CISA directives, 2015 to 2026: 31 orders, one vendor at a time, three-day clocks
We built a dataset of every public binding operational and emergency directive to see what federal agencies were ordered to do, how fast, and for how long.
What the directives are
A binding operational directive (BOD) is a compulsory direction to federal executive branch departments and agencies for safeguarding federal information and information systems, issued under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 [4]. An emergency directive (ED) rests on section 3553(h) of title 44 of the U.S. Code, which lets the Secretary of Homeland Security order any lawful action on an agency information system, including systems operated by another entity on the agency's behalf, in response to a known or reasonably suspected threat [19]. Both bind federal civilian executive branch agencies and neither applies to national security systems or to certain Defense and Intelligence Community systems [1]. The Department of Homeland Security issued the early BODs; later ones and every emergency directive carry CISA's name [4] [11].
Banks, health systems and state agencies are not bound, but the directives are the federal government's own list of what it considers urgent enough to order. Read across eleven years, they show which threats moved from advice to mandate, and how short the federal clock has become.
Data and method
We built the dataset from CISA's directives page and its full listing [1], the archive of revoked and closed directives [2], CISA's January 8, 2026 press release closing ten emergency directives [3], and the page of each directive, all opened on November 16, 2026. The rules we applied:
- Included: every item CISA labels a BOD or an ED that has its own page. Implementation guidance, supplemental directions and revised "V1" versions count as part of their parent directive [1]. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, which the listing files under binding operational directives [1], is a presidential directive and is left out.
- Issue date: the date given in the directive's own text. Archived pages show a later date at the top (for example January 8, 2026 on the ED 19-01 page, which was issued January 22, 2019 [19]); we did not use that date as the issue date.
- Status: the page's own label ("Revoked", "Closed") and notice. "Listed as current" means the directive appears on the main listing with no such label [1].
- Category: our own grouping from each title and its required actions; CISA does not classify directives this way. "Single-vendor" is our rule: an ED counts when its title names one vendor's product or system, including an open-source project's product (Apache Log4j) and one company's own corporate system (ED 24-02) [27] [30]. A stricter rule, counting only commercial products that agencies run, leaves out those two.
- Shortest deadline: for EDs, the earliest fixed deadline in the directive's required actions, counted in calendar days from the issue date, ignoring time of day; where an ED sets only relative periods, the shortest one. For BODs, the shortest period the directive sets, whether counted from issue or from a trigger such as a scan report, a CISA request or a catalog listing. Actions ordered "immediately" are noted but not counted.
- Time to revocation: issue date to the issue date of the directive that revoked it; time to closure: issue date to January 8, 2026 for the ten EDs closed that day [3].
Counts are by calendar year of issue. The numbers in directive names do not follow the calendar year: ED 21-01 was issued on December 13, 2020 [23] and BOD 22-01 on November 3, 2021 [13]. For several numbers in each series there is no public page found as of 16 November 2026: BOD 19-01, BOD 26-01, BOD 26-03, ED 20-01, ED 22-01, ED 25-01 and ED 26-02 [1] [2]. The dataset counts only directives with a public page, so the totals describe the public record [1] [2].
Every directive, as checked on 16 November 2026
| Directive | Title | Issued | Category (Moraph) | Status | Shortest deadline (days from issue) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BOD 15-01 [4] | Critical Vulnerability Mitigation Requirement for Federal Civilian Executive Branch Departments and Agencies’ Internet-Accessible Systems [4] | May 21, 2015 [4] | Vulnerability remediation [4] | Revoked; superseded by BOD 19-02 [4] [11] | 30 days to mitigate critical vulnerabilities from the weekly scan report [4] |
| BOD 16-01 [5] | Securing High Value Assets [5] | June 9, 2016 [5] | High value assets [5] | Revoked; superseded by BOD 18-02 [5] [10] | 7 days to name a point of contact [5] |
| BOD 16-02 [6] | Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices [6] | September 27, 2016 [6] | Network device hardening [6] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [6] | 45 days to complete the listed actions [6] |
| BOD 16-03 [7] | 2016 Agency Cybersecurity Reporting Requirements [7] | October 17, 2016 [7] | Reporting [7] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [7] | Metrics due November 10, 2016 (24 days) [7] |
| BOD 17-01 [8] | Removal of Kaspersky-branded Products [8] | September 13, 2017 [8] | Product removal (one vendor) [8] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [8] | 30 calendar days to identify the products [8] |
| BOD 18-01 [9] | Enhance Email and Web Security [9] | October 16, 2017 [9] | Configuration [9] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [9] | 15 days after CISA sets up its reporting location, to add it to DMARC reports; 30 calendar days for a plan of action [9] |
| BOD 18-02 [10] | Securing High Value Assets [10] | May 7, 2018 [10] | High value assets [10] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [10] | 7 days to submit contact information [10] |
| BOD 19-02 [11] | Vulnerability Remediation Requirements for Internet-Accessible Systems [11] | April 29, 2019 [11] | Vulnerability remediation [11] | Revoked June 10, 2026; superseded by BOD 26-04 [11] [18] | 15 calendar days for critical vulnerabilities [11] |
| BOD 20-01 [12] | Develop and Publish a Vulnerability Disclosure Policy [12] | September 2, 2020 [12] | Disclosure policy [12] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [12] | 30 calendar days to update contact details [12] |
| BOD 22-01 [13] | Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities [13] | November 3, 2021 [13] | Vulnerability remediation [13] | Revoked June 10, 2026; superseded by BOD 26-04 [13] [18] | Two weeks to remediate newer catalog entries (default) [13] |
| BOD 23-01 [14] | Improving Asset Visibility and Vulnerability Detection on Federal Networks [14] | October 3, 2022 [14] | Asset visibility [14] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [14] | 72 hours to start on-demand discovery after a CISA request [14] |
| BOD 23-02 [15] | Mitigating the Risk from Internet-Exposed Management Interfaces [15] | June 13, 2023 [15] | Configuration [15] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [15] | 14 days after notice or discovery of an exposed interface [15] |
| BOD 25-01 [16] | Implementing Secure Practices for Cloud Services [16] | December 17, 2024 [16] | Configuration (cloud) [16] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [16] | Tenant inventory by February 21, 2025 (66 days) [16] |
| BOD 26-02 [17] | Mitigating Risk From End-of-Support Edge Devices [17] | February 5, 2026 [17] | Asset lifecycle (edge devices) [17] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [17] | Update supported devices immediately; inventory within 3 months [17] |
| BOD 26-04 [18] | Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk [18] | June 10, 2026 [18] | Vulnerability remediation [18] | Listed as current; no revocation notice [18] | 3 days for the highest-risk cases in its timeline table [18] |
| ED 19-01 [19] | Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering [19] | January 22, 2019 [19] | Infrastructure tampering (no single vendor) [19] | Closed January 8, 2026 [19] [3] | 10 business days [19] |
| ED 20-02 [20] | Mitigate Windows Vulnerabilities from January 2020 Patch Tuesday [20] | January 14, 2020 [20] | Single-vendor product emergency (Microsoft) [20] | Closed January 8, 2026; actions moved to BOD 22-01 [20] [3] | Status report by January 17, 2020 (3 days) [20] |
| ED 20-03 [21] | Mitigate Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability from July 2020 Patch Tuesday [21] | July 16, 2020 [21] | Single-vendor product emergency (Microsoft) [21] | Closed January 8, 2026; actions moved to BOD 22-01 [21] [3] | Update or workaround by July 17, 2020 (1 day) [21] |
| ED 20-04 [22] | Mitigate Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability from August 2020 Patch Tuesday [22] | September 18, 2020 [22] | Single-vendor product emergency (Microsoft) [22] | Closed January 8, 2026; actions moved to BOD 22-01 [22] [3] | Update domain controllers by September 21, 2020 (3 days) [22] |
| ED 21-01 [23] | Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise [23] | December 13, 2020 [23] | Single-vendor compromise response (SolarWinds) [23] | Closed January 8, 2026 [23] [3] | Disconnect immediately; report by December 14, 2020 (1 day) [23] |
| ED 21-02 [24] | Mitigate Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Product Vulnerabilities [24] | March 3, 2021 [24] | Single-vendor product emergency (Microsoft) [24] | Closed January 8, 2026; actions moved to BOD 22-01 [24] [3] | Report by March 5, 2021 (2 days) [24] |
| ED 21-03 [25] | Mitigate Pulse Connect Secure Product Vulnerabilities [25] | April 20, 2021 [25] | Single-vendor product emergency (Pulse Connect Secure) [25] | Closed January 8, 2026; actions moved to BOD 22-01 [25] [3] | Run the integrity tool by April 23, 2021 (3 days) [25] |
| ED 21-04 [26] | Mitigate Windows Print Spooler Service Vulnerability [26] | July 13, 2021 [26] | Single-vendor product emergency (Microsoft) [26] | Closed January 8, 2026; actions moved to BOD 22-01 [26] [3] | Disable the service on domain controllers by July 14, 2021 (1 day) [26] |
| ED 22-02 [27] | Mitigate Apache Log4j Vulnerability [27] | December 17, 2021 [27] | Single-product emergency (Apache Log4j, open source) [27] | Closed; actions moved to BOD 22-01 (closure date not stated) [27] | Find and patch or mitigate by December 23, 2021 (6 days) [27] |
| ED 22-03 [28] | Mitigate VMware Vulnerabilities [28] | May 18, 2022 [28] | Single-vendor product emergency (VMware) [28] | Closed January 8, 2026; actions moved to BOD 22-01 [28] [3] | Enumerate instances by May 23, 2022 (5 days) [28] |
| ED 24-01 [29] | Mitigate Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure Vulnerabilities [29] | January 19, 2024 [29] | Single-vendor product emergency (Ivanti) [29] | Listed as current; not marked closed [29] | Apply mitigation by January 22, 2024 (3 days) [29] |
| ED 24-02 [30] | Mitigating the Significant Risk from Nation-State Compromise of Microsoft Corporate Email System [30] | April 2, 2024 [30] | Single-vendor compromise response (Microsoft) [30] | Closed January 8, 2026 [30] [3] | Status report by April 8, 2024 (6 days) [30] |
| ED 25-02 [31] | Mitigate Microsoft Exchange Vulnerability [31] | August 7, 2025 [31] | Single-vendor product emergency (Microsoft) [31] | Listed as current; not marked closed [31] | Assess and update by August 11, 2025 (4 days) [31] |
| ED 25-03 [32] | Identify and Mitigate Potential Compromise of Cisco Devices [32] | September 25, 2025 [32] | Single-vendor product emergency (Cisco) [32] | Listed as current; required actions replaced by V1 of April 23, 2026 [32] | Core dumps and updates by September 26, 2025 (1 day) [32] |
| ED 26-01 [33] | Mitigate Vulnerabilities in F5 Devices [33] | October 15, 2025 [33] | Single-vendor product emergency (F5) [33] | Listed as current; not marked closed [33] | Inventory immediately; update by October 22, 2025 (7 days) [33] |
| ED 26-03 [34] | Mitigate Vulnerabilities in Cisco SD-WAN Systems [34] | February 25, 2026 [34] | Single-vendor product emergency (Cisco) [34] | Listed as current; required actions replaced by V1 of March 11, 2026 [34] | Inventory and log collection by February 26, 2026 (1 day) [34] |
Volume: fewer than three a year, with a peak in 2020 and 2021
From May 2015 to November 16, 2026 the public record holds 15 binding operational directives and 16 emergency directives [1] [2].
| Year | BODs | EDs | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 1 [4] | 0 [1] | 1 [1] [2] |
| 2016 | 3 [5] [6] [7] | 0 [1] | 3 [1] [2] |
| 2017 | 2 [8] [9] | 0 [1] | 2 [1] [2] |
| 2018 | 1 [10] | 0 [1] | 1 [1] [2] |
| 2019 | 1 [11] | 1 [19] | 2 [1] [2] |
| 2020 | 1 [12] | 4 [20] [21] [22] [23] | 5 [1] [2] |
| 2021 | 1 [13] | 4 [24] [25] [26] [27] | 5 [1] [2] |
| 2022 | 1 [14] | 1 [28] | 2 [1] [2] |
| 2023 | 1 [15] | 0 [1] | 1 [1] [2] |
| 2024 | 1 [16] | 2 [29] [30] | 3 [1] [2] |
| 2025 | 0 [1] | 3 [31] [32] [33] | 3 [1] [2] |
| 2026 (to November 16) | 2 [17] [18] | 1 [34] | 3 [1] [2] |
The pace is uneven rather than rising. The years 2020 and 2021 produced ten directives between them, eight of them emergency directives [1] [2]. No emergency directive was issued in 2023, and from 2024 to November 2026 CISA issued six emergency directives and three binding ones [1]. Over the whole period that is an average of fewer than three directives a year [1] [2].
Moraph's view
Moraph's view: a directive is an expensive instrument. Each one consumes agency staff time and CISA's own follow-up capacity, which is the likeliest reason volume stays low. The 2020 to 2021 peak tracks a run of widely exploited flaws and the SolarWinds compromise; the count says more about how many crises CISA judged to need a federal order than about how much risk there was.
Emergency directives: one vendor at a time
The single-vendor count is our classification, not CISA's, under the rule in Data and method. On that rule, 15 of the 16 emergency directives name one vendor's product or system in their title; the only exception is ED 19-01 on DNS infrastructure tampering [19]. Taken across all 31 directives, those 15 make up 48% [1] [2]. On the stricter rule, which leaves out the open-source Log4j library and the 2024 directive on Microsoft's own corporate email, the count is 13 of 16, or 81% [27] [30].
Microsoft products or systems are the subject of seven emergency directives, from the January 2020 Windows flaws to the August 2025 Exchange hybrid directive [20] [21] [22] [24] [26] [30] [31]. The other recent subject is network edge equipment: remote access gateways (ED 21-03, ED 24-01), Cisco firewalls running ASA or Firepower software (ED 25-03), F5 BIG-IP devices (ED 26-01) and Cisco SD-WAN systems (ED 26-03) [25] [29] [32] [33] [34]. Four of the six emergency directives issued since January 2024 concern edge devices, and the other two concern Microsoft [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34].
The binding directives have followed the same target. BOD 23-02 ordered internet-exposed management interfaces off the internet or behind separate access control [15], and BOD 26-02 requires agencies to decommission end-of-support edge devices on its list within 12 months and all such devices within 18 months [17]. Only one BOD names a vendor: BOD 17-01, which ordered the removal of Kaspersky-branded products [8].
Deadlines: days for emergencies, weeks for standing rules
Across the 15 emergency directives with a fixed first deadline, the median time from issue to that deadline is 3 days, and five gave agencies 1 day: ED 20-03, ED 21-01, ED 21-04, ED 25-03 and ED 26-03 [21] [23] [26] [32] [34]. ED 19-01, the longest, allowed 10 business days [19]. Several also set a standing clock for the vendor's future fixes: apply updates within 48 hours of release for Pulse Connect Secure, Ivanti and Cisco devices [25] [29] [32], and within one week for F5 [33].
Binding directives move more slowly but the remediation clock has shortened at each revision. BOD 15-01 gave 30 days to mitigate critical findings from CISA's weekly scans [4]; BOD 19-02 cut that to 15 calendar days for critical and 30 for high vulnerabilities [11]; BOD 22-01 set two weeks by default for newer known exploited vulnerabilities [13]; and BOD 26-04 sets 3 days, the shortest window in its timeline table, for five of the 16 combinations of public exposure, KEV listing, automatable exploitation and technical impact, including the highest-risk one [18]. Our companion trend report on the KEV catalog measures how often the catalog has applied that window since June 10, 2026.
Moraph's view
Moraph's view: the emergency directives were a preview of the standing rule. For six years CISA ordered fixes in one to three days, one product at a time; BOD 26-04 makes three days the default for the most dangerous cases without waiting for an emergency. The cost of that shift falls on asset inventory: an agency cannot meet a clock keyed to "publicly exposed" without knowing which assets are exposed.
How directives end
Four binding directives have been revoked, each by a newer directive on the same subject on the day it was issued: BOD 15-01 by BOD 19-02 after 1,439 days, BOD 16-01 by BOD 18-02 after 697 days, and BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01 by BOD 26-04 after 2,599 and 1,680 days [10] [11] [13] [18]. The average time from issue to revocation is 1,604 days, about 4.4 years [4] [5] [11] [13]. Eleven BODs remain listed as current, including BOD 16-02 and BOD 16-03 from 2016, the second of which sets requirements for fiscal year 2016 reports [6] [7].
Emergency directives are closed rather than revoked. On January 8, 2026 CISA closed ten of them, issued between 2019 and 2024; seven tied to specific vulnerabilities were retired because those flaws are in the KEV catalog, and for ED 19-01, ED 21-01 and ED 24-02 CISA found their objectives met or the requirements obsolete [3]. Those ten had been open for an average of 1,763 days, from 646 days for ED 24-02 to 2,543 days for ED 19-01 [3]. ED 22-02 on Log4j was closed earlier with its actions moved to BOD 22-01; its archived page is dated April 8, 2022 but does not say that is the closure date [27]. Five emergency directives remain listed as current, the oldest being ED 24-01 of January 19, 2024 [29] [1].
Moraph's view
Moraph's view: an emergency directive is meant to be short, but in practice it lasts years, because closing one needs a standing rule to carry its remaining duties. Until 2026 that rule was BOD 22-01; with BOD 22-01 itself revoked, the duties it absorbed now presumably sit under BOD 26-04. Expect future closures to cite BOD 26-04 in the same way, and expect old binding directives to stay on the books until a replacement on the same subject arrives.
What to watch
BOD 26-04's Phase III, remediation to the new timelines, is due within 180 days of its June 10, 2026 issue [18], which falls on December 7, 2026. CISA must reassess those timelines once per fiscal year and consider whether technological or adversarial advances warrant further reductions [18]. BOD 26-02's 12-month and 18-month decommissioning deadlines run from its February 5, 2026 issue [17].
Moraph's view
Moraph's view: on the record so far, the next emergency directive is more likely to concern a single vendor's edge device or Microsoft product than anything else.
What this means for you
- Federal agency CIOs and CISOs: Plan for BOD 26-04's Phase III remediation timelines, due within 180 days of June 10, 2026, and for BOD 26-02's 12-month and 18-month edge device decommissioning deadlines [18] [17]. Both depend on an inventory that marks which assets are publicly exposed and which edge devices are end of support.
- Contractors and cloud providers running agency systems: Emergency directives reach systems operated by another entity on an agency's behalf [19], and BOD 26-04 requires agencies to review contracts for the changes needed to comply [18]. Expect agencies to pass one-to-three-day obligations on through their contracts.
- Banks, health systems and state agencies: The directives do not bind you [1], but an emergency directive on a product you run is a strong signal of active exploitation. Track new directives as they are issued and rehearse the actions recent ones required: inventory within a day, collection of logs or core dumps, and patching within 48 hours of a vendor release [29] [32] [34].
- Network and infrastructure teams: Most recent emergency directives concern remote access gateways, firewalls, F5 BIG-IP devices and SD-WAN systems [29] [32] [33] [34]. Keep management interfaces off the internet, as BOD 23-02 requires of agencies [15], and keep a replacement plan for edge devices near end of support.
Moraph predictions
Every prediction is Moraph's view, not a fact. Each has a date, a confidence level (70% means we expect to be wrong about three times in ten) and a test anyone can apply. We score them on this page when the date comes and never remove one. How we make and score predictions.
P1 By Confidence 80% Open
CISA issues at least one new emergency directive with an issue date in calendar year 2027.
How we will check: On cisa.gov/news-events/directives, list emergency directives (not supplemental directions or revised versions) whose own page gives an issue date between 2027-01-01 and 2027-12-31. Right if there is at least one.
Basis: CISA issued at least one emergency directive in seven of the eight calendar years from 2019 to 2026, with none in 2023 [1] [2].
P2 By Confidence 70% Open
The first new emergency directive CISA issues after November 16, 2026 names one vendor's product or system in its title, and is issued by December 31, 2027.
How we will check: Find the earliest emergency directive with an issue date after 2026-11-16 on CISA's directives pages. Right if it is issued by 2027-12-31 and its title names one vendor's product or system (an open-source project's product, or one company's own system, counts, as in this piece's method); wrong if none is issued by then or the title names no single vendor.
Basis: On our classification, 15 of the 16 public emergency directives name one vendor's product or system (13 of 16 on the stricter rule), and every one since 2020 does on the first rule [1] [2].
P3 By Confidence 65% Open
CISA marks at least one of the five emergency directives listed as current on November 16, 2026 (ED 24-01, ED 25-02, ED 25-03, ED 26-01, ED 26-03) as closed by December 31, 2027.
How we will check: On January 1, 2028, open the pages of the five directives and CISA's directives archive. Right if at least one is labelled Closed (or otherwise ended) with a closure on or before 2027-12-31.
Basis: CISA closed ten emergency directives at once on January 8, 2026 after a review of all active directives [3]; ED 24-01 has been open since January 19, 2024 [29].
P4 By Confidence 60% Open
CISA issues at least one new binding operational directive with an issue date in calendar year 2027.
How we will check: On cisa.gov/news-events/directives, list binding operational directives (not implementation guidance) whose own page gives an issue date between 2027-01-01 and 2027-12-31. Right if there is at least one.
Basis: At least one binding directive was issued in every calendar year from 2015 to 2024, none in 2025 and two in 2026 to November 16 [1] [2].
Facts on this page link to their sources. Text marked "Moraph's view", and every prediction, is our own analysis, not a fact or advice. Methodology.
Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the piece where needed.