Federal zero trust, logging and EDR mandates: outlook to 2027
OMB has replaced its logging memo, left its zero trust memo standing past its deadline and kept EDR on the books through metrics, and the next round of guidance is due under an amended 2025 order.
Four instruments, three fates
Federal civilian cybersecurity since 2021 has rested on one executive order and three OMB memoranda written to carry it out: Executive Order 14028 of May 2021, which told agencies to plan for zero trust architecture, deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) and improve logging [1]; M-21-31 on logging [2]; M-22-01 on EDR [3]; and M-22-09, the zero trust strategy [4]. By November 2026 their paths had split [10] [19]. The logging memo has been rescinded and replaced, the zero trust memo has outlived its own deadline without being withdrawn, and the EDR program carries on through CISA tooling and reporting metrics rather than a new memo. This outlook sets out where each stands, which later orders changed the picture, and what is dated beyond the deadlines now running.
All statuses are as checked on November 16, 2026. This piece describes federal policy documents; it is not legal advice, and the requirements bind federal agencies, not banks, health systems or state governments.
Status as checked on November 16, 2026
| Instrument | Date | What it requires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Executive Order 14028 [1] | May 12, 2021 [1] | Zero trust plans, an EDR initiative, logging requirements [1] | In force; EO 14306 is the only presidential document since January 18, 2025 that mentions it in the Federal Register [7] |
| OMB M-21-31 (logging) [2] | August 27, 2021 [2] | Event logging tiers EL1 to EL3 [2] | Rescinded by M-26-14, effective May 22, 2026 [10] |
| OMB M-22-01 (EDR) [3] | October 8, 2021 [3] | Give CISA access to agency EDR; close EDR gaps [3] | EDR coverage is still measured in the FY 2026 and FY 2027 CIO metrics [19] |
| OMB M-22-09 (zero trust) [4] | January 26, 2022 [4] | Specific zero trust goals by the end of fiscal year 2024 [4] | Deadline passed; still cited by CISA's 2026 Logging Reference Architecture and the CIO metrics [12] [19] |
| Executive Order 14144 [5] | January 16, 2025 [5] | Phishing-resistant pilots, CISA access to EDR data, OMB guidance [5] | Amended by EO 14306 of June 6, 2025 [6] |
| OMB M-26-14 (logging) [10] | May 22, 2026 [10] | Risk-based logging baseline and maturity model [10] | In force; clocks run from CISA's Logging Reference Architecture, published August 20, 2026 [11] |
Logging: from M-21-31's tiers to a risk-based baseline
EO 14028 section 8 asked DHS for recommendations on the types of logs to keep, how long to keep them and how to protect them, and required that logs be protected by cryptographic methods [1]. OMB answered with M-21-31 on August 27, 2021, which gave agencies one year to reach event logging tier EL1, 18 months for EL2 and two years for EL3 [2]. Its tables set 12 months of active storage and 18 months of cold storage for the log categories they list [2].
Few agencies got there. GAO found that by the August 2023 deadline only 3 of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies were at tier 3; 3 were at tier 1 and 17 were at tier 0, "not effective" [13]. GAO made 20 recommendations to 19 agencies; as of May 2026, 19 remained open and one, to CISA, was closed as implemented [13]. Each open status note says that M-26-14 replaced M-21-31 on May 22, 2026 and that GAO will report once it confirms what the agency has done under M-26-14 [13].
M-26-14 says that implementing M-21-31 improved foundational capabilities, but that some requirements, "such as the retention of vast quantities of logging data without clear utility," proved neither operationally feasible nor cost-effective for most agencies [10]. It rescinds M-21-31 effective immediately and orders agencies to put two objectives first: continuous event monitoring (CEM) and threat hunting, investigation, response and forensics (THIRF), for every system run by the agency or by third parties on its behalf, including Internet of Things devices and operational technology [10]. Its minimum baseline requires logs to be actively searchable for at least 6 months and retrievable for a year after creation [10].
The deadlines run from CISA's Logging Reference Architecture (LRA), which the memo required within 90 days [10]. CISA's page gives a publish date of August 20, 2026 [11]. From that release, agencies have 90 days to complete an Agency Logging Plan, 120 days to reach at least Level 1 on every element of the maturity model, 180 days for Level 2 and 320 days for Level 3 [10]. The memo's table calls Level 1 "Basic" while its own maturity model calls it "Initial" [10]. Each system is rated on five elements (inventory visibility, collection coverage, collection operations, data retention and log management), and overall maturity is the lowest of them [10]. The LRA points out one trap: Level 3 needs only 3 months of searchable logs, so an agency at Level 3 must still meet the 6-month searchable baseline in Appendix B [10] [12].
The memo keeps the duty that dates from EO 14028: after a known or suspected compromise, agencies must provide logs to CISA and the FBI on request [1] [10].
Moraph's view
We read M-26-14 as a trade: lower retention in exchange for measurement. M-21-31's tables asked for 12 months of active and 18 months of cold storage; M-26-14 asks for 6 months searchable and a year retrievable. In return every system now gets a maturity score on five elements, reported as the share of systems at each level, and the weakest element sets the score. That makes the gap visible in a way the old tiers did not. The 19 open GAO recommendations were measured against the old standard; we expect GAO to judge agencies against the new and lower bar, which should make some of them easier to close.
Zero trust: the deadline passed, the memo did not
EO 14028 gave each agency head 60 days to develop a plan to implement zero trust architecture [1]. M-22-09 followed on January 26, 2022, requiring agencies to meet specific zero trust goals by the end of fiscal year 2024, organized under CISA's five pillars of identity, devices, networks, applications and workloads, and data [4]. Among them: phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for agency staff, contractors and partners, as an option for the public, and EDR tools that meet CISA's technical requirements and are deployed widely [4]. GAO reported in April 2024 that 49 of the order's 55 leadership and oversight requirements were fully complete [14]. It also recommended that OMB show it had coordinated with agencies on resources for EDR and for logging; as of November 2024 OMB had not provided documentation, and both recommendations are listed as open [14].
Fiscal year 2024 ended more than two years ago, yet no successor strategy has replaced M-22-09. OMB's current memoranda page lists memoranda from M-25-10 through M-27-01 of October 23, 2026, and none of their titles rescinds M-22-09 [9]. Newer documents still lean on it. CISA's August 2026 LRA aligns with zero trust principles "consistent with M-22-09" and CISA's Zero Trust Maturity Model Version 2.0, and says it creates no additional zero trust requirements [12]. The FY 2026 and FY 2027 CIO FISMA metrics tie their network segmentation and interconnection questions to M-22-09 and ask how many systems enforce phishing-resistant MFA [19]. M-26-14 requires the LRA to align with the Zero Trust Maturity Model [10]. Yet CISA's own Zero Trust Maturity Model page now carries an "Archived Content" banner warning that the archive may not reflect current policy [20].
The 2025 orders changed the next layer. EO 14144, signed January 16, 2025, told agencies to pilot commercial phishing-resistant standards such as WebAuthn and gave OMB 3 years to issue guidance, including any needed revision of Circular A-130, that would cover migration to zero trust architectures, EDR, encryption, network segmentation and phishing-resistant MFA [5]. EO 14306 of June 6, 2025 struck those two subsections and rewrote section 7: OMB must still issue guidance and any necessary A-130 revision "within 3 years of the date of this order" to address critical risks and adapt modern practices and architectures, but the list naming zero trust, EDR and the other controls is gone [6]. The March 2026 Cyber Strategy for America keeps the aim, promising to accelerate the modernization, defensibility and resilience of federal information systems by "implementing cybersecurity best practices, post-quantum cryptography, zero-trust architecture, and cloud transition" [23].
Moraph's view
Zero trust has moved from a program with a finish line to a baseline that other documents assume. Nothing has replaced the fiscal 2024 deadline, and we do not expect a new dated zero trust memo; the pattern of 2026 is to measure through FISMA metrics and to fold zero trust into topic memos such as M-26-14. The open question is the rewritten section 7 of EO 14144. We read "this order" as EO 14144 itself, dated January 16, 2025, so its 3-year clock runs into January 2028 (counted from EO 14306's June 6, 2025 date, it would run into June 2028), and the rewritten text no longer names zero trust at all, so the guidance could be broad or slight.
Endpoints: coverage reported, central access voluntary
EO 14028 section 7 required agencies to deploy an EDR initiative and asked OMB to set government-wide EDR requirements supporting CISA's hunt, detection and response work [1]. M-22-01 gave agencies 90 days to give CISA access to their current enterprise EDR deployments or engage on future options, and 120 days to assess gaps with CISA [3]. EO 14144 went further, directing CISA to build the capability to gain timely access to data from agency EDR tools and to release a concept of operations within 180 days [5]. EO 14306 kept that provision while deleting the word "novel" from the threats CISA is to hunt [6].
The vehicle is CISA's Persistent Access Capability (PAC), meant to give CISA visibility into agency EDR solutions [15]. As of March 2025, CISA officials told GAO that five CFO Act agencies were fully onboarded and five partially onboarded [15]. DHS said CISA lacks the authority to mandate that an agency join and estimated it would finish its work by January 30, 2026 [15]. As of May 2026, GAO still listed its PAC onboarding recommendation as open [16]. GAO found the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program had generally met expectations for zero trust architecture but had not finalized key activities for endpoint detection [15].
Agencies report coverage instead. The last annual FISMA guidance, M-25-04, which the NRC's inspector general still used for its fiscal year 2026 audit [18], requires agencies to report at least 90 percent of government-furnished equipment through CDM, including their EDR deployment [17]. The FY 2026 and FY 2027 CIO metrics ask how many government-furnished devices are covered by an EDR platform vetted through CISA's EDR initiative [19]. Asset discovery under BOD 23-01, which requires automated discovery every 7 days and vulnerability enumeration every 14 days, is shown on CISA's page without a revoked label [21], as is BOD 25-01, which required mandatory secure configurations for cloud tenants by June 20, 2025 [22]. M-26-14 builds on the same data, telling agencies to use CDM and hardware and software asset inventories to check whether log coverage reaches all their technology [10].
Reporting: a year without new FISMA instructions
For fiscal year 2026, OMB and DHS did not issue the annual FISMA instructions, according to the NRC's inspector general, which audited against M-25-04 instead; a joint OMB and CIGIE communication of March 17, 2026 told inspectors general to use the FY 2025 metrics for FY 2026 audits [18]. The CIO metrics did change. Version 1.0 of the FY 2026 and FY 2027 CIO FISMA metrics was published on August 3, 2026 and version 1.1 on September 1, 2026 [19]. They ask agencies to report the number of systems at each M-26-14 logging maturity level for each of the five elements, with overall maturity reported by FIPS 199 impact level [19]. Submissions are due October 30, 2026 for the FY 2026 annual period; CFO Act agencies then report quarterly from January 29, 2027 to October 29, 2027, while other agencies report only for the annual periods [19].
What comes after the current deadlines
The dated items left are the M-26-14 clock, which counts from the LRA's August 20, 2026 release [10] [11]; the quarterly CIO metrics through October 29, 2027 [19]; the LRA's own review, which M-26-14 requires at least once a year [10]; the rewritten EO 14144 section 7 guidance [6]; and the EO 14306 instruction that OMB require agencies to support TLS 1.3 or a successor no later than January 2, 2030 [6].
Moraph's view
We expect 2027 to be the year federal logging gets graded rather than redefined: agencies will report maturity by system, GAO will begin judging its old recommendations against M-26-14, and CISA will revise the LRA. Zero trust and EDR will stay where they are now, required by older memos that nobody has withdrawn and measured through metrics. The real next step for both is the OMB guidance under EO 14144 as amended, and we doubt it will arrive as a revised Circular A-130 before its 3-year mark. Vendors and contractors running agency systems should expect logging duties to reach them through the "third parties on the agency's behalf" language in M-26-14 rather than through a new rule.
Data and method
We opened each instrument in its official copy on November 16, 2026: executive orders on govinfo, OMB memoranda on whitehouse.gov (M-25-04 on the archived White House site), CISA's directive and resource pages, GAO's report pages and the NRC inspector general's report. To confirm which orders amend EO 14028 or EO 14144, we searched the Federal Register for presidential documents published since January 18, 2025 that mention either number; the 14028 search returned EO 14306 alone, and the 14144 search returned EO 14306 and two notices continuing the national emergency on malicious cyber-enabled activities [7] [8]. M-26-14 counts its deadlines from the LRA's release; we give them as periods with CISA's stated publish date and do not convert them to calendar dates. We could not confirm whether CISA released the concept of operations on EDR data access that EO 14144 required, or whether OMB has published FISMA reports to Congress for fiscal years 2024 and 2025, so neither is used here.
What this means for you
- Federal agency CIOs and CISOs: Plan to the M-26-14 periods from the LRA's August 20, 2026 release, and report maturity per system on all five elements, since the lowest element sets the score [10] [11]. Keep the 6-month searchable baseline even at Level 3, which needs only 3 months [12].
- Contractors and cloud providers running agency systems: M-26-14's objectives cover systems operated by third parties on an agency's behalf, including IoT and operational technology [10]. Expect agencies to ask for log retention, timestamps and access terms that let them meet the baseline and hand logs to CISA and the FBI on request [10].
- Security and logging tool sellers: The LRA aligns with M-22-09 and the Zero Trust Maturity Model and adds no new zero trust requirements [12]; the CIO metrics ask about EDR platforms vetted through CISA's EDR initiative [19]. Agency buying is likely to track those two documents more than any new zero trust deadline.
- Inspectors general and auditors: FY 2026 audits use the FY 2025 IG metrics, and the NRC's inspector general audited against M-25-04 [18], while CIO reporting has moved to the M-26-14 maturity model [19]; expect the two to describe logging in different terms until new instructions arrive.
Moraph predictions
Every prediction is Moraph's view, not a fact. Each has a date, a confidence level (70% means we expect to be wrong about three times in ten) and a test anyone can apply. We score them on this page when the date comes and never remove one. How we make and score predictions.
P1 By Confidence 75% Open
OMB does not rescind or replace M-22-09 by the end of 2027.
How we will check: Open each OMB memorandum dated from November 16, 2026 to December 31, 2027 listed on OMB's memoranda page. Right if none states that it rescinds, replaces or supersedes M-22-09.
Basis: No memorandum on OMB's current list rescinds M-22-09 [9]; CISA's August 2026 logging architecture aligns with it [12], and the CIO metrics for fiscal years 2026 and 2027 cite it [19].
P2 By Confidence 60% Open
GAO closes as implemented at least one of the 19 open event-logging recommendations from GAO-24-105658.
How we will check: On GAO's page for GAO-24-105658, at least one of the agency recommendations open in May 2026 shows 'Closed - Implemented' with a status comment dated on or before December 31, 2027.
Basis: As of May 2026, 19 recommendations were open and GAO said it would assess agencies against M-26-14 [13], whose retention baseline is shorter than M-21-31's [2] [10].
P3 By Confidence 55% Open
CISA publishes an updated version of the Logging Reference Architecture.
How we will check: CISA's Logging Reference Architecture page or document shows a publication or version date later than August 2026, dated on or before December 31, 2027.
Basis: M-26-14 requires the LRA to be re-evaluated at least once a year and agencies to be notified of updates within five business days [10]; the current document is marked Publication: August 2026 [12].
P4 By Confidence 60% Open
OMB does not publish a revised Circular A-130 by January 16, 2028.
How we will check: Right if neither OMB's website nor the Federal Register shows a revised Circular A-130 issued between November 16, 2026 and January 16, 2028.
Basis: EO 14144 section 7, as rewritten by EO 14306, requires OMB guidance including any necessary A-130 revision within 3 years of the order [5] [6], which OMB can meet without revising the circular; OMB issued no FISMA instructions for fiscal year 2026 [18].
Facts on this page link to their sources. Text marked "Moraph's view", and every prediction, is our own analysis, not a fact or advice. Methodology.
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