The CFPB’s 2015 cramming cases charged carriers as payment processors; the orders made them prove consent
On May 12, 2015, the CFPB and FCC announced settlements with Sprint and Verizon over third-party charges on phone bills. The CFPB charged the carriers as payment processors, and the orders made consent records, complaint tracking and refunds the biller’s job.
Looking Back revisits past weeks one at a time, up to the most recent, and asks what it meant for the banks, health systems and public agencies we serve. The series was written in 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, and each article says which week it looks back on.
Two-minute summaryThe dek and the first sentence of each section, quoted from the article
On May 12, 2015, the CFPB and FCC announced settlements with Sprint and Verizon over third-party charges on phone bills. The CFPB charged the carriers as payment processors, and the orders made consent records, complaint tracking and refunds the biller’s job.
- The week The Bureau’s release described the business.
- The role: a carrier as a processor of others’ payments In our reading, the Bureau framed the carrier as the party that held the customer relationship and moved the money.
- The consent: what had to happen before a charge reached a bill In our reading, the Bureau treated a default setting as a decision the carrier made.
- The signals: complaints and red flags The FCC documents gave examples.
- The remedy: refunds, credits, reports and training The orders set a refund rule for disputes.
- How the theory reaches different organizations Banks and credit unions that let third parties originate charges or debits to member accounts hold the account and move the money.
- Objections, and where the argument stops That is correct.
- With hindsight The court orders followed in June 2015.
The week
On May 12, 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau announced that it had filed proposed orders in federal courts against Sprint and Verizon. [1] It said the orders, if approved, would provide $120 million in redress to wireless customers. [1] It said those customers had been illegally billed hundreds of millions of dollars in unauthorized third-party charges. [1] Those were the Bureau’s allegations. [1]
The Bureau’s release described the business. It said consumers use mobile phones to buy digital products such as apps, games, books, movies and music, and the purchases appear on phone bills. [1] It said wireless carriers collect and process payments for these purchases and control the networks connecting merchants and customers. [1] It said that from about 2004 through 2013, nearly all carriers’ third-party billing involved premium text messages. [1]
The release set out the Bureau’s theory. It said the Bureau charges Sprint and Verizon, “as payment processors for third parties,” with violating the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition on unfair practices. [1] It listed four practices it alleged: allowing third parties to charge consumers illegally, billing consumers automatically without consent, ignoring complaints, and disregarding red flags about vendors. [1] It said the carriers took a 30 to 40 percent cut of the gross revenue from these charges. [1]
The procedural posture differed by carrier. The Bureau had filed suit against Sprint in the Southern District of New York in December 2014, and filed a proposed consent order on May 12. [1] Against Verizon, it filed a complaint and a proposed consent order the same day in the District of New Jersey. [1] Under the proposed orders, Verizon would pay $70 million and Sprint $50 million in consumer refunds, overseen by the Bureau. [1] The companies would also pay $38 million in federal and state fines. [1]
The Federal Communications Commission acted the same day. Its Enforcement Bureau adopted and released orders approving consent decrees with Sprint and with Verizon on May 12, 2015. [3] [4] The FCC’s release said Verizon would pay $90 million and Sprint $68 million to settle its investigations. [2] It said the settlements were negotiated in coordination with the Bureau and the attorneys general of all 50 states and the District of Columbia. [2]
The FCC’s documents described the money. Sprint’s $68 million included $50 million for consumer redress, $12 million to the participating states and $6 million in fines to the U.S. Treasury. [3] Verizon’s $90 million included a minimum of $70 million for redress, $16 million for the states and $4 million as a fine. [2] The FCC said its cases with others had brought $353 million against the four largest wireless carriers, with $267.5 million to be returned to customers. [2]
The FCC’s legal basis was different from the Bureau’s. Its orders said the Commission has held that placing unauthorized charges on telephone bills is an “unjust and unreasonable” practice under Section 201(b) of the Communications Act. [3] [4] The FCC’s release said that since January 2014 it had taken 19 enforcement actions totaling $391 million for cramming. [2] It listed AT&T Mobility in October 2014 and T-Mobile USA in December 2014. [2]
The FCC decrees also recorded the carriers’ own positions. Sprint acknowledged, solely for purposes of its decree, that some third-party merchants had circumvented its procedural requirements in certain cases. [3] It contended that it refunded charges to consumers who identified charges they believed were unauthorized. [3] Verizon’s decree said it did not constitute an admission, finding of law or fact. [4]
The week therefore produced two sets of settlements built on two statutes. In our reading, the FCC treated the carriers as carriers, while the Bureau charged them as processors of payments for others. [1] [3]
The 2015 cramming settlements are easy to file under telecom enforcement. The charges were for ringtones and horoscope texts, and the FCC enforced the Communications Act. [3] [4] The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s part of the case is the one with lessons for banks, card issuers, fintechs and anyone else who bills on behalf of others. It charged the carriers “as payment processors for third parties.” [1]
That theory turns a phone bill into a payment channel. The Bureau said carriers collect and process payments for digital purchases and control the networks connecting merchants and customers. [1] It said Sprint and Verizon outsourced payment processing for these purchases to vendors but failed to monitor them properly. [1] Those were allegations. [1] Verizon’s court order was entered without adjudication of any issue of fact or law. [5]
Our argument is that the orders defined what a biller for others must be able to show. In our reading, they required evidence of each customer’s consent, a working signal from complaints, and a refund path that defaults to the customer. Those duties apply to any organization whose statement carries a charge it did not originate.
We take the settlements in four parts:
- The role: why the Bureau treated a carrier as a payment processor.
- The consent: what the orders required before a third party’s charge reached a bill.
- The signals: how complaints and vendor red flags were meant to work.
- The remedy: refunds, credits, reports and training, and who carried them.
The parts do not overlap. The first is legal status, the second the front door of the transaction, the third the monitoring loop and the fourth the clean-up. After them we look at how the theory reaches different organizations, take the objections, and end with checks.
The role: a carrier as a processor of others’ payments
The Bureau’s description
The Bureau’s release described carriers as collecting and processing payments for purchases that appear on phone bills. [1] It said the carriers outsourced processing for digital purchases to vendors, and that the lack of oversight gave vendors nearly unfettered access to consumers’ accounts. [1] It said some merchants needed only consumers’ phone numbers to place charges. [1]
In our reading, the Bureau framed the carrier as the party that held the customer relationship and moved the money. The merchant sold the content. Aggregators and vendors passed charges along. The carrier put the charge on the bill and collected it. The Bureau held the carrier to account for that last step.
The chain of parties
The FCC documents described a chain with at least three links. Merchants sold the content. Aggregators, on behalf of merchants, passed the charges to the carrier. [3] [4] The carrier placed them on the bill. [4] Verizon’s decree said Verizon did not itself obtain authorization from subscribers before placing charges, and relied on aggregators. [4]
Sprint’s decree described a contractual version of the same chain. Sprint’s aggregators were obligated by contract to ensure that authorization was received from subscribers. [3] Sprint’s agreements entitled it to obtain authorizations from the aggregators, who held them or required merchants to hold them. [3] In our reading, each link pointed to the next for the evidence, and the customer dealt only with the carrier.
The revenue share
The carriers were paid for the service. The Bureau’s release said the companies received a 30 to 40 percent cut of the gross revenue. [1] The FCC’s orders said Sprint received approximately 35 percent of collected revenues per charge, and Verizon retained 30 percent or more. [3] [4] The Bureau’s release said the companies profited from illegitimate charges, which it alleged. [1]
In our reading, a percentage of each charge ties the biller’s revenue to volume, including disputed volume. That does not prove intent, and the orders made no such finding. It does mean that a biller for others has a financial stake in the charges it carries. A risk committee looking at a similar arrangement would weigh that stake against the monitoring cost.
The statute behind the theory
The Verizon order recited the Bureau’s complaint. It said the complaint alleged that from 2004 through 2013, Verizon violated Section 1036(a)(1)(B) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act by charging customers for unauthorized third-party charges. [5] The Bureau’s later report described the claim as a violation of the Act’s prohibition against unfair practices. [6]
The report repeated the processor framing. It said the complaints alleged that Sprint and Verizon, “as payment processors for third parties,” violated the prohibition by outsourcing processing to vendors without properly monitoring them. [6] In our reading, that sentence carries the case’s reach. It ties liability to the function of processing a payment, not to the industry the processor is in.
Why the FCC’s theory is narrower for our purposes
The FCC relied on Section 201(b) of the Communications Act. [3] [4] That section reaches charges and practices for and in connection with communication service. [3] In our reading, a bank or fintech is not reached by that theory. The Bureau’s theory is the one that travels to financial services.
What the role part means for a financial firm
A bank that lets merchants or partners place charges on a customer’s account sits in a similar position. So does a fintech that bills for a partner’s product inside its app, and a processor that onboards merchants for a platform. Each holds the account and moves the money for a charge it did not create.
The Bureau’s release named the duty it said was breached: monitoring the vendors who processed charges. [1] In our reading, the case suggests a regulator may look past the merchant and ask what the account holder’s institution did. Organizations should ask counsel how the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s definitions apply to their own arrangements.
The consent: what had to happen before a charge reached a bill
Default enrollment
The Bureau’s release said neither carrier required customers to opt in to third-party billing. [1] It said they enrolled customers automatically without their consent. [1] It said consumers could ask to block third-party charges, but that consumers unaware such charges were possible did not know to ask. [1]
In our reading, the Bureau treated a default setting as a decision the carrier made. Blocking existed, but its value depended on customers knowing about it. A default that exposes every account to third-party charges puts the burden of protection on the least informed customer.
Express informed consent
The orders replaced the default with a consent requirement. The Verizon order defined express informed consent as an affirmative act or statement giving unambiguous assent to be charged, made after a clear and conspicuous disclosure of material facts. [5] It required Verizon to obtain express informed consent before a consumer is charged for any third-party charge. [5] Sprint’s FCC decree used the same definition and the same requirement. [3]
The orders let consent be collected by someone else. Consent could be given to the carrier or to another person or entity obligated to the carrier to obtain it. [5] That person had to keep enough information for the consent to be verified. [5] Where the carrier did not collect consent itself, it had to set policies to confirm consent was properly collected and documented, and monitor and enforce them. [5]
Remedial action when consent was missing
The orders named what followed when consent was not properly documented. The carrier would require remedial action, which may include suspension, proactive credits or retraining, or cease billing for such charges. [5] For charges through operating system storefronts, Verizon’s policies could include a statistically valid random sample of purchases to test whether consent was collected. [5]
In our reading, that last provision is a model for assurance over a partner. The biller does not collect consent itself. It samples the partner’s records to test whether consent exists, and acts when it does not. A bank that relies on a fintech partner to collect authorizations faces the same question of evidence.
Confirmation and disclosure
The orders added a second check after the sale. Verizon had to send a purchase confirmation, separate from the bill, for every third-party charge, including recurring ones, beginning no later than July 1, 2015. [5] Sprint’s decree set September 15, 2015 for the same system. [3] Each confirmation had to identify the blocking options available. [3] [5]
The orders also set the bill format. Sprint’s decree required third-party charges, except on prepaid accounts, to appear in a dedicated section of the bill under a heading that clearly identified them as third-party charges. [3] It required that section to disclose how to block such charges. [3] The Bureau’s release described the same requirement for both carriers. [1]
What clear and conspicuous meant
The orders defined the standard every disclosure had to meet. A statement was clear and conspicuous if its size, color, contrast, location, duration and audibility made it readily noticeable, readable, understandable and capable of being heard. [5] It could not contradict other information presented with it. [5] A statement that modified or explained other information had to appear near it. [5]
The orders added rules by medium. Audio disclosures needed a volume and cadence a consumer could follow. [5] Television and internet disclosures had to stay on screen long enough to read. [5] Text message disclosures had to be readable on the device, and hyperlinks in them should be clearly labeled. [5] In our reading, a fintech’s in-app confirmation would be judged by the same kind of test.
Blocking at no charge
The orders made blocking free and visible. Sprint had to offer blocking at no charge beginning no later than June 1, 2015. [3] It had to disclose third-party charges and blocking options in material given at or near the time of subscribing. [3] Verizon’s order set July 1, 2015 for its blocking and disclosure duties. [5]
Multiline, business and prepaid accounts
The orders dealt with how accounts are organized. For multiline accounts, the account holder could be designated to receive purchase confirmations, and could elect not to receive them for purchases on other lines. [3] [5] The Verizon order defined the account holder as the person or entity responsible for paying all charges on all lines. [5]
The orders also drew a line around business and government accounts. Their definition of consumer excluded a business or government entity that alone was liable for the charges, if third-party billing on that account was available only on request. [3] [5] Prepaid accounts were covered: the orders reached charges deducted from prepaid balances as well as charges on bills. [3] [5]
In our reading, these definitions show the work a consent program involves. The biller has to know who on an account may consent, who receives notice and which accounts are in scope. A bank with joint accounts, authorized users or commercial cards faces the same questions when a partner charges those accounts.
What the consent part means for a financial firm
The consent part reads like a payments authorization standard. In our reading, it asks four things of a biller for others. It must know who obtained the customer’s authorization and where the record is. It must be able to verify the record on request. The customer must get a confirmation outside the statement. The customer must be able to turn off third-party charges entirely.
The orders’ contribution, in our reading, was to treat the biller as responsible for the record even when a partner collected it. That is a vendor management point as much as a consent point.
The signals: complaints and red flags
Complaints that were not tracked
The Bureau’s release said both companies failed to track customer complaints about unauthorized charges. [1] It said the companies therefore lacked “the most basic alert mechanism that could have revealed flaws in their monitoring systems.” [1] It said they also failed to provide full and prompt remediation. [1]
The FCC documents gave examples. Sprint’s order said that in three months in 2013, Sprint issued over 30,000 refunds for premium messages to customers who said they had never authorized the services. [3] It said some customers complained that Sprint offered only partial refunds or refunded only two months of charges. [3] Verizon’s order said that in eight months in 2013 to 2014, Verizon billed tens of thousands of such charges to customers who complained they had not authorized them. [4]
Complaints sent elsewhere
Not every complaint reached the carriers. The FCC’s orders said consumers had complained to the FCC and other government authorities. [3] [4] Sprint’s decree said some customers filed complaints with the FCC and others asking authorities to act on their behalf. [3]
In our reading, a complaint program that counts only complaints made to the company misses part of the signal. Regulators’ complaint channels and state attorney general offices are also sources. A firm that reviews what its customers say to regulators about its partners has an earlier view of trouble.
Refunds as data
In our reading, a refund is a complaint that has already been resolved, and a count of refunds is a fraud signal. Sprint’s 30,000 refunds in three months were a measure of the problem, according to the FCC’s order. [3] The Bureau’s point was that the companies did not use that information to find the merchants and vendors behind it. [1]
The orders turned this into a requirement. Sprint’s decree required it, no later than September 15, 2015, to implement a process to track consumer claims that a third-party charge was unauthorized. [3] Verizon’s decree set the same date for its record-keeping process. [4]
Older disputes
The Verizon order also set rules for older charges. For disputed charges first incurred within the prior 12 months, Verizon had to refund or deny on the basis of evidence of consent it offered to the customer. [5] For charges “initially incurred more than 12 months prior to when the Consumer contacted Verizon,” the order gave Verizon 10 business days to refund or deny on the same basis. [5] The order said that subparagraph would expire 4 years from the effective date. [5]
In our reading, the 12-month line is a data retention question in disguise. A biller that keeps consent records for a shorter period than it can face disputes will be unable to deny claims. Retention of consent evidence has to match the dispute window, not a general records schedule.
Red flags about vendors
The Bureau’s release said both companies disregarded red flags that premium messaging billing was a breeding ground for unauthorized charges. [1] It said they continued to outsource merchant oversight and billing to certain vendors despite lawsuits citing evidence that those vendors enabled cramming. [1] Those were allegations. [1]
Sprint’s decree recorded what Sprint had in place. It said Sprint’s contracts required merchants to follow a double opt-in procedure, and to send monthly renewal reminders at least 24 hours before each billing event. [3] It said Sprint ran a fraud prevention program, monitored merchants’ advertising and message flows, and suspended or barred noncompliant merchants. [3] It said that when the FCC asked for authorizations in late 2014, Sprint sought them from aggregators and merchants but was unable to obtain them. [3]
What a monitoring view would show
The quarterly reports the FCC required suggest what a monitoring view could contain. They covered claims where the carrier showed consent, refunds given because it could not, other refunds, and the product, third party and consent holder behind each. [3] [4] In our reading, the same fields would let a biller rank partners by unauthorized-charge claims and see which consent holders fail to produce records.
That view also answers a question the Bureau raised. The release said the lack of complaint tracking meant the companies lacked a basic alert mechanism for flaws in their monitoring. [1] A ranked view by partner is such a mechanism. It turns individual refunds into a pattern someone is accountable for.
Controls on paper and in evidence
In our reading, Sprint’s decree shows the gap between a contractual control and evidence of it. Sprint’s contracts required consent. [3] Its program reviewed merchants. [3] When asked to produce the consent, it could not. [3] The orders’ answer was to require consent records that can be verified, and monitoring of whoever holds them. [3] [5]
What the signals part means for a financial firm
For a bank or fintech, the signals part maps to complaint management and third-party risk. In our reading, it asks whether complaints about a partner’s charges are tagged by partner and merchant. It asks whether refund volume is reviewed as a risk measure, as well as a cost. It asks whether lawsuits or regulator actions against a vendor reach the team that manages that vendor.
The FCC decrees added a reporting duty that makes the point. For six years, each carrier had to report to the FCC every three months on claims, refunds and the parties responsible for consent. [3] [4] The reports had to break out claims and refunds by third-party product and third party. [3] [4]
The remedy: refunds, credits, reports and training
Refunds by default
The orders set a refund rule for disputes. Sprint had to give a consumer a full refund or credit of any third-party charges the consumer said were unauthorized. [3] It could deny the refund only on stated grounds, such as having information showing express informed consent and providing it on request. [3] Another ground applied where the last disputed charge “was incurred more than three (3) months prior to when the Consumer contacted Sprint,” if Sprint complied with the confirmation requirement. [3]
In our reading, the rule flips the burden. The customer’s claim is enough unless the biller can produce consent. That is why the consent records in the second part matter. A biller that cannot find the record pays the refund.
Access to history
The orders required carriers to direct disputing consumers to a representative with access to at least 12 months of account information. [3] [5] The representative had to offer blocking. [3] [5] The Verizon order said Verizon could not require the consumer to contact the third party first to get a refund. [5]
In our reading, these terms move the dispute to the first contact. A representative who can see a year of charges, offer a block and grant a refund can close the matter in one call. A process that sends the customer to the merchant pushes the cost onto the person least able to bear it. The orders chose the first design. [3] [5] For a bank or fintech, the parallel question is whether front-line staff can see partner charges and reverse them without escalation.
Compliance officers and training
Each FCC decree required the carrier to designate a senior corporate manager as compliance officer within 30 days of the effective date. [3] [4] Each required a training program for customer service representatives at least annually for six years, unless the carrier stopped third-party billing. [3] [4] The Verizon court order contained the same training duty. [5]
A redress plan under oversight
The Verizon order made redress a supervised process. Verizon or its agent would administer redress subject to the Bureau’s oversight. [5] Verizon had submitted a written redress plan to the Bureau’s Enforcement Director, who had made a determination of non-objection. [5] Verizon had to follow the plan’s steps, deadlines and timeframes. [5]
The Bureau’s release gave customers a claims website and a phone number for each carrier. [1] In our reading, redress is an operation with its own data needs. It needs a list of affected accounts, a claims intake, a decision rule and a payment channel, all of which must be ready before the order is entered.
The money
The Bureau’s release described $70 million in Verizon refunds and $50 million from Sprint. [1] The Verizon court order put it differently. It required refunds under a redress plan of at least $35 million, not to exceed $70 million. [5] Once Verizon had paid at least $35 million, it could claim a $16 million credit for refunds it had previously paid. [5] It could then claim a further credit for the costs of administering redress. [5]
Any unexhausted amount was to be paid to the Bureau at the end of the redress period. [5] In our reading, the structure rewarded a company for refunds it had already made. That is another reason to keep refund records by cause.
Acquisitions and successors
The orders looked ahead to corporate change. Sprint’s decree said that for newly acquired entities, Sprint had to take immediate steps to cease billing for commercial premium messaging. [3] It had a reasonable period, which in no event could exceed six months from the acquisition, to bring them into compliance. [3] The Verizon court order required Verizon to notify the Bureau of a merger, sale or other change that would produce a successor company. [5]
In our reading, a consent decree travels with the business. An acquirer of a billing operation inherits the duties, and the acquired firm’s consent records become the acquirer’s evidence. Due diligence on a payments business would include the state of those records.
Three sets of authorities
Each carrier faced three overlapping instruments. There was the Bureau’s court order, the FCC’s consent decree and assurances of discontinuance with the participating states. [5] The Verizon order said the state assurances and the FCC order were not related consumer actions for its purposes. [5] The FCC’s decrees defined their effective dates by reference to the entry of the Bureau’s court orders. [3] [4]
In our reading, the linkage meant one compliance program had to satisfy all three. Dates, definitions and reports had to agree. The FCC decrees and the Verizon court order used the same definitions for terms such as clear and conspicuous, express informed consent and block. [3] [4] [5] That consistency was a choice by the agencies, and it made the program easier to run.
What the remedy part means for a financial firm
The remedy part is a template for remediation planning. In our reading, a firm should know in advance who would run a redress program, how it would find affected customers, and what records would support credits for refunds already paid. The orders also show regulators requiring named accountability, through a compliance officer, and multi-year reporting. [3] [4]
How the theory reaches different organizations
Banks and credit unions
Banks and credit unions that let third parties originate charges or debits to member accounts hold the account and move the money. In our reading, the Bureau’s processor framing describes that role. Each should ask counsel whether and how the Act applies to it.
Card issuers and processors
In our reading, the orders’ contribution for them is the emphasis on vendor and merchant monitoring, and on using complaint data as an alert. [1]
Fintechs and platforms
A fintech that bills for partners’ products inside its app looks closest to the carriers here. The orders’ terms on confirmations, dedicated statement sections and free blocking translate directly. [3] [5] In our reading, a platform that cannot produce a partner’s consent record faces the same exposure as Sprint’s decree describes. [3]
Merchant acquirers and payment facilitators
Acquirers and payment facilitators onboard merchants and process their charges. In our reading, the Bureau’s allegation that the carriers disregarded red flags about vendors is the part that maps closest to them. [1] A processor that keeps a merchant whose charges draw complaints and lawsuits would face the same question the Bureau put to the carriers.
Vendors and aggregators
The orders bound the carriers, but the duties flowed down. Where someone else collected consent, the carrier had to set policies, monitor them and require remedial action. [5] In our reading, an aggregator or vendor serving a biller under a similar order should expect audit rights, sampling and suspension terms in its contract.
Prepaid and stored-value programs
The orders covered charges deducted from prepaid balances. [3] [5] In our reading, a prepaid or stored-value program that lets third parties draw on balances has the same exposure. A customer who does not see a monthly statement may notice an unauthorized deduction even later than a postpaid customer would.
Utilities, government billers and others
A utility or public body that collects charges for others on its bills would face the same operating questions. In our reading, the Bureau’s theory depends on who counts as a covered person or service provider under its statute, and we do not decide who those are. In our reading, the operational lessons on consent, complaints and refunds apply to any biller for others, whatever law governs it.
Telecommunications carriers
Carriers faced both regimes. The FCC enforced Section 201(b), and the Bureau enforced the Consumer Financial Protection Act. [1] [3] The FCC said the settlements were negotiated in coordination with the Bureau and the attorneys general of all 50 states and the District of Columbia. [2]
Objections, and where the argument stops
“These were settlements, not rulings”
That is correct. The Bureau’s release described allegations. [1] Verizon neither admitted nor denied the allegations in the court order, except as stated. [5] Verizon’s FCC decree said it was not an admission. [4] Sprint acknowledged only limited facts for purposes of its decree. [3] We draw lessons from what the orders required, not from findings.
“The products were trivial”
The charges were small. The Bureau’s release put one-time fees at about $0.99 to $14.99 and subscriptions at $9.99 a month. [1] The FCC’s orders said the typical charge was $9.99 a month. [3] [4] The Bureau said customers were billed hundreds of millions of dollars in unauthorized charges. [1] In our reading, low-value charges at scale are where consent records matter, because customers do not dispute what they do not notice.
“Premium messaging is gone”
The orders barred both carriers from billing for commercial premium messaging. [3] [5] The Bureau’s release said purchases now include apps, games, books, movies and music. [1] The orders’ consent and confirmation duties applied to third-party charges generally, whatever the channel. [5] In our reading, the channel ended but the model of billing for others did not.
“Consent rules will shut out legitimate merchants”
The orders did not ban third-party billing. They barred commercial premium messaging and required consent for other third-party charges. [3] [5] They let consent be collected by merchants or storefronts obligated to the carrier, with monitoring. [5] They let Verizon test storefront consent by sampling. [5] In our reading, the orders kept the channel open for merchants that could show consent, and closed it for those that could not.
“Financial firms already do this”
The objection assumes other payment rules already require the same evidence. The orders do not speak to that, and do not show that banks lacked these controls. They show what a regulator required when a biller relied on contracts without evidence. [3] In our reading, the test for a financial firm is whether it can produce the evidence, not whether its contracts require it.
“The FCC had it covered”
The FCC had brought cramming cases before, and settled with these carriers the same day. [2] Its authority reached the carriers as communications providers. [3] [4] The Bureau’s case added a theory that does not depend on the biller being a carrier. [1] In our reading, that is why the Bureau’s part matters to financial firms, even though the FCC’s orders described their payments as part of one global settlement with the Bureau and the states. [3] [4]
Where the argument stops
We do not claim the Bureau would bring the same theory against a bank, or that a court would accept it. Both cases ended in consent orders, without adjudication of the Bureau’s theory. [5] [6] The argument is limited to what the orders required and what that implies for anyone who bills on behalf of others.
Checks for a payments or customer leader
Consent
- List every place your statements or accounts carry a charge originated by someone else.
- For each, name who collects the customer’s authorization, where the record is kept and how fast you can retrieve it.
- Test a sample of partner-collected authorizations, as the Verizon order allowed for storefront purchases. [5]
Signals
- Tag complaints and refunds by partner and merchant, and review the counts as a risk measure.
- Route lawsuits and regulator actions about your vendors to the people who manage them.
Remedy
- Decide in advance who would run a redress program and what records would support credits.
- Make blocking or opting out of third-party charges available and easy to find.
- Give front-line staff the account history and authority to refund a disputed partner charge in one contact.
Corporate change
- When you buy or merge with a business that bills for others, review its consent records and any orders it is under.
- Keep consent evidence for at least as long as customers can dispute a charge.
With hindsight
The court orders followed in June 2015. The Verizon stipulated final judgment carries a docket stamp showing it was filed on June 9, 2015. [5] The Bureau’s Fall 2015 semi-annual report listed the Verizon consent order as entered on June 9, 2015, and the Sprint consent order as entered on June 30, 2015. [6] The Bureau’s May 12 release notes that it was updated on September 16, 2015. [1]
The Verizon order confirmed the terms the release had described, with some differences in the money. It set a consumer redress period from May 12, 2015 to March 31, 2016. [5] It set refunds of at least $35 million and not more than $70 million, with credits for earlier refunds and administration costs. [5] It said Verizon neither admitted nor denied the complaint’s allegations, except as stated in the order. [5]
The orders’ operating duties had dates in 2015. Verizon’s consent system, purchase confirmations and blocking information were due by July 1, 2015. [5] Sprint’s consent system and confirmations were due by September 15, 2015, and its free blocking by June 1, 2015. [3] Both carriers’ complaint tracking was due by September 15, 2015. [3] [4] The FCC reporting and training duties ran for six years. [3] [4]
The Bureau’s semi-annual report summarized the case in its own words. It said the complaints alleged that Sprint and Verizon, as payment processors for third parties, violated the Act’s prohibition against unfair practices. [6] It said the companies outsourced payment processing for digital purchases to vendors but failed to monitor them properly. [6] The report listed the cases among the Bureau’s enforcement actions for the period from April 1 to September 30, 2015. [6]
The FCC later wrote its theory into rules. On June 7, 2018, it adopted an order that codified a prohibition on cramming in a new Section 64.2401(g) of its truth-in-billing rules. [7] The order said the Commission had never codified a rule against cramming, though it had long enforced the prohibition under Section 201(b). [7] It said codifying the prohibition for wireline and wireless carriers would act as a deterrent. [7] The rules took effect on August 16, 2018. [7]
The FCC’s order also addressed wireless customers directly. It agreed with commenters that wireless consumers should have the same protections as wireline consumers when unauthorized charges appear on their bills. [7] It said this was consistent with its earlier enforcement investigations holding wireless providers accountable for alleged unauthorized charges. [7]
As checked on November 16, 2026, the Bureau’s enforcement page for the Verizon case listed its status as post order or post judgment. [8] It listed the product as payments. [8] The Bureau’s May 2015 release remained in its newsroom archive. [1]
What held up is the processor framing. The Bureau repeated it in its own report after the orders were entered. [6] The FCC’s rules later codified the telecom side. [7] We found no Bureau rule that codified the processor theory for billers in general, and we do not claim one. What carries over is the operating model in the orders: verifiable consent, separate confirmations, free blocking, tracked complaints and refunds by default. [3] [5]
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