribe. The second is the credential: the two factors the prescriber presents each time they sign. The third is access control: the two-person process that grants and revokes the permission to sign. The fourth is audit: the daily review, incident reporting and third-party assurance that prove the first three held. A final section takes the objections.
The four links are sequential. Proofing comes before a credential can be issued. A credential is useless until access control grants permission to use it for signing. Audit checks all three after the fact. A weakness in any one breaks the chain, and the links have different owners: credentialing for proofing, identity and access management for the credential, a two-person governance process for access, and security operations and compliance for audit. That division is why the mandate could not be met by the electronic health record vendor alone.
The connection between the statute and DEA’s rules is worth stating precisely. Apart from ordering DEA to update the biometric requirements, Section 2003 did not set security requirements of its own. It required electronic transmission through a program meeting the Medicare e-prescribing standards, and it relied on DEA’s existing framework for anything involving controlled substances. Until 2018 that framework governed a choice: a prescriber who found the identity steps burdensome could keep writing paper prescriptions. The Medicare requirement removed the choice for Part D controlled substance prescriptions outside the exceptions. Every weakness a health system tolerated while e-prescribing of controlled substances was optional became a weakness in a required process.
A note on who is covered. The Medicare requirement in Section 2003 applies to Part D prescriptions. DEA’s rules apply to any electronic prescription for a controlled substance, whoever pays. State laws may add their own e-prescribing mandates, which are separate. A health system’s program has to satisfy DEA’s rules for every controlled substance prescription it sends electronically, and the Medicare requirement determines how many of those prescriptions must be electronic. Organizations should confirm with counsel which state and federal requirements apply to each prescriber group.
The weight of each link differs by type of organization. A large health system acting as an institutional practitioner carries all four itself and can proof in-house. An independent physician practice depends on an outside credential provider for proofing and on its software vendor for much of the audit machinery, but must still run the two-person access process and the daily review. An ambulatory network with employed and affiliated practices may run both models at once. A telehealth provider faces the proofing link at its hardest, because its prescribers may never be in a room with anyone who can check their identification.
Proofing: the credentialing office as an identity provider
DEA’s rules offer two routes to proofing. An individual practitioner obtains a two-factor credential from a credential service provider approved by the General Services Administration to proof identity at Assurance Level 3 or above under NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, or from a certification authority cross-certified with the Federal Bridge. An institutional practitioner, such as a hospital, may instead proof its own prescribers through the entity that grants them privileges, which the rule gives as an example: a hospital credentialing office.
That second route is where the mandate changed the work of hospital staff offices. Under 21 CFR 1311.110, the credentialing entity must check government-issued photo identification against the person presenting it, confirm that the practitioner’s state authorization to practice and, where applicable, to prescribe controlled substances is current, and confirm either a current DEA registration or that the institution has granted the practitioner privileges to prescribe under the institution’s own registration. It must retain a record of the proofing. It must then authorize issuance of the credential to a separate entity within the institution or to an outside provider.
What the credentialing office already had, and what it lacked
Medical staff offices may verify licenses and registrations to grant clinical privileges, and their records are built for that purpose. DEA’s rule asked for something more specific: a record that a particular person, matched to a photo ID, was proofed for the purpose of issuing a signing credential, and a separation between the people who proof and the people who issue. A credentialing file showing that a physician’s license was verified does not by itself show that the person who later enrolled a token in the e-prescribing system was that physician.
The gap is in the handoff. A health system that proofs in the medical staff office and enrolls credentials in the IT service desk needs a record that ties the two: who was proofed, by whom, when, against which document, and which credential was then enrolled for that person by whom. Without that link, an auditor can see two correct processes and no evidence that they refer to the same human being.
Prescribers who do not fit the medical staff model
The institutional route covers practitioners eligible to use the institution’s application. Several groups strain it. Residents and other practitioners who prescribe under the hospital’s registration are covered, but their status changes with rotations and graduation. Locum tenens prescribers may hold privileges at several institutions at once. Advanced practice clinicians may have state prescribing authority that differs from physicians’. Telehealth prescribers in an ambulatory network may never visit a facility where a photo ID can be checked in person. Each group needs a written proofing path, and the path needs to work on the prescriber’s first day, not after a week of manual exceptions.
Independent practices sit outside the institutional route. They rely on credential service providers, and the practice’s job is to choose an application that works with such providers and to make sure each prescriber completes proofing before the date the practice depends on. An ambulatory network that includes both employed and affiliated practices may run both routes at once, and should know which prescribers are on which.
Remote proofing and the assurance levels
The rule ties external proofing to NIST SP 800-63-1 Assurance Level 3. When DEA reopened comment in 2020, it explained that Level 3 under the older guideline corresponds to Identity Assurance Level 2 under the newer SP 800-63-3, and that both allow either in-person or remote identity proofing. For a telehealth network or an affiliated practice spread across several states, remote proofing through a credential service provider was the practical route. The rule also requires the provider to issue the credential using two channels, such as email, mail or telephone, so that interception of one does not hand over the credential. Health systems that rely on remote proofing should know which provider performed it, at what assurance level, and how the two-channel issuance was completed for each prescriber, because those are the facts a change in DEA’s proofing rules would put in question.
Measures for the proofing link
The proofing link can be measured without waiting for an inspection. Useful figures include the number of prescribers with signing rights and no linked proofing record, the interval between a new prescriber’s start date and completion of proofing, and the number of proofing records performed by someone who also enrolled the credential. Each should be near zero or short. A medical staff office that reports these figures to the same committee that oversees controlled substance diversion turns a compliance step into a diversion control the committee can watch.
The VA and other special cases
The rule adds steps for practitioners at Department of Veterans Affairs facilities, who must be confirmed as duly appointed under the VA’s own statutes or, for contractors, as meeting the criteria for appointment. Federal health systems and academic centers with VA affiliations therefore need proofing records that reflect those appointments. The general point holds across settings: proofing must check the specific authority the person will use to prescribe, and a license held somewhere is insufficient on its own.
The credential: two factors that survive a clinical workflow
Under 21 CFR 1311.115, the application must require two of three factors to sign: something the practitioner knows, such as a password; something the practitioner is, such as a fingerprint or iris scan; and something the practitioner has, a hard token separate from the computer being accessed. A hard token must meet at least FIPS 140-2 Security Level 1 for cryptographic modules or one-time-password devices. A biometric must meet the separate requirements of 1311.116.
The biometric rules are specific. The subsystem must operate at a false match rate of 0.001 or lower, using matching software whose performance has been tested by NIST or another DEA-approved laboratory under stated conditions, including sequestered test data and a laboratory without an interest in the outcome. The reader must be co-located with, or built into, the computer or device used to prescribe, in a known, controlled location. It must bind device identity at enrollment and check it at authentication. Biometric data sent over an open network must be cryptographically protected and protected against replay.
Choosing factors for the floor, not the office
Clinical workflows punish slow authentication. A prescriber in an emergency department may sign dozens of orders a shift on shared workstations. A token that must be fetched from a locker, or a fingerprint reader that fails with gloves, pushes clinicians toward workarounds. The rule forbids the obvious workaround directly: under 1311.102 the practitioner must keep sole possession of the hard token and must not share the password or biometric with anyone, and must not let anyone else use them to sign. A prescriber who lets a colleague or scribe complete the signing step risks the DEA registration itself.
Factor choice is therefore a clinical design decision. A health system that chooses phone-based tokens gains convenience but takes on dependence on personal devices, mobile coverage inside buildings and a process for lost or replaced phones. One that chooses biometrics has to place compliant readers at every workstation where controlled substances are signed and meet the location and device-binding rules. Each choice has an operating cost that appears long after go-live.
Lost factors are a same-day event
The rule sets a clock for the credential’s failure. A practitioner must notify the people who set access controls within one business day of discovering that a hard token was lost, stolen or compromised, or that the authentication protocol was otherwise compromised. A practitioner who fails to do so may be held responsible for prescriptions written with the credential. That makes lost-token reporting a prescriber obligation with personal consequences, and health systems should treat it accordingly: a simple reporting channel, available around the clock, and a replacement process fast enough that clinicians do not delay reporting to avoid being locked out.
The rest of the credential’s life
Loss is one event in a credential’s life. Others include replacement of a phone that carried a software token, a new workstation for a biometric user, a change of name, and a prescriber returning after leave. Each is a point where the binding between person and credential can be broken or silently reassigned. The safe design treats every rebinding as a fresh enrollment against the existing proofing record, performed by someone other than the prescriber and recorded. A help desk that can move a token to a new device on a phone call from someone claiming to be the prescriber has recreated the problem the proofing step solved. Help desk identity checks for these requests deserve the same care as the original proofing.
Signing is a distinct act
Under 1311.140, the application must show the prescription details and a statement that completing two-factor authentication legally signs the prescription and authorizes transmission, and must prompt for the factors while that information is displayed. The two-factor step is the signature. That design means single sign-on to the electronic health record does not satisfy the requirement. The prescriber may already be logged in, but signing a controlled substance prescription requires a fresh two-factor event tied to that prescription list. An identity team that has built single sign-on to reduce clinician friction has to build an exception for this one act.
Shared workstations and session design
Hospitals run on shared workstations. A clinician may tap a badge to resume a session, review a patient and walk away. The signing rule interacts with that design in two ways. First, because signing needs a fresh two-factor event, a session left open does not let the next person sign a controlled substance prescription under the first clinician’s credential, provided the application enforces the step every time. Second, the factor itself must not be left at the workstation. A token left in a reader, or a password written on a monitor, defeats the rule. Session and workstation design, badge-tap configurations and token storage are therefore part of the controlled substance control set, and the clinical engineering and desktop teams that own them belong in the program.
Downtime and failed transmissions
The rule anticipates failure. Under 1311.170, if an intermediary or the pharmacy reports that an electronic prescription was not delivered, the application may print the prescription for manual signature, and the printout must state that it was originally transmitted electronically to a named pharmacy at a given time and that transmission failed. The practitioner must ensure any replacement paper or oral prescription carries the same indication. These provisions protect against a prescription being filled twice. A health system’s downtime procedures for controlled substances should include them, along with a way to identify prescriptions caught in a failed transmission, so that the paper fallback does not create the duplication the rule is designed to prevent.
Access control: two people to grant the right to sign
Proofing and a credential do not by themselves let anyone sign. The application must also be configured to grant that permission, and DEA’s rules make the configuration a two-person act. For an institutional practitioner, under 1311.130, the entity that conducts proofing must develop a list of practitioners permitted to indicate that controlled substance prescriptions are ready to be signed and to sign them, and the list must be approved by two individuals. The approved list then goes to a separate entity within the institution, which enters the permissions. One individual enters the data, and a second must authenticate and execute it. The institution must retain a record of who is authorized to do these things.
For individual practitioners in a private practice, under 1311.125, at least two individuals must be involved, one of whom must be a DEA registrant with a two-factor credential who approves the entries. The application must require two-factor authentication for approving changes to these access controls as well as for signing.
Revocation on the day it is discovered
The access control rules also set revocation triggers. Permission must be revoked, on the date the occurrence is discovered, when a practitioner’s factor is lost, stolen or compromised, when the relevant DEA registration expires without renewal or is terminated, revoked or suspended, and when the practitioner is no longer authorized to use the institution’s application, for example on leaving. For lost factors, access must end immediately on notification.
Each trigger maps to a data feed a health system may or may not have. Departures come from human resources or medical staff records, and contracted or affiliated prescribers may not appear in the employee feed at all. Registration status comes from DEA’s records and the prescriber’s own renewals. Lost tokens come from the prescriber. A program that revokes permissions only when someone remembers will miss the same-day standard. Automated feeds from the systems of record into the e-prescribing access list, with a daily reconciliation, meet it.
Why the two-person rule is an architecture choice
The two-person requirement shapes system design. If the e-prescribing permissions are managed in a general identity governance platform, the platform must enforce the two-person approval and execution steps, with two-factor authentication, for these particular entitlements, and must keep the records DEA requires. If they are managed inside the clinical application, the application must do so. Either way, an administrator who can grant themselves or others the right to sign alone is a gap in the chain. Privileged access reviews in a health system should include the people who can change controlled substance signing permissions, and should test that none of them can act alone.
Agents, scribes and the single signer
The rule distinguishes preparing a prescription from signing it. Under 1311.135, the application may let the registrant or an agent enter prescription data, but only the registrant may sign. The practitioner remains responsible for information an agent entered before the practitioner reviewed and signed it. In a busy clinic, nurses, pharmacists and scribes may queue prescriptions for signature. That is permitted. What must not happen is that the person who queued the prescription also completes the signing step. Access design should give agents the right to enter and indicate readiness only where the rule allows, and the audit review should look for signatures completed at workstations or times where the prescriber could not plausibly have been present.
Practitioners with more than one registration
Some prescribers hold more than one DEA registration, for example in different states. The application must require the practitioner or agent to select the correct registration for each prescription. For a multistate ambulatory network or a telehealth service, the access list should record which registrations each prescriber may use and where, so that a registration lapsing in one state revokes signing only under that registration and the revocation trigger can be applied correctly.
Testing the two-person control
A two-person rule is easy to describe and easy to erode. Over time, the same two people may approve every change, one of them may approve entries they also prepared, or a break-glass account may bypass the workflow during an outage and never be reviewed. Internal audit can test the control by sampling permission grants and confirming that the list approval, the data entry and the execution were performed by the required number of distinct, authorized people, each with two-factor authentication. Emergency changes made outside the workflow should appear on the daily audit report as changes to logical access controls, which the rule already treats as auditable events.
Audit: proving the chain held
The fourth link turns the first three into evidence. Under 1311.150, the application provider must define auditable events, including attempted unauthorized access, unauthorized changes to records, interference with the application or the audit trail, and any setting of or change to logical access controls for controlled substance prescriptions. The application must analyze the audit trail at least once every calendar day and generate an incident report identifying each auditable event. A person designated to set access controls must decide whether each event represents a security incident that compromised or could have compromised the integrity of prescription records, and any such incident must be reported to the application provider and to DEA within one business day.
A separate duty falls on the prescriber. Under 1311.102, a practitioner who discovers that prescriptions issued under their registration were not signed by them, or did not match what they signed, must notify the access control designees and DEA within one business day.
Daily review needs an owner
A daily incident report that nobody reads is not a control. The rule assigns the decision to the people designated to set access controls, who may sit in pharmacy informatics or the identity team rather than in security operations. A health system should decide whether those designees review the report themselves, with security operations supporting, or whether the review is delegated in a way the rule allows, and should document it. The same report is a useful security signal: repeated failed signing attempts, unexpected permission changes and audit interference are all indicators that matter beyond DEA compliance.
Deciding on incidents inside one business day
The one-business-day reporting window starts from a decision that someone must make: whether an auditable event represents an incident that compromised or could have compromised prescription records. That decision is hard to make quickly without a playbook. A health system should write down, in advance, which events are presumed incidents (for example, a permission change outside the two-person workflow, or a signature the prescriber disowns), which require investigation before deciding, and who may make the call on weekends and holidays. It should also decide who sends the report to the application provider and to DEA, and keep a copy of each decision, including decisions that an event was not an incident. Those records show an inspector that the daily review is a control and not a formality.
Third-party assurance and the practitioner’s check
Under 1311.300, an application must have a third-party audit, or a certification by a DEA-approved certifying organization, before it may be used for controlled substance prescriptions, and again whenever relevant functionality changes or every two years, whichever comes first. The auditor must be qualified in specified ways, such as a Certified Information Systems Auditor. Under 1311.102, the practitioner must determine before first use that the auditor or certifier found the application records, stores and transmits the required prescription information accurately. If the provider reports that the application no longer meets the requirements, practitioners must stop issuing electronic controlled substance prescriptions with it, and the institution must ensure the designated individuals terminate signing access until the issue is fixed.
That last requirement is a resilience problem as well as a compliance one. A failed recertification or a defect report from the vendor can, under the rule, stop controlled substance e-prescribing across an institution. Health systems should know the certification dates of their applications, receive vendor compliance notices through a monitored channel, and have a documented fallback to the paper and oral prescribing that the law still permits, with the Part D exception for prescriptions that would otherwise be delayed to the patient’s harm in mind.
Evidence for an inspection
A health system asked to show its program should be able to produce, for any prescriber chosen at random: the proofing record and who performed it; the credential enrollment record linked to that proofing; the two-person approval and execution of the signing permission; any revocation and its timing; and the daily audit reports and decisions for a sample period. If any link requires reconstruction from email, the chain is weaker than the system suggests.
Hosted applications and the provider’s own staff
Where the e-prescribing application is hosted by its provider, the rule reaches the provider’s people. The list of auditable events must include attempted or successful creation, modification or destruction of controlled substance prescriptions or of the related access controls by any agent or employee of the application service provider. The third-party audit of a hosted application must address physical security as well as processing integrity. A health system using a hosted electronic health record should confirm, through its contract and the audit report, that provider staff actions on these records are logged and appear in the daily review, and that the audit scope covers the hosting facilities.
Connecting the audit trail to diversion monitoring
A health system’s drug diversion program may already watch dispensing cabinets, waste records and prescribing patterns. The e-prescribing audit trail belongs in the same picture. A prescriber whose controlled substance prescriptions cluster at unusual hours, a signing session from a workstation in a unit where the prescriber has no patients, or a spike in prescriptions to a single pharmacy are each signals a diversion committee would want. DEA’s rule requires the daily review for security incidents. Feeding the same data to the diversion program costs little and lets the organization notice misuse of a valid credential, which no authentication rule can prevent on its own.
Objections: the vendor’s job, a soft penalty, a percentage threshold
The first objection is that DEA’s requirements are the application vendor’s problem. The vendor builds the signing workflow, supports the factors and arranges the third-party audit. Health systems simply buy a certified product.
The rule does not support that view. The certified application provides the capability. Proofing, credential issuance, the two-person permission process, revocation, lost-token handling, daily review and incident decisions are duties of the institution and the practitioner. The vendor’s certification says the software can enforce the rules. Whether the hospital did is a separate question, answered by the hospital’s own records.
The objection that enforcement was mild
A second objection is that Medicare’s enforcement turned out to be gentle, a notice of non-compliance, so the mandate need not drive investment. That reading misjudges where the risk lies. The Medicare requirement decides how many prescriptions must be electronic. DEA’s rules govern every electronic controlled substance prescription a health system sends, and failures there touch the DEA registrations of individual prescribers and the institution. A health system that moved controlled substance prescribing to electronic channels to meet Medicare’s requirement, without building the identity chain properly, enlarged its DEA exposure.
The objection that a threshold leaves room for exceptions
A third objection is that a percentage threshold lets organizations leave hard cases on paper. That is true and sensible for genuinely hard cases, such as downtime or the narrow situations the statute and CMS allow. It is a poor reason to leave whole groups, such as locum tenens or telehealth prescribers, without a proofing path. Those groups are where the identity chain is weakest, and where diversion risk may be highest, because their status changes and their identity is hardest to confirm in person. Leaving them out avoids the work the rule exists to require.
The objection that proofing is a one-time event
A fourth objection treats proofing as something done once at enrollment. The rule’s revocation triggers show otherwise. Registration status, employment and possession of factors all change. A program that proofs carefully once and then never reconciles permissions against the systems of record decays, unnoticed, into one where former staff and lapsed registrants can still sign. Continuous reconciliation is the price of the first proofing remaining meaningful.
The objection that state mandates already forced this
A fifth objection is that some states required electronic prescribing of controlled substances on their own, so the federal law added little for health systems there. CMS has said its program is separate from state requirements, and that meeting a state mandate does not by itself establish compliance with the Medicare requirement, which CMS measures from Part D claims. More important, any state mandate operates on top of the same DEA rules. A health system in such a state already needed the identity chain. The 2018 law extended the same need to prescribers and organizations in states that had not acted, and to multistate networks that previously could run different practices in different places.
What we would tell a chief medical information officer today
Name an owner for each link: credentialing for proofing records, identity and access management for credentials, a two-person governance group for signing permissions, and security operations with pharmacy for daily audit review. Connect them with records that let an auditor follow one prescriber from photo ID to signed prescription. Feed departures, registration changes and lost-token reports into automatic revocation the same day. Report to the board’s quality or compliance committee a short set of figures: prescribers with signing rights and no linked proofing record, revocations completed after the day of discovery, daily reports reviewed late, and permission changes without two people. And plan for the chain’s first link to change, because DEA has said it intends to revisit how prescribers are proofed.
With hindsight
Medicare’s requirement arrived later and softer than the statute’s date suggested. CMS’s EPCS Program FAQ, version 8.0 of June 2026, says the program’s rules were addressed in the Physician Fee Schedule final rules for calendar years 2021 through 2025, and that the compliance requirement became effective with the first measurement year, calendar 2023. Prescribers must electronically prescribe at least 70 percent of their Schedule II to V controlled substance prescriptions under Part D, after exceptions, in each measurement year. Exceptions cover prescribers with 100 or fewer qualifying prescriptions, those in a declared disaster or emergency area, and those with a CMS-approved waiver for circumstances beyond their control. Prescriptions for residents of long-term care facilities will count no earlier than January 1, 2028. Starting with measurement year 2024, CMS identifies which disasters and emergencies qualify for the disaster exception. Prescribers do not register or report; CMS measures compliance from Part D claims data, and says its program is separate from state requirements, so a state waiver does not cover it.
The penalty, starting with measurement year 2023, is a notice of non-compliance sent in the fall after the measurement year, with access to a portal to check status and apply for a waiver. CMS says non-compliance may be considered in its processes for assessing fraud, waste and abuse, which could lead to referral to law enforcement or revocation of billing privileges where evidence of such conduct is present. CMS sends notices by email where it has a valid address in the Medicare enrollment and national provider systems, and by letter otherwise, so the accuracy of those records decides whether a prescriber sees the notice in time to seek a waiver.
DEA’s side moved more slowly. On April 21, 2020, DEA reopened comment on its 2010 interim final rule, noting the SUPPORT Act’s instruction to update the biometric requirements within a year of enactment and asking about aligning identity proofing with NIST SP 800-63-3, where Identity Assurance Level 2 corresponds to the old Level 3. Comments closed on June 22, 2020. The rule remained interim; the agenda’s timetable still records it as effective since June 1, 2010, with no final action listed.
The latest Unified Agenda entry for the rule, RIN 1117-AA61, lists it among long-term actions with a proposed rule date “To Be Determined.” It says DEA has identified an emerging trend of bad actors using electronic prescription applications to generate and fill fraudulent prescriptions, and that it intends to propose requiring practitioners to undergo in-person identity proofing before being issued two-factor credentials, to update the biometric requirements and to replace superseded technical standards.
What held up was the chain itself: proofing, credential, two-person access and daily audit still define controlled substance e-prescribing, and DEA’s own stated concern is fraud through the applications. What did not hold up was the timetable. As checked on November 14, 2026, the biometric update the 2018 law ordered had not been finalized, and the in-person proofing proposal, which would bear most on prescribers who had been proofed remotely, had no date.
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