Joint ransomware advisories, 2020 to 2026: fewer each year, wider partners, exploits first

We read all 26 #StopRansomware advisories and the 10 earlier joint ransomware advisories on CISA's listing to see which groups they name, which sectors they say were hit and how the attackers got in.

What we counted

CISA posts its joint cybersecurity advisories, each with an AA code, on its Cybersecurity Alerts & Advisories listing; a full-text search of that listing for "ransomware" returned 253 items when we read every page on November 16, 2026 [1]. The #StopRansomware hub's own list of official alerts is incomplete for this purpose: it links 18 of the 26 #StopRansomware advisories and omits the seven oldest of them and the newest, SafePay [2]. We therefore built the set from the main listing and opened each advisory.

  • Main set: every item labeled Cybersecurity Advisory whose title begins "#StopRansomware", from the first, MedusaLocker on June 30, 2022 [4], to SafePay on October 20, 2026 [29]. That gives 26 advisories [1].
  • Earlier and related set: joint advisories with an AA code dated from January 1, 2020 whose title contains "ransomware" but not "#StopRansomware". That gives 10 [1]. Two ransomware-titled advisories CISA issued alone, AA20-049A on pipeline operations and AA25-163A on SimpleHelp, are left out because they are not joint [1]. The Conti advisory, AA21-265A, is counted although the listing now files it under alerts [33].
  • Updates: each AA code is counted once, at its original publication date. Where CISA revised an advisory, we classified the text as it stood on November 16, 2026, so the sectors, techniques and authors shown include later updates. 13 of the 26 show a "Last Revised" date after their original release, the latest being Medusa on August 18, 2026 [26].
  • Groups: named as each advisory's title names them. LockBit 3.0 has two advisories [12] [18], so the 26 advisories name 25 groups or variants.
  • Sectors: recorded only where the advisory's own text says the actors targeted, affected or victimized a sector; page tags and "intended audience" lines are ignored. Sector names were grouped (for example, "healthcare", "medical" and "Healthcare and Public Health" count as healthcare).
  • Initial access: the technique IDs listed in each advisory's MITRE ATT&CK table for the Initial Access tactic, or in its initial access text where it has no such table. ATT&CK's Initial Access tactic, TA0001, holds 11 techniques [3]. For counting, sub-techniques roll up to their parent (T1566.001 counts as T1566), and IDs an advisory placed under initial access that ATT&CK files under another tactic are shown in the table but not counted [3].
The 26 #StopRansomware joint cybersecurity advisories, June 2022 to November 2026: authoring organizations as named in each advisory's current text, sectors as the text states them, and the MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs each lists for initial access [1]
PublishedCodeGroup or variant (title)Authoring organizationsSectors namedInitial access IDs listed
2022-06-30AA22-181A [4]MedusaLockerFBI, CISA, Treasury, FinCENNo sector namedT1133, T1566 [4]
2022-08-11AA22-223A [5]Zeppelin RansomwareFBI, CISADefense contractors, educational institutions, manufacturers, technology companies, "especially" healthcare and medicalT1133, T1190, T1566 [5]
2022-09-06AA22-249A [6]Vice SocietyFBI, CISA, MS-ISACEducation, "disproportionately"T1190, T1078 [6]
2022-10-21AA22-294A [7]Daixin TeamFBI, CISA, HHSHealthcare and Public Health, "predominantly"T1190, T1078 [7]
2022-11-17AA22-321A [8]Hive RansomwareFBI, CISA, HHSGovernment Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, "especially" Healthcare and Public HealthT1133, T1190, T1566.001 [8]
2022-12-01AA22-335A [9]Cuba RansomwareFBI, CISAFinancial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, Information TechnologyT1078, T1133, T1190, T1566 [9]
2023-02-09AA23-040A [10]Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber ActivitiesNSA, FBI, CISA, HHS, ROK NIS, ROK DSAHealthcare and Public Health and other critical infrastructureT1190, T1133, T1195 (in the text; no table) [10]
2023-03-02AA23-061A [11]Blacksuit (Royal) RansomwareFBI, CISANo sector namedT1021.001, T1133, T1190, T1566, T1566.001, T1566.002 [11]
2023-03-16AA23-075A [12]LockBit 3.0 [12]FBI, CISA, MS-ISACNo sector namedT1133, T1189, T1566, T1078, T1190 [12]
2023-05-16AA23-136A [13]BianLian Ransomware GroupFBI, CISA, ASD's ACSCMultiple US critical infrastructure sectors; in Australia, critical infrastructure, professional services and property developmentT1078, T1133, T1190, T1566 [13]
2023-06-07AA23-158A [14]CL0P Ransomware Gang Exploits CVE-2023-34362 MOVEit Vulnerability [14]FBI, CISANo sector namedT1190, T1566 [14]
2023-09-20AA23-263A [15]Snatch RansomwareFBI, CISADefense Industrial Base, Food and Agriculture, Information TechnologyT1078, T1133 [15]
2023-10-11AA23-284A [16]AvosLocker Ransomware (Update)FBI, CISANo sector namedT1133 [16]
2023-11-15AA23-319A [17]Rhysida RansomwareFBI, CISA, MS-ISACEducation, healthcare, manufacturing, information technology, governmentT1078 [17]
2023-11-21AA23-325A [18]LockBit 3.0 Ransomware Affiliates Exploit CVE 2023-4966 Citrix Bleed Vulnerability [18]CISA, FBI, MS-ISAC, ASD's ACSCEducation, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government and emergency services, healthcare, manufacturing, transportationNone listed (the text names exploitation of CVE-2023-4966) [18]
2023-12-18AA23-352A [19]Play RansomwareFBI, CISA, ASD's ACSCNo sector namedT1078, T1190, T1133, T1059.001 [19]
2023-12-19AA23-353A [20]ALPHV BlackcatFBI, CISA, HHSHealthcare, "the most commonly victimized" since mid-December 2023 [20]None from the Initial Access tactic (T1598 and T1586 for helpdesk impersonation) [20]
2024-02-29AA24-060A [21]Phobos RansomwareFBI, CISA, MS-ISACMunicipal and county governments, emergency services, education, public healthcareT1078, T1133, T1566.001 [21]
2024-04-18AA24-109A [22]Akira RansomwareFBI, CISA, DC3, HHS, Europol EC3, and French, German and Dutch agenciesEducation, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, Healthcare and Public Health, Financial Services, Food and AgricultureT1078, T1133, T1190, T1566.001, T1566.002 [22]
2024-05-10AA24-131A [23]Black BastaFBI, CISA, HHS, MS-ISAC"At least 12 out of 16" critical infrastructure sectors, including Healthcare and Public Health [23]T1566, T1566.004, T1190 [23]
2024-08-29AA24-242A [24]RansomHub RansomwareFBI, CISA, MS-ISAC, HHSWater and wastewater, information technology, government services and facilities, healthcare and public health, emergency services, food and agriculture, financial services, commercial facilities, critical manufacturing, transportation, communicationsT1566, T1190 [24]
2025-02-19AA25-050A [25]Ghost (Cring) RansomwareFBI, CISA, MS-ISACCritical infrastructure, schools and universities, healthcare, government networks, religious institutions, technology and manufacturing companiesT1190 [25]
2025-03-12AA25-071A [26]Medusa RansomwareFBI, CISA, HHSMedical, education, legal, insurance, technology, manufacturingT1190, T1566 [26]
2025-07-22AA25-203A [27]InterlockFBI, CISA, HHS, MS-ISACNo sector namedT1189 [27]
2026-08-10AA26-222A [28]Gunra RansomwareFBI, CISA, DC3, NSA, USSS, Korean National Police AgencyHealthcare and public health, financial services and insurance, critical manufacturing and construction, transportation and logistics, government services and facilities, utilities, academia, media and communications, retail, professional and nonprofit servicesT1190 [28]
2026-10-20AA26-293A [29]SafePay RansomwareFBI, CISA, USSS, Germany's Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz, the UK's National Crime Agency and a UK regional crime unit (North West ROCU)No sector namedT1133, T1190 [29]
The 10 earlier and related joint ransomware advisories, 2020 to 2024 [1]
PublishedCodeTitleAuthoring organizationsGroup named
2020-10-28AA20-302A [30]Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health SectorCISA, FBI, HHSRyuk and Conti
2021-05-11AA21-131A [31]DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware AttacksCISA, FBIDarkSide
2021-08-31AA21-243A [32]Ransomware Awareness for Holidays and WeekendsFBI, CISANo single group (holiday and weekend attacks)
2021-09-22AA21-265A [33]Conti RansomwareCISA, FBI, NSA; USSS added March 9, 2022Conti
2021-10-18AA21-291A [34]BlackMatter RansomwareCISA, FBI, NSABlackMatter
2022-02-09AA22-040A [35]2021 Trends Show Increased Globalized Threat of RansomwareUS, Australian and UK cybersecurity authoritiesNo single group (2021 trends)
2022-07-06AA22-187A [36]North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health SectorFBI, CISA, TreasuryMaui (North Korean state-sponsored actors)
2023-02-08AA23-039A [37]ESXiArgs Ransomware Virtual Machine Recovery GuidanceCISA, FBIESXiArgs campaign
2023-06-14AA23-165A [38]Understanding Ransomware Threat Actors: LockBitCISA, FBI, MS-ISAC and international partnersLockBit
2024-08-28AA24-241A [39]Iran-based Cyber Actors Enabling Ransomware Attacks on US OrganizationsFBI, CISA, DC3Iran-based cyber actors working with ransomware affiliates

How many advisories, and from whom

The #StopRansomware series ran at six advisories in the second half of 2022, 11 in 2023, four in 2024, three in 2025 and two in 2026 to November 16 [1]. Before the series, the joint ransomware advisories on the listing numbered one in 2020 and four in 2021, three of them on DarkSide, Conti and BlackMatter [31] [33] [34].

The FBI and CISA author all 26 #StopRansomware advisories [1]. Six are FBI and CISA alone, all of them from 2022 or 2023 [5] [9] [11] [14] [15] [16]. The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) joins nine, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) nine, and HHS was added as a co-sealer of the Medusa advisory in its 2026 revision [26]. Seven name a non-US agency as an author: South Korea's intelligence and defense security agencies on the North Korean advisory [10], Australia's ACSC on BianLian, the LockBit Citrix Bleed advisory and Play [13] [18] [19], European agencies on Akira [22], the Korean National Police Agency on Gunra [28], and German and UK police and crime agencies on SafePay [29].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the series has thinned out, from roughly one a month in 2023 to two in 2026, while its author lists have widened from cyber agencies to police forces abroad. We read that as a shift toward advisories timed with joint investigations rather than a fall in the threat; the advisories themselves give no reason for the pace, so this is our inference.

Which groups the advisories name

The 26 advisories name MedusaLocker, Zeppelin, Vice Society, Daixin Team, Hive and Cuba in 2022 [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]; North Korean state-sponsored actors, Blacksuit (Royal), first published as Royal and retitled in an August 7, 2024 update,, LockBit 3.0, BianLian, CL0P, Snatch, AvosLocker, Rhysida, Play and ALPHV Blackcat in 2023 [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [19] [20]; Phobos, Akira, Black Basta and RansomHub in 2024 [21] [22] [23] [24]; Ghost (Cring), Medusa and Interlock in 2025 [25] [26] [27]; and Gunra and SafePay in 2026 [28] [29]. Only one group, North Korea's, is described as state-sponsored; the rest are criminal operations, several described as ransomware-as-a-service [15] [24] [28].

Where the advisories give victim counts, each states its own figure at the time of writing: at least 210 victims for RansomHub [24], over 500 organizations for Black Basta as of May 2024 [23], about 900 entities for Play as of May 2025 [19], over 500 victims for Medusa as of April 2026 [26] and at least 600 for SafePay [29]. These are each advisory's own figures for one group, not a census, and they cannot be added up.

Which sectors they say were targeted

18 of the 26 advisories name at least one sector the actors targeted or affected; the other eight speak only of "a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure" or name none [1]. Healthcare appears in 15 of the 18 [7] [8] [20]. The three that leave it out are Vice Society, which names education [6]; Snatch, which names the Defense Industrial Base, Food and Agriculture and Information Technology [15]; and BianLian, which names professional services and property development in Australia [13].

After healthcare, the 18 most often name manufacturing (10), education (9), information technology (9), government (8) and financial services or insurance (6) [1]. Six advisories single out one sector above the others: education for Vice Society ("disproportionately") [6]; healthcare for Zeppelin and Hive ("especially") [5] [8], for Daixin Team ("predominantly") [7] and for the North Korean advisory [10]; and healthcare again for ALPHV Blackcat after its administrator encouraged affiliates to target hospitals [20]. Two of the earlier joint advisories were also about healthcare, in October 2020 and July 2022 [30] [36].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: healthcare's place in these advisories partly reflects who writes them. HHS is an author on nine of the 26, and an advisory co-written by the health department is more likely to call out hospitals. The sector lists say where the FBI saw these groups, not how ransomware divides across the economy; for counts of health data breaches, the HHS breach portal is the better record.

How the attackers got in

Counted by parent technique, Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) is listed for initial access in 18 of the 26 advisories, External Remote Services (T1133) in 14, Phishing (T1566) in 13 and Valid Accounts (T1078) in 10 [3]. Drive-by Compromise (T1189) appears twice, for LockBit 3.0 and Interlock [12] [27], and Supply Chain Compromise (T1195) once, for North Korean actors spreading trojanized messenger files [10]. Two advisories list no Initial Access technique: the LockBit Citrix Bleed advisory names the vulnerability CVE-2023-4966 instead [18], and ALPHV Blackcat lists T1598 and T1586 for staff impersonating IT and helpdesk workers by phone or SMS [20].

The mix changes over time. In the 17 advisories of 2022 and 2023, T1133 and T1190 each appear in 11 and T1566 and T1078 in eight [1]. In the nine since January 2024, T1190 appears in seven, T1566 in five, T1133 in three and T1078 in two [1]. Several recent advisories name the exploited products: ConnectWise vulnerability CVE-2024-1709 for Black Basta [23], Citrix, Fortinet and Apache ActiveMQ flaws for RansomHub [24], and FortiGate firewall and SSL-VPN appliances for Gunra [28].

Social engineering has also moved off email. Black Basta's advisory lists Spearphishing Voice (T1566.004) for phone and Microsoft Teams calls [23], and Interlock's describes fake browser updates and the ClickFix technique, in which a fake CAPTCHA prompts users to run a malicious PowerShell script [27].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: the advisories point to internet-facing systems, and remote access in particular, as the door most groups use. Exposed RDP and VPN logins were the common thread in 2022 and 2023; since 2024 the advisories more often name a specific exploited flaw in a gateway or remote management product. The numbers are small and each advisory mixes recent and historical behavior, so this is a direction, not a measurement. Our KEV trend report follows the related record: the vulnerabilities CISA flags for known ransomware use.

What these advisories are and are not

The series' standard note says each advisory is part of an ongoing effort to publish details of ransomware variants and threat actors, including "recently and historically observed" tactics and indicators [24]. They are written from FBI investigations and partner reporting, and their figures and sector lists describe one group at the time of writing [24] [26]. Updates can change the record: the Play advisory added a PowerShell technique under initial access in June 2025 [19], and the Royal advisory was rewritten for BlackSuit in August 2024 [11].

Moraph's view

Moraph's view: as a dataset, the series is best read for what defenders are told to look for, not for how common each group is. A group gets an advisory when the FBI has enough to publish and partners agree to sign, which may lag a group's peak by a year or more.

What this means for you

  • Health systems: Use the healthcare-named advisories as a reading list for threat hunting: 15 of the 18 advisories that name sectors include healthcare [1], and some HHS-coauthored ones, such as ALPHV Blackcat and Black Basta, point health organizations to HHS's Healthcare and Public Health cybersecurity performance goals [20] [23].
  • Banks, insurers and credit unions: Check remote access and internet-facing gateways first; T1190 and T1133 are the techniques the advisories list most often [3], and six advisories name financial services or insurance among the sectors hit [1].
  • State and local agencies and school districts: Read the MS-ISAC co-authored advisories, which cover groups such as Phobos and Vice Society that the text ties to local government and education [21] [6].
  • Security operations teams: Map detections to the Initial Access techniques the advisories list rather than to group names, which change; the Royal advisory became BlackSuit in an update [11], and helpdesk impersonation by phone appears in more than one advisory [20] [23].

Moraph predictions

Every prediction is Moraph's view, not a fact. Each has a date, a confidence level (70% means we expect to be wrong about three times in ten) and a test anyone can apply. We score them on this page when the date comes and never remove one. How we make and score predictions.

  1. P1 By Confidence 70% Open

    CISA publishes at least two new #StopRansomware joint cybersecurity advisories (a new AA code, a title beginning "#StopRansomware") with an original publication date in calendar year 2027.

    How we will check: On or after December 31, 2027, search CISA's Cybersecurity Alerts & Advisories listing for "StopRansomware" and count Cybersecurity Advisory items with a 2027 date and an AA27 code whose titles begin "#StopRansomware". Right if two or more.

    Basis: The series published four advisories in 2024, three in 2025 and two in 2026 to November 16 [1].

  2. P2 By Confidence 75% Open

    CISA publishes no more than four new #StopRansomware joint cybersecurity advisories with an original publication date in calendar year 2027.

    How we will check: Same count as P1. Right if the count is four or fewer.

    Basis: The yearly count fell from 11 in 2023 to four, three and two in the three years since [1].

  3. P3 By Confidence 65% Open

    At least one #StopRansomware advisory first published in 2027 names a non-US government agency among its authoring organizations.

    How we will check: Open each #StopRansomware advisory with a 2027 original publication date and read the list of authoring organizations in its summary. Right if any names a non-US government agency; wrong if none does or none is published.

    Basis: Seven of the 26 advisories have a non-US co-author, including both published in 2026 [28] [29].

  4. P4 By Confidence 65% Open

    At least one #StopRansomware advisory first published in 2027 lists Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) under the Initial Access tactic.

    How we will check: Open each #StopRansomware advisory with a 2027 original publication date and read its MITRE ATT&CK Initial Access table (or initial access text if it has no table). Right if any lists T1190; wrong if none does or none is published.

    Basis: T1190 is listed in 18 of the 26 advisories and in seven of the nine published since January 2024, including both from 2026 [3] [28].

  5. P5 By Confidence 70% Open

    CISA revises at least one #StopRansomware advisory first published before 2027, showing a "Last Revised" or update date in calendar year 2027 on the advisory page.

    How we will check: In January 2028, open the 26 advisories listed in this report and read each page's "Last Revised" date and update notes. Right if any shows a revision dated in 2027.

    Basis: 13 of the 26 show a revision after release; recent ones include Play in June 2025 [19], Akira in November 2025 [22] and Medusa in August 2026 [26].

Facts on this page link to their sources. Text marked "Moraph's view", and every prediction, is our own analysis, not a fact or advice. Methodology.

Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it and correct the piece where needed.

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