Tailoring sorted banks by where they stood, not how fast they were moving
The Fed’s October 2018 tailoring proposal sorted large banks by size and four risk indicators averaged over a year. Silicon Valley Bank later exposed what the design left out: speed of growth, the phase-in clock and concentrated deposits.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
The Fed’s October 2018 tailoring proposal sorted large banks by size and four risk indicators averaged over a year. Silicon Valley Bank later exposed what the design left out: speed of growth, the phase-in clock and concentrated deposits.
- The week On Wednesday, October 31, 2018, the Federal Reserve Board held an open meeting and invited public comment on a framework that would, in its words, more closely match the regulations for large banking organizations with their risk profiles.
- The lines: fixed thresholds and the cliffs at each one The proposal used three asset lines for U.S. firms outside the GSIB group: $100 billion, $250 billion and $700 billion.
- The measures: what the indicators counted Size was not the only route into a higher category.
- The clock: averaging, effective dates and phase-ins The third part of the machine decided timing.
- The requirements: what each category demanded The fourth part was the content of each category.
- Objections: management failed, rules would not have saved it, tailoring was right The first objection is that Silicon Valley Bank failed because of its own management and its supervisors, not because of the tailoring framework.
- With hindsight The Board finalized the framework on October 10, 2019.
The week
On Wednesday, October 31, 2018, the Federal Reserve Board held an open meeting and invited public comment on a framework that would, in its words, more closely match the regulations for large banking organizations with their risk profiles. The framework set four categories of standards for banking organizations with more than $100 billion in total consolidated assets. The Board said the proposals built on its existing tailoring of its rules and would be consistent with the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, the statute enacted earlier in 2018 that raised the threshold for automatic application of enhanced prudential standards.
The categories were defined by size and by other risk indicators. The chart the Board released placed U.S. global systemically important banks in Category I. Category II covered firms with $700 billion or more in total assets or $75 billion or more in cross-jurisdictional activity. Category III covered firms with $250 billion or more in total assets, or $75 billion or more in nonbank assets, weighted short-term wholesale funding or off-balance sheet exposure. Category IV covered other firms with $100 billion to $250 billion in total assets.
The Board described the effects in three steps. Firms in the lowest risk category, generally domestic firms with $100 billion to $250 billion in assets, would no longer be subject to standardized liquidity requirements. They would remain subject to firm-developed liquidity stress tests and liquidity risk management standards, would no longer have to run company-run stress tests, and would move to a two-year cycle for supervisory stress tests. Firms in the next category, generally those with $250 billion or more in assets or material levels of the other risk factors that were not GSIBs, would have their standardized liquidity requirements reduced and would run company-run stress tests on a two-year cycle, while remaining subject to annual supervisory stress tests. The largest and most complex firms would see no changes to their capital or liquidity requirements. The chart showed that Category III firms could opt out of recognizing accumulated other comprehensive income, or AOCI, in regulatory capital, and that Category III firms with less than $75 billion in weighted short-term wholesale funding would face a liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio between 70 and 85 percent, on which the proposal sought comment.
The capital and liquidity parts were developed jointly with the FDIC and the OCC. The Board said a separate proposal for foreign banks would follow, and that it would accept comments through January 22, 2019.
Governor Lael Brainard issued a statement objecting to the proposals as drafted. She said she had hoped to support a proposal for noncomplex domestic firms of $100 billion to $250 billion consistent with the 2018 act, but that the proposals went beyond it by relaxing requirements for domestic institutions with $250 billion to $700 billion in assets. She wrote that the liquidity coverage ratio for that group could fall by as much as 30 percent, and that the proposal would eliminate it entirely for institutions with $100 billion to $250 billion in assets. Citing staff analysis, she put the reduction in high quality liquid assets at the affected firms at as much as $70 billion and a 15 percent reduction in their liquidity buffers. She also objected to letting firms of $250 billion to $700 billion opt out of the AOCI requirement, which staff estimated would raise their reported capital by $5 billion with no change in their capacity to absorb losses.
The October 2018 proposal is remembered as deregulation, and the argument over it has mostly been about how much. That framing hides the design. Tailoring set lighter rules for smaller large banks, and to do so it built a sorting machine: a set of lines, a set of measures, a clock that decided when a bank moved between categories, and a schedule of requirements for each category. Each of those parts made a choice about what risk looks like and how quickly it changes. Silicon Valley Bank tested every one of them.
This article argues that the framework’s weakest assumption was about speed. It sorted banks by where they stood, averaged over a year, and gave them time to adjust once they moved. It did not ask how fast a bank was growing or how fast its funding could leave. The four parts of the machine, taken in turn, show where that assumption sat. The first is the lines: the fixed asset thresholds that defined the categories. The second is the measures: the risk indicators that could move a bank up. The third is the clock: the averaging and phase-in rules that decided when a new category took effect. The fourth is the requirements: what each category demanded in liquidity and capital. A final section takes the objections.
The parts do not overlap. The lines and measures decide which category a bank belongs in. The clock decides when that answer takes effect. The requirements decide what the answer means. A bank can be well served by one part and badly served by another, and a compliance program can fail at any of them.
This is a framework for bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies with $100 billion or more in assets, and, through related rules, for their depository institutions. Credit unions and smaller banks sit under different regimes. Yet the design questions recur wherever a regulator sorts institutions into tiers, including the asset thresholds that apply to community banks and to supervision of smaller institutions, so the lessons travel. Institutions should confirm with counsel and their supervisors how any category rule applies to them.
The statutory background explains why the proposal took this shape. As Governor Brainard summarized it on the day, the 2018 act raised the threshold for automatic application of enhanced prudential standards to $250 billion and gave the Board discretion to apply any of those standards to domestic firms of $100 billion to $250 billion. The Board therefore had to decide, for firms in that range, which standards to keep, and it chose to build categories rather than decide firm by firm. It also chose to revisit standards for firms above $250 billion, which the act did not require and which drew Brainard’s objection. The categories were the Board’s instrument for both choices.
The audience inside a bank is wider than the regulatory policy team. The treasurer owns the liquidity consequences, the CFO and controller own the reported figures that set the category, the chief risk officer owns the stress testing and risk identification the categories assume, and the board owns the decision about how to grow. Each of the four parts below lands on a different one of them, which is one reason category changes can catch a bank unprepared even when every function did its own job.
The lines: fixed thresholds and the cliffs at each one
The proposal used three asset lines for U.S. firms outside the GSIB group: $100 billion, $250 billion and $700 billion. The first two came from the 2018 act, which raised the automatic threshold for enhanced prudential standards to $250 billion and gave the Board discretion over firms between $100 billion and $250 billion. The third was the Board’s own choice for Category II.
Fixed lines create cliffs. A bank at $99 billion and one at $101 billion are nearly identical, yet one is outside the enhanced framework and the other is in it. The proposal softened some cliffs by adding risk indicators that could move a firm up regardless of size, but the base was still a dollar figure that does not move with the economy. A bank that grows with its customers will cross lines even if its business does not change.
What crossing a line means for a compliance program
For a bank approaching a line, crossing it is a program event as well as a reporting event. Category IV brought supervisory stress testing, capital planning expectations, liquidity risk management standards and, as the framework later developed, standardized liquidity requirements in some cases. Each requires data, models, governance and people. The work to meet them is measured in quarters and years. A bank that plans for the requirements only once it has crossed will spend its first period in the category without the capabilities the category assumes.
That is why the lines matter for operations as much as for capital. A chief risk officer at a $70 billion bank growing quickly should treat the $100 billion line as a project milestone with a date, estimated from the bank’s own growth plan, and build toward it. The rule does not require that. Prudence does, and supervisors may reasonably ask whether management saw the line coming.
Cliffs cut both ways
Fixed lines also create incentives to stay below them. A bank that would cross a line through growth may slow growth, sell assets or restructure to avoid the costs above it. Those choices can be sensible. They can also distort decisions in ways the framework did not intend, which is one reason the Board later turned to indexing thresholds. For a bank’s board, the question is whether a decision to stay below a line is a business judgment or a compliance avoidance, and whether it would look the same to a supervisor.
Thresholds as a data problem
Total consolidated assets seems a simple number. In a growing bank it is not. It depends on accounting choices, on the timing of deposit inflows parked in securities or reserves, and on acquisitions. A bank near a line needs a forecast of the measure the rule uses, at the frequency the rule uses, and an owner who watches it. The same applies to every threshold in the framework, including the $75 billion indicator thresholds discussed below.
Mergers cross lines in a single step
Organic growth approaches a line gradually. An acquisition can cross it in one transaction. A bank holding company at $80 billion that agrees to buy a $30 billion bank will be above $100 billion when the deal closes, and its post-merger systems will have to meet the new category’s expectations while also integrating the acquired bank. Merger planning should therefore include a regulatory category workstream from the first diligence meeting: which category the combined firm will fall into, when that will take effect under the averaging rules, and which capabilities must be ready. Supervisors reviewing an application may ask the same questions, and a bank with a written answer is better placed.
Holding companies and their banks
The proposal applied to bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies, and the related capital and liquidity proposal, developed with the FDIC and OCC, reached their depository institutions. The two levels were also supervised differently: Silicon Valley Bank’s review later described the subsidiary bank being rated under the CAMELS system for insured depository institutions, while its parent was rated under the separate system for large holding companies. A compliance program for a firm near a line needs to map, requirement by requirement, which entity each applies to, and who in that entity owns it.
The same design, below $100 billion
Lines like these run through the whole system. Vice Chair for Supervision Bowman noted in October 2026 that a community bank had been defined as a bank with less than $10 billion in assets for the past 15 years, and argued that fixed thresholds can push a smaller noncomplex bank into a higher supervisory tier. The tension she described is the mirror of the one in this article. Fixed lines can over-regulate a simple bank that grows with the economy and under-regulate a complex bank that grows faster than the categories register. Both problems come from sorting by size at a point in time. Credit unions and banks well below $100 billion face their own versions of the same cliffs, and the planning disciplines below apply to them too.
The measures: what the indicators counted
Size was not the only route into a higher category. The proposal added four other indicators, each tied to a kind of risk the Board said could bring complexity and risk to the financial system: cross-jurisdictional activity, weighted short-term wholesale funding, nonbank assets and off-balance sheet exposure. A firm with $75 billion or more in any of the last three moved to Category III even if its assets were below $250 billion. Cross-jurisdictional activity of $75 billion or more moved a firm to Category II.
The funding indicator is the one that matters for this argument. The proposal described weighted short-term wholesale funding as tracking the measure reported on the FR Y-15. It defined short-term wholesale funding as funding obtained from wholesale counterparties or retail brokered deposits and sweeps with a remaining maturity of one year or less, weighted by maturity, collateral and counterparty. The proposal explained the purpose: reliance on short-term, generally uninsured funding from more sophisticated counterparties can make a firm vulnerable to large-scale funding runs.
The risk the measures did not name
The indicators were chosen with the 2008 crisis in mind, when runs came through wholesale funding markets and nonbank affiliates. They measured those channels carefully. The share of a bank’s deposits that were uninsured, and how concentrated those depositors were in one industry or one network, was not one of the indicators that set a firm’s category. A bank could fund itself almost entirely with large deposits from a single sector and remain in the lowest category if it stayed under $250 billion and its measured wholesale funding stayed under $75 billion.
That gap was a choice about what to count, not an error of arithmetic. The liquidity rules that applied within each category addressed deposit stability in their own ways. But the sorting machine did not use deposit concentration to decide which rules applied. For a bank whose risk lay there, the category understated it.
Indicators as reported data
Each indicator came from regulatory reports. Total assets from the FR Y-9C, the risk indicators from the FR Y-15 and related schedules. That made the category a function of reporting. A bank’s regulatory reporting team, which might have seen its work as producing filings, was in fact computing the inputs that decided which rules applied. Errors in those reports could put a bank in the wrong category. A reporting control environment that is adequate for filing accuracy may need to be stronger when the numbers also decide the bank’s regulatory regime.
Measuring the risk the rule does not
A bank cannot change the indicators, but it can measure what they leave out. A treasury function that tracks uninsured deposit share, concentration by depositor sector and by referral network, and the speed at which those deposits could leave under stress gives the board a view the category does not. We think a bank whose business model concentrates its funding should report that view to its board alongside its category, and should be ready to explain to supervisors why the category alone understates its risk.
How a fast grower’s numbers behave
The indicators are levels. They say how much wholesale funding or nonbank assets a firm has, averaged over time. A bank growing quickly on the back of deposit inflows can see its total assets rise while its measured wholesale funding stays low, because the new money arrives as deposits rather than as market funding. The bank looks bigger but no riskier on the indicators, even though the source of its growth may be the source of its risk. A growth rate, or the change in uninsured deposits over a year, would capture that pattern. Neither was part of the sorting machine. A bank’s own risk reporting can include both.
Reporting controls that match the stakes
If regulatory reports decide the regulatory regime, the controls over them should look like controls over financial statements. That means documented data lineage from source systems to each reported line that feeds an indicator, reconciliation to the general ledger, independent review before filing, and a forecast of the next quarters’ values that is compared with actuals. It also means someone who understands that a reclassification of an exposure, made for good accounting reasons, may move an indicator across a threshold. Internal audit should include the indicator calculations in its plan in any year the bank is within reach of a line.
Indicators chosen for one crisis
Every indicator reflects a theory of how banks fail. Cross-jurisdictional activity reflects the complexity of resolving firms across borders. Nonbank assets reflect the risks of affiliates outside the bank. Off-balance sheet exposure reflects commitments and derivatives that can turn into funding needs. Weighted short-term wholesale funding reflects the market runs of 2008. All four are sound. Together they describe the failures regulators had recently seen. A framework built this way is strongest against the last crisis, and a bank’s own risk identification should ask what the indicators would not see in its particular business.
The clock: averaging, effective dates and phase-ins
The third part of the machine decided timing. The proposal said a category would apply based on the average level of each indicator over the preceding four calendar quarters, to capture significant changes in a firm’s risk profile rather than temporary fluctuations. A firm would leave a category only when it failed the category’s indicators in each of the four most recent quarters. Changes in requirements from a change in category would take effect on the first day of the second quarter after the change. The Board gave an example: a firm moving from Category IV to Category III based on its average over the four quarters of one year would face Category III standards from April 1 of the following year.
Averaging and delayed effect are reasonable designs for stable institutions. They prevent a bank from flipping between categories because of a large deposit on a quarter-end date. They give banks time to build systems. But they also mean that a bank growing quickly is always regulated as the smaller bank it used to be. The averaging lags the bank’s current size. The effective date lags the averaging. Transition periods for specific requirements, such as the first supervisory stress test, add further lag.
How the lags stack
For a bank growing slowly, the lags are a matter of weeks or months and make little difference. For a bank growing fast, they compound. Its average over four quarters is below its current size. Its new category starts later than the average crosses the line. Its new requirements phase in later still. The result is that the gap between the bank’s actual risk and its regulatory requirements is widest for the banks changing fastest, which are the banks where risk is most likely to be building.
Running ahead of the clock
A bank cannot shorten the regulator’s clock, but it can run its own. A bank expecting to cross a line can adopt the next category’s practices before they are required, such as running a liquidity coverage ratio calculation internally, building stress testing capabilities and holding the governance meetings the next category expects. The cost is real. The benefit is that, when the category arrives, the bank is already operating to it, and in the meantime its board sees the risk as the next category would measure it. A supervisor reviewing a fast-growing bank may reasonably ask why it waited for the clock.
What examiners see during transition
Transition periods are a gap in rules, not in supervision. Supervisory expectations for risk management and governance can apply while specific quantitative requirements phase in. A bank in transition should expect examiners to ask how management is preparing and whether its risk management has kept pace with its size, and should have an answer in writing.
The clock runs slower on the way down
The proposal’s exit rule was stricter than its entry rule. A firm moved up when its four-quarter average crossed a threshold. It moved down only when it no longer met the indicators for its category in each of the four most recent quarters. That asymmetry prevents firms from dipping below a line for a quarter to shed requirements, which is sensible. It also means the clock was designed with gaming in mind on the way down and with stability in mind on the way up. A framework concerned with speed on the way up would look different, perhaps triggering certain requirements on a single quarter’s level when growth is rapid.
Laying out the timeline in advance
A bank can map the clock for itself. Starting from its growth plan, it can project the quarter in which its four-quarter average will cross the next line, the date on which the new category will take effect under the second-quarter rule, and the dates on which each specific requirement will apply after any transition. Laid out on one page, that timeline shows the board how long the bank will operate above a line while still regulated below it. If that period is long, the board can decide whether to adopt the next category’s practices early. Without the timeline, the board may not know the gap exists.
Who owns the clock
In a bank, nobody naturally owns the regulatory clock. Regulatory reporting knows the averages. Regulatory policy knows the effective-date rules. Business lines know the growth plan. Treasury and risk know what the next category will require. A bank near a line should name one executive to own the timeline, with authority to call on all four, and should review it at the board’s risk committee each quarter. The Board’s later review of Silicon Valley Bank described the bank and its supervisors spending considerable effort to understand when rules applied, including transition periods and cliff effects. Effort spread across functions is not the same as ownership.
The requirements: what each category demanded
The fourth part was the content of each category. For liquidity, the proposal removed standardized liquidity requirements for the lowest category, leaving firm-developed liquidity stress tests and liquidity risk management standards. It reduced them for Category III firms with lower wholesale funding. For capital, it allowed Category III and IV firms to opt out of recognizing AOCI in regulatory capital, so that unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities would not affect their capital ratios. For stress testing, it moved lower categories to two-year cycles and removed company-run tests for the lowest.
Each of these choices made a judgment about which risks were material for a firm of a given category. Removing standardized liquidity requirements assumed that firm-developed stress tests would capture the bank’s funding risks. Allowing an AOCI opt-out assumed that unrealized securities losses were less relevant to the loss-absorbing capacity of these firms. Governor Brainard challenged both judgments in her statement on the day, warning that the AOCI change would make capital look stronger without changing the capacity to absorb losses.
Firm-developed tests are only as good as their assumptions
Internal liquidity stress tests can be more tailored than a standardized ratio. They can also be more optimistic. A firm-developed test chooses its own run rates for different deposit types. A bank whose depositors are concentrated in one sector, and whose test assumes run rates drawn from more diversified deposit bases, will understate its exposure. The standardized ratio, whatever its flaws, imposed an external view. Removing it put more weight on the bank’s own assumptions and on supervisors’ willingness to challenge them.
AOCI and the measure of capital
The AOCI opt-out changed what capital ratios measured. Without it, a fall in the market value of available-for-sale securities reduces regulatory capital. With it, the fall is invisible in the ratio until securities are sold. For a bank holding large securities portfolios funded by deposits that could leave, the ratio and the economic position could diverge sharply. Boards and investors who read the ratio without the unrealized losses beside it were reading a different number than the one that would matter if the bank had to sell.
Requirements for owners inside the bank
Each requirement has an owner: liquidity rules belong to treasury, capital rules to finance and capital planning, stress testing to risk and finance together, and governance requirements to the board and senior management. When a framework removes or delays a requirement, the owner still owns the risk. A treasury function freed from a standardized ratio is still responsible for knowing whether the bank can survive a run. We think the useful internal rule is to keep measuring what the removed requirement measured, at least for the bank’s own management, until the bank can show the risk is immaterial.
Stress testing on a two-year cycle
The proposal moved the lowest category’s supervisory stress tests to a two-year cycle and removed company-run tests. Stress tests are where interest rate, credit and funding assumptions meet in one scenario. A two-year cycle means that a bank whose balance sheet changes fast may be tested on a structure that no longer exists. For a fast-growing Category IV bank, we think internal stress testing on the bank’s current balance sheet, run at least annually and reviewed by the board, is the minimum prudent substitute, whatever the supervisory schedule.
What the requirements left to supervision
Where a framework removes a quantitative requirement, it shifts weight to qualitative supervision: examiners’ assessments of risk management, governance and liquidity planning. That shift is defensible. It also means the outcome depends on how assertive supervision is, which can change with policy. Banks should not assume that a lighter rule means lighter scrutiny. They should assume that examiners will judge, without a ratio to point to, whether management understood its risks, and should keep the evidence that it did.
The liquidity standards that remained
Even for the lowest category, the proposal kept firm-developed liquidity stress tests and liquidity risk management standards. Those requirements were the bank’s own view of its liquidity, subject to supervisory review, and they were where deposit concentration could and should have appeared. A bank in the lowest category that took those standards seriously would have modeled the outflow of its largest and most correlated depositors and held liquidity accordingly. The removal of the standardized ratio did not remove the obligation to understand the bank’s funding. It removed an external check on whether the bank had done so.
Objections: management failed, rules would not have saved it, tailoring was right
The first objection is that Silicon Valley Bank failed because of its own management and its supervisors, not because of the tailoring framework. The Federal Reserve’s own review in April 2023 led with that point: the bank’s board and management failed to manage their risks, and supervisors did not fully appreciate the vulnerabilities or act quickly enough when they did.
That is true, and it does not answer the argument. The same review’s fourth finding was that the tailoring approach and a shift in supervisory stance impeded effective supervision by reducing standards, increasing complexity and promoting a less assertive approach. Management failures are what rules exist to catch. A framework that delays external measures for the fastest-growing banks leaves more of the work to management and supervisors at the moment they are under the greatest strain.
The objection that stricter rules would not have changed the outcome
A second objection is that no liquidity ratio would have survived the run Silicon Valley Bank experienced, with over $40 billion leaving in a day and over $100 billion more expected the next. That may be right. The Board’s review was careful: it estimated that under the pre-2019 requirements the bank would have faced a shortfall in high quality liquid assets and lower reported capital, and said that would have required different actions and may have encouraged closer scrutiny. Rules work by forcing earlier choices. The argument here is about the timing and the measures that would have forced those choices earlier, not about whether a ratio could stop a run on the day.
The objection that tailoring was the right policy
A third objection holds that tailoring was sound: requirements built for the largest global banks impose real costs on regional banks with simpler business models, and Congress directed the change. This article does not argue against tailoring in principle. It argues that a tailoring framework should account for speed, of growth and of potential outflows, and for concentration of funding, alongside size and the four indicators. A framework that did so could still be lighter for a slow-growing, diversified regional bank and heavier for a fast-growing bank with concentrated funding, which is what tailoring promises.
The objection that indexing fixes the lines
A fourth objection looks forward: indexing thresholds to inflation or economic growth, as the agencies proposed in 2026 for certain capital thresholds and the Board said it would consider for others, removes the cliffs created by fixed lines. Indexing addresses one problem, the drift of fixed lines over time. It does not address the clock or the measures. A bank that grows fast within an indexed framework faces the same averaging lag and the same blind spot on deposit concentration. Indexed lines could even widen the gap for fast growers if banks sit longer in lower categories as the lines rise.
The objection that supervisors had the tools anyway
A fifth objection is that supervisors always had discretion. They could criticize a bank’s liquidity planning, downgrade its ratings or require action whatever its category. On this view the categories set minimums and the failure lay in using the discretion. There is force in this, and the Board’s review found that supervisors identified vulnerabilities without acting quickly enough. But categories also shape where supervisory attention goes. A framework that labels a firm as the lowest-risk category of large bank signals, to supervisors and to the firm, how much scrutiny is expected. The review’s finding that tailoring promoted a less assertive supervisory approach suggests the label mattered.
The objection that this is hindsight
A final objection is that the speed of the 2023 run, driven by a concentrated depositor network and, as the Board’s review put it, fueled by social media, was hard to foresee in 2018. That is fair as far as the scale of the run goes. It is less fair about the design questions. The proposal itself justified the funding indicator by the risk of large-scale runs by sophisticated, generally uninsured funders. Brainard warned on the day that distress at noncomplex large banks generally shows up first as liquidity stress. The risks were named in 2018. What the design did not do was measure them where they appeared in deposits rather than in wholesale markets, or account for how fast a bank could grow into them.
What we would tell a chief risk officer today
Know the date, on your own growth plan, when you will cross the next line, and start building that category’s capabilities well ahead of it. Measure what the indicators leave out, especially uninsured deposit share and concentration, and report it to the board with your category. Keep computing the liquidity and capital measures your category does not require, including capital with unrealized securities losses included. And treat the regulatory reporting that feeds your category as a control, owned and tested like one. If the bank is planning an acquisition, put the combined firm’s category and timeline in the first board paper on the deal, not the last.
With hindsight
The Board finalized the framework on October 10, 2019. The final rules sorted banks with $100 billion or more in assets into four categories based on asset size, cross-jurisdictional activity, reliance on short-term wholesale funding, nonbank assets and off-balance sheet exposure. For larger firms they set standardized liquidity requirements at the higher end of the proposed range. The Board estimated an aggregate 0.6 percent decrease in required capital and a 2 percent reduction in required liquid assets for banks of $100 billion or more, with no reduction for the highest categories. The final rules also applied liquidity standards to a foreign bank’s U.S. intermediate holding company based on that company’s own risk profile, and took effect 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.
Silicon Valley Bank tested the design. According to the Board’s review of April 28, 2023, its parent crossed $100 billion in average total consolidated assets in June 2021 and became a Category IV firm. At its failure on March 10, 2023, supervisory stress testing, the stress capital buffer, the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio had not yet applied to it because of transition periods. About 94 percent of its total deposits were uninsured at the end of 2022, and its uninsured share was more than double the average for its large bank peers. It lost over $40 billion in deposits on March 9 and expected to lose over $100 billion more the next day. The review estimated that under pre-2019 requirements the firm would have had a shortfall of high quality liquid assets of about 9 percent in December 2022 and about 17 percent in February 2023, and that including unrealized losses on its available-for-sale securities would have cut its reported regulatory capital by $1.9 billion. It said the firm and its supervisors spent considerable effort understanding when rules applied, including transition periods and cliff effects, and that the firm regularly engaged consultants to prepare for the transition. The firm’s first supervisory stress test would have occurred in 2024. When it failed it had 31 open safety-and-soundness supervisory findings, which the review said was about triple the number observed at peer firms. Its fourth finding was that the tailoring approach impeded effective supervision.
The capital piece has since moved. On March 19, 2026, the Board, the FDIC and the OCC proposed requiring Category III and IV banking organizations to recognize most elements of AOCI in regulatory capital, with a five-year transition, and to index certain dollar thresholds for inflation. Comments were due June 18, 2026.
The lines may move next. On October 6, 2026, Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle Bowman said the Board would consider, later in the year, updates to fixed-dollar asset thresholds with a mechanism to update them every five years, and broader updates to the large bank tailoring framework.
What held up was the categorization itself, which remains the structure of large bank regulation. What has not held up is the 2018 judgment on AOCI, which the 2026 proposal would reverse for these firms if it is adopted. The parts this article calls the clock and the measures, averaging lags and the absence of deposit concentration from the indicators, were not the subject of any final rule we found as checked on November 14, 2026.
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