CJIS Security Policy and public safety data: outlook to 2027

The FBI's modernized CJIS Security Policy makes MFA, patch windows and scanning sanctionable now, and its other new controls after September 30, 2027, for agencies and the vendors that host their data.

Two policy versions and one sanction date

Every state and local agency that touches FBI criminal justice information (CJI), and every vendor that hosts or supports its systems, works to the FBI's CJIS Security Policy. The policy applies to all entities with access to CJI or that operate systems used to process, store or transmit it, and it is a floor: agencies may adopt stricter rules but never weaker ones [1]. Version 6.0, dated December 27, 2024, is recorded in the policy's change log as the completion of its modernization, and version 6.1, dated June 25, 2026, incorporates the changes approved during calendar year 2025; both were approved by the Advisory Policy Board (APB) and the Compact Council [1]. An archived copy of the FBI's resource center, captured on November 5, 2026, still offers version 6.1 as the current download [3]. This outlook reads what the two versions ask of agencies and vendors, and when auditors can sanction it, as checked on November 16, 2026.

Why the policy was rewritten

GAO reported in May 2020 that the security requirements four federal agencies (CMS, the FBI, the IRS and SSA) set for states conflicted with each other, with conflicting parameters in 49 to 79 percent of their requirements, and it told the FBI to revise its policy with input from states and other agencies and to align it with NIST guidance [11]. GAO now lists both of its priority recommendations to the FBI as closed and implemented, noting an updated policy in September 2023 that better aligned with NIST SP 800-53 [11]. Texas, describing version 6.1 to its agencies, calls it a significant modernization aligned with NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 [8]. The practical result is a control catalog in NIST's format: families such as IA (identification and authentication), AU (audit and accountability) and PS (personnel security), each control carrying a priority marking [1].

When auditors can sanction which controls

Section 1.4 of the policy sets the enforcement rule. Starting October 1, 2024, the sanctionable requirements are those that existed before modernization (version 5.9) plus modernized requirements marked Priority 1; all Priority 2, 3 and 4 modernized requirements sit in a “zero-cycle” that began October 1, 2024 and ends September 30, 2027 [1]. Modernized requirements marked Existing, which carry over version 5.9 rules, stay in the sanctionable set whatever their priority [1]; Texas, for example, told its agencies that three “-1” controls marked Existing and Priority 2 are sanctionable now [10]. The same words appear in version 6.0, so the date did not move with the 2026 update [2]. California's Department of Justice explained the term to its agencies: a zero-cycle is one audit cycle of “review and educate but not sanction,” one cycle being three years because state CJIS Systems Agencies (CSAs) audit on a triennial cycle, so an entity audited in fiscal year 2025 would not be sanctioned on Priority 2 to 4 controls until its fiscal year 2028 audit [7].

By our count, the List of Priorities in version 6.1 has 182 rows: 22 marked Priority 1, 108 Priority 2, 40 Priority 3 and 12 Priority 4, with an asterisk on 57 rows to show a control that already existed in version 5.9 [1]. Version 6.0's list had 184 rows, two more of them at Priority 4 [2].

States set their own pace inside that window. The Texas Department of Public Safety says all Texas CJIS audits through March 31, 2027 are conducted against version 5.9.5, and that version 6.1 is not yet used for audits, so agencies should start gap assessments [8]; its news page describes 6.1 as incorporating the 2025 corrections and additions approved by the APB and asks agencies to begin those assessments immediately [9]. A Texas listserv bulletin on version 6.0 local agency roles told agencies that three “-1 Policy and Procedures” controls (audit and accountability, incident response and media protection) are sanctionable now, while the remaining “-1” controls are not sanctionable until October 1, 2027 [10].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the binding date for most agencies is the first audit they face after September 30, 2027, not the date itself. Because CSAs audit on a three-year cycle, some local agencies will not meet a sanctionable finding on a new Priority 2 control until 2028 or later, while others audited in late 2027 will meet it at once. Agencies and vendors that read the zero-cycle as a grace period for the whole catalog are misreading it: Priority 1 controls and everything carried over from version 5.9, including Priority 2 controls marked Existing such as weekly audit record review, have been sanctionable since October 1, 2024.

Multi-factor authentication

Under IA-2, multi-factor authentication is required for access to privileged accounts, enhancement (1), and to non-privileged accounts, enhancement (2); both are marked Priority 1, so under section 1.4 they have been sanctionable since October 1, 2024 [1]. Version 6.0 carried the same Priority 1 marking [2]. IA-5 sets the assurance requirements at Authenticator Assurance Level 2 (AAL2), where multi-factor authentication is required, at least one authenticator must be replay resistant; enhancement (1), also Priority 1, says a memorized secret, if chosen, must be at least 8 characters [1]. The policy's glossary still defines assurance levels by NIST SP 800-63-3 [1], while NIST's fourth revision is now final (see our identity and authentication outlook).

Encryption and where CJI may live

SC-13 requires CJI in transit outside a physically secure location to be protected by FIPS 140-3 certified modules or FIPS 197 (AES) with a symmetric key of at least 256 bits, and says FIPS 140-2 certificates will not be acceptable after September 21, 2026 [1]. SC-28 sets the same 256-bit floor for CJI at rest outside physically secure locations [1]. NIST's own transition page says FIPS 140-2 validations move to the historical list on September 21, 2026 [12]. The same section of SC-28 limits storage of CJI, encrypted or not, to cloud environments inside the physical boundaries of APB-member countries and under the legal authority of an APB-member agency, and bars cloud providers from using metadata derived from unencrypted CJI for advertising or other commercial purposes [1]. Our CJIS and IRS Publication 1075 comparison notes the key-length change from version 6.0 [2].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the FIPS 140-2 cutoff has already passed, so every VPN, disk encryption product and cloud key service that protects CJI outside a physically secure location now needs a FIPS 140-3 certificate, or must be a later version of an approved module that is under current FIPS 140-3 review, which SC-13 allows in the interim. Vendors that sell to many agencies at once should expect this to be the first question in renewals during 2027, because it is a yes-or-no check an auditor can make from a certificate number.

Logging, scanning and patching

AU-6 requires agencies to review and analyze system audit records weekly for inappropriate or unusual activity, and AU-11 requires audit records to be kept for at least one year or until no longer needed; both are marked Existing, so they are already in the sanctionable set even though AU-6 is Priority 2 and AU-11 Priority 4 [1]. RA-5, marked Priority 1, requires vulnerability scanning at least monthly and remediation within 15 days for critical, 30 for high, 60 for medium and 90 for low findings; SI-2, marked Existing and Priority 1, applies the same day counts to installing security-relevant updates after their release [1]. Version 6.0 already carried the RA-5 day counts at Priority 1 [2].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the monthly scan and the 15-day critical window are the controls most likely to separate prepared agencies from the rest, because they need tooling and evidence every month rather than a written policy. Small agencies that rely on a county or city IT shop, or on a vendor-hosted records system, depend on someone else's patch calendar to pass them.

Personnel screening and incident reporting

PS-3, marked Existing and Priority 2, requires state-of-residency and national fingerprint-based record checks before access, denial of access where a felony conviction exists (subject to a review in extenuating circumstances), and a list of personnel authorized unescorted access to unencrypted CJI; it recommends rescreening under the same authority [1]. IR-6, marked Priority 2, requires personnel to report suspected incidents to the agency's incident response capability immediately and no later than one hour after discovery, and incident information to go to the CSO, the State Identification Bureau Chief or Interface Agency Official, and the FBI CJIS ISO [1].

What vendors are audited on, and how often

SA-9 requires agencies to audit all external service providers with access to the information system at least triennially, and to have authority for unannounced inspections of their facilities; one CSA may audit a contractor facility on behalf of another and share the results [1]. The sample CJIS User Agreement in the policy says each CSA, Interface Agency or State Identification Bureau audits the agencies that reach CJIS Division systems through it every three years, and is itself audited by the CJIS Division every three years [1]. Private contractors work under the CJIS Security Addendum in the policy's Appendix H [1]. At agency level, Texas told its agencies that the single Local Agency Security Officer role has been replaced by eighteen formal designations of personnel with security responsibilities, set out in the “-1” controls of each family [10].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: a cloud or software vendor serving agencies in several states faces several CSAs auditing to their own schedules and, through March 2027 in at least one large state, to an older policy version. The vendor's practical target is the strictest reading across its customers, which in 2027 means version 6.1 with Priority 2 controls treated as live.

How the policy changes

Changes reach the policy through the CJIS Advisory Process: regional working groups that typically meet twice a year, ad hoc subcommittees including the Security and Access Subcommittee, which recommends the security policy, and the APB, which has 35 representatives and makes recommendations to the FBI Director [4]. The APB was scheduled to meet in New Orleans on June 3 and 4, 2026 [6] and is scheduled to meet in Oklahoma City on December 9 and 10, 2026 [5]. Version 6.1's summary of changes lists three APB topics from spring 2025 and administrative changes approved by the Security and Access Subcommittee on November 14, 2025 [1].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the two versions so far have come about eighteen months apart, with 6.1 gathering one calendar year of approved changes. We expect a further version during 2027 that gathers the 2026 decisions, and we do not expect the APB to move the September 30, 2027 date: it has survived one full revision, and at least one large state has already planned its audits around it.

What to watch in 2027

  • March 31, 2027: the end of Texas audits against version 5.9.5 [8].
  • September 30, 2027: the end of the zero-cycle for Priority 2 to 4 controls [1], and October 1, 2027 for the remaining “-1” controls in Texas [10].
  • Any policy version after 6.1 on the FBI resource center [3], and Federal Register notices for the 2027 APB meetings [5].
  • Vendor evidence of FIPS 140-3 certificates now that FIPS 140-2 validations are historical [1] [12].

Data and method

We read the FBI's version 6.1 and 6.0 policy PDFs downloaded from le.fbi.gov on November 16, 2026; the resource center and advisory process pages refuse automated access, so we cite Internet Archive copies of the exact official URLs, captured on November 5, 2026 and July 13, 2026 [3] [4]. The row counts are ours: we counted the priority markings at the end of each row of each version's List of Priorities, treating an asterisk as a control carried over from version 5.9, as the list's own note says [1] [2]. Control requirements are paraphrased from the named control; whether a given Priority 2 change, such as the 256-bit key minimum, is audited before September 30, 2027 is for each CSA to say, and we do not state it [1]. State practice is shown for Texas and California only, from their own pages [7] [8]. Statuses are as checked on November 16, 2026.

What this means for you

  • State CJIS Systems Agencies: Publish which policy version each audit after September 30, 2027 will use, and whether Priority 2 findings will be sanctioned at the first audit after that date, as Texas has done for 2027 [8] [10]; the policy leaves the zero-cycle end date fixed [1].
  • Local police, sheriffs, courts and other agencies: Check Priority 1 controls first, since they are sanctionable now: MFA on every account, monthly scans and the 15/30/60/90-day remediation windows [1]; keep up controls marked Existing, such as weekly audit record review, which are sanctionable now whatever their priority [1]; then build evidence for new Priority 2 controls, such as the “-1” policy and procedures controls in most families [1] [10], before the next audit after September 30, 2027.
  • Cloud, software and managed service vendors: Hold FIPS 140-3 certificate numbers for every module that protects CJI outside a physically secure location [1] [12], keep CJI storage inside APB-member countries [1], and expect at least triennial audits by each customer agency or a CSA acting for it [1].
  • Agencies sharing data with other federal programs: Map CJIS controls against IRS, CMS and SSA requirements once, since GAO found high rates of conflicting parameters across the four agencies' rules [11]; our comparison table with IRS Publication 1075 is a starting point.

Moraph predictions

Every prediction is Moraph's view, not a fact. Each has a date, a confidence level (70% means we expect to be wrong about three times in ten) and a test anyone can apply. We score them on this page when the date comes and never remove one. How we make and score predictions.

  1. P1 By Confidence 70% Open

    The FBI publishes a CJIS Security Policy version numbered higher than 6.1 and dated in 2027.

    How we will check: The FBI CJIS Security Policy Resource Center (or an archived copy of it) offers a policy document numbered above 6.1 whose cover date falls between January 1 and December 31, 2027.

    Basis: Version 6.0 is dated December 27, 2024 and version 6.1, dated June 25, 2026, incorporated the calendar year 2025 changes approved by the APB [1]; APB meetings were noticed for June 2026 and December 2026 [6] [5].

  2. P2 By Confidence 75% Open

    The CJIS Security Policy version current on October 1, 2027 still states that the zero-cycle for Priority 2, 3 and 4 requirements ends September 30, 2027.

    How we will check: Section 1.4 of the version offered on the FBI resource center on October 1, 2027 gives September 30, 2027 as the end of the zero-cycle (not a later date, and without a new deferral).

    Basis: The date is identical in versions 6.0 and 6.1 [2] [1], and Texas has told its agencies that most “-1” controls become sanctionable on October 1, 2027 [10].

  3. P3 By Confidence 75% Open

    The Texas Department of Public Safety states that its CJIS audits are conducted against version 6.1 or a later version of the CJIS Security Policy.

    How we will check: The Texas DPS CJIS documents page, or another Texas DPS CJIS page, names version 6.1 or later as the version audits are conducted against.

    Basis: Texas DPS says audits through March 31, 2027 are conducted against version 5.9.5 and that agencies should prepare for future audit cycles under 6.1 [8].

  4. P4 By Confidence 85% Open

    No CJIS Security Policy version published on or before December 31, 2027 accepts FIPS 140-2 certificates again or lowers the 256-bit minimum symmetric key for CJI in transit.

    How we will check: Every policy version dated on or before December 31, 2027 keeps SC-13's 256-bit minimum and its statement that FIPS 140-2 certificates are not acceptable after September 21, 2026.

    Basis: Version 6.1 raised the in-transit key minimum from the 128 bits of version 6.0 and states the FIPS 140-2 cutoff [1] [2], and NIST moves FIPS 140-2 validations to its historical list on the same date [12].

Facts on this page link to their sources. Text marked "Moraph's view", and every prediction, is our own analysis, not a fact or advice. Methodology.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the piece where needed.

  • CJIS Security Policy
  • FBI CJIS Division
  • Advisory Policy Board
  • multi-factor authentication
  • FIPS 140-3
  • audit logging
  • personnel screening
  • state CJIS Systems Agencies
  • cloud vendors